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James, William

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British and french fleets. [1795.]

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BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

THE abstract of the British navy, for the commencement of the present, advances but slowly upon that of the preceding year. In the line-total there is a decrease of three cruisers; but the commission column shows an increase of six, and the increase of cruisers, line and under-line, amounts to 63.* The number of French national ships captured by the British during the year 1794 amounts to 36; of which number, 27 (and of these 24 only as cruisers) were added to the British navy.† The latter lost, during the same period, 17 vessels; of which nine, including one of the line, fell into the hands of the enemy.‡

Of the 15 ships that remained of those building at the commencement of the war, four had been launched; also 20 of the 24 ordered in the year 1793, and 16, all of a small description, out of the 31 § ordered in 1794. Among the latter was a first-rate, originally intended to be a 100-gun ship, but subsequently ordered to be made large enough to carry 120 guns, besides poop-carronades. Of this ship we shall say more, when we come to the abstract of the year succeeding that in which she is launched.

During the year 1794 an admiralty order was issued, directing that all frigates, down to the 18-pounder class of 32s inclusive, should in future be constructed with four, instead of three inch bottoms; whereby, it was considered, the ships would be more strong and durable, and, in the event of grounding, be able to bear the shock with less injury to their frames.

* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 3.

† See Appendix, No. 15.

‡ Ibid. No. 16.

§ The deduction of the 16 is already made in the "ordered" column of the abstract; as, indeed, is the case in every similar instance. All ships, in either of the "launched" columns of one abstract, that are not to be found in the "building" column of the preceding one, must have been ordered to have been built since the date of the latter.

But improvement was not confined to the strength of the ships. It had long been an imputation upon the British, that their ships of war were, generally speaking, very indifferent sailers. As one means of obviating this, it was determined to give to the ships greater length, in proportion to their breadth, than had hitherto been customary in the English dock-yards. The raising of the lower batteries of the two and three decked ships, with a due regard to their proper stability, was also an improvement, and no slight one, in the higher rates that were constructing.

Towards the end of November, 1794, a new scale was drawn up, by order of the board of admiralty, for arming the navy with carronades; and this establishment, unlike that of 1779,* was made compulsory on the part of the ships coming forward to be fitted. But still, as a captain might generally, on a special application, have the whole or any less number of his long guns exchanged for an equal number of additional carronades; and, as many ships, from continuing at sea, underwent no change in their armament until long subsequent to the date of the order, little use can be made of it in the way of a general guide. A whole, although a small class of vessels had been armed throughout, except for chase-guns, with 18-pounder carronades; a great accession of force, undoubtedly, as vessels of the size in question could only have borne an equal number of 3, or at most of 4 pounders. Two instances occur in the year 1794, where carronades of the highest caliber were employed: the 74-gun ship *Albion*, and 64 *Nonsuch*, on being fitted as floating batteries, were armed, the one with twenty-eight, the other with twenty 68-pounders.†

During the year 1794, an alteration took place in the established complements of British ships of war. The order in council directing it bears date on the 16th of April; but as the alteration could scarcely take effect throughout the navy before the end of the year, we have deferred any notice of it till now. The order purports to direct a reduction in the complement of every ship in the British navy: complements, as we have elsewhere observed, already much lower than those allowed in any other naval establishment. But the reduction, in truth, was merely nominal; as few if any of the "servants," forming so large a proportion of the old complements, were ever on board the ship to which they were attached. They were nearly as much men of straw, as the widows' men that, even now, are absurdly reckoned as part of the complement of a British ship of war. These servants were to be replaced by about three-fourths as many boys, who were to be actually on board. A fifth of these boys was to consist of young gentlemen volunteers, intended for officers, and who were not to be under 11 years of age. The second class was to con-

* See p. 34.

† See notes f*, and u*, Annual Abstract No. 3.

sist of three-fourths boys, between 15 and 17 years of age, and who were to keep watch with the seamen. The remainder of the boys were to be between 13 and 15 years of age, and were intended, chiefly, to wait upon the lieutenants and other officers.

The greatest proportion in which these boys are to the complement is a seventh; the smallest about a twentieth; and even the latter far exceeds what is customary in the complements of the ships of war belonging to any other nation. The additional carronades, and the complement, as altered, of every class of British ship, will be found annexed to the abstract for the year 1795.

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year 1795, was,

Admirals	21
Vice-admirals	36
Rear-admirals	31
” superannuated	28
Post-captains	425
” ”	27
Commanders, or sloop-captains	230
Lieutenants	1623
” superannuated	26
Masters	361

And the number of seamen and marines, voted for the service of the same year, was 100,000.*

Several circumstances conspired to diminish the effect which the defeat of the 1st of June might be supposed to have produced on the French navy. The exaggerated accounts, which alone were permitted to be read, rather heightened than depressed, the national confidence; and the arrival of the great American convoy furnished supplies, if not of provisions to any great extent on account of the amazing consumption of so populous a country as France, of seamen at least; and these became increased owing to another cause, the languishing state of privateering during the year 1794, (three French privateers only were captured), occasioned, chiefly, by the little encouragement which the government, for the very purpose, perhaps, of manning the national navy, held out to the merchants.

The navy of France was still very strong. In the road of Brest there were, including the new 74 Fougueux on her way from Rochefort, 35 sail of the line, besides the Invincible three-decker and two 74s repairing, and the immense Vengeur and one 74 building, (the latter nearly ready), in the arsenal. At Lorient there were on the stocks one 80 and two 74 gun ships, and at Rochefort, one three-decker, one 80, and one 74; making

* See Appendix, No. 17.

a total, without reckoning the ships in Toulon, of 46 sail of the line.

Three distinct expeditions appear to have been in the contemplation of the French government at the close of the year 1794. One squadron, of six sail of the line and a few frigates and corvettes, under the orders of Rear-admiral Renaudin, the late Vengeur's gallant captain, was to hasten to the Mediterranean, to reinforce the Toulon fleet. With a second squadron, of six sail of the line, four frigates, four corvettes, and a sufficiency of transports to contain 6000 troops, Rear-admiral Kerguelen, an officer of the old French marine, and one of the most active and experienced at this time in the service, was to make his way to India, for the purpose of placing the Isle of France in a proper state of defence. A third squadron, composed of two or three sail of the line and smaller vessels, including transports with troops, was destined for Saint-Domingo, in order, if possible, to restore the French authority in that ill-fated island.

Such, however, was the state of penury, both in the arsenals and the storehouses of Brest, that there was not timber and cordage enough properly to repair the ships disabled on the 1st of June, nor a sufficiency of provisions to supply the fleet with sea-stores, flour and biscuit in particular, for even a much shorter voyage than either of those in contemplation by the French minister, or commissary, M. d'Albarade. To increase the evil of waiting for the expected convoy of 50 or 60 vessels north-about from the Baltic, the number of mouths daily to be fed in the port amounted to 72,000.*

The reinforcement to the Toulon fleet being considered of more immediate consequence than the other expeditions, the squadron allotted for that service was, with great difficulty, provisioned for six months; and the remainder of the Brest fleet, many of the ships with only a 15 days' stock on board, and a few others with fished masts, and with hulls, from the hard battering they had received, scarcely seaworthy, were to quit port, and escort those six sail of the line beyond the probable cruising ground of the British Channel fleet, reported to consist, including the Portuguese squadron, of 33 sail of the line.

Every thing being in readiness, or as much so at least as circumstances would permit, a gale of wind from a fair quarter was considered a favourable opportunity; and on or about the 24th of December, 1794, the Brest fleet, consisting of 35 ships of the line (five three-deckers, three 80s, and the remainder 74s,)† 13 frigates, and 16 corvettes, avisos, and tenders, making in the whole 63 vessels of war, got under way, and stood for the harbour's mouth or goulet. The commander-in-chief of this, for

* Relations des Combats, &c. par Y. I. Kerguelen, ancien contre amiral, p. 369.

† As no action occurred with these ships thus united as a fleet, their names need not appear.

France, immense armament, was Vice-admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, having under him the Rear-admirals Bouvet, Nielly, Vanstabel, and Renaudin, and, as his colleagues and supervisors, the conventional deputies Faure and Tréhouart.

The folly of attempting to move so numerous and ill-provided a fleet in the midst of a peculiarly severe winter, and, above all, during the prevalence of a violent gale of wind, very soon showed its effects. The *Républicain* three-decker struck on the Mingan rock, which stands nearly in the centre of the goulet, and was entirely lost; and the *Redoutable* 74, but for the skill and presence of mind of her captain, M. Moncouso, would have shared the same fate: as it was, the latter ship lost all her anchors and boats.

In consequence of these disasters, the remaining ships of M. Villaret's fleet came again to an anchor, and did not make a second attempt until the 31st of December. On this day the fleet, now, by the loss of the *Républicain*, reduced to 34 sail of the line and frigates, weighed and stood out to sea; where we will leave the French ships to make the best of their way, while we recount a very dashing exploit in the reconnoitring way, which occurred during their absence.

On the 2d of January, early in the morning, an indistinct account of the sailing of the Brest fleet having reached Falmouth, a squadron of British frigates, consisting of the *Flora*, Captain Sir John Borlase Warren, *Arethusa*, Captain Sir Edward Pellew, and *Diamond*, Captain Sir William Sidney Smith, was despatched to the bay of Brest, to ascertain the truth of the prevailing rumour.

On the 3d the squadron arrived off the port; and Sir John immediately sent the *Diamond* to look well into the harbour. With the wind at east, the frigate commenced beating up towards the entrance. At 2 p. m. Sir Sidney observed, also working in, three sail, evidently French ships of war. At 5 p. m., in order to be ready to take advantage of the next flood-tide, the *Diamond* cast anchor between *Pointe Saint-Mathieu* and *Bec-du-Raz*, and found lying, within about a mile from *Saint-Mathieu* and scarcely two from herself, a large ship, judged to be one of the three which had been seen beating to windward. At 11 p. m. the *Diamond* got under way, and continued working up under all sail.

On the 4th, at 2 a. m., Sir Sidney made out the vessel at anchor to be a ship of the line, and at 2 h. 30 m. a. m. passed close to windward of a frigate at anchor within *Basse-Buzée*. The ebb-tide had now made; but the *Diamond*, that she might not drift to leeward or create suspicion, continued under sail, tacking between the roads of *Bertheaume* and *Camaret*.

The appearance of daylight at 7 a. m. brought to her view two ships coming through the goulet de Brest, 15 sail of small vessels at anchor in *Camaret* road, and a ship without her fore and mizen masts aground, as it appeared, on *Petit-Menou* point. This ship

there can be very little doubt was the *Républicain*, *Pointe du Petit-Menou* lying directly in a line with the *Mingan* rock, and with *Pointe de Bertheaume*, near to which at that time was the *Diamond*.

At 7 h. 40 m. A. M., not observing any ships in *Brest* road, the *Diamond* bore up towards *Saint-Mathieu*. At 8 A. M. the *château de Bartheaume* made several signals; on which the *Diamond* hoisted French national colours. In ten minutes afterwards a corvette, which had been running along *Bertheaume* bay to the westward, shortened sail, and evinced her suspicion of the *Diamond* by hoisting several signals, and hauling close under the lee of the castle. The British frigate, nevertheless, stood on, and soon passed within hail of the line-of-battle ship; which, with jury yards and topmasts, was still at anchor, apparently without any maindeck guns, and very leaky. Sir *Sidney* asked the French commander, if he wanted any assistance. The latter is stated to have replied "No," and to have readily informed Sir *Sidney*, that the ship's name was the *Nestor*, that she had been dismasted in a gale of wind, and had parted from the fleet three days before. With this intelligence, the *Diamond*, whose disguised appearance, aided by Sir *Sidney's* excellent French, had completely deceived the French captain and his officers, crowded sail to rejoin her consorts.

While the French 74 and British frigate were speaking each other, a French frigate, with topgallant yards across, lay at anchor a short distance to windward. It appears that this was the new 40-gun frigate *Virginie*, Captain *Jacques Bergeret*, and that the remaining French ship of the three which were beating up when the *Diamond* first saw them, was the 74-gun ship *Fougueux*, recently launched at *Rochefort*, and which, with the *Virginie*, had escorted from *Bordeaux* the 15 sail of vessels at anchor in *Camaret* bay. The *Diamond*, notwithstanding her perilous situation, got clear off, and at 10 h. 30 m. joined the *Arctusa*; which frigate the commodore stationed in-shore, on the look-out for her venturous companion.

Scarcely had the French fleet got well to sea before it encountered a gale of wind, in which several of the ships were damaged, and the *Nestor*, with the loss of some of her masts, put back, as has already been stated. The probability of the fleet's being kept at sea beyond the 15 days, for which the majority of the ships had been provisioned, rendered it necessary for the six *Toulon* ships to divide their six months' stock among their companions, and defer their voyage to another opportunity. In a day or two after the gale had abated a thick fog came on, in which the whole of *Rear-admiral Vanstabel's* division, of eight sail of the line and some frigates, separated and returned to *Brest*.

On the 28th of *January*, when the remainder of the fleet, continuing their cruise, had reached 150 leagues from *Brest*, a

second and a much more tremendous gale overtook them. The Neuf-Thermidor (late Jacobin), Scipion, and Superbe, being old ships, foundered. Nearly the whole of the Neuf-Thermidor's crew perished, many of them on account of the fore and main masts falling on the quarterdeck. The crews of the other two ships, except 21 men in the Superbe, were fortunately saved. The latter ship overset before all her people had quitted her. The Neptune ran on shore and was wrecked at Péros, a bay about 12 leagues from Brest, between Bréhet and Morlaix. The Téméraire and Convention reached with great difficulty, the one Port-Malo, the other Lorient. The remainder of the fleet returned to Brest on the 1st and 2d days of February, in a very crippled state. The Majestueux three-decker was so leaky, that she could be hardly kept afloat, even at her moorings.

As some slight compensation for these disasters to his fleet, M. Villaret captured and destroyed, during his 34 days' cruise, about 100 sail of enemy's vessels, great and small, including the British 20-gun ship, or, as from her real mounted force the French were warranted in designating her, 30-gun frigate Daphne.

On the 14th of February, after several days' detention in Torbay by a heavy gale at south-east, in which nine of the 36 sail of the line in company parted their cables, but fortunately brought up again; Admiral Earl Howe, although in a state of health that would have justified retirement from the command, put to sea with the Channel fleet, and on the following day was joined, off Plymouth, by the Reasonable 64, Rear-admiral Parker, and the already named five Portuguese line-of-battle ships under Admiral de Valle; * making his lordship's whole force 42 sail of the line, exclusive of about an equal number of frigates and sloops. Having seen the East and West India and other convoys safe out of the Channel, and parted company with the detachments that had been ordered to attend them to their respective destinations; and having also gained certain intelligence that the French fleet was again in Brest harbour, Lord Howe, with the remainder of his fleet, reanchored at Spithead.

The moment the Brest fleet, with so serious a reduction of its numbers, had regained their port, the utmost exertions were used, in the first instance, to requip and reprovision the six sail of the line and frigates intended for Toulon. By great exertion, and not without some difficulty, that was accomplished, and on the 22d of February Rear-admiral Renaudin sailed for his destination, and, as we shall hereafter show, arrived there in safety.

In a week or two after the departure of M. Renaudin, 12 of the remaining ships of the Brest fleet, with the whole of the frigates, were at anchor in the road ready for sea; and early in

* See p. 182.

May Rear-admiral Jean-Gaspar Vence, with three 74s and six or seven frigates, was detached to the southward, to escort a convoy of coasters from Bordeaux.

On the 30th of May the following squadron sailed from Spithead on a cruise off Ushant:

Gun-ship.			
100	Royal-Sovereign	{	Vice-adm. (b.) Hon. Wm. Cornwallis.
			Captain John Whitby.
	{ Mars	"	Sir Charles Cotton.
74	{ Triumph	"	Sir Erasmus Gower.
	{ Brunswick	"	Lord Charles Fitzgerald.
	{ Bellerophon	"	Lord Cranstoun.
Gun-frigate.			
38	Phaëton	"	Hon. Robert Stopford.
32	Pallas	"	Hon. Henry Curzon.
G.-brg.slp-			
18	Kingfisher	"	Thos. Le Marchant Gosselyn.

On the 8th of June, at 10 A. M., the squadron made the land about the Penmarcks; and at 10 h. 30 m. A. M. the Triumph threw out the signal for six sail east by north. These, and the other vessels seen about the same time, composed the squadron of Rear-admiral Vence; who, with a numerous convoy in charge, was on his return to Brest. Having lain to until he discovered that the vessels in chase of him were enemy's cruisers, the French admiral, at about noon, stood away for Belle-Isle, under a press of sail.

At 2 P. M. the Kingfisher, Phaëton, and Triumph, then considerably ahead of their companions, one of whom, the Brunswick, was hull-down astern, commenced firing at the enemy; but, finding it impossible for the rest of the squadron to arrive up in time to prevent the French from getting under the island, within the southmost point of which the leading British ships then were, the vice-admiral made the signal to close. At 4 P. M. two French frigates were chased in the south-west, one with a large ship in tow, which she abandoned to the British, as they approached: and then the two crowded away to join their admiral, who was about coming to an anchor. Several shots were now interchanged between the batteries of Belle-Isle and the advanced British ships, until the Triumph and Phaëton, shoaling their water, made the signal for danger.

The vice-admiral thereupon recalled his ships from chase, and stood off with eight French vessels, laden with wine and brandy, which the squadron had captured out of a fleet, that was still plying to windward under the land, to gain the anchorage in Palais road. On the next day, the 9th, it was calm until 8 P. M.; when, a breeze springing up, the British squadron took the prizes in tow, and steered for the Channel. On the 11th, when a few leagues to the southward of Scilly, the vice-admiral ordered the Kingfisher into port with the prizes, and stood back to the southward and eastward, to look after M. Vence and his squadron.

When the news reached Brest, that Rear-admiral Vence had been chased into, and, as the account added, was blockaded at Belle-Isle, the nine ships of the line at anchor in Brest road were still waiting for a supply of provisions, before they could attempt to sail upon their distant missions. All other considerations were now to give way to the relief of this squadron, supposed to be in jeopardy at Belle-Isle: supposed, we say, because it was known to the more experienced among the French officers, that no blockading force could prevent Rear-admiral Vence from reaching Lorient; and, in fact, the French admiral was not blockaded at all, Vice-admiral Cornwallis, as has been shown, having sailed for the mouth of the Channel to protect his prizes. However, the French minister was resolved; and accordingly, on the 12th of June, nine sail of the line, two 50-gun rasés, seven other frigates, and four corvettes, under the orders of Vice-admiral Villaret-Joyeuse in the *Peuple* (late *Montagne*), attended by the two deputies *Palasne-Champeaux* and *Topsent*, and by Rear-admirals *Kerguelen* and *Bruix*, got under way and stood out, the ships still having on board, as it appears, only a 15 days' stock of provisions.

On the 15th, when a few leagues from *Isle Groix*, M. Villaret's squadron fell in with M. Vence; who, in verification of what Rear-admiral *Kerguelen* and others had stated to be practicable, had quitted his anchorage at Belle-Isle without difficulty or molestation, and was now on his return from Brest. The French fleet, thus united, was composed of the following line-of-battle ships and frigates:

Gun-ship.	120	<i>Peuple</i> .		Gun-ship.	74	{ <i>Fougueux</i> . <i>Jean-Bart</i> . <i>Mucius</i> . <i>Nestor</i> .		Gun-ship.	74	{ <i>Redoutable</i> . <i>Tigre</i> . <i>Wattigny</i> . <i>Zélé</i> .	
	74	{ <i>Alexandre</i> . <i>Droits-de-l'Homme</i> . <i>Formidable</i> .									
<i>Frigates,</i>											
	Brave, rasé.	Scévola. „	Virginie.	Proserpine.	Insurgente.	Driade.	Fraternité.	Fidelle.	Cocarde.	Régénérée.	Name unknown.

There were also three large ship and two brig corvettes, and two cutters; making in all, 30 vessels.

On the 16th, at about 10 h. 30 m. A. M., while working off the land near the *Penmarcks* on his return to Brest, with the wind at west-north-west, M. Villeneuve discovered, directly to windward, the squadron of Vice-admiral Cornwallis, then making the best of his way towards Belle-Isle, to reconnoitre the road in which he had left M. Vence and his squadron.

As the *Phaëton*, when as the look-out frigate of the British squadron she first discovered the French fleet, did not, after making the signal that the enemy was of superior force, haul her wind and return to the squadron, the vice-admiral concluded

that the signal had reference to the number, rather than to the apparent strength, of the French ships, and accordingly stood on nearer than he otherwise would. At 11 A. M., however, being too weak to offer battle to a force now so evidently superior, the British squadron hauled to the wind on the starboard tack under all sail, formed in line ahead thus: Brunswick, Royal-Sovereign, Bellerophon, Triumph, Mars.

At 2 P. M. the French fleet, then on the same tack as the British squadron, separated into two divisions; one of which tacked and stood to the northward, in order to take advantage of the land wind, while the other continued its course to the southward. At 4 P. M. the British squadron tacked, and did so again at 5 P. M. At 6 P. M. the French north division tacked to the southward. Soon afterwards, as the French admiral appears to have expected, the wind shifted to the northward, and thus enabled the north division to weather, and the south division to lie well up for, the British squadron; from the centre ship of which, the Bellerophon, the first division bore east by north, or upon her starboard quarter, distant eight or nine miles, and the second division south-east, or upon her larboard quarter, distant about ten miles.

The Bellerophon and Brunswick, the former in particular, had always been considered as excellent sailers; but, owing to some error in their stowage, they were now quite out of trim. The consequence was, that, in the course of the night, to improve their sailing, these ships were obliged to cut away their anchors and launches and start a portion of their water and provisions; and the Bellerophon had also to throw overboard her four poop-carbonades, with their carriages, and a great quantity of shot.

Notwithstanding they had thus lightened themselves, the Bellerophon and Brunswick very much retarded the squadron in its progress: so much so, indeed, that at daylight on the 17th the French fleet was discovered coming up very fast, formed in three divisions. The weather division consisted of three ships of the line and five frigates, and was nearly abreast of the British rear. The centre division consisted of five ships of the line and four frigates; and the lee division, of four sail of the line, five frigates, two brigs, and two cutters.


At about 9 A. M. the French van-ship, believed to have been the *Zélé*, Captain Magnae, opened her fire upon the rearmost English ship, the *Mars*; who, hoisting her colours, as did the rest of the squadron, promptly returned it with her stern-chasers: One of the French frigates from the centre division, since known to have been the *Virginie*, Captain Bergeret, gallantly ran up on the larboard or lee quarter of the *Mars*, and yawing fired repeatedly into her. At 9 h. 30 m. A. M., wishing to cover the Bellerophon from the effects of the enemy's fire, neither that ship nor the *Triumph* being able to spare the loss of a sail, the vice-admiral ordered the former to go ahead.

The Bellerophon, accordingly, passed close under the lee of

the Royal-Sovereign, the latter having shortened sail for that purpose, and took her station next in line to the Brunswick. At a few minutes before noon the cannonade became general on the part of the British ships, each firing her stern or quarter guns as she could bring them to bear. At 1 P. M. the second ship of the French van opened her fire on the British rear; and at 1 h. 30 m. P. M. the first ship, having had her main topgallant-mast shot away, and being otherwise damaged, by the fire of the Mars, sheered off, and dropped astern. The supposed Zélé's late second astern, the present van-ship, now opened a brisk cannonade on the larboard quarter of the Mars.

A harassing fire continued to be kept up at intervals by the leading French ships in succession, during the next three or four hours; at the end of which Vice-admiral Cornwallis, observing that the Mars, from the crippled state of her rigging and sails, had fallen to leeward, and was likely to be overpowered, threw out the signal for her to alter her course to starboard, or from the ships that were most annoying her.

Immediately afterwards the Royal-Sovereign bore round up in the direction of the Mars, and, opening her powerful broadside on the enemy, ran down, in company with the Triumph, to the support of her gallant but crippled friend; who was thereby soon brought into close order of battle, and saved from further molestation. The commencement of this bold and well-executed manœuvre, we have endeavoured to illustrate by the following diagram.



Four of the French van-ships had, in the mean time, bore up to secure the crippled ship; but, seeing the approach of the British three-decker, they again hauled to the wind. A partial firing continued until about 6 h. 10 m. P. M., when it entirely ceased. In another half an hour the French ships shortened sail, and gave over the pursuit. Soon afterwards they tacked and stood to the eastward, and at sunset were nearly hull-down in the north-east.

The brunt of the action having been borne by the Mars and Triumph, those ships, particularly the former, were the only sufferers by the enemy's shot. The Triumph had some of her sails and running rigging cut, but escaped without the loss of a man. The Mars had her mainmast, and fore and main top-sail yards damaged, besides standing and running rigging; she had also 12 men wounded, but none killed. Owing to the comparatively flimsy structure of their stern-frames, and the want of proper port-holes, all the British ships were great sufferers from the protracted stern-fire which they were obliged to maintain. In the Triumph, who from her position in the line had the most occasion to keep up a stern-fire, the stern-galleries, bulkheads, and every part of the stern of the ward-room except the timbers, were cut away, and, from her three stern-batteries (first deck, second deck, and quarterdeck), that ship expended, in single shots, nearly 5000 lbs. of powder.

It was very fortunate for the Mars and Triumph, and indeed for the whole British squadron (for their admiral does not appear to have been one who would have abandoned any of his ships), that there were no Captains Bergeret among those who commanded the headmost line-of-battle ships of the chasing fleet. But, after all, what could have induced the French admiral to withdraw his 12 sail of the line and 14 or 15 frigates, at a time when they had almost surrounded five British sail of the line and two frigates? The French accounts admit that Mr. Villaret, with a force such as we have described it, surrounded Vice-admiral Cornwallis's squadron, consisting of not a ship more than it really contained; and the reason they allege why the former did not make a prize of that squadron is, that several of the leading French ships disobeyed signals and were badly manœuvred.

This is not doing the French admiral justice. We can better explain the cause of M. Villaret's extraordinary forbearance. On the 17th, in the morning, the British frigate Phaëton was detached ahead of her squadron, to try the effect of a ruse de guerre, which we will proceed to describe.

Having got to the distance of some miles, the frigate made the signal for a strange sail west-north-west; soon afterward, s for four sail; and finally, the well-known signal for a fleet, by letting fly the topgallantsheets, and firing two guns in quick succession. At 3 P. M., being then very far ahead, the Phaëton

made the private signal to the supposed fleet; and then, by the tabular signals, with which the French were well acquainted, she communicated to her own admiral that the fleet seen were friends, and, at 4 h. 30 m., that they were ships of the line. The Phaëton then repeated the signal, as from the admiral to call in the strange fleet, by hoisting the Dutch ensign, and shortly afterwards shortened sail.

At 6 p. m., as a singular coincidence, there actually appeared, in the direction to which the Phaëton's signals had been pointing, several small sail. The British frigate immediately wore to rejoin her squadron; and very soon afterwards, as has already been stated, Vice-admiral Villaret, to whom the strange sails must just then have discovered themselves, gave over the chase and tacked to the eastward.

So far from the French officers denying this, several of them, when afterwards in company with British officers, strenuously insisted that it was Lord Bridport's fleet, which they knew was at sea, that they saw, and that that, and that alone, was the cause of their not following up their advantage. Let, however, M. Villaret's reasons for his conduct have been what they may, the masterly retreat of Vice-admiral Cornwallis excited general admiration; and the spirit manifested by the different ships' companies of his little squadron, while pressed upon by a force from its threefold superiority so capable of crushing them, was just such as ought always to animate British seamen when in the presence of an enemy.

Among the merits of the British admiral on this occasion, must not be forgotten the handsome manner in which, in his official letter, he mentions his officers and men; nor the modest manner in which he refers to his own gallant act of bearing up, in the face of so formidable a fleet, to support one of his crippled ships. After extolling the behaviour of every captain by name, the vice-admiral proceeds thus: "Indeed, I shall ever feel the impression which the good conduct of the captains, officers, seamen, marines, and soldiers in the squadron, has made on my mind; and it was the greatest pleasure I ever received to see the spirit manifested by the men, who, instead of being cast down at seeing 30 sail of the enemy's ships attacking our little squadron, were in the highest spirits imaginable. I do not mean the Royal-Sovereign alone: the same spirit was shown in all the ships as they came near me; and although, circumstanced as we were, we had no great reason to complain of the conduct of the enemy, yet our men could not help repeatedly expressing their contempt of them. Could common prudence have allowed me to let loose their valour, I hardly know what might not have been accomplished by such men." Of the Royal-Sovereign's individual share he merely says: "In the evening they made a show of a more serious attack upon the Mars, and obliged me to bear up for her support." Such good conduct in all concerned

met its reward; and both houses of parliament unanimously voted their thanks to Vice-admiral Cornwallis and his companions in arms on this memorable occasion.

Two English naval writers of respectability, and, indeed, of no slight influence, both being professional men, seem to attribute the successful issue of Vice-admiral Cornwallis's retreat to the manner, the peculiar manner, in which he formed his squadron. One says: "He retreated with his ships in the form of a wedge, of which the Royal-Sovereign was the apex; and whenever the enemy approached sufficiently near, they were soon taught to keep at a safer distance."*

The other writer, upon two of his plates, actually represents the British squadron in this wedge-like form, with "the flagship at the angular point." He is afterwards obliged to admit, that, "a distinguished officer, who was present on this occasion, has observed that these figures are not wholly correct."† Admiral Ekins, then, in a third and fourth plate, represents the Brunswick and Bellerophon in extended line abreast, the first on the weather, and the last on the lee bow of the Royal-Sovereign; who has, in a well-formed line astern of her, the Triumph and Mars.

That the Bellerophon was not on the lee bow of the Royal-Sovereign is clear from the following extract from the former ship's log, referring to the period when the Mars compelled the supposed Zélé to sheer off: "The admiral hailed the Bellerophon, and desired her to keep her station a little on his weather bow." As it appears to us, the Brunswick, Bellerophon, and Royal-Sovereign should have been represented nearly in line ahead, and the Triumph and Mars, from the latter's accidental fall to leeward, nearly in line abreast, and bearing on each quarter (as the Brunswick and Bellerophon are represented in the above plate on each bow) of the Royal-Sovereign; who, in consequence, was able occasionally to fire from her stern-chasers between them.

Vice-admiral Cornwallis proceeded straight to Plymouth, with the intelligence of the fleet from which he had had so narrow an escape, and Vice-admiral Villaret-Joyeuse made the best of his way back to Brest, to give an account of the disaster that had attended him. Just as the French fleet, having rounded the point of Penmarck, was about to enter the bay of Andierne, a violent gale of wind from the northward, that lasted 27 hours, separated the ships, and drove them for shelter to the anchorage of Belle-Isle.

Here all the ships assembled, and the fleet soon afterwards weighed and made sail; when, on the 22d of June, 3 h. 3 m. A. M., the British Channel fleet made its appearance in the north-west. This fleet, on account of the continued indisposi-

* Brenton, vol. i., p. 374.

† Ekins's Naval Battles, p. 148.

tion of Earl Howe, under the command of Lord Bridport, had sailed from Spithead on the same day that the French fleet had quitted Brest, and consisted of the

Gun-ship.			
100	{	Royal-George . . .	{ Admiral (w.) Lord Bridport.
		Queen-Charlotte	{ Captain William Domett.
			{ " Sir Andrew Snape Douglas.
98	{	Queen	{ Vice-adm. (b.) Sir Alan Gardner.
			{ Captain William Bedford.
		London	{ Vice-adm. (b.) John Colpoys.
			{ Captain Edward Griffith.
		Prince-of-Wales	{ Rear-adm. (r.) Henry Harvey.
			{ Captain John Bazely.
			{ " Charles Powell Hamilton.
80	{	Prince	{ " James Richard Dacres.
		Barfleur	{ " William Edge.
		Prince-George	{ " " " "
		Sans-Pareil . . .	{ Rear-adm. (r.) Lord Hugh Seymour.
			{ Captain William Browell.
74	{	Valiant	{ " Christopher Parker.
		Orion	{ " Sir James Saumarez.
		Irresistible . . .	{ " Richard Grindall.
		Russel	{ " Thomas Larcom.
		Colossus	{ " John Monkton.

Frigates, Révolutionnaire, Thalia, Nymphe, Aquilon, Astrea, and 20-gun ship Babet; *Mægera* and Incendiary fireships, Charon hospital-ship, and Argus and Dolly luggers.

The object of the departure of the Channel fleet appears to have been to give protection to an expedition, under the command of Commodore Sir John Borlase Warren, in the 40-gun frigate Pomone, bound to Quiberon bay; and of which expedition we shall presently say more. Lord Bridport continued in company with Sir John Warren and his charge until the 19th; when, being near Belle-Isle, and the wind blowing fair for Quiberon, the admiral, with the Channel fleet, stood out from the coast, in order to keep an offing and be ready to receive the Brest fleet, should the latter quit port (its departure being then unknown) and attempt to molest the expedition.

The *Arethusa*, Sir John's advanced frigate, just as she had made the land of Belle-Isle, descried the fleet of M. Villaret coming from under it, and immediately made the signal for "16 sail of the line and 10 frigates." The squadron and transports thereupon altered their course, so as to avoid the French fleet, and Sir John despatched a fast-sailing vessel with the intelligence to Lord Bridport.

Either the expedition was not seen by the Brest fleet, or was considered to be the Channel fleet and of superior force. At all events, M. Villaret missed a very fine opportunity of benefiting his country; and early on the next morning, the 20th, Sir John Warren came in sight of Lord Bridport. The latter, meanwhile, had despatched a lugger to Sir John, with directions to send to him his three line-of-battle ships, the *Robust* and *Thunderer* 74s,

Captains Edward Thornborough and Albemarle Bertie, and the Standard 64, Captain Joseph Ellison, in order that the British fleet might be more upon an equality with the French fleet, according to the account of its numbers, as first represented by the Arethusa, and since communicated to the admiral by the commodore's despatch-vessel.

Lord Bridport, with his 14 sail of the line exclusive of the three in sight in the north-west and endeavouring to join him, kept between the expedition and the French fleet, composed, it will be recollected, of 12 sail of the line; but he was prevented, by a sudden change in the wind, from gaining a sight of the latter until 3 h. 30 m. A. M. on the 22d, as has already been stated. At this time the British fleet was in latitude $47^{\circ} 4'$ north, longitude $4^{\circ} 16'$ west, Belle-Isle bearing east by north half-north, distant about 14 leagues, standing upon the starboard tack, with a light air of wind from about south by east.

Finding that the French admiral, by his manœuvres, had no intention to offer battle, Lord Bridport, at 6 h. 30 m. A. M., directed, by signal, the Sans-Pareil, Orion, Colossus, Irresistible, Valiant, and Russel, as being the best sailing ships, to chase; and at 6 h. 45 m. P. M. signalled the whole fleet to do the same. Every sail that could be carried on a wind was now set on all the ships; and at noon the centre of the French fleet, then standing in for the land, bore east-south-east, distant about 12 miles. During the afternoon it became nearly calm, but the little wind there was had drawn rather more aft.

At 7 P. M. the British admiral made the signal to harass the enemy's rear, and at 7 h. 25 m. P. M. to engage as the ships came up, and to take stations for mutual support. By sunset the British fleet, notwithstanding the unfavourable state of the weather, had advanced considerably upon that of the French. At about 10 h. 30 m. P. M. the ships were all taken aback, and soon afterwards it again fell nearly calm. At 3 A. M. on the 23d, however, a fine light breeze sprang up from the south-west by south; and, with the daylight, appeared the French fleet, right ahead, all in a cluster, except three or four ships, the rearmost of which was a long way astern of her companions, and at no greater distance from the van of the British fleet than three miles.

At this time the British ships were very much scattered, and all astern of the Queen-Charlotte, except the Irresistible, who was within hail on her larboard bow. The Queen-Charlotte had attained this advanced, and for a three-decker rather extraordinary, station in the chase, by the nicest attention in trimming her sails, so as to meet the light and variable airs of the preceding night, and by constantly keeping her head in the direction of the enemy. The ships which, besides the Irresistible, were the nearest to the Queen-Charlotte, were the Orion, Sans-Pareil, Colossus, and Russel.

At 4 A. M. the isle of Groix, or Belle-Isle, as the Royal-George and one or two other British ships appear to have considered it, bore on the Queen-Charlotte's lee bow, or nearly east, distant about eight miles. At 5 A. M. one of the French frigates took in tow the Alexandre, Captain François-Charles Guillemet; which ship, not having improved in the quality that had, in the preceding year, deprived the British navy of her services, was now the sternmost of M. Villaret's fleet. At a few minutes before 6 A. M. this ship, and one or two ahead of her, began firing their stern-chasers at the Irresistible. At 6 A. M. the latter opened her fire upon the Alexandre, whom the frigate, for her own safety, had by this time abandoned; and in a minute or two afterwards, the Orion commenced firing at the same ship.

At about 6h. 15m. A. M. the next ship ahead of the Alexandre, the Formidable, Captain Charles-Alexandre Durand-Linois, received the starboard guns of the Queen-Charlotte, and immediately discharged her larboard guns in return. At 6h. 30m. A. M. the Formidable, at whom the Sans-Pareil had just commenced a cannonade, caught fire on the poop, and soon being, in hull, masts, rigging, and sails, very much cut up by the well-directed broadsides of two such antagonists, particularly of the Queen-Charlotte (the Sans-Pareil having passed ahead in search of a better-conditioned opponent), dropped astern. Shortly afterwards, on her mizenmast falling over the side, the Formidable bore up and struck her colours.

The Colossus, Russel, London, and Queen, on the part of the British, and the Peuple, Mucius, Redoutable, Wattigny, and Nestor, on the part of the French, now participated more or less in the action. The remaining four French ships, the Zélé, Fougueux, Jean-Bart, and Droits-de-L'Homme, kept too far ahead to be engaged; and all the British ships, except the eight already named, notwithstanding the quantity of sail they carried, were far astern.

The rigging and sails of the Queen-Charlotte soon exhibited proofs of the destructive fire which the French rear-ships had been pouring upon her, and she became in consequence quite unmanageable. At 7h. 14m. A. M., finding herself, as she dropped astern, annoyed very much by the fire of a ship on her larboard beam, the Queen-Charlotte opened her broadside upon this antagonist, and at once compelled the Alexandre, already in a very crippled state from the gallant resistance she had previously made, to haul down her colours. As the Queen-Charlotte had edged away to close the Alexandre, the Tigre, Captain Jacques Bedout, with whom, as well as partially with the Peuple, the former had been engaged on the larboard side, ranged ahead, pursued and cannonaded by the Sans-Pareil. A freshening breeze from the south-south-east now brought up the Queen and London; and, on receiving their fire, the Tigre hauled down her colours.

At about 7 h. 57 m. A. M. the Royal-George passed the Queen-Charlotte on the starboard and weather side, as the latter lay repairing her damaged rigging. Having knotted her ropes in the best manner the time would allow, the Queen-Charlotte hauled on board her fore and main tacks, to afford every possible assistance to the admiral. At 8 h. 15 m. Lord Bridport threw out a signal for the Colossus, who was about a mile and a half on the Queen-Charlotte's weather bow, to discontinue the action; and, in five minutes afterwards, made the same signal to the Sans-Pareil, who was about a mile and a half on the Queen-Charlotte's lee bow, and then receiving a fire from the larboard quarter guns of the People. The Royal-George, when about half a mile from the west point of Isle-Groix, bore up and fired her starboard broadside into the stern and larboard quarter of the People and her larboard broadside (not knowing that she had struck) into the starboard bow of the Tigre; who immediately bore up, and a second time made the signal of submission.

Immediately after she had done firing at the Tigre, which was about 8 h. 37 m. A. M., the Royal-George wore round from the land and from the French fleet; and the other British ships followed the motions of their admiral. The Prince, Barfleur, and Prince-George were now directed, by signal, to take in tow the prizes; and they and the fleet stood away to the south-west. The weathermost French ships, when Lord Bridport discontinued the action, did not, it appears, point higher than the mouth of the river Quimperlay, and could therefore have been weathered by the Royal-George and the other fresh ships that were coming up. Finding himself thus unexpectedly relieved, the French admiral kept his wind, and, after making several tacks, sheltered his fleet between Isle-Groix and the entrance to the Lorient.

None of the British ships appear to have had any spars shot away; but the ships that were near enough to get into action suffered more or less damage in their masts, rigging, and sails. The fore and main masts of the Queen-Charlotte, who, as we have seen, particularly distinguished herself, were badly wounded. So were the main masts of the Sans-Pareil and Irresistible; as well as the main yard of the latter and the foretopsail yard of the former.

Taking the ships in the order in which they appear to have been engaged, the Irresistible had three seamen killed, her captain, master (Thomas Troughton), and nine seamen and marines wounded; the Orion, six seamen and marines killed, and 18 wounded; the Queen-Charlotte, four seamen killed, and one master's mate (David Coutts), one midshipman (Hornsby Charles), and 30 seamen, marines, and soldiers wounded; the Sans-Pareil, her second lieutenant (Charles M. Stocker), second lieutenant of marines (William Jephcott), and eight seamen and marines or soldiers killed, and, as far as the official returns show,

only two midshipmen (Francis John Nott and Richard Spencer) wounded; the Colossus, five seamen, marines, and soldiers killed, and one lieutenant, (Robert Mends), one midshipman (John Whyley), and 28 seamen, marines, and soldiers wounded; the Russel, three seamen killed, and Captain Bacon of the 118th regiment, and nine seamen, marines, and soldiers wounded; and the London and Royal-George, one three, and the other seven seamen and marines wounded; total, 31 killed, and 113 wounded.*

The three prizes were much shattered in their hulls, the *Alexandre* in particular. The loss sustained by the French ships, either separately or in the gross, has been omitted in the official account; but it otherwise appears that the three respectively lost as follows: *Tigre*, out of a complement, as deposited by her officers, of 726 men and boys, 130 in killed and wounded together; the *Alexandre*, out of a complement, owing to her greatly inferior size, of only 666, as many as 220; and the *Formidable*, out of a complement of 717, the still greater number of 320. Each ship's loss contained, doubtless, a large proportion of officers; but we are unable to particularize further than that the *Formidable* had three lieutenants killed; Captain Linois (in the eye), her second captain, and three (being the remainder of her) lieutenants wounded. Nor can the slightest doubt remain, that the officers and men of all three French ships conducted themselves in the bravest manner.

Had the whole of the ships on each side been able to engage, the opposing forces would have stood thus: British, 17 sail of the line (including eight three-deckers), five frigates; French, 12 sail of the line (including one three-decker), 11 frigates. Two of these frigates were superior in size, and nearly equal in force, to almost any two of Lord Bridport's 74s. Still the disparity here shown excuses M. Villaret for declining to engage.

With respect to three-decked ships of war, we may be allowed to remark that, unless of the first class in size and force, they are not so desirable in a fleet, particularly a chasing fleet, as first-class two-deckers. It is impossible to disguise their appearance, and their commanding height and three tiers of cannon frequently occasion an enemy, as in the case of the British 98s for instance, to overrate their force and fly before them; a mode of

* The following statement shows the total numerical loss sustained by each of the eight ships that were fortunate enough to get into action:

Irresistible	killed, 3	wounded, 11
Orion	" 6	" 18
Queen-Charlotte	" 4	" 32
Sans-Pareil	" 10	" 2
Colossus	" 5	" 30
Russel	" 3	" 10
London	" 0	" 3
Royal-George	" 0	" 7
Total	31	113

escape seldom very difficult, owing to their usual slowness of sailing. Whereas, a two-decked ship, like the *Sans-Pareil*, although larger every way but in height, and throwing full as heavy a broadside, is still only a two-decker, and is therefore permitted to approach, until the enemy finds it too late to get beyond the reach of her guns.

As soon as M. Villaret had recovered from his surprise at the unaccountable forbearance of Lord Bridport, he called a council of his admirals on board the *Proserpine* frigate, in which his flag was flying, to consult with them upon the propriety of anchoring on the coast so as best to resist the attack which he still conjectured would be renewed against him, as soon as the British admiral had made the necessary arrangements for the purpose.

Rear-admirals Kerguelen and Bruix both assured Admiral Villaret, that, if he adopted the measure, the whole of his fleet would be lost; that the anchorage was very bad all along that coast; that his cables would be cut by the rocks; and that the British, having the weathergage, would cannonade his ships when they pleased, or probably send fireships to destroy them. These experienced officers advised the admiral to wait until the tide suited, and then enter the port of Lorient. Vice-admiral Villaret attended to these wise suggestions, and by 8 P. M. was at anchor in Lorient with the whole of his fleet, except the three captured ships.

One of the two officers, to whom the preservation of the French fleet was thus owing, expresses himself very pointedly on the manner in which Lord Bridport had terminated the action of the morning. "*Le combat cessa avant neuf heures du matin; nous étions à une demie-lieue de Groix, lorsque les ennemis levèrent la chasse. S'ils avaient bien manœuvré, ils auraient pu, ou prendre tous nos vaisseaux, ou les faire périr à la côte.*"* However, the affair was viewed differently in England, and Lord Bridport, Sir Alan Gardner, and Lord Hugh Seymour, three out of the five flag-officers present, received the thanks of parliament.

We are at a loss to discover the reason of this selection. If it was meant to include the flag-officers of the ships which had the good fortune to get into action, why was the London's flag-officer, Sir John Colpoys, omitted? This appears almost as extraordinary as that the accidental absence of Rear-admiral Sir Roger Curtis (he was attending Captain Molloy's court-martial at Portsmouth) should have occasioned the Queen-Charlotte, who, under Captain Sir Andrew Snape Douglas, had distinguished herself beyond any ship in the fleet, not only to be unrewarded by the thanks of parliament, but, a much less pardonable omission, to be unmentioned in Lord Bridport's official despatch. The letter, indeed, is peculiarly meagre of thanks to

* *Histoire des Evénemens, &c. par contr' amiral Kerguelen, p. 381.*

any officers but those belonging to the Royal-George; the very ship on board of which the signal was made that eventually saved the French fleet, or the greater part of it, from capture. Lord Bridport applies the term "fleet," properly enough, to the enemy's "12 sail of the line," but actually uses the diminutive term "squadron," when he refers to his own force; and that, too, with seeming propriety, as he names no more than 10 out of his 14 line-of-battle ships.

The French fleet being disposed of in the manner we have related, the expedition to Quiberon proceeded fearlessly to its destination; and Lord Bridport prepared to follow it as soon as he had despatched home the trophies of his victory. Of his three prizes, the *Alexandre*, or *Alexander*, as now again entitled to be called, was scarcely worth any thing; but the *Tigre* and *Formidable* were fine new 74s, similar in size to the *Impétueux* and *America* captured by Earl Howe. The *Tigre* was allowed to retain her name; but there being a *Formidable* 98 already in the service, the name of the *Formidable* 74, as if to perpetuate an acknowledged discreditable mistake, was changed to that of the island, close to which, instead of to *Groix*, the action was supposed to have been fought; and both the *Belle-Isle* and her classmate the *Tigre*, as British ships of war, we shall frequently have to name amidst the details that are to follow. We will now return to Sir John Warren's expedition; of the success of which, since Lord Bridport's affair especially, the most sanguine hopes were entertained.

On the 25th of June this famous expedition, consisting of the three line-of-battle ships already named, *Robust*, *Thunderer*, and *Standard*, also of the frigates *Pomone*, bearing Sir John's broad pendant, *Anson*, *Artois*, *Arethusa*, *Concorde*, and *Galatea*, and 50 sail of transports, with about 2500 French emigrants on board, commanded by the Comte de Puisaye, and assisted by the Comtes d'Hervilly and de Sombreuil, entered the bay of Quiberon, considered to be one of the finest on the coast of France for landing an army. It possesses a capacious and secure anchorage of nearly six miles in extent, beyond the reach of shot or shell, and is protected from westerly and south-west gales by the peninsula of Quiberon, the small but fruitful islands of Hoedic and Houat, and the Cardinal rocks.

On the 27th, at daybreak, the troops were landed near the village of Cramac, without the loss of a man; and without being opposed, except by about 200 republicans, who were driven back with some slaughter. Arms and ammunition for 16,000 royalists, who had joined the emigrants, were now landed from the ships; and the troops were cantoned among the inhabitants.

An attack on the peninsula of Quiberon having been projected, Sir John Warren disembarked 2000 royalists and 500

emigrants, together with 300 British marines. Fort Penthièvre, situated on a commanding eminence on the northern extremity of the peninsula, being invested on the other side by the Comte d'Hervilly, at the head of about 8000 royalists and emigrants, and having a garrison of only 600 men, surrendered. Stores and provisions were here landed in abundance; and the emigrants, royalists, and Chouans, fared sumptuously.

On the night of the 16th of July the Comte d'Hervilly, at the head of about 5000 men, including 200 British marines, made an unsuccessful attack on the right flank of General Hoche's army, strongly posted on the heights of St.-Barbe. In this affair, the comte, a brave and active officer, was badly wounded; and the emigrant troops were only enabled to make good their retreat to the fort, in consequence of the unremitting fire kept up by five British launches, armed each with an 18 or 24 pounder carronade, and stationed close to the beach.

Desertion now daily thinned the royalist ranks, and treachery was at work in every quarter of the garrison. Matters continued growing worse until the night of the 20th; when, amidst the howling of the storm and the pelting of the rain, and amidst a darkness, too, as black as the deeds that were agitating, a party of emigrant soldiers who were on guard deserted, and quickly conducted back to the fort a large body of republican troops. In an instant all within was confusion. While the faithful were staining the ground with their blood, the timorous laid down their arms and joined the assailants in the cry of *Vive la république!* and the traitorous turned round and massacred their officers, and such of their comrades, too, as did not at once re-echo the republican war-whoop. About 1100 troops, led by Puisaye, hastened to the shore, and there awaited the return of daylight to escape to the shipping. Others, headed by the brave Sombreuil, resisted to the last, and finally obtained terms of capitulation.

In direct violation of those terms, however, the whole of the officers and men that had surrendered were marched as prisoners to Nantes. There, after being tried by a military tribunal, the young and amiable Comte de Sombreuil, the Bishop of Dol, and several other emigrants of distinction, were shot: the remainder, being chiefly privates, sought refuge in the ranks of the inhuman General le Moine.

Early on the morning (the 21st) succeeding the reduction of the fort, the British frigates, which on account of the gale and extreme darkness had been unable to approach the shore during the night, worked up to the south-east point of the peninsula, and there received on board, by means of the boats of the squadron, under the able direction of Captain Richard Goodwin Keats of the *Galatea*, the Comte de Puisaye and his 1100 troops, besides about 2400 royalist inhabitants; leaving behind, however, for the use of the republicans, 10,000 stands of arms,

150,000 pairs of shoes, and magazines and clothing for an army of 40,000 men.

To add to the mishaps of this ill-fated expedition, six transports that had arrived the evening previous to the disgraceful treachery at the fort, laden with rum, brandy, and provisions, fell also into the hands of the republicans. What was the extent of the loss in men, sustained by the detachment of British marines that was landed, does not appear to have been made public.

Sir John Warren next proceeded to the small islands of Hoedic and Houat, of which he took quiet possession. He afterwards disembarked near to Lorient, at their own request, 2000 of the Chouans brought from Quiberon. He also detached the *Standard* 64 and a frigate or two, to summon the governor of Belle-Isle, which lies about five leagues to the westward, to deliver up the island for the use of Louis XVIII. Captain Ellison, to his very long letter on the subject, received from General Boucret a very laconic reply; the purport of which was, that, being well supplied with provisions and artillery, he, the general, was ready for the English fleet whenever it chose to come.

Sir John himself, in the mean while, having left a few frigates to keep the command of the anchorage at the islands of Hoedic and Houat, and cover, if necessary, the retreat of the garrisons, had proceeded to the island of Noirmoutier at the mouth of the Loire; but the republicans, who had recently dispossessed of that island the royalist General Charette, were too well prepared to warrant an attack by so inferior a force. After destroying two or three small armed vessels, the commodore contented himself with taking possession of Isle d'Yeu, a small island about five leagues to the southward of Noirmoutier.

In the beginning of October Sir John was joined at Isle d'Yeu by the 38-gun frigate *Jason*, Captain Charles Stirling, escorting a fleet of transports, containing 4000 British troops under the command of Major-general Doyle. On board of the *Jason* had also arrived, the Comte d'Artois, the Duc de Bourbon, and several other French noblemen. The troops were landed on the island, along with a great quantity of military stores, clothing, and provisions; but no use was, or, in the desperate situation of the royalist cause, could be, made of this force. Accordingly, at the close of the year, Isle d'Yeu was evacuated, and the troops, after remaining in a state of inactivity for nearly three months, were re-embarked on board the transports and carried back to England.

Lord Bridport continued at sea hovering off the coast where the unfortunate Quiberon expedition was frittering away its strength, until the 20th September; when the admiral returned to Spithead with two or three of his ships, leaving Rear-admiral Harvey, with the remainder of the Channel fleet, to watch the motions of

the French at Brest and Lorient. The ships in the latter port, having, as stated before, quitted Brest with only 15 days' provisions on board, had been compelled, owing to the poverty of the place, to discharge the principal part of their crews; disease and desertion had gradually thinned the remainder. Towards the end of the year, when the severity of the season obliged the blockading ships to keep farther in the offing, several of the ships at Lorient made an effort to escape from so ill-provided a port, and, by coasting it at favourable opportunities, contrived to reach Brest in safety: two or three others, we believe, shifted their quarters to Rochefort.

On the 17th and 18th of November the English Channel was visited by a westerly gale of such extraordinary violence, as scarcely to fall short of a West Indian hurricane. Rear-admiral Christian, with a squadron of eight sail of the line, having in charge a fleet of 200 transports and West Indiamen with upwards of 16,000 troops on board, was compelled to return to Spithead, after having had the ships of his convoy, with which he had quitted St. Helen's only a day or two before, scattered in every direction. Several of the transports and merchantmen foundered, and others went on shore and were wrecked. Above 200 dead bodies were taken up between Portland and Bridport. While the gale was at its height, the shock of an earthquake was felt in several parts of the kingdom. The repairs of the squadron and remaining ships of the convoy made it the 5th of December before the rear-admiral could again put to sea; but the fleet was again separated in a dreadful storm, which continued for two or three weeks.

Among the ships that nearly became the grave of her crew in the first of these disasters, was the late French three-decker Commerce-de-Marseille. Having been found so badly timbered, and so greatly out of order, as not to be worth the cost of a thorough repair, she remained at anchor at Spithead until the autumn of the present year; she then underwent a partial repair, and was armed and equipped for sea. Shortly afterwards, however, the guns on her first and second decks were sent on shore again, and the ports caulked up; and, fitted as a store-ship, the Commerce-de-Marseille, drawing at the time 29 feet water, formed part of Rear-admiral Christian's expedition to the West Indies. In the gale, the partial effects of which we have just described, this castle of a store-ship was driven back to Portsmouth; and, from the rickety state of her upper-works, and the great weight of her lading, it was considered a miracle that she escaped foundering. The Commerce-de-Marseille relanded her immense cargo, and never went out of harbour again; but the ship was not taken to pieces, and consequently remained on the lists of the navy, until the month of August, 1802.

On the 16th of January, while the British Mediterranean fleet of 15 sail of the line and frigates, still under the command of

Vice-admiral Hotham, was riding at anchor in San-Fiorenzo bay (island of Corsica), in a heavy cross swell, the effect of a recent gale of wind, the 74-gun ship *Berwick*, Captain William Smith, then under refit, with her lower masts stripped of their rigging, rolled all three over the side. The captain, first lieutenant, and master were immediately tried by a court-martial; and, it appearing that the proper precaution had not been taken in securing the masts, all three officers were dismissed the ship. Having appointed Captain Adam Littlejohn to command the *Berwick*, and directed him to follow, as soon as he had rigged his ship with jury-masts, Vice-admiral Hotham made sail for Leghorn road; a step, we must be permitted to pronounce, not quite so prudent, as if the vice-admiral had deferred his departure until the disabled ship was able to accompany the fleet; a delay which, considering that it was only necessary to place the *Berwick* in a state to be taken in tow, could not, with the accustomed alacrity of British seamen, have extended much beyond the period of a day.

By great exertions during the winter in repairing the old ships, and in expediting the new 74, the *Barras*, left on the stocks by the British at their evacuation of the port in December, 1793, the French in Toulon got ready for sea, by the latter end of February, the following fifteen sail of the line :

Gun-ship.		Gun-ship.		Gun-ship.
120	{ <i>Sans-Culotte.</i>		{ <i>Barras.</i>	
	{ <i>Ca-Ira.</i>		{ <i>Censeur.</i>	
80	{ <i>Tonnant.</i>	74	{ <i>Conquérant.</i>	74
	{ <i>Victoire.</i>		{ <i>Duquesne.</i>	
74	{ <i>Alcide.</i>		{ <i>Généreux.</i>	

Frigates, *Minerve*, *Alceste*, *Artémise*, *Courageuse*, *Friponne*, and *Vestale*, and two brig-corvettes.

With the four first-named frigates, and the two 28-gun frigates *Badine* and *Brune*, chef de division *Perrée*, had on the 7th of January returned from a very successful cruise in the Mediterranean. He is represented to have captured a frigate (not from the British, certainly) and two corvettes, forming a part of those taken from Toulon (untrue: the *Scout* and *Speedy* brigs were the only British "corvettes" captured in the Mediterranean in the year 1794); also 25 merchant-vessels, richly laden, and to have brought into port as many as 600 prisoners.

As soon as intelligence reached Toulon that the British fleet had quitted the shores of Corsica and retired to the road of Leghorn, the utmost exertions were used to get ready the long-meditated expedition for attempting the recovery of that island. The troops, about 5000 in number, being at length embarked in due proportions on board the different ships. On board the *Sans-Culotte* there was embarked what, in those days, was considered the necessary appendage to a French fleet, a spy or deputy from the National Convention, and Rear-admiral Martin,

on the 3d of March, weighed and put to sea with his 15 sail of the line and six frigates. On the 7th, at daybreak, after a succession of north-easterly gales, which had partially dismasted two of the ships, the fleet gained a sight of the island to which it was bound. At 7 A. M., when within five leagues of Cape Corse, the advanced frigates discovered to leeward, standing out of the bay of San-Fiorenzo, where she had been detained by foul winds until the preceding morning, the jury-rigged Berwick, making the best of her way to Leghorn.

All sail was immediately set, on the part of the French, for pursuit, and, the moment Captain Littlejohn, by the usual mode of signalling, had ascertained that the strange fleet was not, what by its colours it purported to be, Spanish, he used every means to effect his escape. The crippled state of the Berwick greatly retarded her progress; and at 11 A. M., when close off Cape Corse, the Alceste frigate, Captain Lejoille, passed to leeward, under Spanish colours, but changed them to French, as she opened her fire, within musket-shot, on the 74's lee bow. The Minerve and Vestale presently took their stations on the Berwick's quarter; and it was not long, according to the British account, before one or two of the headmost line-of-battle ships joined in the carronade.

In the hope that Vice-admiral Hotham's fleet might have put to sea, the Berwick kept a steady course for Leghorn; but, before noon, her rigging was cut to pieces, and every sail in ribands. Just as the Berwick had punished the temerity of the Alceste, by a broadside that is represented to have disabled her, a bar-shot took off Captain Littlejohn's head. The command then devolved upon Lieutenant Nesbit Palmer; who, considering all further resistance useless, and having, it is said, obtained the concurrence of his officers, ordered the Berwick's colours to be struck.

On board the Berwick four seamen were wounded, but the captain was the only person killed. So small a loss was attributed to the high firing of the French; who, making sure of the Berwick's capture, and wanting such a ship entire in their fleet, were wise enough to do as little injury as possible to her hull. The Alceste lost, by the Berwick's fire, her captain, another officer, and six seamen wounded, but none killed. It does not appear that the two other frigates sustained any loss. According to the French accounts, the three frigates were all that engaged the Berwick, and the action continued from first to last very little more than a quarter of an hour.

The Berwick's officers and crew were distributed among the different ships, without being allowed to take any clothes except those on their backs, and were, in every other respect, most shamefully treated. On their subsequent enlargement and return home, they were tried by a court-martial for the loss of their ship, and honourably acquitted.

On the 8th Vice-admiral Hotham, who with the British fleet composed of the

Gun-ship.			
100	Britannia	{	Vice-adm. (r.) William Hotham.
		{	Captain John Holloway.
	{ Princess-Royal	{	Vice-adm. (w.) Sam. Cranst. Goodall.
		{	Captain John Child Purvis.
98	{ St.-George	{	Vice-adm. (b.) Sir Hyde Parker.
		{	Captain Thomas Foley.
	{ Windsor-Castle	{	Rear-adm. (r.) Robert Linzee.
		{	Captain John Gore.
	{ Tancredi	"	Chevalier Caraccioli, <i>Neapolitan</i> .
	{ Captain	"	Samuel Reeve.
	{ Fortitude	"	William Young.
74	{ Illustrious	"	Thomas Lenox Frederick.
	{ Terrible	"	George Campbell.
	{ Courageux	"	Augustus Montgomery.
	{ Bedford	"	Davidge Gould.
64	{ Agamemnon	"	Horatio Nelson.
	{ Diadem	"	Charles Tyler.

Frigates, Pilade and Minerva, *Neapolitan*, and Inconstant, Lowestoffe, Meleager, and Romulus, also two sloops, and one cutter, *British*.

Was lying in Leghorn roads, received intelligence, by express from Genoa, that the French fleet, composed of fifteen sail of the line, besides frigates, had, two days before, been seen off the islands of Sainte-Marguerite. Shortly afterwards the British ship-sloop Moselle appeared in the offing, with the signal for a fleet in the north-west; which fleet, according to the report of the Moselle when she entered the road, was steering to the southward. The British fleet instantly unmoored; and at day-break on the following day, the 9th, weighed and put to sea with a strong breeze from the east-north-east.

Having no doubt that the strange fleet was from Toulon, and judging, from its alleged course when seen by the Moselle on the 6th, its destination to be Corsica, Vice-admiral Hotham shaped his course for that island; having previously despatched the Tarleton brig to San-Fiorenzo, with orders for the Berwick to join him off Cape Corse. In the course of the night the brig returned to the fleet, with the unwelcome intelligence of the Berwick's capture; and, as we conjecture, with some information that led the vice-admiral to steer to the north-west, instead of towards Corsica as he had at first intended. This alteration in the course soon began to show its beneficial effects; for on the very next day, the 10th, the advanced British frigates gained a distant sight of the French fleet, standing towards the land in the direction of Cape Noli; that is, working its way back to Toulon against a south-west wind, to avoid an encounter with the British fleet, which, the Berwick's people had doubtless informed the French admiral and deputy, was likely to have put to sea from Leghorn road. Yet the "committee of public safety,"

in its report to the National Convention, insisted that the only object (it being the policy of the French government to conceal the intended attack upon Corsica) of the fleet's sailing was, "to seek the enemy, fight the English wherever they could be found, drive them out of the Mediterranean, and restore for that sea a free navigation."

On the 11th, in the afternoon, the French fleet, counted at 15 sail of the line, six frigates, and two brigs, was descried in the south or windward quarter by the Princess-Royal and several ships then near her, and which ships were distant between five and six miles from their main body. On the 12th, at daylight, the French fleet again made its appearance, and presently bore up as if to reconnoitre. On arriving within about three miles of the Princess-Royal, the French van-ship hauled to the wind on the larboard tack, and was followed, in succession, by her companions astern. At this time, owing to the lightness of the wind and a heavy swell from the westward, none of the ships could make much progress. Towards evening, however, a fresh breeze sprung up from the south-west, and the British ships took advantage of it to close each other and form in order of battle, with their heads to the westward. At sunset the extremes of the French fleet bore from the British van west and south-west by south.

During the night, which was very squally, the French 74 *Mercure* carried away her main topmast, and was permitted to part company, attended by a frigate. Subsequently the two ships reached in safety the anchorage in Gourjean bay, and found lying there the prize-ship *Berwick*, attended also by a frigate, and then on her way to Toulon to get refitted.

On the 13th, at daylight, or soon after, the French admiral evincing no intention of bearing down to engage, Vice-admiral Hotham threw out the signal for a general chase, which was promptly complied with, the wind at this time blowing very fresh, attended with frequent squalls. At 8 A. M. the French 80-gun ship *Ca-Ira*, the third ship from the rear, accidentally ran foul of her second ahead, the *Victoire*, also of 80 guns, and, besides doing some damage to the latter, carried away her own fore and main topmasts.

So fine an opportunity was not lost upon Captain Thomas Francis Freemantle, then, with the 36-gun frigate *Inconstant*, far advanced in the chase. At about 9 A. M. this frigate, ranging up within musket-shot on the larboard quarter of the French 80, gave her a broadside and stood on. The French frigate *Vestale* presently bore down, and, after firing several distant broadsides at the *Inconstant* as she ran by her, took the *Ca-Ira* in tow. Having tacked, the *Inconstant* again passed under the lee of the two-decker, and fired into her. The latter, however, having by this time cleared the wreck of her topmasts from her larboard side, opened a heavy fire from her lower-deck guns; which killed

three, and wounded 14, of the *Inconstant's* men. One of the shots, a 36-pounder, struck the frigate between wind and water, and compelled her to bear up.

At 10 h. 45 m. A. M. the *Agamemnon* got upon the quarter of the *Ca-Ira*, still in tow by the *Vestale*, and, aided for a short time by the Captain, continued a distant engagement with the crippled 80, until about 2 h. 15 m. P. M.; when, several of the French ships bearing down to the protection of their disabled companion, the *Agamemnon* ceased firing, and dropped into her station in the line. In the mean time a partial firing had been kept up, by the *Bedford* and *Egmont* on one side, and, on the other, by the three rearmost French ships, one of which was the *Timoléon* of 74, and another the *Sans-Culotte* of 120 guns; but the action terminated, for that day, after the *Agamemnon* had bore up.

Rear-admiral Martin and Deputy Letourneur, who, for the alleged purpose of better directing the manœuvres of the fleet, had removed from the regular flag-ship, the *Sans-Culotte*, to the frigate *Friponne*, not considering, probably, their one three, and 13 two deckers able to cope with Vice-admiral Hotham's four three, and 11 two deckers, put about on the larboard tack, and kept close to the wind, which now blew moderately from the south-south-east, under all sail, followed by the British fleet on the larboard line of bearing, as fast, as four or five heavy-working ships would permit. By some accident, or, as the French accounts allege, by some mismanagement on her part, the *Sans-Culotte*, in the course of the night, separated from her companions. The French were thus left without a single three-decked ship in their fleet, to oppose to the four plainly visible in the fleet that was chasing them.

On the 14th, at daybreak, *Genoa* bearing north-east, distant about seven leagues, the French fleet was again descried to the westward, standing as before, on the larboard tack, with a moderate breeze from the southward. During the night the *Vestale* had given up the charge of the *Ca-Ira* to the *Censeur* 74; and the latter, with her dismasted companion in tow, was a considerable distance astern and to leeward of the French line.

At about 5 h. 30 m. A. M. a breeze sprang up from the north-west, which brought the British fleet to windward. At 6 h. 30 m. A. M. the captain and *Bedford*, having been ordered by signal, stood for and engaged the two separated French ships; both of whom opened their fire as the two British 74s bore down to attack them.

Being some distance ahead of the *Bedford*, the captain had to sustain the united broadsides of the French 80 and 74 for the space of 15 minutes ere she was in a situation to return a shot with effect. The consequence was that, when the firing, including that period, had lasted one hour and 20 minutes, the captain had all her sails cut to pieces, her fore and main stays-topmast

stays, three-fourths of the shrouds, and all the running rigging, shot away, her fore and mizen yards, and fore and main topmasts, disabled, some shot in the mainmast, and several in the hull, a lowerdeck gun split, several carriages broken, and all her boats rendered unserviceable. Being thus reduced to an unmanageable state, the captain made a signal for assistance, and was towed clear of her opponents.

The Bedford, also, having had her standing and running rigging and sails much cut, her foremast, fore yard, bowsprit, maintopsail yard, and mizen topmast shot through, and the poles of the fore and main topgallantmasts shot entirely away, was equally obliged to discontinue the engagement and suffer herself to be towed out of the line.

In this smart affair with the *Ca-Ira* and *Censeur*, the captain had three men killed, her first lieutenant (Wilson Rathbone), master (William Hunter), and seven seamen wounded, two of them mortally; and the Bedford had six seamen and one marine killed, her first lieutenant (Thomas Miles), 14 seamen and three marines wounded. The two French ships also suffered considerably in hull, masts, and men, and were both reduced to nearly a defenceless state.

Since the beginning of this partial engagement with his rear, the French admiral had made a signal for the fleet to wear in succession and form the line upon his van-ship, the *Duquesne*; intending to pass, on the starboard tack, to leeward of the British line then on the contrary tack, and to windward of the *Ca-Ira* and *Censeur*, so as to cover the latter from the fire of the *Illustrious* and *Courageux*, who, having made sail to support the Captain and Bedford, were now far ahead and rather to leeward of their line.

Owing to the lightness of the wind, the *Duquesne* was some time in coming round on the starboard tack. It was about this time, when almost every ship in the two fleets was in an ungovernable state for the want of wind, that the *Lowestoffe* found herself lying with her starboard quarter and stern exposed, at a long-gun range, to the larboard broadside of the *Duquesne*; who, opening her lowerdeck ports, commenced a fire upon the British frigate. Not being in a position to discharge a gun in return, Captain Hallowell judiciously ordered all his crew, except the officers and the man at the wheel, to go below; so that, when the large and beautiful Neapolitan frigate *Minerva*, as she drifted near to the *Duquesne*, took off the attention of the French crew from the *Lowestoffe*, the latter had not a man hurt: her stern and sails, however, were a good deal cut, by the 74's shot. At length the *Duquesne* got round on the starboard tack, and then, instead of leading her line, as she had been ordered by the signal, to leeward, the French 74 passed to windward, of the British van-ships.

At 8 A. M. the *Illustrious* began, within about 600 yards, to engage the *Duquesne* and *Victoire* in succession, when a third ship, the *Tonnant*, joined against her; and with the three French ships, two of which were 80s, the *Illustrious* and *Courageux* kept up a warm cannonade. At 9 A. M. the fore topmast of the *Illustrious* went over the starboard bow; and at 9 h. 15 m. A. M. her mainmast fell aft on the poop, carrying away the mizenmast, and breaking the beams of the poop deck. Her foremast and bowsprit were also dangerously wounded, and her hull pierced with shot in every direction. The *Courageux*, also, had her main and mizen masts shot away, and her hull much shattered.

The three French ships, at length, passing ahead, and, in consequence of the calm state of the weather, not being closely followed by the remainder of their line, the *Illustrious* and *Courageux* were fortunate enough (their friends having, in like manner, been retarded by the want of wind) to be no longer assailed by a force, the decided superiority of which must soon either have sunk or subdued them; as, coupled with their damages, the following account of their loss will testify. The *Illustrious* had 15 seamen and five marines killed, one midshipman (Mr. Moore), 68 seamen, and one marine, wounded; the *Courageux*, one midshipman (Mr. Coleman), eight seamen, and six marines killed; her master (Mr. Blackburn), 21 seamen, and 11 marines wounded.

The *Duquesne*, *Victoire*, and *Tonnant*, after exchanging a few shots with the British ships astern of their two crippled opponents, abandoned the *Ca-Ira* and *Censeur* to their fate, and, followed by the ships astern, which a light air of wind was now bringing up, stood away to the westward under all sail. The firing, which, as we have shown, had commenced at 6 h. 20 m. A. M., ceased altogether about 2 P. M.; at which time Vice-admiral Hotham, considering that his van-ships were not in a condition to renew the action, and still impressed, we suppose, with the idea that the French fleet consisted of 15 sail of the line, did not tack in pursuit: hence, the two fleets, steering in opposite directions, were soon so far separated as to be mutually out of sight.

None of the British ships sustained any damage or loss equal in extent to the Captain, Bedford, *Illustrious*, and *Courageux*; and the greater part of the *Egmont's* loss, which, except that of the *Windsor-Castle*, was the most severe of any suffered by the remaining British ships, arose from the bursting of one of her lowerdeck guns. The Neapolitan 74 *Tancredi* received several shots between wind and water, and had her foremast injured: her loss amounted to one killed and five wounded. The frigate *Minerva*, belonging to the same power, was struck by three of the *Ca-Ira's* shots: one entered the cabin-window, and wounded

four men, the only loss the frigate suffered; another lodged in the counter between wind and water; and the third cut away a considerable quantity of lower rigging.

The Windsor-Castle had six seamen killed, one lieutenant (Thomas Hawker), and 30 seamen and marines wounded; Egmont, seven killed and 21 wounded; Saint-George, four killed and 13, including Lieutenant Robert Honeyman, wounded; Princess-Royal, three killed and eight wounded; Diadem, three killed and seven wounded; Britannia, one killed and 18 wounded; Fortitude, one killed and four wounded; Terrible, six, and Agamemnon, 13, including her master, John Wilson, wounded: making, with the loss of the Inconstant, Captain, Bedford, Illustrious, Courageux, Tancredi, and Minerva frigate, already given, a total of 74 killed, and 284 wounded.*

Of the French ships, the Ca-Ira and Censeur made a most gallant resistance; not surrendering until the latter had her mainmast, and the former (from the first, as we have seen, without topmasts) her fore and main masts shot away. Their Captains, Jean-Félix Benoit, and Louis-Marie Coudé, merited every praise; and so did their officers and crews. Having, in addition to their regular complements, a quantity of troops on board, the united loss of these ships in the action was about 400 men. The Duquesne, Victoire, Tonnant, and Timoléon, also sustained some loss, particularly the second and last ships; but

* The following statement will exhibit the separate loss of each ship, and other particulars, including the order of battle, as laid down in the official letter.

Division.	Squadron.	Ships of the Line.	Tons.	Men and boys.	K.	W.
Starboard or Weather.	Van.	Captain	1639	584	3	19
		Bedford	1605	584	7	18
		Tancredi (neapolitan)	1800	600	1	5
		Princess-Royal (flag)	1973	753	3	8
		Agamemnon	1384	485	0	13
	Centre.	Illustrious	1616	584	20	70
		Courageux	1721	634	15	33
		Britannia (flag)	2091	850	1	18
		Egmont	1643	584	7	21
		Windsor-Castle (flag)	1874	746	6	31
	Rear.	Diadem	1376	485	3	7
		Saint-George (flag)	1950	753	4	13
		Terrible	1678	584	0	6
Fortitude.....		1645	584	1	4	
		Frigates.	23996	8810		
		Inconstant	267	3	14
		Minerva	0	4

we are unable to specify its amount. Much damage was likewise done to the *Timoléon* and *Victoire*, to the latter in particular; and the credit of inflicting it, as well as what the *Tonnant* and *Duquesne* may have suffered, belonged almost exclusively to the *Illustrious* and *Courageux*.

This not being an action of a very decisive or important nature, it will be unnecessary to enter minutely into the force on either side. A general view, however, may be desirable, and that we can readily present. None of the British ships appearing to have been ordered any carronades, their long-gun force, as specified in the first annual abstract, will suffice. With respect to the Neapolitan 74 *Tancredi*, we shall consider her to have been armed with the same nominal calibers, as the French 74, No. 4, in the table at p. 54; and, in reducing the weight into English pounds, shall apply the rule (see p. 43) laid down for Spanish guns. Hence, the *Tancredi's* broadside weight of shot will be 849 pounds English: her number of tons we shall consider to be 1800. The *Britannia* mounted 42-pounders on her lower deck: her broadside weight of metal consequently amounts to 280 lbs. more than what stands as the force of her class at E in the first annual abstract.

The French *Toulon* ships do not appear to have mounted, as yet, any carronades. Their force is therefore readily obtained, by a reference to the establishment of each class, as shown in the small table to which we have before referred. The French fleet, in this instance, had troops on board, in number, according to the British official account, 4220. As, however, the principal officers of the *Ca-Ira* and *Censeur* swore, on their examination in the prize-court, that the total number of persons on board their respective ships, at the commencement of the action, amounted, instead of, as in the official account, 1300 for each ship of 80, and 1000 for each ship of 74 guns, in the *Ca-Ira* to 1060, and in the *Censeur* to 921, the probability is, that the troops did not much exceed 3400; and there can be no doubt that the French naval officers, on going into action, wished the troops and their baggage out of the ships. It will be to the advantage of the British, not to notice the troops at all; but to consider the French ships as having had on board their full complements of men, and no more. These complements appear also to be overrated in the British admiral's letter: the establishment of a French 120 is, in round numbers, 1100 men, of an 80, 840 men, and of a 74, 700 men; and not 1200, 950, and 730.

The tonnages of the French ships may be stated, at 2600 for the 120, an estimate that makes her 147 tons less than her reputed sister-ship, the *Commerce-de-Marseille*; at 2210 tons, as the actual measurement of one, and a moderate average for another 80; at 2281, as the actual measurement of the third 80; and at 19,711 tons, for the eleven 74s, part of them by actual

measurement, the remainder upon a fair average. These points settled, the following statement will exhibit a tolerably correct view of the

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE TWO FLEETS.

		BRITISH. March. 12, 13, & 14.	FRENCH.		
			March		
			12.	13.	14.
Ships	No.	14	15	14	13
Broadside-guns . . .	{ No.	557	587	550	490
	{ lbs.	12711	14587	13680	12307
Crews	Agg. No.	8810	11320	10620	9520
Size	„ tons.	23996	29012	27212	24612

Those who recollect the boasting of the French Republic, at this particular time, may be surprised that Rear-admiral Martin and M. Deputy Letourneur did not bear down to engage on the first day, whatever they may have done on the second, when the French had lost one ship by parting company, and another, it may be said, by getting dismasted; or, on the third day, when they had lost the weathergage, and a third ship, by far the most powerful in the fleet.

It may here be remarked, that, according to a list in the British official account, the Sans-Culotte and Mercure were both present on the 14th of March; yet, not only are the French accounts clear on that point, but no notice is taken, in the log of any one of the British ships, of the sight of an enemy's three-decked ship after the evening of the 13th. Yet, a periodical naval work of some notoriety contains the following statement: "The Sans-Culotte was so severely handled by him (Captain Frederick of the Courageux) and others, that it was the principal cause of her quitting her own fleet, and (she) with difficulty reached Genoa, during a heavy gale that succeeded the action.*

To enumerate the instances of want of precision, discoverable in Vice-admiral Hotham's letter, would be to enter again into the details of an action, of which enough has already appeared. Suffice it, that one English writer, finding nothing but confusion in the gazette account, and not knowing, seemingly, where else to search for particulars, has drawn up a very brief, but not the less obscure, account of the battle; and another writer, although obliged to confess himself unable to comprehend on which tack either fleet was formed, has persisted in giving three sets of figures descriptive of the evolutions of the two.†

The French naval writers, very naturally, lay all the blame of what befel their fleet to the conventional deputy who was on board of it; and one writer makes M. Letourneur's surname

* Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxvii., p. 354.

† Ekins's Naval Battles, p. 196 and plate.

“de la Manche,” or “of the Channel,” the butt of his wit, in saying, that it “appeared to be a pledge of knowledge in the direction of a fleet, but now seems only to denote a countryman of the hero of Cervantes.”* One thing is clear, that there was no landman to control the movements of the British fleet; and yet who, from a review of all the circumstances, will say that he commander-in-chief of it did all that was practicable? However, the capture of two line-of-battle ships, and the superiority of force against the British in the statement at the foot of the gazette-letter, occasioned Vice-admiral Hotham’s action off Genoa to rank, in public opinion, as a sort of second-rate victory.

Taking in tow his dismasted ships, including the two prizes, the British admiral bore away for Spezia bay. On the night of the 17th the *Illustrious*, and the *Meleager* frigate that had her in tow, separated from the fleet in a violent gale of wind from the south-east. Shortly afterwards the hawser parted, and, being unable, on account of the heavy sea and increasing gale, to send a fresh tow-rope to the frigate, the *Illustrious* hove to. The ship now laboured very much, and shipped a great deal of water through the lowerdeck ports, many of the lids of which had been damaged or destroyed in the action: her jury mizen-mast also went by the board, and most of her sails blew to pieces. At daylight on the 18th land was seen ahead, but it could not be made out. To avoid the threatened danger, the two ships put their heads to the eastward, which brought them on the starboard tack.

At about noon the *Meleager* parted company; and at 1 h. 30 m. p. m. the third gun from forward on the larboard side of the lower deck of the *Illustrious* went off, from the friction of the shot in the gun, blew off the port-lid, and carried away the upper port-sill. Unable to continue on this tack owing to the rush of water through the open port, or to put about on the other on account of the proximity of breakers in that direction, the *Illustrious* wore until the port was secured, and then, hauling up again, as well as the want of aftersail would permit, and laid up north.

At about 2 p. m. the *Illustrious* made the land to the eastward of the gulf of Spezia, and at 2 h. 30 m. Captain Frederick gave charge of the ship to a man on board, who declared himself a pilot for that part of the coast, and promised to anchor the *Illustrious* in safety. At 7 h. 30 m. p. m., shoaling the water unexpectedly, Captain Frederick ordered the anchor to be let go, and veered to a whole cable: the ship was then in Valence

* “La convention nomma à ce poste *Letourneur de la Manche*, dont le surnom parut un gage de science dans la direction d’une armée navale, et semble aujourd’hui ne désigner qu’un compatriote du héros de Cervantes.”—*Principes Organiques de la Marine Militaire, et Causes de sa Décadence dans la dernière Guerre*, par Pinière.

bay, situated between Spezia and Leghorn. Just as this was done, the *Illustrious* struck the ground abaft, and the cable by which she had till then been held, and another employed to supply its place, parted successively. The previously damaged state of the stocks of the sheet and spare anchors rendering it impossible to let go a third anchor, the ship paid round off in-shore, and, although the wind had moderated since 6 p. m., the sea made a fair breach over her. At 10 p. m. it began to blow hard from the west-south-west, and at 10 h. 30 m. p. m., owing to the heavy shocks which the ship received, the rudder was carried away.

Soon after daylight on the 19th attempts were made to get a hawser on shore, then only half a mile distant, with the view of saving the people by a raft, but without success. In the evening the brig-sloop *Tarleton*, Captain Charles Brisbane, arrived, and anchored near the wreck, but the weather would not admit the passage of boats. On the 20th, in the morning, the *Lowe-stoffe* frigate, Captain Benjamin Hallowell, arrived; and shortly afterwards the *Romulus*, Captain George Hope, together with the launches of the British fleet, then at anchor in Spezia bay. At length, the crew and principal part of the stores having been removed to the vessels in company, the hull of the *Illustrious* was set on fire and destroyed.

On the 25th, after some partial repairs done to the disabled ships, the fleet weighed from Spezia bay, and on the 26th cast anchor in the bay of San-Fiorenzo. Here the British fleet lay refitting until the 18th of April; when Admiral Hotham (promoted on the 16th to be admiral of the blue), leaving behind the two prizes, to one of which, the *Ca-Ira*, Captain Henry Dudley Pater had been appointed, and to the other, the *Censeur*, Captain John Gore, proceeded to Leghorn, and on the 27th anchored with his fleet in the road.

The French, after their disaster, proceeded straight to the bay of Hyères; where the fleet was soon afterwards joined by the *Mercure* and *Berwick* from Gourjean bay, and on the 23d by the *Sans-Culotte* from Genoa; which port the French three-decker had entered on the morning of the 16th, after having been chased by five ships of war, supposed to be British, but in all probability Spanish. The French admiral despatched the *Victoire*, *Timoléon*, and *Berwick*, and the frigates *Alceste* and *Minerve*, to Toulon, to get repaired, and, with his fleet, now reduced to 11 sail of the line and about four frigates, remained at anchor in Hyères' bay.

On the 4th of April Rear-admiral Renaudin, whose departure from Brest we formerly noticed, anchored in Toulon road with the 80-gun ship *Formidable*, 74s *Jupiter*, *Mont-Blanc*, *Jem-mappes*, *Révolution*, and *Tyrannicide*, frigates *Embuscade*, *Félicité*, and another, and two or three corvettes. This squadron was a great acquisition to Vice-admiral Martin (promoted

to that rank on the 22d of March); as, not only were the ships, except perhaps the *Formidable* recently launched at Lorient, prime sailers, but, among the captains in command of them, were the two enterprising officers, Richery and Ganteaume. We are in doubt whether Rear-admiral Jean-Louis Delmotte, and chef de division Villeneuve, arrived with this reinforcement, or had previously belonged to Vice-admiral Martin's force, now augmented, without reckoning the three ships ordered for repair, to 17 sail of the line.

About the time that Rear-admiral Renaudin arrived, Vice-admiral Martin removed from Hyères bay to the road of Toulon; where, some time in May, a spirit of disaffection broke out among the crews of the Toulon ships, but not, it appears, among those from Brest. The latter were moored across the entrance of the road, to defend the harbour and shipping from any attempt that might be made upon them by the British; but such precautions were unnecessary, the British fleet lying inactive at Leghorn. At length, by the great exertions of the new conventional deputy M. Niou, a man either belonging or that had belonged to the navy, order was restored in the fleet, and the seamen pledged themselves, in the most solemn manner, "to wash their crime in the blood of the enemies of the republic."

To keep alive this laudable feeling and profit by its effects, Vice-admiral Martin, or rather, as the French accounts say, M. deputy Niou, on the 7th of June, put to sea with the fleet, consisting, as already mentioned, of 17 sail of the line (one 120, two 80s, remainder 74s), besides six frigates and two or three corvettes.

On the 8th of May the British fleet sailed from Leghorn on a cruise off Cape Mola, the south-west extremity of the island of Minorca; and on the 14th of June, while close to the cape, was joined by a squadron of nine sail of the line, under Rear-admiral Mann, from Gibraltar and England. Admiral Hotham continued cruising off Minorca until the morning of the 24th; then bore up and made sail to the eastward, and on the 29th, in the afternoon, anchored in the bay of San-Fiorenzo.

On the 4th of July Admiral Hotham detached Commodore Nelson, with the *Agamemnon* 64, *Meleager* frigate, 20-gun ship *Ariadne*, *Moselle* sloop, and *Mutine* cutter, with directions to proceed, in the first instance, off Genoa, and then cruise along the coast to the westward. On the 7th, at 4 P. M., Cape del Melle bearing north by west, distant six or seven leagues, the *Agamemnon* discovered the Toulon fleet, about five leagues off in the north-west. In the evening the French fleet went in chase; and, during the night, some of the leading ships came fast up with the *Moselle*. On the 8th, at 7 h. 20 m. A. M., Cape Corse bearing south-east by south, distant five leagues, the *Agamemnon* began firing guns as signals to the fleet in San-

Fiorenzo bay; and, at 9 h. 30 m. A.M., the French ships discovering the British fleet of 22 sail of the line and several frigates, at anchor, left off chase and turned their heads to the westward.

The state of the wind, which blew right into the bay, was not the only obstacle that prevented the British fleet from immediately proceeding in chase. Most of the ships were in the midst of watering and refitting. Owing, however, to the extraordinary exertions of their crews, Admiral Hotham was enabled, at 9 P.M., to take advantage of the land-wind, and get under way with the fleet. That fleet, on being joined by Commodore Nelson's squadron, consisted of the

Gun-ship.			
100	Britannia.....	{	Admiral (b.) William Hotham. 1
		{	Captain John Holloway.
	Victory*	{	Rear-admiral (b.) Robert Mann.† 5
		{	Captain John Knight.
	Princess-Royal.....	{	Vice-admiral (r.) Sam. Cranston Goodall. 2
		{	Captain John Child Purvis.
98	St.-George	{	Vice-admiral (r.) Sir Hyde Parker. 3
		{	Captain Thomas Foley.
	Windsor-Castle	{	Vice-admiral (w.) Robert Linzee. 4
		{	Captain John Gore.
80	Barfleur*.....	„	John Bazeley.
	Gibraltar*	„	John Pakenham.
	Captain	„	Samuel Reeve.
	Fortitude	„	William Young.
	Bombay-Castle*	„	Charles Chamberlayne.
	Saturn*	„	James Douglas.
	Cumberland*	„	Barth. Samuel Rowley.
	Terrible	„	George Campbell.
74	Defence*	„	Thomas Wells.
	Egmont	„	John Sutton.
	Culloden*	„	Thomas Troubridge.
	Bedford	„	David Gould.
	Courageux	„	Benjamin Hallowell.
	Audacious*	„	William Shield.
	Guiscardo	{	Portuguese ships, captains unknown.
	Sannito	{	
64	Agamemnon	{	Commodore Horatio Nelson.
	Diadem	{	Captain Charles Tyler.

Frigates, Meleager and Cyclops, 20-gun ship Ariadne; *sloops*, Comet, Eclair, and Flèche; and *cutter* Resolution.

On the 8th, at noon, the British fleet, having cleared San-Fiorenzo bay, steered to the westward under all sail, with the wind from the south-south-west. On the 12th, in the evening, Levant island bearing from the van of the British fleet west, distant eight leagues, two vessels, spoken by the Cyclops,

* The ships thus marked were those that joined the admiral on the 14th of the preceding month.

† Had shifted his flag from the Cumberland a few hours only before the fleet got under way.

Captain William Hotham, and Flèche, Captain Thomas Boys, gave information that, a few hours before, they had seen the French fleet to the southward of the Hyères. The admiral immediately threw out the signal to prepare for battle, and the fleet made all sail to the south-west.

During the night a heavy gale from the west-north-west split the main topsails of six of the British ships; and on the 13th, at daybreak, the wind still blowing fresh, attended by a heavy swell, while different ships were bending new topsails, the French fleet was discovered about five miles off upon the lee beam; standing on the larboard tack and very much scattered, was the British fleet then on the opposite tack, standing to the southward. At 3 h. 45 m. Admiral Hotham made the signal for his fleet to form the starboard, and, in about an hour afterwards, the larboard, line of bearing, and to make all possible sail, preserving that order. This was done for the alleged purpose of keeping the wind of the enemy and cutting him off from the shore, then only five leagues distant.

At 8 A. M., finding that the French admiral, whose fleet formed now in a compact line on the larboard tack, was steering about two points off the wind, which at this time blew from the westward, had no other view than that of endeavouring to escape, Admiral Hotham made the signal for a general chase, and for the ships to take suitable stations for mutual support, and to engage the enemy on arriving up with him in succession. The signal was obeyed with alacrity, and the ships were soon under all the sail that their masts would bear. In the course of the forenoon the wind moderated, and drew more to the southward, and at noon the rear of the French fleet bore from the British van north-north-east, distant three-quarters of a mile; but the rearmost ship of the British fleet, as a proof of its disunited state, was nearly eight miles off in the west-south-west.

At half past noon the wind suddenly shifted from south-west by west to north, and thus brought the starboard and lee broadsides of the three rearmost French ships to bear upon the British van; the three leading ships of which were the Victory, Culloden, and Cumberland. The fire thus opened upon them was quickly returned with interest, especially upon the sternmost French ship, the Alcide; which, in less than an hour, became greatly disabled. At about 1 h. 30 m. P. M. the Culloden had her main topmast shot away, but, nevertheless, was using every effort, by crowding sail upon her fore and mizen masts, to get again alongside of the enemy.

At a few minutes before 2 P. M. the Alcide, after a noble defence, struck her colours to the Cumberland; who, without stopping to take possession, passed on to the second French ship in the rear. In the mean time the French frigates Justice and Alceste had approached the Alcide to take her in tow, and the Alceste actually sent her boat for that purpose; but a shot from

the Victory sank the boat, and the two French frigates were compelled to retreat. The Agamemnon, Blenheim, Captain, and Defence, were now becoming distantly engaged.

At 2 h. 42 m. P. M., just as the Cumberland having fired several shot at the Justice, and received great annoyance from the stern guns of one of the French line-of-battle ships, had attained a position alongside of the latter, the signal was thrown out to discontinue the action. Once, if not twice, had the Victory to repeat the signal, with the Cumberland's pendants, before that ship would, or, we suppose we must say, could see it. When this signal was made by Admiral Hotham, the Blenheim, Gibraltar, Captain, and a few other ships were closing with the enemy's rear; and the Defence from her known good sailing, would probably have been in advance of them, had she not, while lying to upon the larboard quarter of the Victory, kept her mizen topsail aback, after repeated hails from that ship to fill and stand on.

At the time the action ended in this indecisive manner, Cape Roux bore from the Victory, then among the ships that were nearest the shore, north-west half-west, distant four leagues. The French fleet, however, by a sudden change of wind to the eastward, had gained the weathergage on the starboard tack, and, while the centre and rear of the British fleet lay nearly becalmed in the offing, was standing, with a light air, towards the bay of Fréjus; but we believe that Vice-admiral Martin, having about 7 P. M. been headed by a breeze from the south-west, did not reach an anchorage until very late.*

* The following statement of this miserable action is from the note-book of as gallant an admiral as the service can boast—he was an eyewitness, and a lieutenant on board the Victory.

“On the 12th of July, 1795, the English fleet, of 21 sail of the line, six of them being three-deckers, in company with two Neapolitan (Mr. James calls them Portuguese) seventy-fours, were a very few leagues to the eastward of Toulon. The wind blowing strong from the Gulf of Lyons from W.N.W. to N.W. In the evening the look-out frigates signalled “the French fleet out, and at no great distance.” The admiral made the signal to prepare for battle.

“At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 13th July, it being my morning watch, on going on deck I saw the whole French fleet under our lee, at about the distance of from two to four leagues, consisting of 17 sail of the line, irregularly formed, and sailing large on the larboard tack, standing in for the land about Fréjus bay. The English fleet, more collected, although six ships had split topsails in the night during the gale, which was still blowing at 4 o'clock, were on the starboard tack standing off the shore, which must have been at least 13 leagues distant. We thus continued to stand on opposite tacks, separately from each other, until about 6 o'clock, when the signal was made to wear, and soon afterwards that for “a general chase.” At this time the French fleet were 6 or 7 leagues from us, and had got in shore, leaving us little hope of our nearing them before they reached the land. However, by carrying a press of sail, and the wind dying away as the French drew in shore, and the English carrying the strong breeze up with them, we were enabled, with six of the fastest and best-managed ships of the van, to close

Of the six or seven ships that were enabled to take any part in this action, if such it can be called, the Culloden was the only one that lost any mast; but the Victory was a considerable sufferer, having had all her stays, except the fore stay, shot

with the rear of the French line, and the action commenced at noon with the three or four rearmost ships of the enemy.

"At this time, or very shortly afterwards, the wind having fallen away, a breeze sprung up from the eastward, which brought the French to windward of us on the starboard tack, our ships in the rear coming up with a fresh breeze at N.W., about 1 P.M. Our six ships before mentioned were joined by the Blenheim and Princess-Royal, the Bombay-Castle, and one or two more, being not far astern. It was about this time that the Alcide caught fire in the foretop, and was soon in flames: she was the second in the rear of the enemy. The Victory, which ship ought to have pushed on and been foremost on such a day, hailed several of the ships to pass ahead of her; and she positively backed her maintopsail to allow others to get in advance of her; whereas, had she carried sail at first, before the wind chopped round, she might easily have passed through the rear of the enemy's line, between the third and fourth ships, have secured three, and brought on a general action. At 2 o'clock the commander-in-chief, being 8 or 9 miles astern, not knowing the actual state of affairs, and fearing his van to be too near the coast, made the signal to discontinue the action, and recalled his van.

"It was not too late at this hour of the day to have done much, had the admiral, whose flag was flying on board the Victory (Rear-admiral Robert Mann), stated by signal 'that the enemy could have been attacked with advantage,' for we were at least three leagues off the land, and had 9 ships up, 3 of three decks, and others coming. At this time three or four more ships might have been captured with ease; but, no! the signal to discontinue the action was obeyed without remonstrance, or stating what could be done. The Cumberland, however, was some time before she obeyed the signal, and followed the enemy; then, firing her broadside, she wore round and rejoined her fleet. The enemy were very badly manœuvred, and fired without doing any execution of consequence for two hours.

"Had the English fleet only put their heads the same way as the enemy's, and stood in-shore at 4 o'clock, the whole of the French line might have been cut off from the land, taken, or destroyed, and even afterwards they might have been followed into Frejus bay, and *wholly destroyed*.

"There was a most beautiful manœuvre performed by the captain of the French frigate, the Alceste, stationed to windward of the enemy's line. Seeing the second ship from the rear (the Alcide) in distress, and dropping astern into our fire, she bore down right athwart the bows, lowered a boat, and attempted to send her on board the Alcide with a hawser, in order to tow her clear of us; but before the boat accomplished the object, a shot from the Cumberland cut her in two, and she disappeared in an instant, with all her brave and unfortunate crew. The frigate perceiving the calamity, immediately made all sail in a masterly manner, as such a clever officer would naturally do, and soon got out of danger.

"On this frigate coming down to take the Alcide in tow, the captain of the Victory of 100 guns, came down below with orders to reserve our fire for the frigate which had bore away to rescue the French 74, then abreast of us, and not half a mile distant; and although the Victory did fire, and many other ships also at this gallant vessel, she had the good fortune to escape any serious accident, having only some of the running rigging cut, which was soon replaced by her daring crew. She got off most beautifully, to the astonishment and wonder of all our fleet, and I pronounce this to be the best executed (although unsuccessful) and most daring manœuvre I ever witnessed in the presence of so very superior a force."

away, as well as her maintopgallant, foretopsail, and spritsail yards. Her bowsprit and all three of her lower masts were also wounded in several places. The Cumberland likewise suffered considerably, having had her main stay, maintopmast stay, shrouds, and running rigging, much cut.

The loss sustained in the action was as follows: Culloden, two seamen killed, her first lieutenant (Tristram Whitter) and four seamen wounded; the Victory, two midshipmen (James Beale and William Willison, neither of whom are named in the Gazette) and three marines killed, one lieutenant (John Hinton), one midshipman (William Irwin), one major and one lieutenant of marines (Frederick Hill Flight and William Darley), and 11 seamen wounded; the Blenheim, two seamen killed and two wounded; the Captain and Defence, each one seaman killed, and the latter six wounded. Owing to the high firing of her opponents, the Cumberland sustained no loss whatever. The total loss in the British fleet amounted, therefore, to no more than 11 killed and 27 wounded.*

About a quarter of an hour after her surrender, the Alcide caught fire in the foretop, owing, it is believed, to some grenades, or other combustible missiles, placed there for use; and, notwithstanding every exertion by the people on board of her, the ship was soon in a blaze fore and aft. About 300, out of the 615 deposed to by her officers as the number of her crew, were saved by the boats of the nearest British ships; but the remainder unfortunately perished in the awful explosion which took place about an hour and a half after the fire had broken out.

Upon the merits of the affair off Hyères, we are relieved from the task of commenting, by the scientific remarks of a professional contemporaneous; who, however, has left the action, in the way of detail, quite as brief and unsatisfactory as it stands in the official account.

"In this action," says Captain Brenton, "there was a total misapplication of tactic, neither recommended by a clerk or justified by experience. The French fleet should have been attacked by a general chase as soon as discovered: the bending new topsails, when the enemy was dead to leeward, was at best a useless measure; and it is much to be regretted that time was lost in forming a line of bearing, which could not be preserved with any effect; as the admiral observes in his despatches, 'the calms and shifts of wind in that country rendering all naval operations peculiarly uncertain.' With this knowledge it was incumbent on him to have dashed upon his enemy, who he knew would not wait for him, and who must have been in a great measure unpre-

* In Admiral Hotham's letter in the Gazette, the total stated is 10 killed and 25 wounded; but there appears to have been a mistake in the return of the Victory's loss, no officer being mentioned except one midshipman, and he is not named.

pared: by an immediate chase he would have compelled them to engage, or have increased their distance from the land, which would in a great degree have ensured their capture or destruction. The delay of making the signal gave them time to recover from their confusion; and when, after a lapse of four hours, the British admiral made sail in chase, the wind failed, and the opportunity was irrecoverably lost.”*

To this it may be added, that the British admiral, had he persevered in the chase for a few hours longer, would have regained the wind of his opponent; as appears by the following entry in the log of the *Victory*: “At half-past 7 bore up; enemy turning into *Fréjus*; wind south-west.” On the other hand, great allowance must be made for the locomotive disqualifications of the chasing fleet, or rather, of the single ship, by whose rate of going the speed of the fleet was, in a great measure, to be regulated. To talk of making a “dash,” where such ships as the old *Britannia* and *St.-George* are present, is enough to raise a smile. Had the first been a private ship, the two might have been left behind to join the next day; but, as carrying on board of her the commander-in-chief of the fleet, the *Britannia*, who was by far the worst sailer of the two, could not be left entirely out of sight.

The decided inferiority of the French, who, besides having but 17 ships to oppose to 23, had but one three-decker to oppose to six, is a sufficient excuse for their declining to engage. The French writers admit that Vice-admiral Martin did his utmost to avoid an engagement, on account of the odds against him; but they wish to have it believed, that the *Alcide* caught fire and blew up in the act of defending herself, instead of after she had struck. The interval between the hauling down of the colours and the first appearance of the fire in the fore top is, however, clearly marked in the logs of the adjacent British ships. It will be enough to say, that the captain of the *Alcide* did his duty like a brave officer; and we wish we knew both his name and the name of the officer who commanded the ship next ahead of him in the line, that ship having, in the most gallant manner, backed her main topsail, to cover, however ineffectually, her disabled companion from the irresistible force by which she was assailed.†

The French fleet soon afterwards returned to Toulon, and the British fleet proceeded, first to San-Fiorenzo, and then to Leghorn. On the 6th of August Admiral Hotham again put to sea, with 20 English, and three Neapolitan sail of the line, and, arriv-

* Brenton, vol. ii., p. 74.

† The contempt with which the officers of the present day speak of this action, considering the superiority of the English, both in three-deckers and in general numbers, sufficiently bears out Brenton in any remarks he may have made on the subject. The relinquishing pursuit, at the moment the *Victory* bore up, is perfectly incomprehensible, and the results of the action are as trivial as the list of killed and wounded.—*Editor*.

ing off Cape Sepet on the 8th, saw the French fleet at anchor in Toulon road. The British admiral then stood away to the eastward, having first detached Captain Nelson, in the *Agamemnon*, with the frigates *Inconstant*, *Meleager*, *Tartar*, and *Southampton*, 20-gun ship *Ariadne*, and brig-sloop *Speedy*, on a cruise along the coast of Italy, for the purpose of co-operating with the Austrian and Sardinian armies in an attempt to expel the republicans from the Genoese territories.

On the 26th, the boats of this squadron, under the personal direction of the commodore, boarded and cut out of the bays of Allassio and Languaglia, in the vicinity of Vado, and then in the possession of a French republican army, two French gun-brigs, the *Résolu* of ten, and another of six guns, two 5-gun galleys, and five merchant vessels laden with provisions. Captain Nelson also destroyed two other vessels, and performed the whole service without the loss of a man.

After the capture of the *Tigre*, *Formidable*, and *Alexandre*, off *Isle Groix*, the French government deemed it necessary to restore to the Brest fleet; as many ships from Toulon as had previously been detached thither; and accordingly, on the 14th of September, Rear-admiral Richery, with the 80-gun ship *Victoire*, 74s *Barras*, *Jupiter*, *Berwick*, *Résolution*, and *Duquesne*, and frigates *Embuscade*, *Félicité*, and *Friponne*, put to sea from the road. The orders of M. Richery, it appears, were not to proceed straight to Brest, but to cruise for a few months on the coast of Newfoundland; and, fortunately for the rear-admiral, no conventional deputy divided with him the command of the squadron.

On the 22d a cartel brought to Admiral Hotham, who two days before had anchored in San-Fiorenzo bay, the first intelligence of the escape of this French squadron from Toulon. On the 5th of October, and not before, Rear-admiral Mann, with a squadron of six sail of the line, composed of the *Windsor-Castle* 98 (his flag-ship), *Cumberland*, *Defence*, *Terrible*, *Audacious*, and *Saturn*, 74s, and frigates *Blonde* and *Castor*, was detached in pursuit; too late, however, to be of any service, as the sequel will show.

On the 25th of September the British 74-gun ships *Fortitude*, Captain Thomas Taylor, *Bedford*, Captain Augustus Montgomery, and *Censeur* (jury-rigged and armed en flûte), Captain John Gore, which had been detached from Admiral Hotham's fleet a few weeks before, sailed from Gibraltar for England, with a valuable convoy from the Levant, numbering 63 sail; and with, for its additional protection, the 44-gun ship *Argo*, Captain Richard Randell Burgess, 12-pounder 32-gun frigates *Juno*, Captain Lord Amelius Beauclerk, and *Lutine*, Captain William Haggitt, and fireship *Tisiphone*, Captain Joseph Turner.

On the same night, in passing through the gut, the *Argo* and *Juno*, with 32 sail of the convoy, parted company. The remain-

ing ships kept with the commodore until the 7th of October; when, at about 9 h. 30 m. A. M., Cape St.-Vincent, by account, bearing east half-south distant 48 leagues, a squadron, which proved to be that of Rear-admiral Richery, was descried in the north-east. As soon as the character of the strangers became known, the commodore made the signal for the convoy to disperse, and, with the Bedford, Censeur, and Fortitude, formed the line, determined, if the French meditated an attack, to give them battle, and save as many as possible of the convoy.

At 1 P. M., just as the three ships had formed in line, the Censeur rolled away her fore topmast, and having only a frigate's mainmast, was compelled to drop astern. On observing that the French ships now fast approached, Captain Taylor judged it proper, with the concurrence of his officers and of Captain Montgomery, to bear up. The British immediately did so, the two efficient 74s keeping close together for mutual support.

At 1 h. 50 m. P. M. the leading French ship opened her fire on the Censeur; who, in about five minutes, returned it with spirit, and was assisted occasionally by the stern-chasers of the Fortitude and Bedford: to fire which, they had been obliged to cut down a great part of the stern. Meanwhile the three French frigates, as they came up, brought to the merchant vessels, and the French line-of-battle ships pressed hard upon all five of the English ships of war. At 2 h. 30 m. P. M., having had her two remaining topmasts shot away, and having expended nearly all the small quantity of powder with which she had originally been supplied, the Censeur struck her colours to three of the French 74s. Shortly afterwards the latter commenced firing at the Lutine. The frigate returned their fire smartly, and, in the end, effected her escape; as did also the Fortitude, Bedford, and Tisiphone.

The 32 merchant vessels, in charge of the Argo and her consort, arrived safe at their destination, but those with Captain Taylor were not so fortunate. Thirty out of 31 sail of them fell into the hands of M. Richery; who on the 13th, with his squadron, the recaptured Censeur, and his fleet of prizes, entered in triumph the port of Cadiz: where, however, he was compelled to remain longer than suited his wishes, or the interests of his government.

But M. Richery's was not the only squadron which escaped from Toulon in the autumn of 1795. Towards the latter end of September chef de division Honoré Ganteaume, with the Mont-Blanc 74, frigates Junon and Justice of 40, Artémise and Sérieuse of 36, and Badine of 28 guns, and the 16-gun brig-corvette Hasard, sailed from the road on a cruise in the Levant, expressly to intercept, previously to its departure from that sea, the very convoy, which afterwards, by accident as it were, fell into the hands of M. Richery.

While contending with contrary winds between Sardinia and Minorca, M. Ganteaume passed barely out of sight of Rear-admiral Mann's squadron on its way to Gibraltar. A French writer, in the "*Victoires et Conquêtes*," declares that M. Ganteaume chased, and very nearly captured, the *Agamemnon* 64, Captain Horatio Nelson, and that subsequently he himself was chased by a squadron of five sail of the line under Vice-admiral Sir Hyde Parker, and only saved from capture by the fall of the topmasts of the two advanced ships. Although it is certain that several detachments from Admiral Hotham's fleet were at this time traversing the Mediterranean, we cannot discover, on inspecting the log-books of the British ships, that M. Ganteaume's squadron was seen by any of them.

Having, in spite of the chances against him, accomplished his passage to the Levant, M. Ganteaume there captured a great many English, Russian, and Neapolitan merchant vessels, and, by his appearance off the port of Smyrna, released the 36-gun frigate *Sensible*, Commodore Jacques-Mélanie Rondeau, and corvette *Sardine*; which, with their prize, the late British 28-gun frigate *Nemesis*, Captain Samuel Hood Linzee, had, until the proximity of Commodore Ganteaume's squadron became known, been blockaded by the British 38-gun frigate *Aigle*, Captain Samuel Hood, and 28-gun frigate *Cyclops*, Captain William Hotham. We may remark, in passing, that the *Nemesis* had been captured on the 9th of December, while at anchor in the neutral port of Smyrna, by the *Sensible* and *Sardine*, without, as it appears, any opposition on the part of the British frigate beyond a fierce remonstrance at the illegality of the measure.

While cruising in the northern quarter of the Archipelago, the French squadron encountered a violent gale of wind, in which, besides some inconsiderable damage done to two or three of the ships, the *Justice* lost all her masts. Ordering the *Junon* to take the latter in tow, M. Ganteaume steered for the road of the Dardanelles. In a few days after he had reached this anchorage, intelligence arrived from Constantinople, that two British sail of the line and three or four frigates had been detached to intercept him.

Leaving the *Justice* to follow as soon as she could be got ready, the French commodore, with the remainder of his ships, weighed and set sail, in the hope to be able to quit the Archipelago before the British squadron could enter it; M. Ganteaume being well aware that, from the little respect which, in the case of the *Nemesis*, Captain Rondeau and the Turks had shown to the neutrality of a port, the British commanding officer would be justified in attacking him in any Turkish road or port in which he might be lying. That the French commodore did not take his departure a day too soon is clear from the fact, that on the 27th of December Captain Troubridge's squadron, consisting of

the 74-gun ship *Culloden*, *Diadem* 64, and *Inconstant*, *Flora*, and *Lowestoffe* frigates, when seven or eight leagues to the south-east of Cape Matapan, standing into the Archipelago, chased the *Badine*, which had just been detached by M. Ganteaume, purposely, as he states, to draw the British squadron away from his own.

Running into the gulf of Coron, the *Badine* anchored close off the town; and on the next day the *Lowestoffe* cast anchor alongside of her, in order to watch her motions. On the 31st of December Commodore Troubridge, with the remainder of his squadron, anchored in the harbour of Milo, and subsequently steered for Smyrna. Meanwhile, Commodore Ganteaume was bending his course for Toulon, and on the 5th of February, 1796, reached the road in safety.

Having detached Rear-admiral Mann and Vice-admiral Sir Hyde Parker, as already stated, Admiral Hotham sailed on the 12th of October, for Leghorn, where he arrived on the next day. On the 1st of November, admiral Hotham struck his flag,* and was immediately succeeded in the command by Vice-admiral Sir Hyde Parker, who had the day before rejoined the fleet with his squadron. On the 11th, the fleet sailed for Leghorn, and on the 20th, anchored in the bay of San-Fiorenzo; where, on the 30th, the 32-gun frigate, *Lively*, Captain Lord Garlies, arrived from Portsmouth, having on board Admiral Sir John Jervis, appointed the commander-in-chief on the station. On the 3d of December, Sir John shifted his flag from the *Lively* to the *Victory*, and on the 13th, sailed with the fleet for Toulon; between which port and [the isle of] Minorca, the admiral was cruising at the close of the year.

WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND HOLLAND.

The extraordinary success which had attended the French arms throughout the year 1794, operating upon the revolutionary spirit by which Holland was overrun, rendered the conquest of that country, especially after the fall of the Netherlands, no difficult task. France, in her policy, permitted Holland to retain the nominal dignity of an independent state, under the style of the Batavian Republic; as, while it flattered the vanity of the Dutch, it gave to the conquerors every advantage to be derived from possessing Holland as a province, without the expense of maintaining her as an integral part of the French empire.

England now found it her duty not to let slip the opportunity of weakening the maritime power of this new ally in her enemy's cause. Accordingly, on the 19th of January, orders

* The admiral soon afterwards returned to England, and, by dint of sheer interest, got himself made an Irish peer.

were issued to seize all Dutch vessels in British ports; in consequence of which, the 64-gun ship, *Zeeland*, 54-gun ship, *Braakel*, 40-gun frigate, *Thulen*, and two brig-corvettes, together with seven homeward and two outward bound Dutch Indiamen, and from 50 to 60 merchant vessels, all lying in Plymouth Sound, were detained by the port-admiral, Vice-admiral Sir Richard King. It was understood at the time, that the ships were not to be considered as prizes, but were to be held in trust for the stadtholder, who had recently arrived at Harwich from Scheveling, in an open boat, with only three men and a boy to navigate her, should he ever regain his supremacy over the Dutch people. The ships were ordered round to Hamoaze; where, after landing their powder, they were allowed, for the present, at least, to keep their colours flying.

On the 9th of February, instead of the customary letters of marque and reprisal, the British government issued a proclamation, authorizing the detention of all Dutch vessels, as well as of all neutral vessels bound to or from Dutch ports. Measures were at the same time taken to gain possession of the islands and settlements belonging to Holland, both in the west and in the east; and, in the course of the month, a small British squadron, under the orders of Vice-admiral Adam Duncan, in the 74-gun ship *Venerable*, was despatched to the North Sea, to watch the motions of the Dutch fleet lying in the Texel, or rather squadron, for the ships ready for sea did not, at this time, amount to more than three or four sail of the line, and about as many frigates.

Early in August a fleet of Russian ships, consisting of 12 crazy sail of the line and seven frigates, associated itself with that under Vice-admiral Duncan; but the combined fleets, during the remainder of the year, had no enemy to encounter, save the perils of a winter's cruise in that favourite region for storms and shoals, the North Sea. Besides having Holland for an enemy, against whom letters of marque and reprisal issued on the 15th of September, England lost Prussia as a friend, that power having, since the 30th of April, concluded a separate peace with France.

LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

On the 30th of December, 1794, at 11 A. M., the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Blanche*, Captain Robert Faulknor, cruising off the island of Desirade, one of the dependencies of Guadeloupe, and, like the latter, again in French possession, chased a large French armed schooner under a fort at the bottom of a bay in the first-named island. At 2 P. M. the *Blanche* stood into the bay after the schooner, which had come to an anchor, with springs on her cables. At 2 h. 30 m. the fort and schooner, as well as some troops drawn up on the shore, opened

a fire upon the *Blanche*, then about 700 yards distant, working up to a nearer and more effectual position.

At 3 h. 45 m. p. m., having got close abreast of the fort, the *Blanche* dropped her anchor, and commenced a heavy fire, as well upon the fort as upon the schooner and some troops drawn up on the shore to assist in defending her. At 4 p. m., having silenced the fort, Captain Faulknor despatched the boats of the frigate to capture the schooner. This the boats very soon effected; and the *Blanche* weighed and stood out with her prize, which was a national schooner mounting eight guns, and commanded by a lieutenant de vaisseau, recently from *Pointe-à-Pitre* in the island of Guadeloupe. The loss sustained by the *Blanche* in this spirited enterprise was rather severe, amounting to one midshipman (Mr. Fitzgibbon) and one marine killed, and four seamen wounded: that on the part of the French schooner could not be ascertained, as the crew, previously to her being boarded, had escaped to the shore.

Having manned his prize and despatched her to the harbour of the *Saintes*, two small islands close to Guadeloupe, and still in British possession, Captain Faulknor proceeded on a cruise off *Pointe-à-Pitre*, a harbour in *Grande-terre*, Guadeloupe, and in which lay, ready for sea, the French 36-gun frigate *Pique*, Captain Conseil. On the 2d of January the *Blanche* was joined by the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Quebec*, Captain James Carpenter; but, the next afternoon, the latter parted company, and, bearing up to the westward under all sail, was soon out of sight.

Thus left alone, the *Blanche* at about 6 p. m. steered straight for *Pointe-à-Pitre*, and, on arriving within four miles of the port, lay to for the night. On the next day, the 4th, at daybreak, the *Blanche* discovered the *Pique* lying at anchor just outside of the harbour. At 7 a. m. the French frigate got under way, and began working into the offing under her topsails, backing her mizen topsail occasionally, to keep company with a schooner which had weighed with her. At about 8 h. 30 m. the *Blanche* made sail to meet the French ship and schooner, until nearly within gun-shot of *Fort Fleur-d'Épée*; when, finding the *Pique* apparently disinclined to come out from the batteries, the *Blanche*, who had hove to, made sail to board a schooner running down along *Grande-terre*. At this time *Pointe-à-Pitre* bore from the *Blanche* north-west, distant two leagues, and the French frigate north-north-west, distant three miles.

At half-past noon the *Pique* filled and made sail towards the *Blanche*. At 1 p. m. the latter brought to an American schooner from *Bordeaux* to *Pointe-à-Pitre* with wine and brandy, and, taking her in tow, steered towards the *Saintes*. At 2 p. m. the *Pique* crossed the *Blanche* on the opposite tack, and, hoisting French colours, fired four shots at her. This challenge, as it might be considered, the British frigate answered, by firing

a shot to windward. The battery at Gosier also fired two shots; but they, like those of the frigate, fell short. At 2 h. 30 m. P.M., finding that the Pique had tacked and was standing towards her, the Blanche shortened sail for the French frigate to come up; but at 3 h. 30 m. P.M. the latter tacked and stood away.

In the hope to induce the Pique to follow her, the Blanche, under topsails and courses, stood towards Marie-Galante. At 7 P.M., observing the Pique still under Grande-terre, Captain Faulknor took out the American crew from the schooner, and sent on board a petty officer and party of men. The Blanche then wore, and stood towards the island of Dominique, with the schooner in tow. At about 8 P.M. the French frigate was desiered astern, about two leagues distant, standing after the Blanche. The latter immediately cast off the schooner, and tacking, made all sail in chase.

At about a quarter past midnight the Blanche, on the starboard tack, passed under the lee of the Pique on the larboard tack, and returned the distant broadside which the Pique had fired at her. At half-past midnight, having got nearly in the wake of her opponent, the Blanche tacked; and, at a few minutes before 1 A.M. on the 5th, just as she had arrived within musket-shot upon the starboard quarter of the Pique, the latter wore, with the intention of crossing her opponent's hawse and raking her ahead. To frustrate this manœuvre, the Blanche wore also; and the two frigates became closely engaged, broadside to broadside.


At about 2 h. 30 m. A.M. the Blanche, having shot ahead, was in the act of luffing up to port to rake the Pique ahead, when the former's wounded mizen and main masts, in succession, fell over the side. Almost immediately after this, the Pique ran foul of the Blanche on her larboard quarter, and made several attempts to board. These attempts the British crew successfully resisted, and the larboard quarterdeck guns, and such of the maindeck ones as would bear, were fired with destructive effect into the Pique's starboard bow; she returning the fire from her tops, as well as from some of her quarterdeck guns run in amidships fore and aft. At a few minutes before 3 A.M. while assisting his second lieutenant, Mr. David Milne, and one or two others of his crew, in lashing, with such ropes as were handy, the bowsprit of the Pique to the capstan of the Blanche, preparatory to a more secure fastening by means of a hawser which was getting up from below, the young and gallant Captain Faulknor fell by a musket-ball through his heart.

At this moment, or very soon afterwards, the lashings broke loose; and the Pique, crossing the stern of the Blanche, who had now begun to pay off for the want of after-sail, fell on board the latter, a second time, upon the starboard quarter. In an instant the British crew, with the hawser which had just before been got on deck, lashed the bowsprit of the Pique to the stump of their own mainmast. In this manner the Blanche,

commanded now by Lieutenant Frederick Watkins, towed before the wind her resolute opponent: whose repeated attempts to cut away this second lashing were defeated by the quick and well-directed fire of the British marines. In the mean while, the constant stream of musketry poured upon the quarterdeck of the *Blanche* from the forecastle and tops of the *Pique*, and a well-directed fire from the latter's quarterdeck guns pointed forward, gave great annoyance to the former; particularly, as having, like many other ships in the British navy at this period no stern-posts on the main deck, the cannonade on the part of the *Blanche* was confined to two quarterdeck 6-pounders. The carpenters having in vain tried to cut down the upper transom beam, no alternative remained but to blow away a part of it on each side. As soon, therefore, as the firemen with their buckets were assembled in the cabin, the two after guns were pointed against the stern-frame. Their discharge made a clear breach on both sides, [and the activity of the bucket-men quickly extinguished the fire it had occasioned in the wood-work. The two 12-pounders of the *Blanche*, thus brought into use, soon made considerable havoc upon the *Pique*'s decks.

At about 3 h. 15 m. A. M. the mainmast of the French frigate (her fore and mizen masts having previously fallen over the side. In this utterly defenceless state, without a gun which, on account of the wreck of her masts, she could now bring to bear, the *Pique* sustained the raking fire of the *Blanche* until 5 h. 15 m. A. M.; when some of the French crew, from the bowsprit-end, called aloud for quarter. The *Blanche* immediately ceased her fire; and, every boat in both vessels having been destroyed by shot, Lieutenant Milne, followed by ten seamen, endeavoured to reach the prize by means of the hawser that still held her; but, their weight bringing the bight of the rope down in the water, they had to swim a part of the distance.

The following diagram will assist in explaining the manner in which this gallantly-fought action was brought to a termination.



The *Blanche*, besides her 32 long 12 and 6 pounders, mounted six 18-pounder carronades, total 38 guns; and, having sent

away in prizes two master's mates and 12 seamen, she had on board no more than 198 men and boys. Of these, the *Blanche* lost her commander, one midshipman (William Bolton) five seamen, and one private marine killed, one midshipman (Charles Herbert), two quartermasters, the armourer, one sergeant of marines, 12 seamen, and four private marines wounded; total, eight killed and 21 wounded.

The *Pique* was armed with two carriage-guns, 6-pounders, less than her establishment, or 38 in all; but she mounted along her gunwale on each side, several brass swivels. Respecting the number composing the crew of the *Pique*, the accounts are very contradictory. Lieutenant Watkins, in his official letter, states the number at 360; and Vice-admiral Caldwell, at Martinique, when enclosing that letter to the admiralty, says, "many more than 360." On the other hand, the three French officers, examined before the surrogate of the colonial vice-admiralty court, subsequently deposed, two of them to "between 260 and 270 men," and the third to "about 270 men," as the total number on board their ship when the action commenced. Upon these certificates, head-money was paid for 265 men; but, according to the documents transmitted along with those certificates, the actual number of men on board was 279. Among the documents is a letter, with admiral Caldwell's signature, stating that the number of killed, wounded, and prisoners, the amount of which, however, is not shown, accords exactly with the number, 279, alleged to be on board the *Pique*; yet, in the admiral's letter in the *Gazette*, the total of killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounts to 360. Schomberg makes the number 460;* and another writer considers the *Pique*'s men to have nearly doubled those of the *Blanche*. We are satisfied, however, that 279 is the full amount of the French crew. Of this number the *Pique* had, it appears, 76 officers and men killed, and 110 wounded; a loss unparalleled in its proportion.

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		BLANCHE.	PIQUE.
Broadside-guns	{ No.	19	19
	{ lbs.	228	273
Crew	No.	198	279
Size	tons	710	906

A difference there is, but scarcely sufficient, except perhaps in point of crew, to entitle the action to be considered otherwise than as an equal match. The French officers and crew fought the *Pique* in a most gallant manner; surrendering only when their ship was a defenceless hulk, and themselves reduced to a third of their original number.

Nor must we omit to do a further act of justice to Captain Conseil, or to his memory rather, for, although not stated, he

* Schomberg, vol. ii, p. 403.

was, we believe, among the mortally wounded in the action, and express it as our conviction, that he evinced a laudable caution in not going out to meet the *Blanche*, until he was certain that the frigate, so recently seen in her company, had retired to a safe distance. On the part of the British officers and crew, consummate intrepidity was displayed, from the beginning to the end of this long and sanguinary battle. Indeed, a spirit of chivalry seems to have animated both parties; and the action of the *Blanche* and *Pique* may be referred to with credit by either.

At 8 A. M. the 64-gun ship *Veteran*, Captain William Hancock Kelly, joined the *Blanche* and her prize, and assisted in exchanging the prisoners. The 64 then took the *Pique* in tow, and carried her, in company with the *Blanche*, to the *Saintes*. The approach of the *Veteran* to perform this service occasioned the French officers to declare, that that ship must have witnessed the combat, and they refused, at first, to sign the usual head-money certificates, unless the *Veteran* was named as one of their captors. The fact is, the *Veteran*, at 3 A. M., while beating up from the *Saintes*, did see the flashes of the guns, bearing from her east-north-east, but did not gain a sight of the combatants themselves until daylight, which was about a quarter of an hour after the action had terminated; and, even then, the *Veteran* was upwards of two hours in endeavouring to reach the spot.

The *Pique* became afterwards added to the British navy as a 12-pounder 36; and Lieutenants Watkins and Milne were both deservedly made commanders. The third lieutenant, and who, on the promotion of these two officers, succeeded to be first of the *Blanche*, was John Prickett, since dead, as a commander.

On the 13th of March, at 7 A. M., *Ushant* bearing south half-west, distant 13 leagues, the British 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Lively*, Captain George Burlton, acting in the absence of Lord Garlies, sick on shore, while standing down Channel on the starboard tack, discovered three strange sail on the same tack, steering for the coast of France. Chase was given by the *Lively*; and soon afterwards, the largest of the three strangers, which was the French 28-gun corvette, or frigate, *Tourterelle*, Captain Guillaume S. A. Montalan, tacked and stood towards the British frigate.

At 10 h. 30 m. A. M. the two ships having approached within gun-shot on opposite tacks, commenced firing at each other. As soon as she had got abaft the *Lively*'s beam, the *Tourterelle* wore; and a close action ensued, which continued until 1 h. 30 m. P. M.; when the French ship, having had her three top-masts shot away, her remaining masts, rigging, and sails entirely disabled, and her hull greatly shattered, hauled down her colours. Shortly afterwards the *Tourterelle*'s mainmast fell over the side.

The damages of the *Lively* were chiefly confined to her rigging

and sails. The latter were much burnt by red-hot shot fired from her opponent; on whose lower or berth deck, until it was thrown overboard just previously to surrender, had been a regular furnace for heating them. Notwithstanding the use of this additional means of resistance, the *Lively*, out of her complement of 251 men and boys, escaped with only two, Lieutenant Loftus Otway Bland and one seaman, wounded; whereas the *Tourterelle*, out of her crew, as deposed by her officers, of 230 in number, had 16 officers and men killed and 25 wounded.

The *Lively's* guns were those of her class at *F* in the table at p. 91, with six brass 24-pounder carronades, or 38 guns in all. The *Tourterelle* mounted two sixes fewer than No. 9 in the small table at p. 54, or 30 guns in all.

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		LIVELY.	TOURTERELLE.
Broadside-guns . . .	{ No.	19	15
	{ lbs.	324	188
Crew	No.	251	230
Size	tons	806	581

Captain Montalan, in commencing the attack, either mistook the *Lively* for a less formidable ship, or relied too much upon the effects of his red-hot shot. In either case, he showed himself an enterprising officer; and the *Tourterelle's* three hours' resistance, disabled state, and heavy loss, afforded ample proofs of his bravery and determination. The employment of hot shot is not usually deemed honourable warfare; but the blame, if any, rested with those who had equipped the ship for sea.

The two other vessels in sight, when the action began, were prizes to the resuscitated* French corvette *Espion*. These, a few days afterwards, were retaken by the *Lively*. The *Tourterelle*, on her arrival in port, was purchased for the British navy; and, although called by the French a corvette, became classed as a British 28-gun frigate. The *Tourterelle* did not, however, long continue as a cruiser: in the year 1799 she was converted into a troop or store ship.

The near approach to equality in the nominal force of the *Lively* and *Tourterelle*; that is, in the rated number of guns on board one ship, and the mounted number on board the other, has been made the basis of an attempt to raise this action far above its proper level. For instance, a naval writer says: "The *Lively*, of thirty-two guns, captured the *Tourterelle*, of thirty guns."† Now, as "of" can mean nothing else than "mounting," what is the uninformed reader to infer, but that these ships differed in force by only a sixteenth? Suppose the writer not to have known that the *Lively* mounted six 24-pounder carronades in addition to her "32 guns," he still, from his pro-

* See p. 301.

† Brenton, vol. i., p. 367.

fessional experience, must have been aware, that the English ship carried long 18-pounders, the French ship long 8, or, putting them into English, long 9-pounders; a difference itself of one half in the weight of metal. Many similar instances might be quoted from the same work; but the case of the Lively and Tourterelle will be sufficient to expose the absurdity and unfairness of such a manner of stating the force between contending ships.

On the 10th of April, at 10 A. M., a British squadron, composed of five ships of the line and three frigates, under the command of Rear-admiral John Colpoys, while cruising to the westward, with the wind at east by north, discovered three strange sail in the north-west quarter. Chase was immediately given; and, at noon, the strangers were discovered to be three French frigates. The 74-gun ship *Colossus*, Captain John Monkton, having got within gun-shot of one of them, opened her fire; which the frigate returned with her stern-chasers. The three French frigates, soon afterwards, took different courses. The two that pointed to the westward were pursued by the 74-gun ships *Robust* and *Hannibal*; while the one that steered a north-westerly course, and which was the 36-gun frigate *Gloire*, Captain Beens, was followed, closely by the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Astræa*, Captain Lord Henry Paulet, and, at a great distance, by one or more of the other ships.

At 6 P. M., having far outstripped her consorts, the *Astræa* got within gun-shot of, and fired several of her quarterdeck guns at, the *Gloire*; who, in return, kept up an incessant fire from her stern-chasers. Advancing gradually up, the *Astræa*, at 10 h. 30 m. P. M., brought the *Gloire* to close action, and, after a 58 minutes' spirited cannonade, compelled the French frigate to haul down her colours. The three topmasts of the *Astræa* were so wounded by the *Gloire*'s shot, that her main topmast fell over the side in two hours after the action, and the fore and mizen topmasts were obliged to be shifted. The masts and yards of the *Gloire*, and the rigging and sails of both ships, were also much cut.

The *Astræa* mounted, it appears, no more than the 32 long guns of her class, and, out of her 212 men and boys, did not lose a man killed, but had one mortally, two dangerously, and five slightly wounded. The *Gloire*, who appears to have mounted two more sixes than the establishment of her class, or 42 guns in all, lost, according to the representation of her officers, 40 in killed and wounded together.

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		ASTRÆA.	GLOIRE.
Broadside-guns	No.	16	21
	lbs.	174	286
Crew	No.	212	275
Size	tons.	703	877

Nothing was wanted but a meeting less likely to be interrupted, to render the capture of the *Gloire* a very gallant performance on the part of the *Astræa*. Nor did the officers and men of the French frigate by any means give away their ship. Much credit is also due to Lord Henry Paulet individually, both for the fairness of his account, and the feeling manner in which he speaks of his antagonist. He expresses sorrow at the *Gloire's* loss of men, and describes Captain Beens as "an able, humane, and intelligent officer." The first lieutenant of the *Astræa*, Mr. John Talbot, was sent to take charge of the *Gloire*, and, soon after his arrival at Portsmouth with the prize, was deservedly made a commander.

The *Gloire's* two consorts were the *Gentille* and *Fraternité*, each of the same force as herself. The *Gentille* was captured, on the following morning, by the *Hannibal*; but the *Fraternité* effected her escape. The *Gloire* was purchased for the use of the British navy, and registered as a 12-pounder 36; but, being old and nearly worn out, she did not long continue as a cruising ship.

On the 1st of May, at 11 A. M., a fire broke out on board the 98-gun ship *Boyne*, Captain George Grey, bearing the flag of Vice-admiral Sir John Jervis, as she lay at her anchors at Spit-head. The flames had burst through the poop before the fire was discovered; and they now spread so rapidly that, in less than half an hour, this fine ship, in spite of every exertion of her officers and crew, was in a blaze fore and aft. As soon as the fire was discovered by the fleet, all the boats of the ships proceeded to the *Boyne's* assistance; and the whole of her numerous crew, except eleven, were thereby saved. The port-admiral, Sir Peter Parker, went on board the *Royal-William*, and made the signal for all ships most in danger to get under way; which order, although both wind and tide were unfavourable, was executed with promptness and judgment, and the ships lying to the eastward of the *Boyne*, and from the direction of the wind unsafely situated, dropped down to St. Helen's.

The *Boyne's* guns, being loaded, went off as they became heated, discharging their shot among the shipping; whereby two men were killed and one wounded on board the *Queen-Charlotte*. Some of the shot even reached the shore in Stoke's bay. At about 1 h. 30 m. P. M. the *Boyne* broke from her cables, and drifted slowly to the eastward, till she grounded on the Spit, opposite South-Sea castle. Here the ship continued to burn until near 6 P. M.; when, the flames having reached the magazine, she blew up with a dreadful explosion. "The blowing up of her fore magazine," says Captain Brenton, "offered one of the most magnificent sights that can be conceived. The afternoon was perfectly calm, and the sky clear: the flames which darted from her in a perpendicular column of great height, were terminated by an opaque white cloud like a round

cap, while the air was filled with fragments of wreck in every direction, and the stump of the foremast was seen far above the smoke descending to the water."*

It has never been correctly ascertained how the fire on board the *Boyne* originated. One account is, that a part of the lighted paper from the cartridges of the marines, who were exercising and firing on the windward side of the poop, flew through the quarter-gallery into the admiral's cabin, and communicated with the papers and other inflammable materials. Captain Brenton thinks, that the overheating of the funnel of the ward-room stove, which passed through the decks, was the cause of the accident.

Among the British light squadrons cruising on the coast of France in the summer of this year, was one commanded by Captain Sir Richard John Strachan of the *Melampus*, having under him the 38-gun frigates *Diamond* and *Hébé*, Captains Sir William Sidney Smith and Paul Minchin, and 32-gun frigates *Niger* and *Syren*, Captains Edward James Foote and Graham Moore.

On the 9th of May, at 3 A. M., while these frigates were lying at an anchor in Gourville bay, island of Jersey, 13 sail of French vessels were discovered running along the French shore to the southward. The squadron instantly weighed and gave chase, with the wind off the land. At 6 A. M. the *Melampus* got near enough to fire upon the headmost vessels; but the whole convoy, except a cutter which escaped round Cape Carteret, ran close in shore, under the protection of two gun-vessels, the *Eclair* and *Crache-Feu*, aided by a small battery on the beach. The boats of the frigates, having assembled on board the *Melampus*, proceeded, under cover of that ship and the other frigates, to attack the convoy; between whose armed vessels and battery, and the British frigates, as they came up in succession, a smart fire was maintained.

Opposed to so formidable a force, the French soon abandoned their vessels; and the boats boarded and took possession of the whole convoy, including the two gun-vessels, each of which was armed with three long 18-pounders. One small sloop, on account of the tide having left her, was burnt; the remaining 10, composed chiefly of ships and brigs, were brought safe off. One of the vessels measured 397 tons, and the average of the whole was about 180 tons. They were laden with ship-timber, powder, cannon, cordage, and other articles of naval stores.

In performing this service, the *Melampus* lost one petty officer and seven seamen wounded; the *Diamond* two seamen wounded; the *Hébé*, her surgeon (John Leggatt) and two seamen wounded; the *Niger*, her second lieutenant (Charles Long) and one seaman wounded; and the *Syren*, one midship-

* Brenton, vol. i., p. 372.

man (John M'Guffock) and one marine killed, and two seamen wounded; total, 2 killed and 17 wounded.

Subsequently, on the 3d of July, when Sir Richard had with him the *Hébé* only, this enterprising officer captured, off St. Malo, six out of 13 French vessels, laden with military stores, and convoyed by a ship of 26 guns, two brigs, and a lugger: he also succeeded in taking one of the brigs, the *Vésuve*, armed with four 18 or 24 pounders, and 60 men.

The British 36-gun frigate *Thetis*, Captain the Honourable Alexander Inglis Cochrane, and 28-gun frigate *Hussar*, Captain John Poer Beresford, being stationed off Chesapeake bay, United States of America, in order to intercept three French store-ships lying in Hampton roads, discovered, at daybreak on the 17th of May, Cape Henry bearing west by south, distant 20 leagues, five sail on the larboard tack, standing to the north-west. These ships, which, although large, were evidently armed en flûte, drew up in line, and awaited the approach of the two British frigates. At 10 h. 30 m. A. M. the strangers hoisted French colours, and the second ship from the van, a broad pendant. The names of the five ships were *Normand*, *Trajan*, *Prévoyante*, *Hernoux*, and *Raison*; but what stations the ships severally held in the line (except that the *Prévoyante* is rightly placed), or which ship was the French commodore's, cannot now be ascertained, and is, indeed, of no great consequence.

The *Hussar*, by signal, hauled up and placed herself opposite to the two van-ships; and the *Thetis*, following in line, opened her broadside upon the centre-ship, which was the largest. By 11 A. M. the *Hussar* had compelled the commodore and his second ahead to quit the line, and make sail to the east-south-east. The fire of both frigates now fell upon the centre-ship and the two ships in her rear; all three of which, at 11 h. 45 m. A. M., hauled down their colours; but the two rear-ships, notwithstanding they had surrendered, crowded sail to get away. One of them, the *Raison*, was soon overtaken by the *Hussar*; but the other effected her escape.

The large ship was the *Prévoyante*, pierced for 36, but mounting 24 guns only, believed to have been 8-pounders. As a proof how resolutely she had been defended, her fore and main masts went over the side in half an hour after her surrender. What was her complement at the commencement of, or her loss during, the action, does not appear in Captain Cochrane's letter. The *Raison* mounted, according to the journal of one of the officers of the *Hussar*, her principal opponent, 14 guns, but Captain Cochrane, in his letter, says 18; in either case probably 6-pounders, with a complement, as it appears, of 125 men, of whom between 20 and 30 were too sick to go to quarters. Her loss in the action is nowhere stated.

The *Thetis*, whose long guns were 18 and 9 pounders, besides

as many 18 or 24 pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and forecastle, as gave her 42 or 44 guns in the whole, with a complement of 261 men and boys, lost eight men killed, and nine wounded, some of them badly. The Hussar, whose 24 main-deck guns were long 9-pounders, exclusive of six 18-pounder carronades and four long sixes on the quarterdeck and forecastle, total 34 guns, with a complement of 193 men and boys, lost only three men wounded. With respect to damages, the latter ship had her standing and running rigging much cut, and three shot-holes in the fore, and one in the main mast.

The Hussar alone, as a regular man of war, was more than a match for the two captured store-ships; and they and their three consorts were of no greater force, however formidable in appearance, than a British 18-pounder 36 and a 28-gun frigate would, at any time, have gladly encountered.

The *Prévoyante* and *Raison* were purchased by government, and fitted out at Halifax, Nova-Scotia. They only remained, however, as cruising ships until their arrival in England in 1799. The *Prévoyante* measured 803 tons, and, until subsequently restored to her original employment of a store-ship, was registered as a 36-gun frigate; not in Steel, for he classes her as a 40, but in the books of the navy. If we look, for a moment, at the *Prévoyante's* establishment of guns, as by Admiralty-order of August 17, 1795, we shall find that this "36-gun frigate" was, in more than one instance, an anomaly of her day.

	No.	Pdrs.
First, or birth deck	10	carrs. 24
Second, or main deck	30	long 12
Quarterdeck and forecastle	6	" 9
"	10	carrs. 18
	—	
Carriage-guns	56	
Men and boys	281	

Suppose the captain of the *Prévoyante*, having taken a French frigate, were to state, as others had done before him, that his ship was "of 36 guns," would not the French officers consider the discrepancy as too gross to be other than a typographical error—a substitution of a 3 for a 5?

On the 25th of May the British 16-gun ship-sloop *Thorn*, Captain Robert Waller Otway, being on the Windward-Island station, fell in with, and, after a spirited action of 35 minutes, during which the enemy was repulsed in two attempts to board, captured the 18-gun ship-corvette *Courier-National*, commanded by a lieutenant de vaisseau.

The *Thorn*, whose guns were 6-pounders, with a crew on board of 80 men and boys, had only five men wounded; while the loss of the *Courier-National*, whose guns were 8 and 6 pounders, with a crew of 119 men and boys, amounted to seven killed and 20 wounded.

This was a well-contested match; and, while every credit is due to Captain Otway and his numerically inferior crew, for so promptly deciding it, the loss sustained by the French ship shows that her officers and men were by no means deficient in bravery.

In the month of June Admiral Hotham, while cruising with the British fleet off the Island of Minorca, received intelligence that the French fleet was at sea. To ascertain the fact, the admiral, on the evening of the 23d, detached the 28-gun frigate *Dido*, Captain George Henry Towry, and 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Lowestoffe*, Captain Robert Gambier Middleton, to reconnoitre the road of Toulon. On the 24th, at 4 A. M., latitude $41^{\circ} 8'$ north, longitude $5^{\circ} 30'$ east, these frigates, standing close hauled on the larboard tack, with the wind at north-north-west, descried approaching them, nearly ahead, the French 40-gun frigate *Minerve*, Captain Perrée, and 36-gun frigate *Artémise*, Captain Charbonnier, which frigates, by a singular coincidence, had been ordered by the French admiral to proceed off Minorca, and ascertain the truth of a rumour that the British fleet was at sea.

As soon as the private signal made by the *Dido*, who was ahead of her consort, discovered the relation of the parties to each other, the French frigates wore round on the other tack and stood away. The *Dido* and *Lowestoffe* immediately made sail in chase. At 7 A. M. it was evident that the French frigates were leaving their pursuers; but at 8 A. M. the *Minerve* and *Artémise*, as a proof that they were not disposed to decline a combat with two ships, whose inferior force must now have betrayed itself, again wore round, and, with French colours flying, stood on under easy sail to meet the *Dido* and *Lowestoffe*; who, with colours hoisted, and all clear for action, kept their course to hasten the junction.

On arriving within about a mile of the *Dido*'s larboard and weather bow, the *Minerve*, who was at some distance ahead of her consort, wore round on the same tack as the *Dido*, and at 8 h. 30 m. A. M. opened her fire upon the latter. The *Dido*, however, reserved her fire until 8 h. 45 m.; when, having got close under the *Minerve*'s starboard and lee beam, the British frigate commenced a steady and well-directed cannonade. In about five minutes the *Minerve*, suddenly bearing up, with yards square, attempted to decide the contest at once by running down the little ship that was presuming to contend with her. Just as the *Minerve*'s flying jib-boom was about to touch the *Dido*'s main yard, the latter put her helm apart, to avoid receiving directly upon her beam, a shock which, with the weight and impetus of the French frigate, must have sent her to the bottom. Owing to this well-planned movement, the *Dido* received the blow obliquely, the luff of the *Minerve*'s starboard bow taking her on the larboard quarter. But so heavy, notwithstanding

Captain Towry's precaution, was the shock, that it drove the *Dido* nearly athwart the hawse of the *Minerve*; and, the latter's jib-boom being carried away by the former's main rigging, the bowsprit of the *Minerve* became locked in the mizen rigging of the *Dido*.

From the bowsprit, thus favourably placed, the Frenchmen, under cover of the *Minerve*'s foremost guns and a heavy fire of musketry, attempted to board, but were prevented, as well by the pikemen on the *Dido*'s quarterdeck, as by the violence with which the ships, owing to a great swell and hollow sea, were striking against each other. After about a quarter of an hour's contest in this situation, and when the *Dido* was literally hanging by her mizen rigging on the *Minerve*'s bowsprit, the latter snapped short in two, carrying overboard with it, besides eight or ten of the French boarders, the *Dido*'s badly wounded mizen-mast. The wreck was quickly cleared; and, the colours of the *Dido* having fallen into the sea with the gaff, the signal-man, Henry Barling, with characteristic bravery, nailed a union jack to the stump of the mast.

As soon as she had thus cleared herself, the *Minerve* passed along the *Dido*'s larboard beam, rubbing sides the whole way, and the mutual cannonade recommenced with vigour. Presently, however, the lower yards of the *Minerve*, hooking the leeches of the *Dido*'s two remaining topsails, tore them out of the bolt-ropes; and the French frigate, continuing to range ahead, left the *Dido* almost a wreck upon her larboard quarter.

Having, owing to the *Dido*'s position ahead of the *Minerve*, been prevented from firing into the latter's stern as she passed under it to assist her consort, the *Lowestoffe* now placed herself on the *Minerve*'s larboard bow, about a ship's length from her; and at 9 A. M. opened her fire, which, in six or eight minutes, brought down by the board the French frigate's unsupported foremast, also her main and mizen topmasts. About this time the *Artémise*, who, in running past, had fired an ineffectual broadside into each of the British frigates, hauled her wind and made all sail.

At 9 h. 15 m. A. M., the escape of the *Minerve* being rendered impossible, Captain Towry caused the signal to chase to be spread over the *Dido*'s quarter. The *Lowestoffe* thereupon quitted the *Minerve*, and made all sail in pursuit of the *Artémise*; and the *Dido*, setting her only serviceable sail, the foresail, stretched ahead to repair her damages. The *Artémise* and *Lowestoffe* soon began exchanging their chase-guns; but the latter, having unfortunately received a shot through her mizen-mast, could not carry her mizen topsail. In consequence of this, the *Artémise* gained upon the *Lowestoffe* so much, that Captain Towry, at 10 h. 30 m. A. M., made the latter's signal of recal.

At 11 h. 30 m. the *Lowestoffe* again closed with the *Minerve* on the starboard quarter, and soon opened upon her a heavy

raking fire. In the mean time the *Dido*, having bent new fore and main topsails, and partially repaired her damaged rigging, had wore and made sail in the direction of the *Minerve*; who, at 11 h. 45 m., on her mizenmast being shot away by the board, and with it her colours, hailed the *Lowestoffe* to send a boat and take possession. At this time the *Artémise* was nearly hull-down to windward; and the *Minerve*, certainly, if not in a defenceless, was in an utterly unmanageable state.

The *Dido*, out of her complement of 193 men and boys, had her boatswain (Cuthbert Douglas) and five seamen killed, her first lieutenant (Richard Buckoll, who, however, did not quit the deck), captain's clerk (Richard Willan), and 13 seamen wounded. The *Lowestoffe*, out of her complement of 212, had none killed and only three wounded. Each of these frigates carried the guns of her class, as described at *J* and *H* of the table at p. 91, with four 18-pounder carronades in addition; making the *Lowestoffe's* guns 36, and those of the *Dido* 32.

The *Minerve* mounted two carronades less than her establishment at p. 54, or 42 guns in all, with a complement on board of 318 men and boys, and is represented to have lost upwards of 20 in killed and wounded (among the latter her captain), exclusive of those that were drowned by the falling of the bowsprit. The loss sustained by the *Artémise*, a regular 36, mounting 40 guns, out of a complement amounting at least to 300, could not of course be ascertained, but, from her small share in the action, was probably of very slight amount.

In every point of view, this was a gallantly fought action on the part of the British. The *Minerve* alone was superior in broadside weight of shot to the *Dido* and *Lowestoffe* together, and the *Artémise* was rather more than a match for the *Lowestoffe*. The conduct of Captain Towry was noble in the extreme. His senior rank gave him, although commanding the smaller ship, the right of choosing his antagonist, and he did not hesitate a moment in laying the *Dido* alongside a ship of nearly double her size and force. A ship of 1102 tons, and 318 men, coming stem-on upon a ship of 595 tons, and 193 men, was indeed a critical situation for the latter; and, had the *Minerve's* consort not behaved in a most dastardly manner, the *Dido* at least must have become the prize of the French commodore.

It was well for the *Dido* that the *Lowestoffe's* captain possessed none of the backwardness of the captain of the *Artémise*; and, indeed, so ready is Captain Towry to admit the benefit he derived from his consort's aid; so far is he from wishing to monopolize the credit of the victory, that in his official letter he says, "By Captain Middleton's good conduct the business of the day was, in a great measure, brought to a fortunate issue."

The *Minerve* was conducted in safety to Port-Mahon, and afterwards to Ajaccio, and was added to the British navy, under

the command of Captain Towry, as a 38-gun frigate; to which class, from her fine qualifications, the *Minerve* became a valuable acquisition. The *Dido's* first lieutenant, already named, was justly promoted to the rank of commander; as was also Mr. Joshua Sydney Horton, the first lieutenant of the *Lowestoffe*.

On the 22d of August, at 1 p. m., as a British squadron under the orders of Captain James Alms of the 36-gun frigate *Réunion*, composed of, besides that frigate, the 50-gun ship *Isis*, Captain Robert Watson, 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Stag*, Captain Joseph Sydney York, and 28-gun frigate *Vestal*, Captain Charles White, was cruising in the North Sea, off the coast of Norway, the two Dutch 36-gun frigates *Alliance* and *Argo*, and the 16-gun cutter *Vlugheld* (*Nelly*, in the gazette-account), were discovered to windward, standing towards the shore on the larboard tack. Chase was given, and a change of wind enabled the *Stag*, at about 4 h. 15 m. p. m., to close with the *Alliance*, the sternmost vessel. The remaining British ships, meanwhile, devoted their attention to the *Argo* and *Vlugheld*, in the hope to cut them off from the harbour of *Egeroe*, towards which they were directing their course. After about an hour's action with the *Stag*, the *Alliance* hauled down her colours; but under what circumstances as to damage or loss, the official account does not inform us, and, at this late day, we have no means of ascertaining.

The *Stag*, armed and manned like her sister frigate, the *Lively*, had four men killed and 13 wounded. The *Alliance*, whose 36 guns consisted of 26 long 12-pounders, six long 6s, and four brass 24-pounder carronades, with a crew of 240 men and boys, undoubtedly sustained a loss, and, in all probability, to a much greater amount than that of her superior opponent, the *Stag*; but, as above stated, no notice is taken of it in Captain Alms's letter: a piece of neglect of which we have already pointed out the injustice. One circumstance is clear, that the *Alliance*, from the first, had no chance of success, the *Réunion* alone being quite a match for the *Argo*, who was armed precisely the same as the *Alliance*; and then a 50-gun ship and a 28-gun frigate were ready, if necessary, to assist the *Stag*.

After a running fight, in which the *Réunion* lost one man killed and three wounded, the *Isis*, two men wounded, and the *Argo*, two killed and 15 wounded, besides being hulled with thirty 24-pound shot, and having her sails and rigging much cut, the *Argo*, with the cutter, got safe into *Egeroe*.

Having blamed Captain Alms for an omission, we are bound to show where he has acted in a manner highly laudable and worthy of imitation. "I have," he says in his letter, "thought proper, for their lordships' information, to send in the *Alliance* with my despatches by Lieutenant William Huggell, of his majesty's ship under my command, whom I recommend to their favour, who will inform their lordships with every proceeding of

the chase and action; but, as the Alliance struck to the Stag, have put Mr. Patrick Tonyn, her first lieutenant, to take charge of her, with orders to proceed to the Nore."

In the beginning of the month of September the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Southampton, Captain James Macnamara, had been left, in company with the 18-gun ship-sloop Moselle, Captain Charles Brisbane, to watch the port of Genoa, in which lay, waiting for an opportunity to return to Toulon, the French 36-gun frigate Vestale, 28-gun frigate or "corvette" Brune, and 14-gun brig-corvettes Alerte and Scout. On the 28th Captain Macnamara detached the Moselle on service to Vado; and, on the 29th, in the afternoon, while standing in towards Genoa, the Southampton discovered several sail steering to the westward. The British frigate immediately crowded sail after the largest ship, which was no other than the Vestale, who, with her little squadron and several small privateers, had taken advantage of the Moselle's temporary absence to effect her own and their escape.

At 10 p. m. the Southampton arrived within hail of the Vestale, and receiving no satisfactory answer, fired her starboard broadside into the French frigate's larboard quarter. The Vestale returned the fire, but, wishing to avoid an action, at 10 h. 25 m. p. m. tacked, and was promptly followed by the Southampton, who soon brought her larboard guns to bear. The Vestale now crowded all sail to get away; as did also the Brune, who was at a short distance ahead of her. The Southampton, after having partially repaired her damaged rigging, as she stood on in chase, discovered the Alerte and Scout brigs close to her, endeavouring to effect their escape by steering different courses. At 11 p. m., just as the Southampton was getting within point-blank range of the Vestale, the former's mizenmast, from a severe wound it had received and the press of sail now carried, fell over the side. Although the wreck was cleared, a jury-mast erected, and fresh sails bent and set, with surprising alacrity, the time lost could not be regained; and the Vestale, in chase of whom the Moselle joined about midnight, effected her escape, with the loss, as it afterwards appeared, of eight men killed and nine wounded.

Thus ended an affair, in which a different line of conduct on the part of the French commander might, on a fair calculation of the odds in his favour, have enabled him to capture a British frigate. All that can now be said is, that the gallantry of the Southampton's captain afforded a remarkable contrast to the pusillanimity (for it would be wrong to call it by any other name) of the captain of the Vestale.*

* Mr. Marshall, in his biographical work (vol. i., p. 686), states that the Southampton ran the Vestale on board, and "soon compelled her to surrender," but that, when about to take possession, the former lost her mizen-

On the 28th of September, at 4 h. 30 m. A. M., the British hired cutter *Rose*, Lieutenant William Walker, of eight 4-pounders and only 13 men and one boy on board, being near to the island of Capraria on her passage from Leghorn to Bastia in Corsica, discovered three French lateen-rigged privateers to leeward: At this time almost the only man on deck was the steersman, but the alarm soon brought up from their beds the remainder of the cutter's small crew; and, although he had on board a king's messenger, Mr. Mason, and two ladies, as passengers, and 10,000*l.* in specie, Lieutenant Walker formed the bold resolve of attacking the three vessels, either of which, in point of men at least, was known, from the complement they usually carried, to be more than treble the force of the *Rose*.

The cutter was quickly cleared for action, and bore down with a moderate breeze and smooth sea directly for the largest of the privateers, which was at some distance to leeward of the other two. It was the intention of Lieutenant Walker to give this privateer the cutter's stem, and for that purpose he himself attended to the steering; but, the *Rose* getting near, the lieutenant rushed forward to be among the foremost of the boarders, when the man whom he had left at the helm either misunderstood or neglected his orders, and permitted the privateer to shoot too far ahead.

The consequence was, that instead of striking the privateer amidships, the cutter with her bowsprit merely carried away the former's mizenmast and the projecting part of her stern. While passing to leeward, however, the *Rose* poured in a destructive raking fire with three round shot in every gun. She then luffed up, with the intention of placing herself on the bows of her antagonist, but became becalmed by the latter's sails. At length the *Rose* moved ahead, and, in tacking, carried away with her main boom the privateer's fore yard. On coming round upon the other tack, the *Rose* discharged a second broadside into her antagonist, and set fire to her foresail and mizen. The privateer instantly called for quarter, and struck.

After threatening the French captain to sink his vessel if he attempted to make sail, Lieutenant Walker, who could have ill spared any hands to take possession, stood after the nearest of the two other privateers, and, by a well-directed broadside between wind and water, sent the second privateer to the bottom; nor, circumstanced as he was, and knowing the unprincipled character of these sea-banditti, could that officer be blamed for not staying to pick up the drowning crew. The *Rose* left them to their fate, and, finding the third privateer making off to windward, stood towards, and with great difficulty secured the one that had struck to her.

mast, and the *Vestale* "rehoisted her colours," and went off before the wind. Not a word of this is to be found in the Southampton's log: it is therefore, in all probability, incorrect.

This privateer mounted one brass long 6-pounder and four 1-pound swivels on her bow, and 12 brass blunderbusses, or musketoons, on her sides, and had on board when taken, exclusive of 13 reported as killed, 29 men. The privateer that was sunk was stated to have had on board 56 men, and the one that escaped, 48; making a total of 146 opposed to 14. Of this her small crew the *Rose* was so fortunate as to have only one man hurt, and that was by having his foot accidentally crushed by one of the gun-carriages. This intrepid fellow, William Brown by name, although so painfully wounded, could not be persuaded to go below, saying to his commander, "Indeed, sir, you cannot spare a man; I can sit here and use a musket as well as any of them."* Notwithstanding her crew had escaped so surprisingly, the *Rose* had her hull struck with shot in every direction, her mast and main boom badly wounded, and her sails riddled like a sieve.

Battening down the privateer's men in their vessel and then taking her in tow, the *Rose* steered with her prize for Bastia, where, in a day or two, they both arrived. Lieutenant Walker soon afterwards, for his very gallant behaviour, received a most flattering letter from the Viceroy of Corsica, Sir Gilbert Elliot, as well as from Admiral Hotham, the British commander-in-chief on the station. But, owing to some unexplained cause, the official letter addressed to Admiral Hotham never found its way into the *Gazette*: hence the affair, although long a topic of admiration among the officers of the British navy serving in the Mediterranean, produced no beneficial result to the party who had so nobly sustained the honour of the British flag.

On the 10th of October, at 9 h. 30 m. A. M., the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Mermaid*, Captain Henry Warre, cruising off the island of Grenada, discovered a ship and brig at anchor off *La-Baye*, and made all sail towards them. At 10 h. 30 m. A. M. the two vessels, which were the French ship-corvette *Républicaine*, of 18 guns, and the brig-corvette *Brutus*, of 10 guns, got under way and made sail to the southward, with the wind easterly.

Finding that the *Mermaid* was gaining fast upon her, the *Brutus* bore up and steered for the land, anchoring, at 10 h. 50 m., in the bay of *Requain*. The frigate bore up also, and at noon anchored close to the brig; who soon began landing her crew, consisting of 50 sailors and 70 soldiers. After firing several broadsides at the *Brutus* and at the people landing from her, Captain Warre sent his boats, manned and armed, and took possession of the brig. It now appeared that two men, left on board for that purpose, had just set the brig on fire in the fore hold, and the British were obliged to scuttle the decks to ex-

* The men, in these cases, being hired with the vessel, receive no allowance for wounds.

tinguish the flames. This done, the Mermaid and her prize, at 3 p. m., weighed and made sail out of the bay.

On the 13th, in the evening, having seen the Brutus safe into St.-George's, the Mermaid came to an anchor off one of the small islands close to the northward of Grenada; and on the 14th, at daybreak, weighed in chase of a ship in the west by north, or leeward quarter. At 10 h. 45 m. A. M. the République, as the ship proved to be, put before the wind under all sail; and at 3 h. 50 m. P. M., after a running fight since noon, and a close action of ten minutes, struck her colours, with a loss, out of a crew, including a French general (intended to command at Grenada) and his suite and several other passengers, amounting to 250 men, of nearly 20 killed and several wounded. On board the Mermaid one seaman only was killed, and three wounded.

On the 14th of October, at 1 p. m., while the British frigates Melampus, Captain Sir Richard John Strachan, and Latona, Captain the Honourable Arthur Kaye Legge, were running before a fresh south-south-east wind, between the island of Groix and the main land of France, the batteries on each side of the channel opened upon them a heavy but ineffectual fire; and which the frigates, as they passed rapidly on, returned with one or two broadsides each. At 6 p. m. the south point of the island of Groix bore from them east, distant seven leagues.

On the 15th, at 6 h. 15 m. A. M., as these two frigates were standing close hauled on the starboard tack, with the wind at west by north, two ships were descried in the south-west, and a brig in the north-west. The latter was the French 16-gun brig-corvette Eveillé, and the two former the French 40-gun frigate Tortue and 36-gun frigate Néréide, making the best of their way to Rochefort, after a 60 days' tolerably successful cruise in company with the new 44-gun frigate Forte, who appears to have got safe in during the preceding night.

The Latona, as soon as she had signalled the two strange frigates to her consort, edged away towards them, and was quickly followed, under all sail, by the Melampus. At 11 A. M. the 74-gun ship Orion, Captain Sir James Saumarez, and 36-gun frigate Thalia, Captain Lord Henry Paulet, made their appearance in the north-east, and joined in the chase. At three-quarters past noon the Latona, who was at some distance ahead of her consort, began firing her bow-chasers at the rearmost French frigate; and the latter, shortly afterwards, returned the fire from her stern-chasers. At 3 p. m. the Orion, having badly sprung her main topmast, wore and discontinued the chase, hauling up for two sail in the north-north-west; which proved to be the 40-gun frigate Pomone, Commodore Sir John Borslase Warren, and 36-gun frigate Concorde, Captain Anthony Hunt.

In the mean time the Latona and Melampus, followed by the

Thalia, continued the chase under all sail, with a fresh breeze from south-west by west. At 4 P. M. the Latona had gained considerably upon the sternmost French frigate; when, the Barges d'Olonne bearing east half-north distant only two miles, and the wind blowing dead upon the shore with a heavy sea, the pilot refused to take further charge of the ship. The Latona thereupon shortened sail, and hauled her wind to the north-west; as did, about the same time, the Melampus, and other chasing ships. The two French frigates, thus unavoidably left to themselves, ran through the Pertuis-Breton, and were soon at anchor in the waters at Rochefort.

The brig-corvette was not so fortunate. At 2 P. M., Isle d'Yeu bearing south-east by south distant three leagues, the British 74-gun ship Thunderer, Captain Albermarle Bertie, discovered the Eveillé standing to the south-east, and made all sail in chase. At 4 h. 30 m. P. M. Sir John Warren, with his ships, appeared to leeward. Both the Thunderer and Pomone soon opened their fire upon the Eveillé; and at 6 P. M., having previously thrown all her guns overboard, the brig struck her colours, and was taken possession of by an officer from the Pomone. The latter, shortly afterwards, accompanied by the Thunderer, Concorde, and prize, anchored in the road of Isle d'Yeu.

As the commanding officer on this occasion, Sir John Borlase Warren possessed the right to do, what he was always fond of doing, pen the official letter to the Admiralty. Whether any one of the captains under him would not have given a more correct account of the occurrences he reports, will appear by a slight analysis of his letter, as it stands in the London Gazette. Sir John says: "The Aquilon, who was the headmost, being within gun-shot of the enemy, they doubled the Baleine bank, and proceeded up the Pertuis d'Antioche to Rochefort." Now, the Aquillon, if she was in chase at all, got scarcely any nearer than the Pomone herself. Admitting a mistake in the name, and that Sir John meant the Latona, did he also mistake the Pertuis-Breton for the Pertuis-d'Antioche? So far from the Latona having "doubled the Baleine bank," she found herself, on shortening sail, much within it, and had to beat out at a considerable risk.

But, let us see what Sir John says about the capture of the Eveillé. "I hauled to the wind directly, and discovered two other sail in the north-west, steering in for the land; the whole squadron chased, and on our nearer approach found them to be a line-of-battle ship and a corvette-brig; I endeavoured to cut them off from the land, and, after several shots had been fired, the corvette brought to, and proved to be, &c." What is the inference here but that Sir John, in a frigate, endeavoured to cut off from the land a French line-of-battle ship and corvette-brig? Will it be credited, that neither the Thunderer, nor the captain of her, is named in Sir John Warren's letter? It was

the accidental discovery of the following words in the Orion's log, "An English line-of-battle ship in chase of a corvette-brig," that induced us to investigate the subject. In the chase of the two frigates, Sir John might have alleged as an excuse, the distance of the Pomone from them; but how happened he to forget the Thunderer, when that ship actually accompanied the Pomone and their joint prize to the anchorage at Isle d'Yeu?

COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS.—WEST INDIES.

As soon as news reached France of the success of the republicans at Guadeloupe, every exertion was used to send out supplies to Victor Hugues. On the 17th of November, 1794, the 50-gun frigate, or *rasé*, *Hercule*, 36-gun frigate *Astrée*, two corvettes, an armed ship or two, and eight or ten sail of transports, having on board about 3000 troops, with warlike stores of every description, sailed from Brest bound to the Antilles.

On the 5th of January, 1795, at 8 A. M., latitude $16^{\circ} 30'$ north, *Désirade* bearing west, distant 12 leagues, the British 74-gun ship *Bellona*, Captain George Wilson, cruising in company with the 32-gun frigate *Alarm*, Captain Charles Carpenter, descried two ships of that very French convoy standing towards her; but which, on discovering their mistake, tacked and stood away. The British ships went immediately in chase, with light winds and very hazy weather. At noon 10 sail, lying to, were discovered to leeward.

Supposing these ships and the two first seen to be a squadron of French men-of-war, the British 74 and frigate discontinued the chase until 1 P. M.; when the strangers gave a decided proof of their unwarlike character by bearing up. Observing this, the *Bellona* and *Alarm* again stood after them, the weather very squally and still hazy. At 5 P. M. the *Bellona* made the *Alarm's* signal to attack the convoy, while she prepared to engage the five ships, or as Captain Wilson calls them, "frigates," which had formed in the rear of the convoy.

The *Bellona*, who was one of the fastest and handiest 74s in the British navy, soon overtook, and, after the discharge of a few shot, compelled the sternmost of these to strike. On taking possession, at 8 A. M., of the "frigate," as Captain Wilson in his journal still calls her, she was found to be "the *Duras*, of 20 guns, 400 troops, and 70 seamen." The crew reported their ship in a sinking state; "during which time," says Captain Wilson, "I lay to, expecting the other frigates to fetch me on the same tack, when Captain Carpenter hailed me to observe the same." At 8 h. 30 m. P. M., continues Captain Wilson, "I saw the frigates had bore up." On this, after directing the *Alarm* to take charge of the prize and follow with all expedition, the *Bellona*, a third time, maid sail in chase; but, favoured as well by a dark and squally night as by the awkwardness, to use no

harsher term, of the British 74 and frigate, the whole of the French ships, except the one which appears to have been thrown out as a bait or decoy, effected their escape.

While the *Bellona* was making the best of her way to Martinique, the *Hercule* and her charge steered for the island of their destination, Guadeloupe, and on the following day, the 6th, reached Pointe-à-Pitre in safety, and, after such an escape, it may be added, in triumph. A second piece of good fortune, indeed, appears to have attended the French commodore; for, on the preceding morning, the British 64-gun ship *Veteran*, Captain William Hancock Kelly, when within only a few hours' sail of her appointed station in Gosier bay, had put back to the southward, to attend the crippled *Blanche* and *Pique* to the *Saintes*.

The arrival of this important reinforcement inspired Victor Hugues with designs against the other ceded islands. Having not only troops, but transports to convey, and ships of war to protect them, this demon of republicanism, whose barbarity, as fully accredited on several occasions, was of the most revolting description, readily contrived to land soldiers at *Sainte-Lucie*, *St.-Vincent*, *Grenada*, and *Dominique*. Artful emissaries accompanied the troops, and soon succeeded in raising a ferment in the islands which they visited. The negroes, charibs, and many of the old French inhabitants, revolted; and dreadful were the atrocities perpetrated upon the well-affected. Neither age nor sex was spared; and plantations, in every direction, were seen mouldering beneath the firebrands of the insurgents.

The British troops, thinly distributed from the first, and since reduced by fatigue and sickness, could offer, in general, but a feeble resistance to the numbers of different enemies opposed to them. The garrison of *Sainte-Lucie*, numbering 2000 men, evacuated that island on the 19th of June, and were embarked on board the armed store-ship *Experiment*, Lieutenant John Barrett, and a transport in company: they had suffered greatly, both by the climate and the enemy. By the 27th of the month, the rebellion in *Dominique* had been completely quelled by the few British troops stationed there, assisted by the bulk of the inhabitants. The island of *St.-Vincent* and a part of *Grenada* were, at the close of the year, still in a revolted state.

In landing troops at the commencement, co-operating with them in the prosecution, or withdrawing them at the abandonment, of an attack, the officers and seamen of the British navy evinced their customary zeal and activity, and freely obtained, from those with whom they acted on shore, their commendations and thanks. Our researches have enabled us to name the following as among the officers, who, on the occasions alluded to, particularly distinguished themselves. Captain Charles Sawyer of the *Blanche*, Captain Frederick Watkins of the *Resource*, Captain Josias Rogers of the *Quebec* (pre-eminently so, at

Grenada especially), and Lieutenant John Barrett of the Experiment.

Early in the month of August, a British squadron, under the orders of Vice-admiral Sir George Keith Elphinstone, and composed of the

Gun-ship.		} Vice-admiral (b.) Sir George Keith Elphinstone, K.B. } Captain John Elphinstone,	
74	Monarch . . .		
	Victorious . . .		William Clark,
	Arrogant . . .		Richard Lucas,
64	America . . .		John Blankett,
	Stately . . .	Billy Douglas,	
g.-sh.-ships.			
16	Echo . . .	Temple Hardy,	
	Rattlesnake . . .	John William Spranger,	

having on board a detachment of the 78th regiment, commanded by Major-general Craig, anchored in Simon's bay, Cape of Good Hope.

Proposals were immediately made to the Dutch governor, General Sluysken, to the effect that he should place the settlement under the protection of his Britannic majesty. This the governor refused, and, preparatory to his intention to set fire to Simon's town, sent away the inhabitants. On the 14th, before this could be accomplished, 450 men of the 78th, and 350 marines from the squadron, were landed and took possession of the town. The Dutch militia and Hottentots, meanwhile, had taken post on the adjacent heights, and occupied the pass of Muyzenburg, distant six miles from Cape-Town, well furnished with cannon, having a steep mountain on its right, and the sea, on its left, but difficult of approach on account of shallow water and a high surf on the shore. From this strong position, the enemy fired occasionally on the British patrols; who, agreeably to their instructions, had forbore to commence the slightest act of hostility. The British now determined on offensive operations; and accordingly, a detachment of 1000 seamen, formed into two battalions, under the command of Captains Hardy of the Echo, and Spranger of the Rattlesnake, were disembarked; making with the soldiers and marines already on shore, a force of about 1800 men. To facilitate the attack, the vice-admiral equipped a gun-boat, and armed the launches of the ships with 24 and 18 pounder carronades.

On the 7th of August, at noon, every thing being ready, and the wind favourable, the America 64 got under way, and, with the Stately of the same force, and the two sloops, the Echo, commanded in the absence of her captain, by Lieutenant Andrew Todd, of the Monarch, leading, stood in-shore, as close as the shallowness of the water would admit. The ships, then aided by the gun-boats and launches, which latter were of course enabled to get much closer, covered the line of march of the troops. At 1 P.M. the ships having arrived abreast of an ad-

vanced post, on which two 24-pounders were mounted, drove the enemy from it by the discharge of a few shots. A second position, defended by one gun, and one howitzer, was similarly abandoned. Soon afterwards the ships arrived opposite the enemy's camp; and being judiciously posted by Commodore Blankett, opened so brisk and well-directed a fire, as to compel the Dutch to fly, long ere Major-general Craig and the troops could co-operate. The fire from the enemy's three field-pieces, killed two and wounded four men, besides disabling a gun, on board of the *America*, and wounded one man in the *Stately*. Some shots, also, passed through both ships, but did not materially injure either of them. At 4 P.M. Major-general Craig, after a fatiguing march over heavy sandy ground, arrived at and took possession of the abandoned Dutch camp.

The Dutch, who after retiring had taken post on an advantageous ridge of rocky heights at a short distance off, were, the same evening, driven from that position, also, by the advanced guard of the 78th, supported by the battalion, with the loss of only one British officer, Captain Scott of the 78th, wounded. On the day following, the 8th, having augmented their force from Cape-Town, the Dutch advanced with eight field-pieces, to regain the position they had lost; but, after some slight skirmishing, in which great steadiness was displayed by the first battalion of seamen under Captain Hardy, the former were compelled to retire. The last-named officer had crossed the water with his battalion of seamen, as had also Major Hill, with the marines, and both seamen and marines received the enemy's fire without returning a shot. "They (the seamen) manœuvred," says Major-general Craig, "with a regularity which would not have discredited veteran troops." The general also compliments the marines for their steady resolution on the same occasion. On the 18th five Dutch Indiamen, lying in Simon's bay, were detained by the rear-admiral's orders. Among them was the *Willemstadt en Boetzlaar*; which was afterwards named the *Princess*, and fitted out by the British at the Cape as a 20-gun ship.

Some partial successes, gained on the 1st and 2d of September, encouraged the Dutch, on the 3d, to meditate a general attack on the British camp. The former advanced in the night with all the force they could muster, and with a train of not less than 18 field-pieces. But, just at this critical moment, the long-expected English fleet, with reinforcements, appeared in the offing. On the following morning 14 sail of East India ships, having on board a considerable quantity of troops, under the command of General Alured Clarke, with guns, ammunition, and stores of every sort, including an ample supply of provisions, came to an anchor in Simon's bay.

With this accession of strength, the admiral and general determined on an immediate attack upon Cape-Town. The

disembarkation of the troops, artillery, and stores, occupied until the morning of the 14th; when the army began its march, each man carrying with him four days' provisions. The seamen with their usual alacrity and cheerfulness, dragged the cannon through a deep sand, although annoyed occasionally by a galling fire. In the mean time the *America*, the two sloops, and the *Bombay-Castle* Indiaman, Captain Acland, whose men had volunteered and greatly assisted in the removal of the cannon, proceeded round to Table bay, to make a diversion on that side. This so alarmed the Dutch governor, whose troops had been retiring before those of General Clarke, that the former, on the same night, sent in a flag of truce, asking a cessation of arms for 48 hours, in order to settle the terms of capitulation. General Clarke refused to grant more than 24 hours; and, at the termination of that period, the town and colony fell into the possession of Great Britain. The regular troops that surrendered amounted to about 1000. The ship *Castor*, and armed brig *Star*, both belonging to the Dutch East India company, were here seized. The latter was taken into the British service, and named the *Hope*.

In our account of the proceedings of Lord Howe's fleet in the year 1794, we mentioned that the *Suffolk* 74, Captain Peter Rainier, and a few other vessels of war, parted company from his lordship off the *Lizard* on the 4th of May, bound with convoy to the East Indies. By the able management of Commodore Rainier, that convoy, and a very numerous one it was, arrived in the succeeding November at Madras, without a missing ship, and what is still more extraordinary, without having touched any where on the voyage. The commodore remained on the East India station as the British commander-in-chief, and in June, 1795, obtained his flag.

On the 21st of July, in pursuance of orders from the government of Fort-George, Rear-admiral Rainier, with the *Suffolk*, Captain Robert Lambert, and 50-gun ship *Centurion*, Captain Samuel Osborn, sailed from Madras road, having in charge some transports containing a detachment of troops, under the command of Colonel James Stuart, destined to act against the Dutch possessions in the island of Ceylon, particularly against the important posts of Trincomalé and Oostenburg.

At the same time the 44-gun ship *Resistance*, Captain Edward Pakenham, accompanied by the tender of the *Suffolk*, and a transport having on board a small party of troops, was detached to assist in an expedition that had previously sailed, escorted by the 32-gun frigate *Orpheus*, captain Henry Newcome, for the reduction of Malacca. On the 23d the *Suffolk* and convoy, then off Negapatnam, were joined by the 44-gun ship *Diomedé*, Captain Matthew Smith (who had not yet been tried by the court-martial noticed at p. 214), and a transport or two, with some additional troops.

Thus strengthened, the expedition again set sail on the 25th, and, on the 1st of August cast anchor in Back bay, in company with the 32-gun frigate *Heroine*, Captain Alan Hyde Gardner, who had joined the day previous. On board the *Heroine* was Major Agnew, deputy adjutant-general, who had been sent to Fort Columbo, by Lord Hobart at Madras, ostensibly to explain to the Governor-general of Ceylon, M. Van-Angelbeck, the object of the expedition, but really to obtain from him an order to the commandant at Trincomalé, to admit 300 British troops to garrison Fort Oostenburg, situated within the harbour. This order Major Agnew had brought with him, but to which the commandant of Trincomalé refused obedience.

Nearly two days were occupied in useless remonstrances, when it was resolved to land the troops. Unfortunately, on that afternoon, the *Diomede*, in working into the bay against a strong land wind, with a transport in tow, struck on a sunken rock, not laid down in the charts; and, scarcely allowing time for the people to save themselves, went down with all her stores on board. The delay occasioned by this accident made it the following morning, the 3d, before the troops could be landed. The disembarkation then took place, at a spot about four miles to the northward of the fort of Trincomalé, without the slightest opposition. Owing, in part, to an extraordinary high surf and the violence of the wind, it took as many as ten days to land the whole of the stores and provisions. The carriage of these and of the artillery to the camp, a distance of about three miles, over a heavy sand, was cheerfully executed by the seamen.

On the 18th the troops broke ground, and still remained unmolested by the Dutch. On the 23d the English batteries, consisting of eight 18-pounders (three of them from the *Suffolk*), besides some guns of smaller caliber, opened their fire on the fort of Trincomalé, and, by the 26th effected a practicable breach. A summons to the commandant was then sent in; and, while that was being discussed within, every preparation for the assault was making without. The garrison demanded such terms as could not be granted. Others were forwarded. The non-acceptance of these occasioned a recommencement of the firing; but, before it had continued many minutes, a white flag was suspended from the walls, and the Dutch commandant agreed to the terms which had been offered. The garrison consisted of 679 officers and men, and the serviceable ordnance, of nearly 100 pieces, including a large proportion of 18 and 24 pounders. The loss sustained by the British in gaining this post, amounted, in king's and in company's troops, to 15 killed and 54 wounded, and in seamen to one killed and six wounded.

On the 27th the fort of Oostenburg was summoned, and on the 31st surrendered upon the same terms as had been granted to Trincomalé. On the 18th of September the fort of Batticaloe

surrendered to a detachment of troops under the command of Major Fraser, of the 22d regiment.

On the 24th General Stuart embarked from Trincomalé, with a considerable detachment of troops and artillery, on board of the Centurion, Captain Samuel Osborn, company's frigate Bombay, Bombay store-ship, and Swallow and John packets, and on the 27th disembarked the whole at Point Pedro, island of Ceylon, about 24 miles from Jaffnapatam; of which important post, on the 28th, the general took quiet possession.

On the 1st of October the British 18-gun ship-sloop Hobart, Captain Benjamin William Page (late one of Rear-admiral Ranier's lieutenants and an officer of considerable experience in East-Indian navigation), having on board a detachment of the 52d regiment, under the command of Captain the Honourable Charles Monson, took quiet possession of Molletive, another Dutch factory and military post on the island of Ceylon. On the 5th the fort and small island of Manar, situated a short distance to the north-west of Ceylon, surrendered to Captain Barbutt, whom General Stuart immediately after taking possession of Jaffnapatam, had detached on that service.

The settlement of Malacca had also, since the 17th of August, surrendered by capitulation to the force under the orders of Major Brown, and of Captain Newcome of the Orpheus frigate. Chinsura and its dependencies likewise surrendered; as, before the close of the year, did Cochin and all the remaining Dutch settlements on the continent of India.