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British and french fleets. [1798.]

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BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

DIRECTING our attention, as usual, to the abstract of the British navy, drawn up for the commencement of the present year,* we find an increase, though small, in the total of the line-of-battle cruisers, but a decrease, of equal amount, in those in commission. The whole number of cruisers, line and under-line, has increased considerably since the last abstract; and so, as a necessary consequence, has the grand total of the navy. The vessels, captured from the French, Dutch, and Spaniards, amount to less than half those in the preceding abstract; but, among the latter, were only three sail of the line, while the line-of-battle ships in the former amount to 12: of these, however, one only, the San-Josef, was of any value as a cruiser.† The continuance of the stormy weather of 1796, through the winter months of the following year, filled the casualty-list of the latter with several melancholy cases of shipwreck. In other respects, the loss sustained by the British navy during the year 1797 was of trifling amount.‡

The "launched" columns of this abstract present nothing worthy of remark; except that we may notice the foundation of a new frigate class, the 40, carrying 24-pounders on the main deck. The new individual was the Endymion, a ship built as nearly as possible after the Pomone, captured from the French in April, 1794;§ but measuring 38 tons more, owing to an error in the mode of taking the dimensions of the Pomone. Had that been rectified, the two ships would have measured nearly alike.

* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 6.

† See Appendix, Nos. 8, 9, and 10.

‡ See Appendix, No. 11.

§ See vol. i., p. 291.

We formerly stated that the reign of the *Pomone* was a short one. In the year 1796, through the ignorance of a French pilot, the ship was run ashore in the night, on the Bœufs off Nantz, and was with difficulty got off by daylight. The *Pomone's* leaky state sent her home; nor could Sir John Borlase Warren, the commander of the squadron of which she formed a part, spare a ship to accompany her. At one time the leak, which was under the step of the foremast, had so depressed the ship, that no water could be got to the pumps; but finally, by great exertions on the part of her officers and crew, the *Pomone* reached Plymouth. Captain Eyles, her commander, ran her at once into the harbour, without asking the usual leave; and he and his officers and crew, received the thanks of the admiralty for their promptitude. After being docked, the *Pomone* was refitted for sea, but received on board 18, instead of 24 pounders for her main deck, on account of the weakness of her frame from the shock she had received. Subsequently the *Pomone* was again run on shore, at the island of Jersey. The ship again got off and returned to port; but was found to be so shaken in her frame, that she never afterwards went to sea.

There were two reasons why so few ships among the larger classes were ordered in the year 1797: one was, the great number, particularly of line-of-battle ships, already on the stocks, or about to be placed there; the other, the great number of fine frigates that, since the commencement of the war, had been captured from the French, among which were nine of one class, that averaged nearly 1100 tons.

In the early part of the preceding year, several applications had been made by captains of 74-gun ships to have their ships fitted with carronades, similar to the *Minotaur*; for which ship, since November, 1793, carronades had been ordered, in lieu of her 9s, at the request of Rear-admiral Macbride.

This induced the board of admiralty, on the 17th of March, to order that every line-of-battle ship, coming forward to be fitted, should be prepared to receive carronades all along her quarter-deck and forecastle, except in the wake of the shrouds. These carronades, except in special cases, were to be 32-pounders, and usually amounted to within four, or at most six, of the whole number of long guns originally established upon those decks. As an example of one special case, the carronades, 18 in number, of the *Gibraltar*, then refitting at Plymouth, were ordered to be 24-pounders; thus making all her guns, except the two forecastle 9s, of the same caliber: see notes § and K* to the first Annual Abstract. As another exception, the *Nep-tune*, a small-class 98, was at a subsequent day, May 6th, 1800, also ordered 24-pounder carronades for her quarterdeck and forecastle.

Although no general order had as yet issued to arm frigates with 32-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and forecastle,

yet most of the captains, especially of the 38s and 36s, managed to get the greater part of their long 9s exchanged for carronades of that highly effective caliber. Six of the eight bomb-vessels, that had been purchased in the year 1797, were each ordered to be fitted with eight 24-pounder carronades, instead of eight long 6-pounders as formerly; and the 42 launched and purchased vessels of the gun-brig class (see the Annual Abstract for the year 1798) were armed wholly with 18-pounder carronades, except for chasers.

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year, was,

Admirals	24
Vice-admirals	36
Rear-admirals	44
” superannuated 26	
Post-captains	518
” superannuated 20	
Commanders, or sloop-captains	338
Lieutenants	2030
Masters	492

and the number of seamen and marines, voted for the service of the year 1798, was 120,000.*

The Channel fleet, at the commencement of the present year, was still commanded by Admiral Lord Bridport. On the 25th of January a detachment from it, consisting of 12 ships of the line and three frigates, under the orders Vice-admiral Sir Charles Thompson in the *Formidable* 98, sailed on a cruise in the Bay of Biscay. On the 9th of April a second detachment of six ships of the line and three frigates, under Rear-admiral Sir Roger Curtis, in the *Prince* 98, sailed from Cawsand bay, to cruise off Ireland; and on the 12th Lord Bridport himself, with the remainder of the Channel fleet, consisting of 10 sail of the line, put to sea from St.-Helen's bound off Brest.

On the 21st, at 11 A. M., while Lord Bridport, with the fleet, was standing across the Iroise passage on the larboard tack, with the wind from the north-east by east, the 74-gun ships *Mars*, Captain Alexander Hood, and *Ramillies*, Captain Henry Inman, which, with two or three frigates were on the look-out to windward, discovered and gave chase to two strange sail, distant about four leagues to the eastward. At 2 P. M., as the British advanced ships were getting abreast of the two strangers, then ascertained to be enemy's ships, a third, and a much larger sail, made her appearance about five leagues off, in the east-south-east, working up alongshore towards Brest. The latter became the preferable object of pursuit, and was therefore at 5 h. 45 m. P. M., chased under all sail by the *Mars*, *Ramillies*,

* See Appendix, No. 12.

and 38-gun frigate Jason, Captain Charles Stirling, the only three ships of Lord Bridport's fleet, that were near enough to obtain a sight of the stranger. At 6 h. 20 m. P. M. the Ramillies, carrying away her fore topmast, dropped astern; and the chase was continued by the Mars and Jason, the body of the British fleet then bearing from the former west, distant 10 or 11 miles, and the Penmarcks east-south-east, distant about nine miles.

Every effort was used to accelerate the sailing of the Mars; and she evidently gained, as well upon the Jason, as upon the enemy, now plainly seen to be a ship of the line. At 7 h. 30 m. P. M., the Penmarcks bearing south-east half-east distant seven or eight miles, the stranger evinced an intention to escape through the passage du Raz. Soon afterwards the Mars put about on the starboard tack; and at 8 h. 30 m. P. M., *Bec du Raz* bearing north by east two or three miles, the French 74-gun ship *Hercule*, Captain Louis l'Héritier, finding herself unable to work up against a strong current, dropped anchor and furled her sails. This was just at the mouth of the passage, and at a distance from Brest, the port she was endeavouring to reach, of about seven leagues. The *Hercule* then carried a spring out abaft, and put herself in the best possible state to give a warm reception to the Mars, now fast coming up.

At 8 h. 45 m. P. M. the latter, who had by this time run the Jason nearly out of sight, hauled up her courses. At 9 h. 15 m. P. M. the *Hercule* opened her starboard broadside upon the Mars, and received an almost immediate return. Finding, however, that the strength of the current would not allow him, while under way, to take up a proper fighting position, Captain Hood resolved to anchor. Accordingly, at 9 h. 25 m. P. M., the Mars ranged ahead of the *Hercule*, and, having passed on to a short distance, let go her anchor. As the Mars dropped astern, the anchor on her larboard bow caught the anchor on the starboard bow of the *Hercule*; and, thus entangled, with their sides rubbing together, did the two ships engage, until 10 h. 30 m. P. M.; at which time the *Hercule* having failed in two attempts to board, and being dreadfully shattered in her hull, particularly on the starboard side, hailed that she struck.

So close had the ships fought, that the guns on the lower deck of each could not, as usual, be run out, but were obliged to be fired within board. With the exception of the jib-boom of the Mars, neither ship lost a spar. During the first ten minutes of the action, however, while the latter was obstructed in her manœuvres by the wind and tide, her bowsprit, foremast and foreyard received several of the *Hercule's* shot. In other respects, the damage to both ships was confined to the hulls. The Mars had her hammocks, boats, and spars shot through, and three or four of her first-deck ports unhinged in the collision of the ships: her hull also, was hit in several places. The *Hercule's* starboard

side was riddled from end to end. Several of the ports were unhinged; and, in some instances, the spaces between the ports entirely laid open. The contrast between the two sides of the ship was, indeed, most remarkable: the larboard side, which had been very slightly injured, was of a bright yellow; while the starboard side, or what remained of it, was burnt as black as a cinder. The five aftermost starboard lowerdeck guns of the *Hercule* were dismounted, and several of the others much damaged.

The loss sustained by the *Mars*, in this long and close fought action, was necessarily severe. Out of a crew of 634 men and boys, she had her commander, captain of marines (Joseph White) one midshipman (James Blythe), 15 seamen, and four private marines killed, three seamen and five private marines missing (but in what way neither the official letter, nor the log, gives any account), and her third and fifth lieutenants (George Argles, badly, but who would not quit the deck, and George Arnold Ford), one midshipman (Thomas Southey), 36 seamen, two sergeants of marines, and one drummer wounded; total, 30 killed and missing, and 60 wounded.

No accurate account has been given of the loss on board the French ship; whose crew, as deposed to by her principal surviving officers, consisted of 680, being 20 short of her established number according to the latest regulation, and which would probably have been filled up on her arrival at Brest. Some accounts reckoned the killed and wounded of the French ship at 400; but the *Hercule's* officers, who were the best judges, did not consider the number to exceed 290, an amount greater, as it was, than two-fifths of her complement.

The *Mars* was a 24-pounder 74; that is, she mounted that caliber of gun, 30 in number, upon her second deck, with, as it appears, 16 long 9s and two 32-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and forecastle, and six 24-pounder carronades on the poop, total 82 guns. The guns of the *Hercule*, as found on board of her, were 78 in number, precisely of the nature established upon her class, as particularized at No. 4 in the small table at p. 54 of the first volume,

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		MARS.	HERCULE.
Broadside-guns.....	{ No.	41	39
	{ lbs.	984	985
Crew.....	No.	634	680
Size.....	tons	1853	1876*

* Principal dimensions of the two ships :

	ft.	in.		ft.	in.
<i>Mars</i> , length of gun-deck,	176	0	extreme breadth,	49	2
<i>Hercule</i> , „ „	181	3	„	48	6½

A fairer match one seldom sees on paper. But there were some qualifying circumstances, the absence of which, in the estimation of those who view the affair as a mere struggle for glory, would have rendered the prize a yet more honourable trophy. The *Hercule* had been out of port but 24 hours, and that for the first time since she had been launched; while the *Mars*, in the words of Earl St.-Vincent, was "an old-commissioned, well-practised ship."* Moreover an English 18-pounder frigate was not far off; and even Lord Bridport's fleet could see the flashes of the guns. Upon the whole, therefore, the action of the *Mars* and *Hercule* was one that, in the conduct of it throughout, reflected about an equal share of credit upon both the contending parties.

Captain Hood was nephew to Lords Bridport and Hood, and received a musket-ball in the femoral artery, about 20 minutes after the action commenced; of which wound he died just as it terminated. Captain L'Héritier was the same officer who so gallantly fought the *America* in the action with Lord Howe. On his return to France after the loss of the *Hercule*, Captain L'Héritier was not only acquitted by a court-martial, but received, and no one can say he did not merit, a flattering letter from the minister of marine, Rear-admiral Bruix.

The *Jason*, who was about two miles off at the time of the *Hercule's* surrender, arrived on the spot in about 20 minutes afterwards, and was then of great service in exchanging the prisoners, and getting the prize out of the intricate passage in which she had anchored. The *Hercule* had been launched at Lorient about ten months, and, when fallen in with, was on her way to join the Brest fleet. She had on board a complete set of rigging for a 74-gun ship at the latter port; and which, as we conjecture, had been intended for the new 74-gun ship *Quatorze-Juillet*, set on fire and destroyed in the harbour of Lorient, a few weeks previous to the *Hercule's* departure, by, according to the French accounts, an incendiary. Fortunately, only three persons were in the ship at the time, and, it is believed, they escaped.

The holes in the *Hercule's* starboard side were so large and numerous, particularly under the counter and just above the water-line that, had the weather been at all boisterous, her arrival in a British port would have been very doubtful. With good management, however, the *Hercule* reached Plymouth in safety on the morning of the 27th, and was added to the British navy under her French name. The cost of simply making good the damages which the *Hercule* had sustained by the shot of the *Mars*, was computed at 12,500*l*. Lieutenant William Butterfield, upon whom the command of the *Mars* devolved after Captain Hood had received his mortal wound, was of course promoted.

Although, during the greater part of the present year, there

* Clarke and M'Arthur's *Life of Nelson*, vol. ii., p. 57.

were from 13 to 15 sail of the line in Brest water, the French commander-in-chief, who was still, we believe, M. Morard-de-Galles, made no attempt to put to sea. The principal cause of this inactivity may probably be traced to the existence of a plan of no inconsiderable magnitude, which, or the first part of it at least, was carrying on in another quarter, and the result whereof it was necessary for the Brest fleet to await. Whether the invasion of England by France, to be attempted some time in the year 1798, was really meditated, or was solely meant to divert the attention of England from the Egyptian campaign, the French historians themselves seem unable to decide. At all events, the greatest and most expensive preparations were made, ostensibly to carry into effect the first part of the plan. Before, however, we enter into any of the details, we will introduce a document tending to show that General Buonaparte endeavoured to persuade the directory to convert the sham into a real attack; and surely none but a mind like his could have conceived a plan so vast and multifarious, and yet with such a unity of purpose, as the following letter discloses. It bears date on the 13th of April, 1798; and we here present such a translation, as we are enabled to give of it:

"In our situation we ought to wage a sure war against England, and we can do so. Whether in peace or war, we should expend from forty to fifty millions (francs) in reorganizing our navy. Our army need not be of greater or of less strength, so long as the war obliges England to make immense preparations, that will ruin her finances, and destroy the commercial spirit, and absolutely change the habits and manners of her people. We should employ the whole summer in getting the Brest fleet ready for sea, in exercising the sailors in the road, and in completing the ships that are building at Rochefort, Lorient, and Brest. With a little activity in these operations, we may hope to have, by the month of September, 35 sail of the line in Brest, including the four or five which may then be ready at Lorient and Rochefort.

"We shall have by the end of the month, in the different ports of the Channel, nearly 200 gun-boats. These must be stationed at Cherbourg, Havre, Boulogne, Dunkerque, and Ostende, and the whole summer employed in inuring the soldiers to the sea. In continuing to allow to the commission for the coasts of the Channel 300,000 francs per *décade*, 'a period of 10 days,' we shall be enabled to build 200 gun-boats of larger dimensions, capable of carrying cavalry. We shall then have, in the month of September, 400 gun-boats at Boulogne, and 35 sail of the line at Brest. The Dutch can also have ready, in this interval, 12 sail of the line in the Texel.

"We have in the Mediterranean two descriptions of line-of-battle ships: 12 of French construction, which, between this and

the month of September, may be augmented by two new ships ; and nine of Venetian construction. We may perhaps be able, when the expedition which the government projects in the Mediterranean is over, to send the 14 ships to Brest, and to retain in the Mediterranean only the nine Venetian ships ; which will give us, in the month of October or November, 50 ships of the line at Brest, and almost an equal number of frigates.

"We may perhaps then be able to transport 40,000 men to any spot of England we wish, by avoiding, however, a naval action, if the enemy should be too strong : in the mean while, 40,000 men threaten to put off in the 400 gun-boats, and about as many fishing-vessels of Boulogne, and the Dutch fleet and 10,000 men threaten a descent upon Scotland. The invasion of England, put in practice in this manner in the months of November and December, would be almost certain. England would waste herself by immense efforts, but these would not secure her from our invasion.

"In fact, the expedition to the East will oblige England to send six additional ships of the line to India, and perhaps twice as many frigates to the entrance of the Red Sea : she would be obliged to have from 22 to 25 ships of the line at the entrance of the Mediterranean, 60 before Brest, and 12 before the Texel, forming a total of 300 line-of-battle ships, without reckoning those she now has in America and the Indies, and the ten or twelve 50-gun ships, with 20 frigates, which she would be obliged to have ready to oppose the invasion from Boulogne. We should always remain masters of the Mediterranean, since we should there have the nine Venetian ships of the line.

"There would yet be another way to augment our force in this sea : to oblige Spain to cede three ships of the line and three frigates to the Ligurian republic. This republic cannot be considered otherwise than as a department of France : it possesses more than 10,000 excellent seamen. It is politic in France to encourage the Ligurian republic, and to take care also that it has a few ships of the line. If any difficulties arise about Spain's ceding to us or to the Ligurian republic three ships of the line, I should think it would be proper for us to sell to the Ligurian republic three of the nine ships we took from the Venetians ; and we should require of them to build three others : it would be a good squadron, manned with excellent sailors, which we should thus obtain. With the money received from the Ligurians we ought to build at Toulon three good ships upon our own models ; for ships built after the Venetian plan require as many sailors as a good 74 ; and seamen—there is our weak point. As future events may turn out, it would be extremely advantageous to us that the three republics of Italy, which ought to be equal in force to the King of Naples and

Grand Duke of Tuscany, should have a stronger navy than that belonging to the King of Naples.”*

We leave this extraordinary letter without comment or remark, except just to point out the singular circumstance that the navy of Spain, the ally of France, and which more than trebled that of Holland, should not have been called in aid of Buonaparte’s grand scheme.

While the Brest fleet is remaining quiet in port, awaiting the issue of the Egyptian campaign, we will recount some adventures between the British cruisers stationed off the French coast and the gun-boats that were to be instrumental in effecting the overthrow of England. It will be necessary first to give a brief account of the origin and composition of a description of force, which we may name, in reference to its avowed, if not its real object, the invasion-flotilla.

Soon after his triumphant return from Italy, Buonaparte was appointed by the directory the commander-in-chief of an army called, in rather a more public manner than would, we should suppose, have been the case, had there been any thing but a diversion intended, “*armée d’Angleterre*.” On the subsequent departure of the conqueror of Italy for Toulon, to superintend what, at his suggestion probably, was the main plan in agitation, General Kilmaine succeeded him in the command of an army, whose very name, coupled with the extravagant tales of its amount, was calculated, if not to create alarm, to cause many expensive preparations in the defensive way on the opposite side of the Channel.

The flat-bottomed boats which, during the latter months of the year 1797, were building in most of the French ports along the Channel frontier, were, it appears, constructed from a plan of the celebrated Swedish architect, Chapman, brought to France by an inhabitant of Antwerp, or Anvers, named Muskein; and whom the directory, besides appointing him to superintend the construction of these boats (usually called by the French sailors “*bateaux à la Muskein*”), made a *capitaine de vaisseau*. The business of providing the means of transport, including the flat and all other descriptions of vessels, was intrusted to a commission of three persons: General Andréossi, with the title of director-general; the engineer Forfait, with the title of director (*ordonnateur*); and Rear-admiral la Crosse, with that of inspector-general of the coasts between Cherbourg and Antwerp. A sum of eight millions of francs, drawn from the funds in the hands of the minister of marine, was placed at the disposal of the abovenamed commissioners, to be accounted for to Buonaparte, or to whomever else was the commanding officer of the expedition. To Rear-admiral la Crosse, owing to the

* As this letter of General Buonaparte’s is a very important one, we have given a transcript of the original; for which see Appendix, No. 13.

great extent of his command, were associated the chefs de division, or commodores, Gentaume, Decrès, Casa-Bianca, and Dumanoir-le-Pelley.

In order that the expense, thus incurring in the ports of Normandy, might not be entirely lost, or perhaps to fix the attention of the British upon the Channel ports, while preparations were going on at Toulon, the French government ordered an attack to be made upon the small islands of Saint-Marcouf; of which, in July, 1795, Sir Sidney Smith, with the *Diamond* frigate, had taken unobstructed possession, and which were considered to give to the English great facility in intercepting the communication between the ports of Havre and Cherbourg. The islands of St.-Marcouf are two in number, lying close together; one named east and the other west, and each not more than 200 yards in length, by about 120 in breadth, exclusive of two large banks, which, at low-water, are seen stretching to a considerable extent from the shore. The islands are situated off the river Isigny on the coast of Normandy, and about four miles distant from the French shore. After being garrisoned with about 500 seamen and marines, including a great proportion of invalids, these small islands were placed under the command of Lieutenant Charles Papps Price, of the *Badger*, a cruiser-converted Dutch hoy, mounting four, or at most six guns.* To be prepared for an attempt at recapture, several pieces of cannon were also mounted, both on the principal or western, and on the eastern island; and, as an additional security, some small vessels of war were appointed to cruise near the spot.

Thirty-three flat-bottomed boats upon Chapman's construction having been launched at Havre, a body of troops, under General Point, was embarked on board of them, and Captain Muskein was ordered, with them and a few gun-brigs, to make a combined attack upon the isles of Saint-Marcouf. On the night of the 7th this little expedition set sail from from Havre; but, the next afternoon, when near the entrance of Caen river, Captain Muskein found his progress obstructed by two British frigates, the *Diamond*, Captain Sir Richard John Strachan, and the *Hydra*, Captain Sir Francis Laforey. At 4 p.m. the gun-brigs and flats anchored in a line close to the shore; and at 5 h. 30 m. the *Diamond* and *Hydra*, having worked up to them, opened their broadsides, receiving in return a pretty sharp fire from the heavy long guns of the flotilla. Before the *Diamond* had discharged above two or three broadsides, she grounded in wearing, and lay fast; still, however, the frigate kept up a fire from such of her guns as would bear. At 8 h. 30 m. the flotilla ceased firing, not being able, owing to the darkness, to see the position of their opponents. The latter did the same; and the *Hydra*, to assist in getting her consort afloat, anchored close to

* See note w*, to Annual Abstract, No. 3.

her. Soon after midnight, by the united exertions of the two ships, the *Diamond* again got afloat, without any material damage, either from grounding or from several shells, which the enemy on shore, to interrupt their operations, had continued to throw at both frigates, but which, fortunately for the latter, fell short. The *Diamond*, however, had previously received some slight injury in her sails and rigging from the fire of the gun-boats. At 6 A. M. on the 9th the flotilla weighed, and, standing along shore to the westward, reanchored at 9 A. M., under the town of *Bernie*. While the *Diamond* and *Hydra* were standing off and on to watch the motions of the enemy, the 50-gun ship *Adamant*, Captain William Hotham, hove in sight in the offing. On observing this, Captain Muskein again got under way, and ran back to the eastward, pursued by the two frigates; who exchanged several broadsides with the flotilla, as well as with some batteries on shore. At 3 P. M., the French vessels having stood into *Caen* river, the *Diamond* and *Hydra* ceased firing and hauled off from the shore.

While Captain Muskein lay at anchor in the small port of *Sallenelle*, repairing the damages done to his vessels, seven heavy gun-brigs, and about 40 flat-boats and armed fishing vessels, joined him from *Cherbourg*, the head-quarters of Rear-admiral *La Crosse*. These vessels also brought an additional body of troops. After a three weeks' blockade in *Caen* river, Captain Muskein found an opportunity to put to sea with his now doubly-formidable flotilla, and was, this time, so fortunate as to reach unobserved the road of *La Hougue*, situated about half way between *Cape Barfleur*, and the isles that were to be attacked. Here it was necessary to await the concurrence of two circumstances; a stark calm, in order to prevent the British cruisers from approaching the scene of action, and neap-tides, when the currents, being at their minimum of violence, would offer less opposition to the progress of the flotilla.

Owing to the absence of these indispensable contingencies, matters remained quiet at the isles of *Saint-Marcouf* until the 6th of May, when Lieutenant *Price* received information that an attack was meditated in the course of that night. A boat was instantly despatched to reconnoitre the enemy, and every preparation made to receive him. By 10 P. M., owing to the prevailing calm, the small naval force on the station, consisting of the 50-gun ship *Adamant*, Captain William Hotham, 24-gun ship *Eurydice*, Captain John Talbot, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Orestes*, Captain William Haggitt, had not been able to approach nearer to the islands than six miles; consequently, the defence of the post was likely to rest upon the sole exertions of the garrison; precisely what the assailants wanted, in order to ensure success to their plan of attack.

At midnight the reconnoitring boat signalled the approach of the enemy, and the garrison, at the same time, heard the French

officers giving orders to the men ; but the darkness was so great that none of the boats were visible. The attacking force consisted of 52-gun brigs and flat-bottomed boats, having on board as was reported, about 6000 men (a number, we think, somewhat overrated), composed chiefly of a detachment from the Boulogne marine-battalion. At daybreak on the 7th the flotilla was seen drawn up in a line opposite to the south-west front of the western redoubt ; and instantly was opened, upon the brigs and flats composing it, a fire from 17 pieces of cannon consisting of four 4, two 6, and six 24 pounder long guns, and three 24, and two 32 pounder carronades, being all the guns that would bear. The brigs remained at a distance of from 300 to 400 yards, in order to batter the redoubt with their heavy long guns while the boats, with great resolution rowed up until within musket-shot of the battery. But the guns of the latter, loaded with round, grape, and canister, soon poured destruction amongst these, cutting several of the boats "into chips," and compelling all that could keep afloat to seek their safety in flight. Six or seven boats were seen to go down, and one small flat, No. 13, was afterwards towed in, bottom upwards. She appeared, by some pieces of paper found in her, to have had 144 persons on board, including 129 of the second company of the Boulogne battalion.

The loss sustained by the British garrison in this highly creditable affair amounted to one private-marine killed, and two private-marines and two seamen wounded ; a loss much less in amount than was to be expected from upwards of 80 bow-guns, many of which were long 36, and none of them, it is believed below long 18 pounders. Lieutenant Richard Bourne, of the Sandfly gun-vessel, who commanded the fort on the eastern island, was unable, at the commencement of the attack, to effect much ; but when, towards the close of it, several of the French boats got within shell-range, two 68-pounder carronades, which were part of his guns, must, from their heavy and destructive discharges, have been of great service in repelling the assailants: Fortunately, no one of Lieutenant Bourne's party was hurt. According to one French account, the invaders lost about 900 in killed or drowned, and between 300 and 400 wounded. According to another, their loss was very trifling. The three British ships got up just as the remnant of the flotilla was retreating ; but, owing to the calm state of the weather, were unable to intercept any of the boats in their way back to La Hougue. As a reward for their conduct on this occasion, Lieutenants Price and Bourne were each promoted to the rank of commander.

Shortly after this unsuccessful début of the famous flotilla, Rear-admiral Bruix, succeeding M. Pléville as minister of marine, directed Rear-admiral La Crosse to take the command, and to make a second attack upon the islands which had been the

scene of their defeat. The French government, however, having good reason, from experience, to doubt the success of the measure, renounced the attempt; and Rear-admiral La Crosse, selecting an opportunity, conveyed back the principal part of his flotilla to Cherbourg, between which port, Granville, and Saint-Malo, the vessels were divided; while Captain Muskein, with his division, was ordered to Hâvre.

Intelligence having reached the British government, that a great number of transport-schuyts were fitting at Flushing, or Flessingue, preparatory to their being convoyed by the Bruges canal to Dunkerque and Ostende, in order to be employed in the long-threatened invasion of England, a squadron, consisting of one 44-gun ship flûte (mounting 26 guns), two 28-gun frigates, two 20-gun ships, three frigate flûtes (mounting about 14 guns each), and 17 sloops, bombs, and gun-vessels, under the orders of Captain Home Riggs Popham, in the Expedition flûte-44, assembled at Margate, and there received on board a body of troops, commanded by Major-general Eyre Coote.

On the 14th of May the squadron set sail for the opposite coast, but, owing to an unfavourable change in the weather, did not, until the 19th, at 1 A. M., reach their intended anchorage in front of the town of Ostende. Soon afterwards the wind, shifting to west and blowing hard, raised a heavy surf on the shore. Still, as information had just been received, by a captured vessel, that the force in Ostende, Nieuport, and Bruges, was very small, it was resolved to land the troops immediately, and trust to the weather's moderating for their safe re-embarkation. One of the transports, the frigate-flûte *Minerva*, Captain John Mackellar, having on board the four light-infantry companies of the first regiment of guards, under Lieutenant-colonel Ward, had recently parted company. The remainder of the troops, with Major-general Coote at their head, consisting of two light-infantry companies of the Coldstream guards, two similar companies belonging to the third guards, the 11th regiment of foot, and the flank companies of the 23d and 49th regiments, numbering, including a small party of miners, about 1140 officers and men, with six pieces of ordnance, also wooden petards, tools, and the necessary quantity of gunpowder for effecting the intended explosion, disembarked, and at about 3 A. M., without opposition or even discovery, effected their landing at a short distance to the eastward of the town.

At about 4h. 15m. A.M. the batteries at Ostende opened their fire upon the three nearest British vessels, which were the brig-sloop *Wolverine*, Captain Lewis Mortlock, and gun-brigs *Asp* and *Biter*, Lieutenants Joseph Edmonds and John Dennis De Vitré; and, for upwards of four hours, a mutual cannonade was maintained. At the end of that time, however, the *Wolverine* and *Asp* had sustained considerable damage in their hulls and rigging; with, to the latter the loss of one seaman killed,

and her commander wounded, and, to the former, of one seaman and one private of the 23d regiment killed, and 10 seamen and five privates of the same regiment wounded. The bombs *Hecla* and *Tartarus*, Captains Thomas Hand and James Oughton, had, in the mean time, been throwing their shells into the town and basin, with great quickness and some effect; much damage having, as alleged, been done to the shipping in the latter, and the former having been seen several times on fire.

Owing to the damaged state of the *Wolverine* and *Asp*, the commodore signalled them to weigh and move further off; and the ship-sloop *Dart* (carrying twenty-eight 32-pounder carronades), Captain Richard Raggett, and the 18-gun brig-sloops *Kite* and *Harpy*, Captains William Brown and Henry Bazely, forthwith proceeded to occupy the stations which the *Wolverine* and *Asp* had quitted; but, owing to its being low-water, the *Dart* and her companions were compelled to anchor at a greater distance from the shore than their commanders wished, or their short-gun batteries suited. Consequently, the subsequent cannonade between the shore and the shipping was neither animated nor effective.

At 9h. 30 m. A. M. the *Minerva* came in and anchored; and Captain Mackellar, by the orders of the commodore, immediately went on shore in his boat to report the ship's arrival to the general. In the mean time Lieutenant-colonel Ward, with a becoming zeal, had filled two flat-bottomed boats with the troops, and was on his way to disembark them, when, as the boats pulled near to the 20-gun ship *Ariadne*, her commander, Captain James Bradley, succeeded in persuading the colonel to return immediately on board the *Minerva*; and thus the four fine companies, commanded by Colonel Ward, to his and their present regret, but subsequent joy, were not allowed to land.

The troops that had landed appear to have fully succeeded in blowing up the locks and sluice-gates of the Bruges canal, and in destroying several gun-boats lying in the basin, with the trifling loss of one private soldier killed, and one seaman wounded. The explosion, as seen from the shipping, took place at 10h. 20 m. A. M., and by noon the troops were ready to re-embark; but such was the state of the weather, that the measure was wholly impracticable. The British then took up a position on some sand-hills near the beach, and there remained under arms but unmolested, during the remainder of that day and the whole of the ensuing night. By daybreak on the 20th, however, the French had collected in considerable force; and, after a smart action in which the British sustained a loss of about 65 in killed and wounded, including, among the former, one lieutenant-colonel, and among the latter, the major-general and several distinguished officers, the whole, with Captain Mackellar and the survivors of his boat's crew, were compelled to surrender on terms of capitulation. Thus ended an expedition,

of which both the object and the success appear to have been overrated; but of which the final result was, beyond all doubt, disastrous to one party, and proportionably triumphant to the other.

A week or two after the occurrence of this unlucky event, an exploit of a very different character was performed by some British cruisers off the French coast, and in sight of a part of the army destined, as was then supposed, for the invasion of England. On the 30th of May, at daybreak, the British 38-gun frigate *Hydra*, Captain Sir Francis Laforey, bomb-vessel *Vesuvius* (eight long 6-pounders, one 10 and one 13 inch mortar, with 67 men and boys), Captain Robert Lewis Fitzgerald, and 12-gun cutter *Trial* (eight long 3-pounders and four 12-pounder carronades, with 45 men and boys), Lieutenant Henry Garrett, standing in towards the port of *Hâvre*, close hauled on the larboard tack, with the wind at east-north-east, discovered about a point upon the weather bow, standing on the contrary tack, three sail, which eventually proved to be the French 36-gun frigate *Confiante*, Captain (de vais.) Etienne Pevrieux, 20-gun ship-corvette *Vésuve*, Lieutenant Jean-Baptiste-Louis Lecolier, and an armed cutter or gun-vessel; all of which, on the preceding night, had quitted *Hâvre*, bound to Cherbourg.

On approaching near enough to ascertain the character of the *Hydra* and her companions, the French vessels wore round on the larboard tack, and stood towards the shore, under a press of sail, chased by the former: especially by the *Hydra*, who was far ahead and to windward of her two consorts. When close in-shore, the *Confiante* and *Vésuve* tacked and hoisted their colours; and the latter, being at some distance on the lee beam of her consort, fired at the *Hydra* in passing.

Having fired in return, the *Hydra* quickly put about; as, shortly afterwards did the French frigate and corvette. At 6 A. M., just as the *Hydra*, while stretching on upon the starboard tack, had arrived abreast of and between the *Confiante* and *Vésuve*, then on the opposite or in-shore tack, the French frigate opened a passing but ineffectual fire; and, in a minute or two afterwards, the corvette from to-leeward also discharged her guns at the *Hydra*. The latter now opened upon the *Vésuve* so well-directed a fire, that the latter, crowding all sail, bore up before the wind towards the shore.

At 6 h. 30 m., leaving the *Vesuvius* and *Trial* to pursue the *Vésuve*, the *Hydra* tacked after the *Confiante*; who thereupon bore up, with the apparent intention of reaching the road of *Hâvre*. Bearing up in pursuit, the *Hydra* soon commenced pouring her broadsides into the French frigate; and the two continued a running fight until 7 h. 15 m., about the time of high-water; when the *Confiante*, then under a press of sail, ran on shore upon the sand opposite to Beuzeval, a village a little to

the eastward of the mouth of the river Dive, and about three leagues to leeward of the port she wished to make.

In the mean while the *Vésuve* had run herself on shore near to a small battery off the entrance of the river Dive; but, floating again at the rising of the tide, the corvette attempted to run down to the mouth of the river Orne, or Caen. The near approach of the *Vesuvius* and *Trial*, however, compelled her again to run on shore at a short distance only from the spot on which she had first grounded. Here the bomb-vessel and cutter commenced cannonading the *Vésuve*; in which occupation we will leave them, while we attend to the two frigates.

The moment the *Confiante* struck the sand, the *Hydra* laid all her sails aback, and kept up, with scarcely any return, an incessant fire, within musket-shot distance, until 9 h. 30 m. A. M.; when the falling of the tide obliged the British frigate, after having been near enough to read the name upon the stern of the French frigate (whose mizenmast had just fallen), to haul off into deeper water. The *Hydra*, as she stood to the offing, made the signal for her two consorts to leave off firing and do the same. Sir Francis, soon afterwards, sent the *Trial* to reconnoitre the French frigate; which at this time bore from the *Hydra* south by east, and the corvette south-south-west, distant five miles.

On the *Trial's* approach, the *Confiante*, whose crew had hauled her further in-shore, fired several shot at her, and a number of troops had assembled on the beach and adjoining heights, ready to protect the grounded frigate from an attack upon her by boats. Under these circumstances, Sir Francis thought it best to defer any attempt to board and destroy the *Confiante*, until a more favourable opportunity should present itself. In the mean while the *Hydra* continued, during the night, as close to the shore as a regard for her safety would permit.

On the 31st at 10 A. M., finding that a great part of the crew had quitted the *Confiante*, Sir Francis despatched the boats of the *Hydra*, under the orders of Lieutenants George Acklom and William J. Simonds, and Lieutenant Blanch of the marines, covered by the *Trial*, to haul down the colours of and burn the French frigate. At about 45 m. past noon the boats got alongside of and boarded the *Confiante*, whom the remainder of her crew had now abandoned, leaving her colours flying. These were presently hauled down by the British, and at 1 h. 30 m. P. M. the French frigate was on fire fore and aft; a service executed in the face of a party of cavalry drawn up on the beach, and of a small though ineffectual fire of musketry from some infantry on the adjoining heights. Having completely destroyed the *Confiante*, and ascertained that she carried 36 long guns, 12 and 6 pounders, besides a pair or two of carronades on her quarterdeck, with a crew, according to her rôle d'équipage, of 300 men, Lieutenant Acklom, with the boats, at about 2 h. 30 m. P. M. returned to the *Hydra* in the offing.

This dashing service was performed without injury to a single man on board of, or belonging to, any one of the three British vessels; and the only damage which the latter sustained was a slight wound by shot in the Hydra's mainmast, and some injury to her rigging. "From the number of slain left on board and the state of her decks," the *Confiante* appeared to have sustained a severe loss; but, as the wounded were carried off, and the killed are not enumerated in either the English or French accounts, we are unable to state its amount.

As soon as, on the ebbing of the tide on the morning of the 30th, the *Vesuvius* and *Trial* had hauled off from the *Vésuve*, the French crew began shoring up the corvette, to prevent her falling over: they next got down her yards and topmasts, and laid out an anchor in the north-west, ready to heave her afloat on the rising of the tide. This was effected while the Hydra's boats were boarding the *Confiante*; and, in the course of the afternoon, the *Vésuve* got safe into the river Dive. Here, at the little port of Sallenelle, was lying Captain Muskein's division of gun-boats on its return to *Hâvre*.

In order to protect the corvette from a second attack, Captain Muskein landed a portion of his guns, and erected batteries at Cabourg and other suitable spots at the entrance of the river. These batteries were worked by the seamen from the gun-boats, assisted by the 200 troops of the Boulogne battalion that had embarked in them. This prompt measure saved the *Vésuve* from sharing the fate of the *Confiante*; and, even when on the 1st of June the 38-gun frigate *Diamond*, Captain Sir Richard John Strachan, joined the little squadron before *Hâvre*, the British were obliged to retire without effecting any thing further. As soon as their departure was ascertained, and the *Vésuve* had rigged herself afresh, the corvette and gun-boats got under way, and reached *Hâvre* in safety.

A French writer complains, that Lieutenant Lecolier did very little to support his commodore; and it certainly would appear, as well that Captain Pevrieux, when he permitted the *Vésuve*, instead of running on shore, or making off as the cutter had just done, to follow the *Confiante* in tacking from the coast, did expect to derive some benefit from the co-operation of his consort, as that the latter bore up out of gun-shot the instant she felt the effects of the Hydra's heavy broadside. Nor, considering the disparity of force between the Hydra and *Vésuve*, and the apparent neglect of the *Confiante*, who was to windward, to close for his support, could Lieutenant Lecolier be blamed for the step he took.

As the *Vesuvius* and *Trial* had gone in pursuit of the corvette, then was the time for Captain Pevrieux to have emulated the conduct of many other French officers of his rank, and, instead of running from, to have at least "shown fight" with, the Hydra. Having, however, previously declined to engage

a British 18-pounder frigate, when commanding a French frigate of the same maindeck force,* Captain Pevrieux would hardly be the assailant now that the ship he commanded carried no heavier metal than twelves.

The same French writer, who blames Lieutenant Lecolier for his early abandonment of the action, would, in all probability, have been less lavish in his encomiums upon Captain Pevrieux for his intrepidity in conducting it, but for two mistakes, so happily coinciding as to double the intended effect. He calls the *Confiante* "une corvette," with as much reason as he calls the *Hydra* "un vaisseau rasé, portant du 24 en batterie et des caronades de 64 sur les gaillards."† Where can this French writer produce a corvette with a "capitaine de vaisseau" and a crew of 300 men? The *Vésuve* mounted 20 long 8-pounders, and yet was commanded, as the writer acknowledges, by a "lieutenant de vaisseau." Of the fact, that the *Confiante* was a frigate, similar in size and force to the *Néréide* and a great many others, we entertain not the slightest doubt; and, indeed, if our memory is not treacherous, we have seen the *Confiante* designated as a frigate in the columns of the *Moniteur*.

Since the failure of their attempt in December, 1796, to make a descent upon Ireland, the French had endeavoured, by means of spies and emissaries, to gain over the catholics to their cause. In this they at length succeeded, and unhappy Ireland became the theatre of open and bloody rebellion. The object of the French directory now was, at every risk, to aid the rebels with a few disciplined troops, and a great quantity of arms, ammunition, and clothing. This, indeed, the directory had pledged themselves to do, but they had let the summer nearly pass away before they made any attempt to fulfil their promise. At length two expeditions were set on foot, and were to have sailed simultaneously, one from Brest, the other from Rochefort.

Owing to some delay in paying the seamen and troops of the Brest expedition, that from Rochefort was the first to sail. It consisted of the following ships:

Gun-frig.

40	Concorde.....	{	Commodore Daniel Savary.
		{	Captain André Papin.
36	{ Franchise.....	"	Jean-Louis Guillotin.
	{ Médée.....	"	Jean-Daniel Coudin.
28	Vénus.....	"	André Senez.

On board this squadron were 1150 troops, with four field-pieces, under the command of General Humbert, having under him the Adjutant-generals Fontaine and Sarrazin. Each ship carried also a considerable quantity of powder, and the same of arms and accoutrements.

* See vol. i., p. 332.

† *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome viii., p. 290.

On the 6th of August Commodore Savary got under way with his squadron from the road of the Isle of Aix, and escaped to sea unobserved. On the 21st the squadron made the westernmost end of Ireland, and the general intended to disembark the troops at Killembach; but contrary winds drove the ships towards the bay of Killala. The French squadron made its approach under English colours, and on the evening of the 22d cast anchor near Killcummin head, the western point of Killala bay. In the course of the evening the troops disembarked, taking on shore with them four field-pieces, four loaded ammunition waggons, 30,000 pounds of powder, and uniforms and equipments complete for 3000 rebel Irishmen.

The only British force at the post consisted of a small detachment of the Prince of Wales's fencible regiment, and a few yeomanry, attended by some clergymen of the neighbourhood, in number altogether about 200. These, or the loyal portion of them at least, offered what resistance they could, but were at length compelled to give way, after having lost a few in killed and wounded, and a great many willing and unwilling prisoners. An officer and 25 privates of the fencible regiment, being the whole of the prisoners who preferred captivity to freedom under the terms on which alone it was offered, were sent on board the French squadron. Commodore Savary soon afterwards weighed and set sail from the coast; and these four French frigates were fortunate enough to reach in safety the port whence they had departed.

The subsequent operations being wholly of a military nature, it may suffice to state, that General Humbert was soon joined by several bands of United Irishmen, but not in such numbers as he had been led to expect; that he had several skirmishes with the loyal part of the inhabitants and the troops sent against him; and that finally, on the 8th of September, at Ballinamuck, the French general, with 843 of his followers, including officers, surrendered, at discretion, to a superior British force under Lieutenant-general Lake.

About a week after the surrender of General Humbert and his "*Armée d'Irlande*,"* the French privateer-brig *Anacréon*, from Dunkerque, having on board the Irish rebel Napper-Tandy, and the French General Rey, besides some other officers and a detachment of light artillery, together with a quantity of arms, ammunition, and clothing, appeared off the Irish coast, near a small island which lies to the westward of the county of Donegal. A communication from the shore soon acquainted General Rey with the fate of General Humbert, and the *Anacréon* immediately made sail on her return. Going north-about, the French brig fell in with and captured two British

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome x., p. 390.

letters of marque from the Baltic; with which in her company, the Anacréon re-entered Dunkerque.

The expedition to which we alluded, as being appointed to sail from Brest at the same time as that under Commodore Savary from Rochefort, consisted of one ship of the line, eight frigates, and an aviso, under the orders of Commodore Bompard, the captain of the Embuscade in her action with the Boston at the beginning of the war, and now on board the 74-gun ship Hoche.* This squadron contained about 3000 troops commanded by Generals Hardy and Ménage, a large train of artillery, and some battering cannon, with a detachment of men belonging to these two armies, under Colonel Pernetly and Captain Kirgenery, also a great quantity of military stores of every description. The French government having at length given the order for departure and a favourable wind occurring, Commodore Bompard, on the evening of the 16th of September, hoping to escape through the passage du Raz before daylight the next morning, put to sea with the

Gun-ship

74 Hoche { Commodore Jean Bapt.-Fr. Bompard.
 { Captain Desiré-Marie Maïstral.

Gun-frig.

40	{	Immortalité "	Jean-François Legrand.
	{	Romaine "	Mathieu-Charles Bergevin.
	{	Loire "	Adrien-Joseph Segond.
	{	Bellone "	Louis-Léon Jacob.
	{	Coquille "	Léonore Deperonne.
36	{	Embuscade "	Nicolas Clement de la Roncière.
	{	Résolue "	Jean-Pierre Bargeau.
	{	Sémillante "	Martin-Antoine Lacouture.
Sch.		Biche Lieut.	Jean-Marie-Pierre Labastard.

On the 17th, at daybreak, the bec du Raz bearing east-half-north distant four or five leagues, and the weather nearly calm, the British 38-gun frigates Boadicea, Captain Richard Goodwin Keats, and Ethalion, Captain George Countess, and 18-gun brig-sloop Sylph, Captain John Chambers White, discovered the above French squadron about five leagues off in the east-south-east, steering west-north-west. At 8 A. M., a light breeze sprang up from the north-east; on which the French ships hauled their wind to south-south-west, and made sail. Now that the French squadron had fairly put to sea, Captain Keats made all sail to the northward, to communicate the intelligence to Lord Bridport; leaving Captain Countess, with the Ethalion and Sylph, to keep company with the enemy and watch his future motions.

On the 18th, at 2 A. M., Captain Countess was joined by the

* Late Pégase, but newly named after the celebrated general; who had died at the head-quarters at Wetzlar on the 18th of September, 1797, of a disease in the chest, and was buried, with the highest military honours, by the side of General Marceau, in the redoubt of Petersberg, near Coblentz.

38-gun frigate *Amelia*, Captain the Honourable Charles Herbert, who the night previous had passed unobstructed, if not unobserved, through the French squadron. At daylight the French began working towards Isle Groix, as if intending to enter Lorient. At 8 A. M., however, they bore up, five of the frigates, of which the more advanced ones were the *Loire* and *Immortalité*, chasing the two British frigates, but without effect. At 10 h. 30 m A. M., the *Hoche* and her nine companions hauled to the wind on the larboard tack, steering about south-west by south, the French commodore wishing to make it appear to his watchful and persevering pursuers, that he was bound to the Antilles. On the 19th it was nearly a calm all day. On the 20th, at 6 A. M., the 44-gun frigate *Anson*, Captain Philip Charles Durham, joined company. At noon the British were in latitude $46^{\circ} 27'$ north, longitude $5^{\circ} 3'$ west, and the French nearly hull-down in the south-west by south. On the 22d at noon, the British frigates again got within eight or nine miles of the French squadron, which was at this time steering west-north-west. On the 23d, in the afternoon, having now little doubt of M. Bompard's destination, Captain Countess despatched the *Sylph* to the commander-in-chief on the Irish station.

On the 25th, in the forenoon, latitude $44^{\circ} 53'$ north, longitude $8^{\circ} 57'$ west, a fleet, that proved to be an English convoy of more than 100 sail, among which were some East India ships, was descried to leeward of the French squadron, then about four miles off in the west-south-west. Whether deceived by the warlike appearance of the Indiamen, or apprehensive that some of his frigates, which were then rather scattered, would be exposed to an attack by the British frigates in company, or whether he was so tied up by his orders that he dared not take advantage of the chance thus thrown in his way, and which, by the by, would have been more beneficial to his country than the safe debarkation in Ireland of 3000 Frenchmen, and even the safe return to Brest of the squadron that had carried them out; whatever it was that influenced M. Bompard, he suffered the convoy to proceed unmolested. On the 26th, in the morning, the French ships tacked, and gave chase to the *Ethalion* and her two companions, but left off about noon. The latter immediately shortened sail, and again stood to the south-west after the French squadron. On the 27th the wind increased, and the sea became so rough, that all the ships were under their topsails and courses; but the British still maintained their position about four miles on the enemy's lee quarter. On the 29th, at 7 A. M., by which time the weather had moderated, the French squadron again went in chase. Three of the French frigates, of which the *Loire* was first, and the *Immortalité* second, came up fast with the three British frigates, and the latter got ready to fire their stern chasers; but about 9 A. M. the *Hoche* sprang her main topmast, and one of the French frigates carried away

a topsail yard. On this the chasing ships shortened sail; as did also the three British frigates. Finding it in vain to hope to shake off the latter, who appeared as if they would really follow him to the Antilles, Commodore Bompard determined to steer for his destination. The French ships accordingly wore on the larboard tack, with their heads to the north-west, and were quickly followed in the manœuvre by Captain Countess's squadron. In the forenoon's chase the Anson had sprung her main topmast; and in the evening the Hoche was seen to lower hers down either to shift or fish it: at daylight on the 30th, however, the topmast of the French ship, to the credit of her officers and crew, was again in its place. At noon this day the ships were in latitude 44° north, longitude $14^{\circ} 23'$ west. On the 1st of October the French began steering a more northerly course, and rather increased their distance from the British. On the 4th, in the evening, the weather continuing thick and coming on to blow very hard from the south-south-east, the Ethalion and her consorts hauled up and soon lost sight of M. Bompard's squadron. On the 7th, in the evening, the Amelia parted company. On the 8th, and a part of the 9th, it was calm; during which the Anson rolled away her main topmast and mizen topgallantmast.

On the 11th, at daylight, the Ethalion and Anson, standing on the larboard tack, with the wind at north-north-west, saw and chased two sail on the lee bow; one of which proved to be the Amelia, and the other a ship (either the Robust or Magnanime) belonging to the squadron of Commodore Sir John Borlase Warren; who, with the 74-gun ship Canada, 80-gun ship Foudroyant, Captain Sir Thomas Byard, 74-gun ship Robust, Captain Edward Thornborough, and 44-gun frigate Magnanime, Captain the Hon. Michael De Courcy, had been despatched from Cawsand bay since the evening of the 23d of September, which was about as soon as intelligence arrived of the escape of the French squadron from Brest. The commodore then proceeded straight to Achil head, and on the 10th, the high land of Donegal being distant about 12 leagues, was joined by the 36-gun frigates Melampus, Captain Graham Moore, and Doris, Captain Lord Ranelagh; which frigates had sailed from Lough-Swilly a few days before, in consequence of the intelligence brought to the north-west coast by the Sylph brig detached by Captain Countess. Shortly after the junction of the Melampus and Doris, Sir John detached the latter to cruise off Tory island and the Rosses, and the former to give the alarm along the Irish coast. A gale of wind from the north-west rendering it unsafe to approach the land without a pilot, the Melampus kept company with the squadron; which was joined the same evening by the Amelia. So that, on the following day, the 11th, when, at about 10 h. 30 m. A. M., Captain Countess joined company, Sir John Warren had under his command the Canada, Robust,

Foudroyant, Magnanime, Ethalion, Anson, Melampus, and Amelia.

Relieved at length from the plagues that had stuck to him so closely, Commodore Bompert proceeded to fulfil his instructions, which were to land the troops in the harbour of Lough-Swilly. The first intention had been to effect the disembarkation in the bay of Killala; and the plan was only changed because the delay in the departure of the expedition rendered it probable that General Humbert, for whom of course the reinforcement was meant, would be found further to the northward. On the 10th, in the evening, the French squadron discovered the loom of the land. With the hope now of getting quite clear of the British frigates, M. Bompert bore away in the direction of Killala bay, and then, at midnight, hauled sharp up to the northward, with the wind, as already mentioned, at north-north-west, blowing strong. On the 11th, at daybreak, the French commodore, thinking all was safe, bore up for Tory island, but soon found cause to regret that he had not kept his wind a few hours longer; for, at noon, the *Immortalité*, the leading frigate, signalled the appearance of the British squadron. The French ships, by signal, now hauled close to the wind; but, owing greatly to an accident which we shall relate presently, that manœuvre proved of no avail.

At about the same time that the *Immortalité* signalled the enemy to her commodore, the *Amelia* did the same to hers, and pointed out the bearing to be north by west, which was about half a point before her weather beam. At this time the *Robust* and *Magnanime* were on the *Amelia*'s weather quarter, standing on the same tack as herself, and the *Canada* and the rest of the squadron were on the opposite or starboard tack, at a considerable distance on her lee beam. Sir John Warren immediately made the signal for a general chase, and for the ships to "form in succession as they arrived up with the enemy." At about 2 h. 30 m. p.m. the *Canada* and ships near her wore on the larboard tack, and made all sail to the east-north-east, which was as high as they could lie. At 6 p.m. the body of the French squadron bore from the *Canada* north-east, distant 10 or 12 miles. As night approached, the weather became very boisterous, attended with a hollow sea; and at 9 h. 30 m. p.m. the *Anson* carried away her mizenmast, main yard, and maintop sail yard.

Some hours previous, owing to the violence of the same gale, a much greater misfortune than this was to Commodore Sir John Warren, had befallen Commodore Bompert. The *Hoché* carried away her main topmast, the latter, in its fall, bringing down the fore and mizen topgallantmasts, and tearing the mainsail nearly to pieces. This accident, of course, retarded considerably the progress of the French squadron; and at a few minutes before 8 p.m. the *Résolue* signalled that she had sprung a leak which

she could not stop. The *Biche* was immediately despatched with orders to Captain Bargeau to run his ship on the coast, and, by burning blue-lights and sending up rockets, endeavour to draw the British squadron after him; while the *Hoche* and the remaining frigates should bear away to the south-west, the commodore intending to land the troops at any practicable point of the coast in that direction. This plan of sacrificing one ship for the safety of seven, or, taking the value of the *Hoche* into the account, of 10 or 12 ships, was well devised, and might have succeeded; but either the *Biche* never reached the *Résolue* with Commodore Bompert's orders, or Captain Bargeau now discovered that the danger was not so imminent as he had at first been induced to believe. At all events, no rockets or blue-lights were observed by the British squadron.

On the 12th, at daybreak, the French commodore, from having, on account of a sudden fall in the wind, run to leeward less fast than he expected, found himself and his squadron nearly surrounded by the ships of his enemies. We will endeavour to show the relative position of the two squadrons soon after 5 h. 30 m. A. M.; which was about the time that the light permitted them to get a glimpse of each other. The French squadron, loosely formed in two rather distant lines, with the *Hoche*, who had bent herself a new mainsail, in the centre of the second line, was standing to the south-west, the wind, as before, from the north-north-west, but now very moderate. Right astern, at the distance of about four miles, were the *Robust* and *Magnanime*; about a point on the lee quarter, at a somewhat greater distance, the *Amelia*; a little further forward in that direction, and at about the same distance, the *Melampus*; a little before the lee beam, at the distance of seven or eight miles, the *Foudroyant*; and on the lee bow, about a mile nearer, the *Canada*. The *Anson*, at this time, was not in sight of either squadron. Consequently M. Bompert, in his crippled state, the wind being in the north-west, found every avenue of escape shut against him except in the south-west, the direction in which he was steering.

Both squadrons now anxiously awaited, but with very different feelings, the signal to engage from the *Canada*; but Sir John, because, as he states in his letter, "it was impossible to close," did not make it until 7 A. M. The *Robust* was then directed to lead "and the rest of the ships to form in succession in the rear of the van;" a piece of formality that might have answered well enough, had three or four of the *Hoche*'s companions been line-of-battle ships like herself. In the mean time, Commodore Bompert had formed his squadron in an irregular single line ahead, thus: *Sémillante*, *Romaine*, *Bellone*, *Immortalité*, *Loire*, *Hoche*, *Coquille*, and *Embuscade*. At 7 h. 10 m. A. M., by her time, the *Robust*, in obedience to the signal just made by the *Canada*, edged down towards the rear of the French line, followed closely by the *Magnanime*, and, on arriving

within gun-shot, received a fire from the stern-chasers and quarter-guns of the *Embuscade* and *Coquille*. At 7 h. 23 m. A. M., the *Rosses* then bearing from the Canada south-south-west distant five leagues, the *Robust* returned the fire of the two French frigates, and at 7 h. 45 m., hauling up her mainsail and taking in her spanker, bore down to leeward of them, for the purpose of closing with the *Hoché*. This object Captain Thornborough accomplished at 8 h. 50 m., after having engaged the two French frigates in passing, and thus commenced a furious action, side by side, between the two 74s.

In a very few minutes after the *Robust* had closed with the *Hoché*, the *Magnanime*, following close upon her leader, opened her starboard broadside; and the *Embuscade* and *Coquille*, particularly the latter, very soon felt its effects. About this time, owing to the *Robust* checking her way to keep alongside of the *Hoché*, the *Magnanime* put her helm hard a-starboard, to avoid running foul of the former, and, ranging past the *Robust* to leeward, became exposed with the latter to a raking fire from the *Loire*, *Immortalité*, and *Bellone*, which ships had bore up out of the line for that purpose. After a few well-directed broadsides from the *Magnanime* and a few distant shots from the *Foudroyant*, the three French frigates ceased their annoyance and made sail to the south-west; while the *Magnanime*, putting her helm hard a-port, obtained a raking position ahead of the *Hoché*. About this time, or soon afterwards, the latter was assailed on her stern and larboard quarter by the *Amelia*; who, as well as the *Ethalion*, had been prevented from getting earlier into action, by having to shorten sail in compliance with Sir John Warren's signal to form the line. Not minding, or perhaps "not seeing" this signal, the *Melampus*, although far to leeward when the action commenced, got near enough to fire in passing, as declared by Commodore Bompert himself, a few very destructive shot at the *Hoché*, just as the headmost French frigates were making sail to escape. The *Canada*, too, having, on tacking to the north-east been favoured by a shift of wind to nearly west, was enabled to fire a few distant shot from her bow-guns at the larboard quarter of the *Hoché*, already a mere wreck from the close and well-directed fire of the *Robust*. In this state, with her standing and running rigging all cut to pieces, her masts left tottering, her hull riddled with shot, five feet water in the hold, 25 of her guns dismantled, and a great portion of her crew killed and wounded, the *Hoché*, at 10 h. 50 m. A. M., struck her colours, and was taken possession of by the boats of the *Robust* and *Magnanime*; the first lieutenant of which latter ship, Mr. Charles Dashwood, had the honour of receiving Commodore Bompert's sword.

At about 11 h. 30 m. A. M. the *Embuscade*, after having, in addition to the injuries she had sustained by the fire of the *Magnanime*, received a fire from the bow-guns of the *Foudroyant*, as that ship was working up, surrendered also; and, dropping

astern, was taken possession of by the *Magnanime*. The *Coquille* then made sail after her companions in the west-south-west-quarter; all of whom were immediately pursued by the *Foudroyant*, *Ethalion*, *Amelia*, and *Melampus*, and also by the *Canada*, as soon as Sir John Warren, with a very different feeling from that evinced by Captain Alms at the capture of the *Alliance*,* had sent his first lieutenant to take charge of the *Hoche*. The *Magnanime*, on account of the shattered state of her rigging and sails, was detained, with the prize-frigate *Embuscade*, in the rear; and the *Robust*, whose condition was even much worse than the *Magnanime*'s, remained to attend the *Hoche*. The *Anson* was away in the south-east, just heaving in sight, and vainly striving, without a mizenmast, to approach the scene of action.

The *Loire*, *Immortalité*, *Bellone*, and *Coquille* were now the nearest of the seven remaining French frigates; and the principal object of all was to cross the bows of the *Foudroyant*, then standing directly across their path. The *Loire* and *Immortalité* succeeded; but the *Bellone*, being an indifferent sailer, was obliged to haul up, to endeavour to escape to windward. This brought her upon the weather bow of the *Foudroyant* who opened upon her a heavy fire, and received one in return, which did some damage to her sails and rigging. A shot from the *Foudroyant*, however, struck the frigate's mizen top and ignited some hand grenades which had been placed there for use. These presently set on fire the rigging and sails; but, by the prompt exertions of *Enseigne de Vaisseau François-Auguste Cotelte*, and a few others of the crew, the flames were extinguished.

The *Bellone*, notwithstanding, weathered upon the *Foudroyant*, and would have got clear of her, but found a British frigate, the *Melampus*, coming up in her wake. Hoping to shorten the chase by bringing down some of the *Bellone*'s spars, the *Melampus*, at about half-past noon, yawed and fired her broadside. A repetition of this two or three times, coupled with some slight injury done to her sails and rigging by the French frigate's stern-chasers, caused the *Melampus* to drop astern. About this time, after an hour's chase and a brave resistance, the *Coquille* hauled down her colours, and, by signal from the *Canada*, was taken possession of by the *Magnanime*. In the mean time the *Ethalion* had overtaken the *Melampus* in the chase of the *Bellone*, and was ordered by signal to continue the pursuit of the latter; while the *Melampus*, accompanied by the *Foudroyant*, *Amelia*, and *Canada*, bore up after the other French frigates, which now appeared to be meditating a serious attack upon the crippled *Anson*.

The *Ethalion* continued in pursuit of the *Bellone*, under a constant fire, during an hour and a half, of the stern chase-guns of the latter. The chief of the *Bellone*'s shot, however, passed over the masts of the British frigate. Nor did the latter, to Cap-

* See vol. i., p. 292.

tain Jacob's regret, yaw to fire. The *Ethalion*, on the contrary, kept a steady course, and thus gradually gained in the chase. At about 2 p. m. the *Ethalion* got abreast of the *Bellone*, but it was to leeward, and at a greater distance than Captain Countess wished. A smart action now ensued; yet, not until she had sustained the *Ethalion*'s heavy fire for one hour and 54 minutes, had the principal part of her masts, rigging, and sails shot away, with five feet water in her hold, did the *Bellone* haul down the republican ensign.

The damages of the *Ethalion* were comparatively slight: she had her main topmast shot through, spritsail yard knocked away, sails and rigging much cut, and the boat on her starboard quarter shot to pieces; and one of the *Bellone*'s shot had also entered between wind and water. The loss sustained by the *Ethalion*, however, was only one seaman killed and four wounded; while that on board the *Bellone* is represented to have been 20 killed and 45 wounded: an amount, if correctly stated, partly attributable to the crowded state of the *Bellone*'s decks, her crew and soldier-passengers amounting, according to the deposition of her officers, to 519. It seems probable, that a proportion of the loss accrued in the general action; but it is not so stated in the gazette letter. The French accounts, indeed, represent the loss of the *Bellone*, in killed and badly wounded together, at no more than 35.

Of Commodore Bompard's squadron, we have already given an account of the capture of one line-of-battle ship and three frigates. Of the remaining five frigates, all standing to the west-south-west, the *Loire* was the headmost by nearly a mile and a half. On approaching the *Anson*, then about seven miles from the nearest ship of her squadron, the *Loire* shortened sail, in the expectation that her companions would unite with her in the attack upon the former. Finding that, while they apparently hung back, the *Anson* kept getting nearer, Captain Segond, by way of a ruse, hoisted the British flag over the French. It appears that Captain Durham, deceived by this appearance, hailed the *Loire*. Finding, however, that she did not shorten sail, the *Anson*, at about 4 p. m., opened a destructive fire. Shifting her colours to French, the *Loire* returned the fire, and, hauling up athwart the hawse of her disabled opponent, effected her escape. Three other French frigates followed in close order, and, at about 4 h. 30 m. p. m., exchanged broadsides with the *Anson*, in passing her to leeward. Shortly afterwards the fifth and last frigate bore down upon the *Anson*'s weather quarter, and, like her companions, gave and received a passing fire. The effect of all this upon the *Anson* was tolerably severe: she had her fore and main masts, fore yard, fore topmast, and bowsprit shot through in several places, besides two seamen killed, and two petty-officers, eight seamen, and three marines wounded.

The loss on board the other British ships from the fire of their

opponents in this action was comparatively trifling. The Canada had one seaman mortally wounded, by, we believe, the recoil of a gun when firing at the Hoche and frigates just before the French 74 surrendered. The Foudroyant had nine seamen wounded by the fire of the Bellone and other frigates passing near her. The Robust, in her close conflict with the Hoche and the frigates ahead of her, had ten seamen killed, her first lieutenant (David Colby), one lieutenant of marines (William Cottle) mortally, and 38 seamen and marines wounded; the Melampus one, and the Magnanime seven seamen wounded: making, with the loss of the Ethalion and Anson already enumerated, a total of 13 killed and 75 wounded. On board the French ships the loss was excessively severe. The Hoche, out of the 1237 men and boys that, according to the depositions of her officers, were on board of her, is represented to have lost, in killed and wounded together, 270. The Embuscade, out of a crew, including soldiers, of 486 men and boys, lost 15 killed and 26 wounded; and the Coquille, out of her 507 sailors and soldiers, 18 killed and 31 wounded. The loss on board the six remaining French frigates cannot with accuracy be stated. The Résolue appears to have had five, and the Romaine three men wounded; and the Loire, chiefly by the fire of the Anson, five seamen and soldiers killed, and 10 seamen and 14 soldiers wounded: making, with the loss of the Bellone already stated, the serious total of 462 in killed and wounded.

Having done with the action between the two squadrons, before we attend to the scattered remains of that of M. Bompert, we will briefly advert to the relative force of the parties. On the one side were an 80-gun ship, two 74-gun ships, five frigates, two of the latter (one with her mizenmast gone) carrying long 24, and the remainder, long 18 pounders; and on the other side, one 74-gun ship, without a main topmast, and eight frigates, two of the latter (the Romaine and Immortalité) carrying long 24, one of them (the Loire) long 18, and the remainder long 12 pounders. The brunt of the action, as has already been shown, was borne by the Robust and Magnanime, they having been, at the onset, the nearest ships to the enemy. The rest of the affair was of too detached and skirmishing a character, to be at all illustrated by confronting, in our usual manner, the aggregate force of the rival squadrons. We may here remark, that rather more consequence was attached to this action than it really merited, on account, chiefly, of some slight mistatements in the accounts given of the French squadron. The eight frigates, for instance, were all styled "heavy," although five of them mounted 12-pounders, a less caliber than was carried by any of the British frigates; and the Hoche was designated as an 84-gun ship, which was assigning her eight guns more than she had ports to fit them to.

As every publication, in which an account of this action appears, except one, has relied upon the statement at the foot of

Sir John Warren's letter, that the *Hoché* was a ship of "84 guns," we deem it necessary to show how many ports she was really pierced for on each deck of the ship. On her lower deck, the *Hoché* had 30 ports, but the French, acting more wisely than the English, had left the two foremost ones vacant: consequently, the ship mounted 28 guns, which, as usual, were 36-pounders. On the second deck her ports were also 30, and all fitted with guns, 18-pounders. On the quarterdeck the *Hoché*, leaving, as is customary in French line-of-battle ships, room for two ports of a side in the cabin, had ten ports, in which were as many 8-pounders. On the forecastle she had six ports, in four of which (two being chase-ports) were four more 8-pounders, making just 74 guns. But the *Hoché* also mounted four brass 36-pounder carronades on her poop, total 78 guns. Of Sir John Warren's account of the force of the *Hoché*, the French, however, must not complain, until they have made some correction in the following account of the force of the *Ethalion*: "Cette frégate, l'une des plus forte de la marine anglaise, portait cinquante bouches à feu, savoir: vingt-huit canons de 18 (so far right), douze de 12, et dix caronades de 42."*

There is not an action recorded in these pages, which has given us more trouble to comprehend in its details, than the one of which we have now nearly disposed. The official letter contains no particulars, and the entries in the different ships' logs are confused, and, in some instances, contradictory. One fact, however, appears certain, that the action commenced when the *Hoché* and frigates were, as stated in Sir John Warren's letter, "on the starboard tack." Yet the following appears in the work of a contemporary: "In which (the admiral's letter) we are told, that the enemy bore down and formed a line on the *starboard* tack, &c.; but this is certainly incorrect. By a sketch from the hand of one of the best witnesses now living (Nov. 1822), Plate XXIII. has been formed; by which it appears that, although the enemy's squadron was considerably to windward of the *flagship*, it was very little so of the *Robust*, *Magnanime*, and *Amelia*, which ships, on the morning of the 12th of October, discovered the enemy as given in the figure, on the *larboard* tack. The *Robust* and frigates brought the *Hoché* and others to action on the *larboard* side and to windward of them; and the action was nearly over before the *Canada* and *Foudroyant*, from being so far to leeward, could render any assistance."† In answer to this, there is, besides the statement in the official letter, a pair of large engravings, dedicated to the Duke of Clarence, and purporting to be taken from drawings by a marine officer present in the battle, in which the French ships are placed on the *starboard* tack; but in which (proh pudor!) the officer's own ship, the *Canada*, is brought where she never was able to get, into the thick of the fire. Another officer who participated in the action, in answer

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome x., p. 411.

† *Ekins's Naval Battles*, p. 251.

to our inquiries on the subject, has expressly stated, that the ships were on the starboard tack. But what will Admiral Ekins's "best witnesses now living," say to the following extracts from a respectable French account of the action? "*Le vent était au N.-O., et la division française le recevait à tribord. L'escadre ennemie, en se plaçant sous le vent, coupait la terre aux bâtimens français,*" &c. "*Bientôt le Robust, le Magnanime, et l'Amelia l'engagèrent, le premier vaisseau ayant pris poste par son travers à babord, et le Magnanime le canonnant en hanche et en poupe.*"*

On taking the Hoche in tow, as she had been ordered by the Canada, the Robust steered for Lough-Swilly. On the 13th, at 11 A. M. the latter ship's fore topmast, owing to the injuries it had received in the action, fell over the side. At 1 h. 30 m. P. M., a squall carried away the wounded fore and mainmasts of the prize; and at 9 P. M., the tow-rope breaking, the Hoche went adrift. A stormy night ensued, and the latter was with difficulty kept afloat. In this emergency all national prejudices were laid aside, and the French united their exertions with the English in pumping, and performing the other duties of the ship; and, considering how numerous the former were to the latter, there cannot be a doubt that the French crew and soldiers were principally instrumental in saving the prize. To us it certainly appears unaccountable, that one crippled ship should have been sent to conduct home another; and that too, at so stormy a season of the year. On the 15th the Doris frigate fortunately joined the Robust, and took the Hoche in tow. We will now leave the three ships directing their course for Lough-Swilly, while we see what is become of the other ships of the two squadrons.

The Magnanime and Amelia were staying by the Coquille and Embuscade, and the Ethalion by the Bellone. The Anson, especially since her action with the retreating frigates, had enough to do to take care of herself. The Canada, Foudroyant, and Melampus, meanwhile, were chasing the five frigates making off to leeward. At 9 P. M. the Canada got sight of one of the frigates, the Romaine, standing into Donegal bay, and at 10 h. 30 m. P. M. was only one mile to the northward of her. Soon after this the breeze fell, and the Canada lost ground in the chase. At 11 P. M., getting very near to the land, the British 74 shortened sail and hauled to the wind. About this time the Melampus saw two other of the French frigates, the Immortalité and Résolue, bear up towards the land, and got a glimpse also of the Loire and Sémillante, hauling their wind to the westward.

On the 13th, at daybreak, the wind then at about west-south-west, the Canada and Foudroyant were close together, the Melampus to leeward, the Anson about nine miles off in the north-north-east, and the Loire and Sémillante (the former

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome x., p. 406.

somewhat disabled) nearly hull-down to the westward. Having made the signal that she had intelligence to communicate, the *Melampus* was ordered within hail of the *Canada*. At 8 h. 30 m. A.M. the two ships having approached each other, Captain Moore acquainted Sir John Warren with the course steered by two of the French frigates: whereupon the *Melampus* was directed to proceed to Donegal bay, in search of the frigate which the *Canada* had herself seen standing in towards that part of the land.

The *Melampus*, accordingly, made all sail to the south-east; but, the wind coming off the land, and blowing fresh, it was not until 11 h. 30 m. P.M., that she got well in with St.-John's point. At this moment, while the *Melampus*, on account of the gale then beginning to blow, was shortening sail, two large ships made their appearance at no great distance from her, one on the weather bow, the other on the weather quarter. These were neither of them the *Romaine* of which she had been sent in chase, but the *Immortalité* and *Résolue*, running before the wind out of St.-John's bay, where they had been lying at an anchor under English colours. By the time the *Melampus* had made sail in chase, the two French frigates had passed to leeward of her, and, owing to the excessive darkness of the night, had at that moment lost sight of each other. The nearest frigate to the *Melampus* was the *Résolue*; and it would not be doing justice to Captain Bargeau, his officers, and crew, were we to omit to mention some facts that have recently come to our knowledge. The *Résolue* was one of the old class of French 36-gun frigates, fitted with hanging ports to her main deck; and at the commencement of the gale, her 12-pounders were run in and double breeched, and the ports shut and barred, to meet the coming storm. That done, the frigate weighed, as already stated, in company with her consort.

In this comparatively defenceless state was the *Résolue*, when she descried the *Melampus* coming up astern. The French officer of the watch told Captain Bargeau, that the *Immortalité* wanted to speak him. The *Résolue* accordingly shortened sail, and, at about 1 A.M. on the 14th, was hailed by the *Melampus*, then running at the rate of about ten knots an hour, and ordered to bring to. As, instead of that, the *Resolue*, who had now discovered her mistake, attempted to haul athwart the hawse of the *Melampus*, the latter opened her fire; and, at the same moment, the British officers and crew heard the drum on board the French frigate beat to quarters. To the last two or three broadsides of five that were discharged into her, the *Résolue* returned a feeble fire from her quarterdeck guns, and then surrendered.

That the guns of the *Melampus*, during the nine or ten minutes they had been at work, had been most ably handled, is clear from the following account of her opponent's damage and loss: The *Résolue* had her main yard shot away, and her main

topmast and mizenmast shot through, and was so badly struck in the hull, that she made four feet water an hour, until the *Melampus*, ten days afterwards got her into the Clyde. This leak, however, appears, from what has elsewhere been stated, to have existed before. Her loss, out of a crew, including troops, of 500 men and boys, amounted to ten men killed and several wounded. Having had scarcely a rope cut and not a man hurt, as soon as Captain Moore had sent Lieutenant John Price and 21 seamen on board the prize, and had removed a portion of the numerous French prisoners, the *Melampus* was ready for the *Résolue*'s consort, had Captain Legrand been disposed, or rather, from the distance and position of the *Immortalité*, been enabled, to try his luck in the chances of war. However, as the latter, being a new frigate, possessed none of the inconveniences of the old manner of construction, and was, moreover, of double the *Résolue*'s force, it was better perhaps for the *Melampus*, excellently manned and appointed as she was, that the *Immortalité* did not molest her.

Deceived by the English accounts, deceived by the French accounts, we formerly joined in censuring both Captain Bargeau and Captain Legrand; the one for not having defended his ship, the other for not having made an effort to save his consort from capture. Had Captain Moore's letter been, as a contemporary calls it, "a clear and compact narrative,"* we should have had no excuse to offer for having spoken so slightly of two brave officers. We have not obtained our information from either of the French captains, or from any of their countrymen, but from a British eyewitness of the transaction, an officer of the *Melampus* herself. Indeed we have generally found the officers of the British navy more ready to do justice to their enemies, than those gentlemen on shore who undertake to blazon their exploits; and yet all the mistatements and boastings of the latter, by the opposite nation at least (and there it is where the principal mischief lies), are usually laid to the charge of the former. A French writer, who, for lack of information, omits to tell his readers why the *Résolue* made no defence, or why the *Immortalité* was unable to render her any assistance, hopes to gratify them by the sneering remark, that the *Melampus* closed with the *Résolue* because she was the weaker ship, "*s'attacha à la première, comme la plus faible.*"* We have no doubt that both Captains Bargeau and Legrand, if questioned, would have expressed it as their opinion, that Captain Moore, had he been permitted a choice, would not have hesitated an instant in selecting for his opponent the *Immortalité*.

Of Commodore Bompert's eight frigates, we have already disposed of four, the *Embuscade*, *Coquille*, *Bellone*, and *Ré-*

* Brenton, vol. ii., p. 366.

† *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome x., p. 413.

solue. A fifth, the Loire, had her career first partially, then conclusively, interrupted by the keen vigilance of British cruisers. On the 15th of October, at 8 A. M., the British 38-gun frigate *Révolutionnaire*, Captain Thomas Twysden, and 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Mermaid*, Captain James Newman Newman (senior officer), accompanied by the 18-gun brig-sloop *Kangaroo*, Captain Edward Brace, being near Black-Sod bay on the north-west coast of Ireland, discovered two large sail bearing north. The latter were soon made out to be enemy's frigates, and the British frigates proceeded in chase. At its commencement the two strangers, which were, as may be conjectured, the Loire and *Sémillante*, kept their wind, but, shortly afterwards, edged away gradually; so that, by evening, both the pursued and the pursuers were going right before the wind, with all sail set. The two French frigates then signalled and apparently spoke each other, and immediately afterwards steered separate courses. The *Révolutionnaire* now chased one; and the *Mermaid*, followed by the *Kangaroo*, far astern, the other. At 7 P. M., owing to the thick and squally weather, the two British frigates lost sight of each other, and soon afterwards of their respective chases. Captain Twysden saw his game no more. Captain Newman, as we shall presently see, was more fortunate. The *Mermaid*, on her enemy disappearing, hauled to the wind, on the larboard tack (the wind north by east), and was soon rejoined by the *Kangaroo*.

On the following morning, the 16th, at daylight, the French frigate was again seen and pursued by the *Mermaid* and *Kangaroo*. At 3 P. M. the *Kangaroo*, whose force was sixteen 32-pounder carronades and two long sixes, came up with and engaged the Loire, for such she was, in a most gallant manner; until, indeed, the brig had her fore topmast shot away, and foremast wounded, by the frigate's stern-chasers. The *Kangaroo* was then compelled to drop astern.

The *Mermaid* continued the pursuit, and kept the enemy in view during the night. At daybreak on the 17th the Loire, observing the *Mermaid* to be alone, evinced, by shortening sail, an inclination to engage; nor was the latter disposed to balk captain Segond's wishes. Accordingly, at about 6 h. 45 m. A. M., both ships steering north-east, which was nearly before the wind, the action commenced, and soon became very animated on both sides. An early attempt, on the part of the Loire, to board the *Mermaid*, was frustrated by Lieutenant Michael Halliday's judicious management of the latter's helm. Shortly afterwards the *Mermaid*, who had stationed herself on the Loire's starboard bow, taking advantage of a sudden shift of wind from west-south-west to south-south-west, was enabled to gall the latter considerably, without receiving much damage.

In a little while, from repeatedly bearing away and luffing up, the *Mermaid* closed with her opponent to within pistol-shot;

when, the fall of the Loire's fore topmast and cross-jack yard gave proofs of the Mermaid's deliberate and well-directed fire. The fire from the great guns of the Loire had now evidently slackened, but that from her musketry, conspicuous at every part of the ship, was unremittingly kept up. At 9 h. 15 m. A.M. the Loire's maintopsail yard came down, and Captain Newman gave instant orders to run athwart her hawse and rake her. Just as she was about to execute this manœuvre, the Mermaid lost her mizenmast by the board, its wreck totally disabling the cabin and quarterdeck guns. Scarcely was the wreck of the mizenmast cleared, and the stern blown out, in order, now that the ship had unavoidably fallen off, to fire the stern-chasers, when the main topmast came down. By this time the Mermaid's stays, backstays, shrouds, tacks, sheets, halyards, sails, spars, and boats were all cut to pieces or shot away; and, from the number of dangerous shot received in the hull, the ship made a deal of water. The main yard hung only by a part of the chain with which it was slung, the mainmast had received nine shots in its head, and both that and the foremast appeared likely every instant to fall. Two of the guns, likewise, were completely disabled. In this crippled condition, the Mermaid could do no otherwise than discontinue the action. The Loire, apparently not much less disabled than the Mermaid, nor seemingly more inclined to renew the engagement, put before the wind, and was soon out of sight.

Although her established compliment was 212, the Mermaid had on board, when this long and spirited action commenced, only 208 men and boys. Of these she lost, exclusive of the carpenter, who, while busy in stopping a shot-hole outside, was swept away by the wreck of the main topmast and drowned, three killed, and thirteen wounded, three of the latter dangerously. The loss sustained by the Loire, out of a complement, including soldiers, of 624 men, is of course left to conjecture; but, from the excellent position maintained so long by the Mermaid, the crowded state of the Loire's decks, and her finally abandoning the field to an adversary of little more than half her size and strength (the Mermaid's guns were 32 twelves and sixes and eight 24-pounder carronades, the Loire's the same as No. 5 in the table at p. 54 of vol. i., with two additional 36-pounder carronades), the amount of both killed and wounded must have been considerable. Indeed it was represented that, towards the close of the action, the Loire's people were seen from the Mermaid to throw the killed overboard in great numbers.

Those who are of opinion that, in a statement of comparative force, the French troops ought to be included, can add them, their number having already been stated; but, when the equivocal aid to be derived from their musketry (see what slight effect it produced on the Mermaid's crew), is contrasted with the certain disadvantage accruing from the room which they and

their baggage occupy, it is considered the fairer mode to confine the estimate to that number of men, the regular complement, which was originally fixed for and put on board the ship, as well to manage her sails, as to fight her guns, great and small. It is a fact, too, worth noticing, that the increased slaughter, which invariably attends increased numbers stowed in a small compass, has often a very discouraging effect upon the survivors of the crew. The panic may linger a while among the landmen and passengers, but its proverbially infectious nature will soon set it spreading. Where ships get foul, and boarding attempts are made, then it is that increased numbers carry their weight; and a case of that sort may merit to be an exception. With this remark, we present the following as the

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		MERMAID.	LOIRE.
Broadside-guns	{ No.	20	23
	{ lbs.	252	442
Crew	No.	208	330
Size	tons	693	1100

This would, indeed, have been a victory for the little Mermaid; but her inferiority of force, not a want of courage in her crew (of that they had given proofs in a previous contest with a French frigate of the Loire's class*), forbade such a consummation. It was not merely for her gallantry in attacking such an antagonist as the Loire, that the Mermaid deserved credit, but for the skillfulness of her crew in pointing their guns. For, although the French work to which we are referring, contains no enumeration of the French frigate's loss of men, the following account of her damages will show to what a state the shot of the Mermaid, described, in part palliation, as "*une frégate de sa force*," had reduced the Loire.

"Ce beau combat était le quatrième que la Loire avait eu à soutenir depuis cinq jours, et quoiqu'elle fût sortie avec gloire de toutes ces affaires, elle était réduite à l'état le plus déplorable. Elle ne possédait plus que ses deux basses voiles en lambeaux, et il était impossible d'en établir d'autres. Il n'y avait plus à bord ni bois, ni cordages, pour essayer d'installer des mâts supérieurs; les bas mâts eux-mêmes, criblés de boulets, menaçaient de tomber. Tout ce que le capitaine put faire pour réparer sa frégate, fut de boucher le mieux possible les trous des boulets reçus à la flottaison, de jumeller ses bas mâts, et de bosser les ralingues des basses voiles, qui étaient coupées en plusieurs endroits. Dans cette triste situation, c'eût été un miracle que la Loire pût atteindre un port de France."[†]

We were at first a little puzzled to make out the four combats, which the Loire had so "*gloriously*" sustained. They

* See vol. i., p. 340.

† Victoires et Conquêtes, tome x., p. 420.

were, however, as follows: that fought in line with the *Hoche*, that between the *Loire* and four other frigates with the disabled *Anson*, that between the *Loire* and *Kangaroo* (we suppose this must be meant), and that with the *Mermaid* alone. That the heavy fire, which the *Loire* opened upon the latter, did not sink her appears, by the following remark, to have surprised the French themselves. "*L'avantage n'était pas pour les canoniers de la Loire, qui, faute d'adresse, ou, ce qui est plus croyable, par trop de précipitation, n'ajustaient pas aussi bien leurs coups que les Anglais.*"* Yet, why the *Loire*, with her decided superiority of force and the subsequent fall of her opponent's mizenmast, did not push the contest to an issue, is nowhere explained; not even in an account which, by its minuteness in other respects, as clearly proves that it was drawn up on board the *Loire*, as that, from among the troops in his ship, or from somewhere else, "*l'excellent manœuvrier le capitaine Segond*" had provided himself with a still more excellent trumpeter.

Scarcely had the *Mermaid's* crew time to knot the remaining shrouds, and get their ship a little into order, before there came on a violent gale of wind. The men had just furled the fore topsail, when the remains of the mainsail blew away; and, in the act of hauling up the foresail, the foremast, fore topmast, fore yard, and foretopsail yard, all fell in-board on the forecastle. Constant fatigue was now endured by the crew, in refitting, pumping, and clearing the wreck; and the ship, under a bare pole, the mainmast, scudded before the wind in a dreadful sea, rendered ten times more alarming by the open state of the cabin, from the cause already explained. At length, on the 19th, the *Mermaid* was fortunate enough to get into Lough-Swilly. Fortunate, indeed, it was, as the bread had all been destroyed by a shot-hole leak in the bread-room, and the ship, having been eight weeks at sea, had only 12 tuns of water left.

The *Loire* had only escaped from one antagonist to fall into the hands of another. At daylight on the 18th, the very day succeeding that on which she had been so roughly handled by the *Mermaid*, the *Loire* unexpectedly found herself to leeward of a ship of more than double the size of her former antagonist. The *Loire*, at this time, lay without her fore and main topmasts; the one having been shot away by the *Mermaid*, and the other, as Captain Newman had conceived would be the case, having fallen over the top in the course of the ensuing night. The ship to windward, which was the 44-gun frigate *Anson*, Captain Philip Charles Durham, had lost her mizenmast, main yard, and main cross-trees; and, in her previous action with the *Loire* and her four companions, had had her bowsprit and fore yard shot

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome x., p. 418.

through in several places. The Anson had also received considerable injury in her fore and main masts. Thus were the two ships about equally balanced in point of disabilities: if there was a difference in this respect, it was in favour of the Anson; but there was a third party present, who, although apparently very insignificant, was not to be overlooked or despised. On the preceding night the Anson had fallen in with the Kangaroo, and Captain Durham, thinking the latter's services might be useful in the Anson's disabled state, ordered Captain Brace to keep company. The Kangaroo, since her disaster of the morning of the 16th, had, with creditable alacrity, refitted herself with a new fore topmast; and at 8 h. 30 m. A. M. on this day, which was as soon as the strange sail was discovered by her, then far to windward of the Anson, got up her topgallantmasts, and made sail in chase.

The Anson, from her leeward position, in reference to the Kangaroo, was of course first up with the Loire; and at about 10 h. 30 m. A. M. the cannonading commenced between the two ships. At 11 h. 45 m. A. M. while the Loire and Anson lay mutually disabled, the latter with her head in a line with the former's stern, the Kangaroo bore down, and received a shot from the Loire, accompanied by several volleys of musketry. To this the brig immediately replied by a broadside. Shortly afterwards the Loire's mizenmast came down, and with it her colours. These the French ship, having six feet water in the hold, and being reduced to an utterly defenceless state by the Mermaid and Anson's shot, did not attempt to rehoist. As soon, therefore, as she was hailed for that purpose, the Loire surrendered, and was taken possession of by a boat from the Kangaroo.

Out of her complement of 327 men and boys, the Anson had one quartermaster and one seaman killed, her first lieutenant of marines (William Abell), two midshipmen (William Robilliard and Francis R. Payler), eight seamen, and two marines wounded; total, two killed and 13 wounded. The Kangaroo, whose complement was 120 men and boys, escaped without any loss. The Loire's loss, according to the French account, amounted to 46 men killed and 71 wounded. Her total number of sailors and soldiers, at the commencement of the action, is stated in Captain Durham's letter at 664; but her officers, when examined in the prize-court, deposed to 624. A great part of the difference is probably to be accounted for by the Loire's loss in her two previous actions. If so, as only five men are admitted to have been killed on board the Loire in her first action, a great many more must have been killed in her action with the Mermaid.

The Anson and Loire, in point of relative force, had they each met in a perfect state, would have been similarly matched

to the *Indefatigable* and *Virginie*.^{*} Whatever chance of success, therefore, the *Loire* may have had with the *Mermaid*, she had very little with the *Anson*, and none whatever with the *Anson* and *Kangaroo* united. The undoubted bravery, which Captain Segond, his officers, and crew displayed in this contest affords a tolerable proof, that the *Loire* would not have quitted her former antagonist, had not her injuries by the *Mermaid*'s shot been of the most serious kind.

The *Loire* had on board a brass field-piece, with the necessary apparatus and stores, clothing complete for 3000 men, 1020 muskets, 200 sabres, 350 pouches, and 25 cases of musket-ball cartridges, evidently to serve for equipping the recruits expected among the Irish malecontents. Leaving the prize in tow of the *Kangaroo*, and attended by the *Anson*, we shall proceed to show which was the next of Commodore Bompard's frigates, that was successfully intercepted on her return to a French port.

On the 20th of October, at 8 A. M., in latitude 48° 23' north, and longitude 7° west, the British 38-gun frigate *Fisgard*, Captain Thomas Byam Martin, while standing on the larboard tack with the wind at west-south-west, saw a strange sail due west, on the opposite tack, steering free. At 8 h. 45 m. A. M. the *Fisgard* tacked in chase, and gained on the stranger; who was no other than the *Immortalité*, pursuing her course to Brest, and which port, but for this to her unlucky encounter, she would very soon have reached. At 11 A. M. the *Immortalité* hoisted French colours, and commenced firing her stern-chasers. At 11 h. 30 m. A. M. the *Fisgard* hoisted English colours, and opened a fire in return with her bow-guns, still, with a fine moderate breeze on the quarter, coming up with the object of her pursuit.

At half-past noon the *Fisgard* got close alongside her opponent, and a spirited action commenced. So effectual, however, was the *Immortalité*'s fire, that, in 25 minutes, the *Fisgard* was rendered quite ungovernable, having her bowlines, braces, top-sail-ties, back-stays, and the whole of her running rigging, cut to pieces. The *Fisgard*, in consequence, dropped astern; and the *Immortalité*, profiting by the occasion, crowded sail to escape. At 1 h. 30 m. P. M., by the active exertions of her crew, the *Fisgard* was again alongside her opponent; and a cannonade now commenced, more furious than the first. At the end of half an hour the *Fisgard* had received some shots so low in the hull, as to have six feet water in the hold. Still her resolute crew persevered; and at 3 P. M., after nearly an hour and a half's close engagement, the *Immortalité*, then nearly in a sinking state from the *Fisgard*'s shot, and having her mizenmast gone close to the deck, and her fore and main masts, and all her other spars, as well as rigging and sails, much cut; and having,

* See vol. i., p. 325.

besides, lost her captain and first lieutenant, hauled down her colours.

The Fisgard had her masts, rigging, and sails a good deal injured, and was struck so low in the hull by some of the *Immortalité's* 24-pound shot, as to oblige her to keep one pump constantly going. Her loss out of a crew of 281 men and boys, and who, the more to their credit, were quite a young ship's company, amounted to 10 seamen killed, one lieutenant of marines (Mark A. Gerrard), 23 seamen and two marines wounded. The *Immortalité*, out of a crew, including soldier-passengers, of 580 (in which number both Captain Martin and the French officers agree), lost, including her brave commander and first lieutenant, also a general of the army (Monge), and seven other naval and military officers, 54 officers, seamen, and soldiers killed, and 61 wounded.

The Fisgard mounted 46 guns, the same as those of the *Révolutionnaire*, described at vol. i., p. 322. The *Immortalité*, as a French frigate, was of a class by herself. It is probable that she was intended, while building, to carry 26 long 18-pounders; but the *Immortalité* was afterwards constructed with one port less of a side, and fitted with 24 long French 24-pounders, making, with 14 long 8-pounders and four brass 36-pounder carronades on her quarterdeck and forecastle, a total of 42 guns. In comparing the force of these ships, we shall, for the reason given at a former page, not reckon the troops that were on board the French frigate.

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		FISGARD.	IMMORTALITE.
Broadside-guns	{ No.	23	21
	{ lbs.	425	450
Crew	No.	284	330
Size	tons.	1182	1010

Here we come again, after a long interval, to a well-matched pair of combatants; an action ably contested on both sides, doing credit to the vanquished as well as to the victor. No obtrusive vessel became a spectator of, much less a participator in, the long and arduous struggle. Considering the numerous cruisers, British in particular, that are usually roaming about the chops of the Channel, a fair single combat, from first to last, is rare, and therefore deserves to be prized.

† This is the proper place to notice a paragraph that appeared in the *Moniteur* of the 27th of November, 1798: "Lorsque le capitaine Legrand a abandonné la frégate anglaise, après l'avoir mise hors d'état de le poursuivre, il était chassé par trois vaisseaux, tous à sa vue." There is always a ready way of confuting assertions like these. Had any British ship of war, much less "three ships of the line," hove in sight during the chase or at the capture of the *Immortalité*, she would have been

entitled to a share of the prize-money; whereas it stands recorded, that no other ship than the *Fisgard* received, or claimed to receive, a doit of it. Moreover, as placing the matter beyond all doubt, the French officers, in the customary certificate to enable the captors to get their head-money, made not the slightest allusion to any other ship than the *Fisgard*.

The whole of the seven prizes, after the most shattered of them had put into port by the way, reached Plymouth. The *Hoche* was newly named the *Donegal*, after the bay near to which she had been captured. She was a fine ship of 1901 tons, and long proved a serviceable cruiser. The *Embussade* was also a fine little frigate of 916 tons, and under the name of *Seine* (the *Ambussade* being a name that, after the middle of December, excited in England no very pleasant recollections), was long attached to the 12-pounder 36-gun class. The *Coquille*, a similar frigate to the *Embussade*, on the 14th of December, while lying at anchor in *Hamoaze*, and just after she had been surveyed preparatory to her purchase by the government, caught fire and blew up: by which accident, three midshipmen, seven seamen, and three women unfortunately perished. The *Bellone* and *Résolue* were frigates of a smaller class than either of the preceding; the one measuring 888, and the other 877 tons: both were purchased into the navy, but, being old and worn out, never afterwards went to sea. The *Loire*, on the other hand, was a fine new frigate, and had recently been presented to the French government by the city of *Nantes*. The *Immortalité* was also a fine frigate, but less than the *Loire*, by about 90 tons; and therefore very far from being, as a contemporary represents her, "one of the largest frigates that had fallen into our hands."* Not being considered capable of carrying to advantage a battery of 24-pounders (of which heavy guns, however, that same writer had assigned her "twenty-eight," instead of twenty-four), the *Immortalité* was fitted with twenty-six 18-pounders; and that was giving her one gun more of a side than she could fairly use upon her broadside.

We must not forget to mention, that the thanks of both houses of parliament were subsequently voted to commodore Sir John Borlase Warren, and the captains, officers, and men under his command, for the successful issue of the action, or actions rather, with the *Hoche* and her squadron; not, certainly for any extraordinary exertions that were either required or made use of, in achieving the victory, but because of the evil consequences which it in all probability averted from the sister-kingdom. Lieutenants William James Turquand, first of the *Canada*, and, after a while, David Colby, first of the *Robust*, were made commanders; as was also, for her capture of the *Immortalité*, the *Fisgard*'s first lieutenant, John Surman Carden.

The dashing manner, in which the *Robust* went into action,

* Brenton, vol. ii., p. 367.

was precisely what might have been expected from the captain of the *Latona*, in November, 1793; and we should have been better pleased with Sir John Warren's letter, imperfect as it is in many respects, had it contained a more particular notice of the (considering the *hors-de-combat* distance of the *Canada* and *Foudroyant*, some have thought *all*) important services of Captain Thornborough.

Very great credit was also due to Captain Countess, for his zeal and perseverance in keeping sight of the French squadron; which, had it not been so well watched by the *Ethalion* and her consorts, would have been on the coast of Ireland nearly a fortnight earlier than it was. In that case M. Bompard would probably have disembarked his troops without molestation, and might, with his squadron have got safe back to a French port. In his official account of the capture of the *Bellone*, Captain Countess speaks in the highest terms of the first lieutenant of the *Ethalion*, Mr. George Sayer; and the latter, upon whom the greater part of the active duty of keeping sight of the French squadron must necessarily have devolved, was, in consequence, made a commander.

We must be permitted to make one more remark before we quit this action. The noble behaviour of the French prisoners on board the *Hoche* and *Coquille* (for she, also, was mainly preserved by their exertions) ought to have obtained for them, after they were landed in England, some abatement of the hardships usually imposed upon prisoners of war. This would be holding out encouragement to men so circumstanced; particularly in cases where their numbers, as in the instances of both the 74 and the frigate, might otherwise be too formidable to be coerced into subjection. Upon national considerations, even this ought never to be overlooked.

It still remains to be shown, what became of the three uncaptured vessels of Commodore Bompard's squadron. The *Romaine* having anchored, under English colours, six or seven miles from the spot at which the *Immortalité* and *Résolue* had brought up, made preparations for disembarking her troops. A communication with the shore, however, soon cooled the zeal of the latter; and the soldiers were not so tired of the sea, or so alarmed at the perils both of weather and capture to be encountered in crossing it, but that they preferred even that risk to the certain fate that awaited them if they attempted to land. The *Romaine*, accordingly, weighed and stood off from the Irish coast, and, overtaking the *Biche* on the passage, anchored on the 23d of October in the road of Brest. About the same time, also, the *Sémillante* managed to get into Lorient.

The very day that sealed the fate of the *Hoche*, saw another expedition quit a port of France for the same destination. Commodore Savary, with the same four frigates with which he had

made the former trip, namely, the *Concorde*, *Médée*, *Franchise*, and *Vénus*, having on board a small quantity of troops, sailed from Rochefort, in order to see what had become both of Commodore Bompard's squadron, which had now been out 26 days, and of General Humbart's army, which had been landed in Ireland since more than two months. On the 27th Commodore Savary had the good fortune to arrive in the neighbourhood of Killala bay, the scene of his former success. Here the commodore soon learnt the fate of both the French army and the French squadron; and, fearing it might be his turn next, put to sea again the same afternoon, and steered straight for France with the melancholy news.

On the 28th, at about 7 A.M., the weather nearly calm, these four French frigates were discovered in the south-east quarter, not far from the Stags of Broadhaven, by the British 80-gun ship *Cæsar*, Captain Sir James Saumarez, 74-gun ship *Terrible*, Captain Sir Richard Bickerton, Bart., and 38-gun frigate *Melpomène*, Captain Sir Charles Hamilton; and, as soon as the breeze would permit, were chased under all sail. At 3 P.M. the wind veered to the south-west. At 6 P.M. the four French frigates, then on a line in the larboard tack, were passed to windward by the *Terrible*, and between her and them several shots were exchanged, one of which struck the 74's mizenmast, and obliged her instantly to fish it. The *Terrible* then wore after the rearmost of the frigates, and bore away in pursuit to the north-north-west. Shortly afterwards the French frigates opened, in passing, a raking fire upon the *Cæsar*, but at too great a distance to produce any effect; and, for that reason, the latter did not return it. At 11 P.M., just as she was fast coming up with the sternmost French frigate, the wind, having considerably freshened, carried away the *Cæsar*'s fore topmast and main topgallantmast; and this was not all, for the wreck demolished the foresail. At 11 h. 15 m. P.M., in consequence of this accident, the *Terrible* and *Melpomène* passed the *Cæsar* in the chase.

On the 29th, at 1 A.M., the *Cæsar* was entirely lost sight of by her two consorts; and at 8 A.M. the enemy's squadron was distant from these about two leagues in the north-west. At noon, owing chiefly, as it would appear, to the bad sailing of the *Vénus*, the *Melpomène*, who was at some distance ahead of the 74, got within two or three miles of the former. As the only means of averting the consequences likely to result from this retardation of the squadron, Commodore Savary made the signal for his frigates to separate. On this the *Concorde* hauled close to the wind (still at south-west) on the larboard tack, the *Médée* and *Franchise* kept, as before, about four points free on the same tack, and the *Vénus* put directly before it. The *Melpomène*

immediately hauled up for the *Concorde*, and the *Terrible* pursued the two frigates in the north-west by west; upon whom the 74 gained so much, that at 4 P. M. she was only two miles astern of them. At 7 P. M. the *Terrible* and *Melpomène* lost sight of each other. On the 30th, at daybreak, the 74 found herself still only two miles distant from one of the frigates in the north-west. and soon afterwards passed several gun-carriages, also two horses, which had been thrown overboard by the French frigate. It is doubtful whether or not this would have saved her, if at 5 P. M. a violent and unexpected squall of wind from the south-east had not carried away the *Terrible's* fore and main topsail-yards, and the topgallant ones also. There was now no alternative; and the *Terrible*, accordingly, left off chase and hauled her wind to the southward and westward. M. Savary was afterwards so fortunate as to reassemble all four of his frigates, and with them to re-enter Rochefort on the 22d day of his departure from it.

This was the last of four expeditions, which the French sent from their ports to assist the malecontents of Ireland. The first, or that of December, 1796, was scattered and discomfited by the weather. The second, under the same Commodore Savary whose fortunate escape we have just done detailing, succeeded, in August of the present year, in disembarking a body of men, but it was only for the survivors of them to yield up their arms in September. The third ended in the capture of the *Hoche* and her companions; and the fourth, rendered unavailable by the failure of the second and third, returned to port as it went.

During the last two months of the year, the Brest fleet remained as stationary as it had done during the first ten. In the attention we are about to bestow upon the fleet of Toulon, we may perhaps develop the principal cause of this forced inactivity of a fleet, which, with a proper application of its numbers and strength, might have done incalculable mischief to an enemy.

We must not, however, quit the Channel without mentioning, that, among the fruits of four years' hard fighting, was the assembling, in France, of 2800 English, and in England of upwards of 30,000 French prisoners. Since the month of January the two nations had agreed that each should maintain their own prisoners; that, for that purpose, an agent should reside in each country, and have the benefit of its market; and that the prisoners, instead of being scattered over the country, should be confined in three or four places of general rendezvous. Agreeably to this arrangement, the French prisoners were to be confined nowhere but at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Norman-Cross, Liverpool, Edinburgh, Chatham, and Stapleton. This was followed, towards the end of the year, by a second agreement, authorizing the reciprocal transmission of cartels, and settling the terms by which an exchange of prisoners was to be regulated.

In the course of the year the French directory issued a decree

declaring that all persons, natives of, or originally belonging to, neutral countries, or countries in alliance with France, who might form a part of the crew of any of his Britannic majesty's ships of war, or of any British vessels, should be considered and treated as pirates. This savage order was met by a counter-declaration from the king of England, dated November 20, directing it to be signified to the commissary for French prisoners in Great Britain, that, if that decree should, in any instance, be carried into effect against any such persons, taken in any vessel or vessels the property of his majesty, or of his subjects, and navigated under the British flag, it was the king's determination to exercise the most rigorous retaliation against those subjects of the French republic, whom the chance of war had then placed, or might thereafter place, at his majesty's disposal. This had, in a great degree, the desired effect.

With the view of ascertaining the precise object of the rumoured preparations making at Toulon, the British admiralty had directed Earl St.-Vincent to detach from the Mediterranean fleet a few ships under [Rear-admiral Sir Horatio Nelson; who, having been allowed, after the Santa-Cruz affair, to go to England for his health, had, on the 29th of April, returned to the fleet off Cadiz. On the 2d of May, Sir Horatio quitted the fleet in the Vanguard, and steered for the Mediterranean. The rear-admiral was to take with him two 74s lying at Gibraltar, and four frigates and a sloop cruising on that station. On the 4th the Vanguard arrived at Gibraltar; and on the 9th, having completed her water and provisions, sailed again, accompanied by the Alexander and Orion 74s, Emerald and Terpsichore frigates, and Bonne-Citoyenne sloop.

On the 17th, when off Cape Sicie, the rear-admiral received information, through a captured privateer, that there were, including the ex-Venetian ships, 19 sail of the line in Toulon harbour; that 15 of them were ready for sea; and that Buona-parté, at the head of an immense body of troops, was expected soon to embark, but for what destination could not be ascertained. On the 19th the wind blew strong from the north-west. On the next day, the 20th, it moderated, but, after dark, again blew strong; so strong, that on the 21st, at 1 h. 30 m. A. M., when about 25 leagues south of the Hyères islands, the Vanguard's main and mizen topmasts, in succession, went over the side. In two hours afterwards the increased violence of the gale carried away the foremast, in three pieces, and sprung the bowsprit in as many places. At daylight, by means of the remnant of her spritsail, the Vanguard was enabled to wear. The two other 74s and the Emerald wore also; and the four ships scudded before the wind. The Terpsichore, Bonne-Citoyenne, and a prize-ship, continued lying-to, under bare poles, and therefore parted company; as, during the night, did the Emerald.

The rear-admiral intended to steer for Oristan bay, island of

Sardinia; but, in the crippled state of the Vanguard, that was found impracticable. The latter, therefore, being taken in tow by the Alexander, who, with the Orion, had received very little damage in the gale, the rear-admiral proceeded to the Sardinian harbour of St.-Pietro; where, at noon on the 22d, the three ships safely cast anchor. Here we will leave them awhile, to attend to what is going on in Toulon.

During the negotiations at Campo-Formio, in the summer of 1797, General Buonaparte took away from the Ambrosian library at Milan, all the books he could find on subjects connected with the East; and, on their being brought to Paris, marginal notes were discovered in every page that treated specially on Egypt: hence it has been inferred, that Buonaparte was, even at this time, ruminating upon the plan, in the attempted execution of which his military fame subsequently received so serious a check, and his moral character so fatal a stab. At all events, in the early months of the year 1798, he submitted the plan of a campaign in Egypt to the directory, and on the 5th of March, was appointed its commander-in-chief. "Les ministres de la guerre, de la marine, et des finances," proceeds the letter of appointment, "sont prévenus de se conformer aux instructions que vous leur transmettez sur ce point important dont votre patriotisme a le secret, et dont le directoire ne pouvait pas mieux confier le succès qu'à votre génie et à votre amour pour la vraie gloire." This flattering letter was signed by "Lareveillère-Lé-paux, Merlin, et Barras."*

In the mean time the most active preparations were making at Toulon, Marseille, Civita-Vecchia, Genoa, and Bastia; particularly at the first-named port, where an immense fleet of men-of-war and transports was getting ready, and whither troops were marching from all quarters of the republic. Buonaparte was to have quitted Paris on the night of the 21st of April; but the last despatches from General Bernadotte, the republican ambassador at the court of Vienna, having excited in the French government some dread of a rupture with Austria, the conqueror of Italy was detained, to try the effect of his influence with the Comte de Cobentzel, the emperor's ambassador at Paris. By this, or some other means, the matter was made up; and on the 3d of May Buonaparte quitted Paris, and on the 8th arrived at Toulon.

The expedition, now that it was complete, consisted of 13 sail of the line, eight frigates, two Venetian 64s and six frigates, armed en flûte, two brigs, with cutters, avisos, and gun-boats, in all 72 vessels of war; exclusive, when those from the outports joined, of 400 sail of transports. Of this immense fleet the crews alone were computed at 10,000 men; besides which there was a body of troops amounting to about 36,000 men. The

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome ix., p. 4.

commander-in-chief of this formidable armament was Buonaparte, having under him, as his generals of division, Kléber, Desaix, Regnier, Bon, Duqua, Menou, Vaubois, Dumuy, and Dumas, besides 11 generals of brigade. The fleet was commanded by Vice-admiral Brueys, having under him Rear-admirals, Villeneuve, Blanquet, and Decrès, and, for his captain of fleet, Commodore Ganteaume. The admiral had his flag on board the 120-gun ship *Orient*, as the *ci-devant* *Sans-Culotte* was now, in reference to the object of the expedition appropriately named, and in her General Buonaparte embarked, accompanied by the principal part of his suite.

On the 19th of May, in the morning, the whole of this numerous fleet, except a portion of the transports, that were to join on the passage, got under way from Toulon road with a strong wind from the north-west, and, running along the coast of Provence, stopped off Genoa, to be joined by the division of transports in that port; then stood straight across to Cape Corse, which was signalled on the 23d, at daybreak. The fleet remained in sight of the eastern coast of Corsica until the 30th and then stood leisurely along the island of Sardinia, in the expectation of being joined by the convoy from Civita-Vecchia; which convoy, it was known, had left that port on the 28th.

On the 3d of June, Buonaparte received intelligence, that three English ships of the line and two frigates had been seen off Cagliari. A division of French ships proceeded in that direction, but saw nothing and returned. Having waited in vain for the junction of the expected convoy from Civita-Vecchia, the fleet proceeded without it, and on the 7th passed within gun-shot of the port of Mazara in Sicily, having in view on the opposite side the small island of Pantellaria. On the 8th an English brig, captured by one of the look-out frigates, gave intelligence that Admiral Nelson's squadron, sent in pursuit of the French fleet, was not very far astern. This news, erroneous as it was, gave great uneasiness to the commander-in-chief.* On the same night the expedition quitted the coast of Sicily, and, steering to the south-east, gained, at 5 h. 30 m. A.M. on the 9th, a sight of the islands of Goza and Malta; off which the admiral was joined by the Civita-Vecchia division of transports numbering 70 sail.

The fate, which soon befel this, as a Mediterranean possession, important island, will be in some degree elucidated by a short account of the measures France had previously taken to undermine its independence. Since the month of January in the present year, M. Poussielgue, secretary to the French legation at Genoa, had been sent to sound the knights and grand-master of the order of St.-John of Jerusalem, as to their inclination to permit a French squadron to approach the shores of their island;

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome ix., p. 10.

or, in other words, by all the insidious and corrupt arts so familiar to the agents of the French government at this epoch, to endeavour to excite an insurrection among the inhabitants. As a further step in the contemplated plan, Rear-admiral Brueys, when in March he was returning to Toulon with his six sail of the line from the Adriatic, sent one of his ships in the port to be repaired; where she remained eight days. The French squadron, meanwhile, sounded all round the island, and ascertained precisely every spot where it was possible to effect a debarkation.

Considering, therefore, the capture of the island of Malta, with its two dependencies, the small islands of Goza and Comino, as the work of treachery, we feel no inclination to give a recital of the few mock-fights that preceded its surrender; but shall merely state, that on the 10th a landing was effected in seven places, and that on the 12th the islands of Malta, Goza, and Comino, surrendered by capitulation. Among the spoils taken, were two 64-gun ships, one frigate, three galleys, and some vessels, 30,000 muskets, 12,000 barrels of powder, provisions for six months, and the plate and other treasure in the church of St.-John, valued at three millions of francs. Leaving Buonaparte and his army and fleet to rejoice over their good fortune, we will return to Rear-admiral Nelson and his three weather-beaten ships in the harbour of St.-Pietro.

By the indefatigable exertions of the officers and crews of the three British ships, or rather, as respects the men, of the *Alexander* and *Orion* only, for the *Vanguard's* was a very indifferent ship's company, the latter ship, in less than four days, got up a jury foremast and jury main and mizen topmasts, fished her bowsprit, and performed other necessary repairs; and on the next morning, the 27th, the squadron again put to sea. The three ships now steered for the rendezvous off Toulon, which they reached on the 31st. The rear-admiral, by this time, was fully acquainted with the sailing of the French armament, reported to consist of 15 sail of the line, 10 or 12 frigates, and 200 transports, with upwards of 40,000 troops on board, commanded by General Buonaparte; but nothing was known of its destination.

On the 5th of June the 16-gun brig-sloop *Mutine*, Captain Thomas Masterman Hardy, joined, with the highly gratifying intelligence that she had, on the 30th, parted from a squadron of 10 sail of the line and a 50-gun ship, that was on its way to join the rear-admiral. The brig also brought Sir Horatio full directions, when that junction was effected, to do what he so ardently desired to do—proceed in quest of the Toulon fleet. Immediately the three 74s and brig, spreading themselves, kept a sharp look-out; and, in so doing, fell in with 15 sail of richly-laden Spanish merchantmen. The *Alexander* and *Orion* each captured one; but the rear-admiral, having his mind bent on

nobler game, would not permit any more of the vessels to be molested. On the 7th, at noon, the two squadrons that were so desirous to join, gained a mast-head sight of each other, and by sunset were united.

About three weeks after Rear-admiral Nelson had been detached by Earl St.-Vincent, a reinforcement from England, consisting of eight sail of the line, under Rear-admiral Sir Roger Curtis, in the *Prince-of-Wales* 98, joined the fleet off Cadiz; and on the same evening (May 24) the in-shore squadron of nine sail of the line, commanded by that active officer, Captain Troubridge, having been relieved by an equal number of ships, sailed, in compliance with orders from home, to strengthen the force under Rear-admiral Nelson. The exchange between the two squadrons had been so admirably conducted, that the Spaniards, the next morning, were not aware that it had taken place; nor, of course, that the British admiral off the port had either detached, or been joined by, any ships.

Since his departure from Earl St.-Vincent's fleet, Captain Troubridge had been joined by the *Audacious* 74 and *Leander* 50; making the force under Rear-admiral Nelson, now consisting of the

Gun-ship		
	Vanguard	{ Rear-admiral (b.) Sir Horatio Nelson, K.B., Captain Edward Berry,
	Orion	" Sir James Saumarez,
	Culloden	" Thomas Troubridge,
	Bellerophon	" Henry d'Esterre Darby,
	Minotaur	" Thomas Louis,
	Defence	" John Peyton,
74	Alexander	" Alexander John Ball,
	Zealous	" Samuel Hood,
	Audacious	" Davidge Gould,
	Goliath	" Thomas Foley,
	Majestic	" George Blagden Westcott,
	Swiftsure	" Benjamin Hallowell,
	Theseus	" Ralph Willett Miller,
50	Leander	" Thomas Boulden Thompson,

amount to thirteen 74-gun ships, and one 50, with, instead of four or five frigates, one brig-sloop only; and yet the service intrusted to the rear-admiral, as we shall presently see, was one, the very success of which might depend on the facility of reconnoitring, and gaining intelligence of, the enemy's movements.

Nelson's instructions from his commander-in-chief were dated on the 21st of May. In these he was ordered "to proceed in quest of the armament preparing by the enemy at Toulon and Genoa; the object whereof appears to be either an attack upon Naples or Sicily, the conveyance of an army to some part of the coast of Spain for the purpose of marching towards Portugal, or to pass through the Straits, with a view of proceeding to Ireland." In some additional instructions of the same date, the

rear-admiral is told, that he may pursue the French squadron to "any part of the Mediterranean, Adriatic, Morea, Archipelago, or even into the Black Sea."

It is clear, from the tenour of these instructions, that the British government were quite in the dark as to the real, or, at all events, the primary destination of the Toulon fleet. But, that their surmise that the fleet would pass the Straits was not wholly without foundation, will appear from the following extract of a letter addressed, under date of the 18th of April, 1798, by Buonaparte to the French directory: "Il serait possible, après l'expédition que le gouvernement projette dans la Méditerranée, de faire passer les quatorze vaisseaux* à Brest."† At all events, Rear-admiral Nelson was left entirely to his own discretion, as to the course to be steered in pursuit of the fleet, which he had been ordered by his instructions to use his utmost endeavour to "take, sink, burn, or destroy." The circumstance of the French having quitted port with a north-west wind rendered it likely, in his opinion, that their course was up the Mediterranean. Accordingly the British fleet, as soon as a provoking calm would allow it to make sail, steered towards the island of Corsica. On the 12th the fleet arrived off Cape Corse, and in the evening lay to off the isle of Elba; whence the Mutine was despatched for intelligence to Civita-Vecchia. It was the rear-admiral's intention, we are told, in case he overtook the French fleet, to make three divisions of his own, thus:

Vanguard,	Zealous,	Culloden,
Minotaur,	Orion,	Theseus,
Leander,	Goliath,	Alexander,
Audacious,	Majestic,	Swiftsure.
Defence,	Bellerophon,	

Two of these divisions, according to the plan laid down, were to attack the ships of war; and the third, to pursue and run down, or otherwise destroy, the transports. A contest between nine small 74s and a 50, on one side, and one three-decker and twelve 80s and 74s, four or five of them the largest two-decked ships in the world, on the other, however much desired by, could scarcely have ended to the advantage of, the admiral in command of the former.

Pursuing their course along the shore of Tuscany, the British passed the small island of Gianuti, with a fine breeze at north-north-west. Here the Leander spoke a Moorish vessel, that gave information (which, by the by, was incorrect) that the French fleet was at Syracuse, in Sicily. About this time the Mutine joined, without having gained any intelligence. On the

* It was calculated, we believe, that the late British ship Berwick might be got ready.

† Victoires et Conquêtes, tome ix., p. 75.

morning of the 17th the British stood into the bay of Naples; and Captain Troubridge was sent, with Captain Hardy in the *Mutine*, to obtain what information could be collected from the British ambassador. All Sir William Hamilton could tell was, that the French had not entered that port, but had coasted the island of Sardinia and proceeded to the southward, probably to Malta.

With this guide for a course, the British fleet again set sail; but light airs, during the two succeeding days, retarded its progress, making it the morning of the 20th ere the celebrated Straits of Messina were entered. From the British consul at the latter port intelligence was received, that the French had possessed themselves of Malta and Goza, and that their fleet was lying at anchor off the last-named island. A fresh breeze at north-west and a rapid current soon carried the British clear of the Straits, and the island of Malta was now their destination. At daybreak on the 22d, however, when the fleet was about 12 leagues south-east of Cape Passero, in Sicily, the *Mutine* learnt from a Genoese, or rather, we believe, a Ragusian brig, which had the day before passed through the fleet unnoticed, that the French had quitted Malta on the 18th, with the same wind that was then blowing. Alexandria now seemed the next probable destination of the enemy; and immediately the British fleet bore up and steered south-east, under all sail.

From the 22d to the 28th three vessels only were spoken, one from the Archipelago, and two from Alexandria; but no French fleet had they heard of, much less seen. Days like these would have been insufferably tedious, had not the seamen, by the excellent regulations adopted in the fleet, a daily employment that, while it heightened their spirits, augmented their powers. The exercise of great guns and small arms, if properly persevered in, excites among the crew an emulation, that makes them doubly anxious to give practical proofs of their skill: they look forward to the day of battle, as the knights of old did to the day of tournament; and, when it comes, their well-grounded confidence displays itself in the shattered sides and deserted decks of their opponents.

On the 28th the British came in sight of the city of Alexandria; and the empty state of the two harbours, except as to a Turkish ship of the line, four frigates and some merchant vessels, confirmed the account they had last received. On arriving off the Pharos, or castle that guards the entrance of the eastern harbour, the *Mutine* was sent in for intelligence. After some delay, Captain Hardy was allowed to land, and was conducted, under a guard, to the governor. The latter expressed his surprise, as well as uneasiness, at the appearance of so formidable a British force; and, on the object's being explained to him, was yet more alarmed, declaring his determination to resist the attempt of either power to land.

The British were now somewhat at a stand. At length a retrograde movement was resolved on, taking a more northerly course. On the 29th the fleet steered to the north-east, with a fresh breeze from north-north-west. In consequence of the continuance of north-westerly weather, it took the ships, under all the sail they could carry on a wind, until the 4th of July, ere they made the coast of Natolia. On the 5th the ships got scattered; and, on the night of the 6th, the *Orion* parted company. This occasioned the fleet, on the following morning, to wear and stand to the northward; a delay that was repaid by the junction, towards evening, of the missing ship. The fleet continued beating to windward till the 16th, when the weather turned favourable; and, at 8 A.M. on the 18th, Cape Passero made its appearance. On the 19th the fleet, being much in want of water and provisions, stood towards Syracuse. The entrance to the harbour is intricate, and no person in the fleet had hitherto passed through it. Such, however, was the skill and attention of the officers, and the adroitness and discipline of the men, that at 30 h. 3 m. P. M. every ship had anchored in safety. Here we will leave the indefatigable British admiral and the congenial spirits around him, while we see what is become of the object of his and their solicitude.

After a stay of four days, Buonaparte, on the morning of the 19th of June, quitted Malta, having left General Vaubois as the governor, and 4000 troops as the garrison, of the island. Favoured by a fresh breeze at north-west, the expedition steered a direct course to the east, the advanced frigates detaining and destroying every vessel they fell in with, as the most effectual, if not the most legal, means of preventing the circulation of intelligence respecting the probable destination of the fleet. On the 30th the French came in view of Cape Durazzo in the island of Candia, and, crossing the gulf of that name, descried at day-break on the 1st of July the Arab tower upon the African coast, and, in a few hours afterwards, the minarets of Alexandria.

A small vessel was immediately sent into the port to gain intelligence, and, in particular, to bring off the French consul, Citizen Magallon. On reaching the flag-ship, the latter acquainted the commander-in-chief with Nelson's appearance off the coast three days before, the hostile disposition of the inhabitants, and the necessity he would be under, if he persisted in making himself master of the city, of employing force. That was General Buonaparte's intention; and the dread that Nelson might arrive, before the disembarkation could be effected, caused the utmost expedition to be used in getting the troops on shore. In her haste to get near to the creek of Mirabou, opposite to the castle of which name situated at the distance of about two leagues from the city the fleet cast anchor, the *Orient* ran foul of the *Dubois* and one of the frigates, and carried away her bowsprit: both the latter ships also sustained some damage.

The wind now got up, and the sea along with it, and the coast was lined with reefs; but the English were hourly expected, and Buonaparte knew full well how his plans would be foiled if the fleets met before his army was landed. On the 1st of July a portion of the troops disembarked, and Buonaparte had just stepped into the boat that was to land him, when the look-out ships signalled an enemy's sail to the westward. The uneasiness which the sight of this vessel caused in the breast of the commander-in-chief elicited from him the following exclamation: "Fortune! wilt thou abandon me? What! only five days!"* A minute or two more and Buonaparte's placidity was restored, for the vessel approaching announced herself as the French frigate *Justice*, from the island of Malta.

On the 2d, after an action in which the French had about 40 officers and men killed, and perhaps thrice the number, including General Kléber, wounded, Buonaparte gained possession of Alexandria. In the course of that and the succeeding day all the troops were disembarked. General Kléber, being disabled from immediate service by his wound, was appointed governor of the city, and Commodore Dumanoir-le-Pelley captain of the port. The port consists of two harbours, the old and the new; one to the south-west, the other to the north-east, with the city on a strip of land between them. Another strip of land, called the isle of Pharos, at nearly right angles from that on which the city stands, forms the north-west, as the main land of Egypt does the south-east, side of both harbours.

The channel leading to the old harbour, the only one at this time supposed capable of receiving the ships, being found shoal, narrow, and intricate, Buonaparte, on the 3d of July, ordered Vice-admiral Brueys to anchor the men-of-war in the road or bay of Aboukir, about 20 miles to the east-north-east of Alexandria. But, if the admiral found his position not a defensive one against an enemy's fleet, he was to direct his course for Corfu; leaving behind him the *Causse* and *Dubois*, with the guns for arming them complete, the frigates *Diane*, *Junon*, *Alceste*, and *Artémise*, the whole of the light flotilla, of which Commodore Perrée had been appointed the commander, and all the frigates armed en flûte, with their guns and stores. Admiral Brueys, accordingly, with his ships of the line and full-armed frigates, proceeded to the bay of Aboukir, and there cast anchor. In the mean time an active and intelligent French officer, Captain Jean-Baptiste Barré, was ordered to survey the old harbour of Alexandria, and report upon its capacity and facility of entrance. On the 15th Captain Barré made a report, in which he showed that, out of the three channels, there was one which, when a rock or two were blown up, would have

* "Fortune, m'abandonnerais-tu? Quoi! seulement cinq jours!"—*Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome ix., p. 26.

25 feet (French) water; but Admiral Brueys, considering the risk too great to attempt entering the port with his line-of-battle ships, the smallest of which drew 22 feet, preferred remaining at Aboukir; where we will leave him awhile in the enjoyment of his apparent security, and revert to the proceedings of one who soon put that security to the test.

Notwithstanding the inconvenient situations of the watering-places in the port of Syracuse, the indefatigable exertions of the officers and men of the British fleet procured, by the fifth day, an ample supply; to which was added, owing solely to the influence of Lady Hamilton, the British ambassador's wife, with the court of "neutral" Naples, a sufficient quantity of fresh beef and vegetables. Thus victualled and refreshed, the ships of the fleet, on the 24th and 25th, again put to sea. All the accounts, received while at Syracuse, agreed in representing that the French fleet had not been seen, either in the Archipelago or the Adriatic, and yet that it had not gone down the Mediterranean: hence no other conclusion remained, than that it still lay to the eastward, and that Egypt, after all, was, or had been, its destination. To be certain it was so, the rear-admiral bent his course for the Morea; and on the 28th, being off Cape Gallo, despatched the Culloden to Coron. The Turkish governor behaved very graciously to Captain Troubridge, permitting him to take out as a prize a French wine-vessel at anchor in the port; and he dismissed him with a yet more valuable present, in the communication, that the French fleet had been seen about four weeks since on the coast of Candia, steering south-east. South-east, then, was steered by the British; and a fresh breeze astern, with a heavy following sea, drove them rapidly towards the goal of their hopes.

On the 1st of August, at 10 A. M., the towers or minarets of Alexandria, the Pharos, and Pompey's pillar, made their welcome appearance; and soon the two ports, which, when last seen, had been unpeopled and solitary, displayed to the view a wood of masts: as an unerring sign, too, of who were now the occupants of the city, the French flag waved upon its walls. The two British look-out ships, the *Alexander* and *Swiftsure*, as they drew nearer, caused a general disappointment to their friends in the offing, by the signal their duty obliged them to make, that the enemy's fleet did not form part of the vessels at anchor; that there appeared to be but eight ships of war, of various sizes (the *Causse*, *Dubois*, and six ex-Venetian frigates), and that the remainder were transports and merchantmen. The disappointment to the fleet was, however, of short duration; as the *Zealous*, a little before 1 P. M., just as the Pharos tower bore from her south-south-west, distant four or five leagues, signalled, that 17 ships of war, 13 or 14 of them formed in line of battle, lay at anchor in a bay upon her larboard bow. In-

stantly the British fleet hauled up, steering to the eastward under topgallantsails, with a fine breeze from north by west to north-north-west.

Let us pause here, while we endeavour to explain how it happened that, in a sea so comparatively small as the Mediterranean, two hostile fleets, one of which was so strenuously seeking the other, that other, too, from its immense numbers, spread over so wide a surface, did not come in mutual contact. On the 24th of May, when the reinforcement for Rear-admiral Nelson quitted Earl St.-Vincent off Cadiz, the French fleet was running down the eastern coast of Corsica; and on the 8th of June, when Rear-admiral Nelson made sail from off Toulon, with a fleet which had only been formed the night before, Vice-admiral Brueys was standing across from Sicily to Malta. It has already been stated, that the French fleet (part of it the day before) quitted the last-named island on the morning of the 19th. Singularly enough, on the night of the 22d, the two fleets crossed each other's track unperceived. That this should have happened, in a case in which one of the fleets numbered, as that of the French then did, nearly 400 sail, must appear strange; but the surprise will diminish, when it is known that the spot of intersection was about midway between Cape Mesurata and the mouth of the Adriatic, the widest part of the Mediterranean; that the British fleet sailed in close order, and had no frigates to spread as look-outs; and that a constant haze pervaded the atmosphere. Subsequently to the 22d the French steered east, to make the Goza di Candia; while the British stood south-east, or straight along the African coast. Hence the latter reached its port of destination just two days before the former; and the British fleet, as it quitted the shore on its departure, was actually seen from the Pharos tower on the morning of the same day, the 30th, towards the evening of which the French fleet made its appearance off the coast of Egypt.

We have already mentioned that the French fleet anchored in the bay of Aboukir. That fleet consisted of the

Gun-ship				Vice-adm. ——— Brueys.
120	Orient			Rear-adm.* Honoré Ganteaume.
				Commodore ——— Casa-Bianca.
	[Franklin			Rear-adm. Armand-Sim.-Mar. Blanquet.†
				Captain Maurice Gillet.
80	Guillaume-Tell . .			Rear-adm. P.-C.-J.-Bap.-Silv. Villeneuve.
				Captain ——— Saulnier.
	[Tonnant			Commodore Arist.-Aub. du Petit-Thouars.

* As captain of the fleet, but M. Ganteaume was not appointed a rear-admiral until the 7th of November following.

† According to the official list, but called Blanquet-Duchayla in most of the French accounts.

Gun-ship

	Aiglon	Commodore Henri-Alexandre Thévenard.
	Généreux	Captain ——— Le Joille.
	Conquérant	" Etienne Dalbarade.
	Heureux	" Jean-Pierre Etienne.
74	Guerrier	" Jean-F.-Timothée Trullet, <i>sen.</i>
	Mercure	" ——— Cambon, <i>acting.*</i>
	Peuple-Souverain	" Pierre-Paul Raccord.
	Spartiate	" Maurice-Julien Emeriau.
	Timoléon	" Jean-Fr.-Timothée Trullet, <i>jun.</i>

Gun-frigate

	Diane	{ Rear-adm. Denis Decrès.
40	Justice	{ Captain Eléonore-Jean-Nic. Soleil.
	Artémise	" ——— Villeneuve.
36	Sérieuse	" Pierre-Jean Standedet.
		" Claude-Jean Martin.

Brigs, Alerte and Railleur ; *Bomb-vessels*, Hercule, Salamine, and another, and several gun-boats.

Previously to our entering into the details of the famous battle that ensued, it will be useful to give a slight description of the spot in which it was fought. The bay of Aboukir commences, as already mentioned, about 20 miles to the east-north-east of Alexandria, and extends from the castle of Aboukir, in a semi-circular direction, to the westernmost or Rosetta mouth of the Nile, distant from the castle about six miles. Aboukir bay has no depth for line-of-battle ships nearer than three miles from the shore, a sand-bank, on which there is not any where more than four fathoms, running out to that distance. Owing also to the width of its opening, the bay affords very little shelter, except on its west-north-west side (that from which the wind on this coast commonly blows) by a small island, situated about two miles from the point whereon the castle stands, and connected with it by a chain of sand-banks and rocks, between which, however, there is a passage for small-craft. Aboukir island is surrounded by a continuation of the shoal that runs along the bottom of the bay ; and which extends from the island about 1650 yards, or nearly a mile, in a north-east direction.

It appears that, on first taking up this anchorage, Vice-admiral Brueys held a council of flag-officers and captains to determine whether, in case of attack, the fleet should engage at anchor or under sail. All the officers, except Rear-admiral Blanquet, approved of the fleet's remaining at anchor : he maintained, that it was only when a fleet could be supported by strong forts crossing each other in their fire, that any advantage was gained by anchoring. However, finding the majority against him, M. Blanquet requested that the Franklin might be placed as one of the seconds to the commander-in-chief. His request was granted, and the ships were formed in line ahead in the

* For Commodore Perrée, appointed to command the gun-boats on the Nile.

following order: Guerrier, Conquérant, Spartiate, Aquilon, Peuple-Souverain, Franklin, Orient, Tonnant, Heureux, Mercure, Guillaume-Tell, Généreux, Timoléon; with, in an inner line, about 350 yards from the first, and about midway between that and the shoal, the Sérieuse frigate, nearly abreast of the opening between the Conquérant and Spartiate, the Artémise abreast of the Heureux, and the Diane, of the Guillaume-Tell.

The van-ship bore from Aboukir island south-east, distant about 2420 yards, or a mile and seven-eighths; which is rather more than double the extent of the shoal in the same direction. Between the Guerrier and her second astern, and between all the other line-of-battle ships successively, the distance was about 160 yards: so that, reckoning each of the 13 ships to occupy upon an average, a space of 70 yards, the length of the line was rather under a mile and five-eighths. But this line was not a straight one. From the centre ship, the Orient, the van-ship bore north-west, the rear-ship south-east by south, and the Guerrier and Timoléon, from each other, about north-west half-north and south-east half-south. Hence the line was a curve, or, rather, a very obtuse angle, having its projecting centre towards the sea. The edge of the shoal at the back of the line, on the contrary, was concave; so much so, that the Orient was nearly twice the distance from it that either the van or the rear ship was, particularly the latter. To protect his flanks, the French admiral, besides giving suitable stations to his bomb-vessels and gun-boats, erected a battery on Aboukir island, and mounted with two brass and two iron 12-pounders, a few pieces of a lighter caliber, and two 13-inch brass mortars.*

Having thus moored his fleet in, what he considered, a strong position, the French admiral awaited the issue of General Buonaparte's plans on shore. In the mean while vessels frequently arrived at Alexandria, with information that the British were on their return to the Egyptian coast; and, on the 21st of July the two British frigates Seahorse and Terpsichore brought to, for a few minutes, off the bay, as if they had been sent to reconnoitre. Besides hoisting French colours, Captain Foot made some of the private signals, obtained out of the French frigate Sensible, which the Seahorse had recently captured; and Captain Gage hoisted French colours over English, to make it appear that his frigate had been captured by the one in company. It is probable that this had the effect of masking the national character of the two British frigates, otherwise, doubtless, two or three of the fine French frigates (including the Junon) then at anchor would have slipped and given chase.

The short interval that had elapsed between the departure of one fleet and the arrival of the other had encouraged the belief, that the British were aware of the proximity of the French fleet,

* The French accounts say, only two 12s and two mortars; but the guns stated in the text were subsequently brought off by the British.

but, for the want of sufficient strength, or for some other reason, declined attacking it. So that, when the *Heureux*, at 2 P. M. on the 1st of August, made the signal for a fleet of 12 sail of the line (Alexander and *Swifture* not then seen), in the north-north-west, the French ships were still lying at single anchor, without springs on their cables, and with a great proportion of their crews on shore getting water. In an instant the men were recalled on board; and the frigates, by the direction of the commander-in-chief, sent some of their men to augment the crews of the ships of the line. At 3 P. M. the French admiral made the signal to prepare for battle, and detached the *Alerte* and *Railleur* brigs to endeavour to decoy the advanced British ships upon the shoal off Aboukir island.

As yet but 12 two-deckers and a brig had made their appearance, and one of the former, from her comparative smallness, might be a hospital or store ship. At 4 P. M., however, two large ships, coming up under a press of sail, hove in sight over Aboukir point near the castle; thus convincing the French, if they had doubted it before, that the British were at least equal to them in force. The course of the British fleet and the rapidity of its approach indicating an immediate attack, Admiral Brueys ordered his ships to cross topgallant yards, as if intending to get under way; but shortly afterwards, observing some of the advanced British ships bring to, he appears to have adopted an idea, that the British would defer the attack until the next morning, when the shoals might be more easily avoided: he thereupon signalled, that he should remain at anchor. This change of plan was afterwards attributed, by some of the French writers, to a belief on the part of Vice-admiral Brueys, that his ships were not sufficiently manned, to fight with advantage when under sail. But the admiral's expressed opinion of the impracticability of the attack on that night was notorious; and it was equally well understood, that he only waited for darkness, to weigh and put to sea, with the intention, in compliance with the orders he had received from Buonaparte, of endeavouring to effect his escape.

If Admiral Brueys, as we have no doubt was the case, did come to the conclusion, that the British would wait till morning before they attacked him, he was soon undeceived, and then ordered each ship to lay out an anchor in the south-south-east, and to send a stream-cable to the ship next astern of her, making a hawser fast to it, in such a manner as to spring her broadside towards the enemy.* This measure was rendered the more necessary by the state of the wind, which blew from north-north-west, instead of north-west, the direction of the line formed by the six van-ships. Let us now see what preparatory arrange-

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome ix., p. 89.

ments had been made, and were making, by the fleet under Rear-admiral Nelson.

At about 2 h. 15 m. P. M. the *Alexander* and *Swiftsure*, having been recalled by signal, stood under all sail, towards the body of their fleet then distant about four leagues, urging its course to the eastward. It was while they were standing out from the land to effect their junction, that the former, as already mentioned, were descried by the French over Aboukir point. At 3 P. M. the signal was made to prepare for battle; and at 4 P. M., when the body of the French fleet bore south-east by south distant nine or ten miles, the British ships were ordered to prepare to anchor by the stern. Each ship, accordingly, made fast a stream-cable to her mizenmast, and, passing it out of one of her gunroom ports, carried it along her side just below the first-deck ports, to several of which it was slung by a slight rope-yarn lashing, and then bent it to an anchor at her bow: so that, when the anchor was let go, the ship ran over her main cable, or that out of the hawse-hole, and brought up by the cable from her stern. This was to avoid the risk of being raked while swinging head to wind, as well as to enable the ship, by slackening one cable and hauling upon the other, to spring her broadside in any direction she pleased.

Shortly after the signal to prepare to anchor, another was made, to signify that the admiral meant to attack the enemy's van and centre. As far as can be gathered from the vague accounts on the subject, Sir Horatio intended, with his fourteen 74s, to pass the French line on its outer side, down to the seventh ship, the *Orient*; so that every French ship of the seven might have a British ship on her bow and quarter. With respect to the 50-gun ship, admitting that Captain Thompson could succeed in persuading the admiral to overlook her comparatively weak powers in such a conflict, it is probable that the *Leander* would have been ordered to assist two of the 74s in overpowering the three-decker.

As the British ships approached the bay, the two French brigs, already named, stood out to reconnoitre; and one of them, the *Alerte*, on arriving nearly within gun-shot of the leading ships, bore away directly across the rocky shoal off Aboukir island, in the hope that one or more of the 74s would have chased her and got on shore. But the ruse did not take, and the British van continued to steer a safe course. At 5 h. 30 m., the fleet being nearly abreast of the extremity of the shoal, the signal was made to form in line of battle ahead and astern of the admiral, as most convenient from the then accidental position of the ships; and Rear-admiral Nelson, about this time, hailed the *Zealous*, to know if Captain Hood thought the ships were far enough to the eastward to bear up. Captain Hood replied, that the *Zealous* was then in 11 fathoms, and that he

had no chart of the bay ; but that he would bear up, and, by sounding carefully, carry the admiral as close to the shoal as could be done with safety.* This was agreed to ; and the Zealous, then with the wind on the larboard quarter, bore away, and, rounding the shoal, brought the wind on her starboard beam. At this time the Goliath was a little advanced on her larboard bow. Shortly afterwards the Vanguard, who was next astern of the Zealous, hove to to speak a boat. This occasioned some of the other ships to shorten sail ; and it was now that the Theseus was hailed by Captain Berry, and directed to be the admiral's second ahead. The Theseus accordingly ran past the Vanguard, and brought to in her station.

At about 6 p. m. the admiral made the signal for the fleet to fill and stand on. The ships did so, and were then ranged in the following order : Goliath, Zealous, Orion, Audacious, Theseus, Vanguard, Minotaur, Defence, Bellerophon, Majestic, Leander ; with, away at some distance to the northward, the Culloden, and, at a still greater distance to the westward, the Alexander and Swiftsure, using every exertion to get up. The wind still continued to blow from the north-north-west : hence the 11 ships standing in line had it on the starboard beam, the Culloden nearly astern, and the Alexander and Swiftsure, until it changed and headed them, nearly on the larboard beam. The rapidity and precision with which the above 11 ships formed the line, elicited the admiration of the French ; the more so on account of the "pêle-mêle" state in which the ships had previously bore down. Soon after the British ships had thus formed, they hoisted their colours, and subsequently union jacks in several parts of the rigging.


At about 6 h. 20 m. p. m. the French ships hoisted their colours ; and the Conquérant, followed by the Guerrier, opened her fire upon the Goliath and Zealous, then in line close to each other, and at some distance ahead of their companions. The mortars on the island also began throwing shells, but without effect. At about 5 h. 30 m. p. m. the Goliath, who, in order to keep ahead of the Zealous, had been obliged, after taking in her topgallantsails, to set them again, crossed the head of the French line, and, pouring a raking broadside into the Guerrier, bore up for that ship's inner bow, where Captain Foley intended to take his station ; but, the anchor not dropping in time, the Goliath ran past the Guerrier, and did not bring up until abreast of the inner or larboard quarter of the second ship, the Conquérant. The Goliath then commenced a warm action with

* Williams's Voyage, a book often quoted by Mr. James ; the author of which was present at the battle of the Nile, gives the following version of this anecdote. "Nelson hailed Hood, and asked him if he thought there was sufficient depth of water for our ships between the enemy and the shore ?" "I don't know, sir," replied Hood, "but with your permission, *I will stand in and try.*"

the latter, and occasionally fired a few distant shot from her foremost starboard guns at the *Sérieuse* frigate and *Hercule* mortar-brig, lying within her.

The *Zealous*, following the *Goliath* in her manœuvre, and dropping her anchor in five fathoms, brought up abreast of the inner or larboard bow of the *Guerrier*; which was precisely the position Captain Foley had intended to take. A prompt and well-directed broadside, at musket-shot distance, from the larboard guns of the *Zealous*, brought down by the board, in less than five minutes, the *Guerrier's* foremast. The sun was at this moment sinking into the horizon, and not a British ship, except the *Goliath* and *Zealous*, had yet fired a shot. So auspicious a commencement of the attack was greeted with three cheers by the whole British fleet.

This is the period we have selected, for showing the positions of the van-ships of the two fleets, as well as the courses by which those of the British fleet steered into their places.



The *Orion* followed next; and, after firing in passing at the *Guerrier*, rounded the stern or starboard quarter of the *Zealous*, and ran along the same side of the latter and of the *Goliath* successively. The *Audacious* and *Theseus*, in the mean while, by taking rather a shorter course than the *Orion*, arrived at their stations before her. The first, steering for the opening between the *Guerrier* and *Conquérant*, dropped her small bower and brought up within about 70 yards of the latter ship's

bows; into which the Audacious poured a well-directed discharge from her larboard guns. The Audacious, soon afterwards, swang round, head to wind, and came to again within about 50 yards of the Conquérant's larboard side, and rather upon the French ship's inner bow.

Steering close ahead of the Guerrier, and within the Zealous and Goliath successively, into whose respective opponents she fired in passing, the Theseus anchored by the stern in a line ahead of the Goliath, and abreast of, and at the distance of about 300 yards from, the Spartiate. Almost immediately after the Theseus had thus placed herself, the Orion, retarded by the circuit she had made, passed the latter ship's starboard, or, in reference to the French line, outer side, with the intention, we suppose, of bringing up abreast of the Aquilon, the fourth ship from the French van; but, the Sérieuse frigate, at anchor considerably beyond the track of the Orion, opening her fire, the 74's starboard guns were brought to bear upon this unworthy antagonist, and discharged with so good an effect, as besides dismasting her so to shatter her hull, that, after cutting her cables and drifting further upon the shoal, the frigate sank. Fortunately for Captain Martin and his men, a part of the upper works of the Sérieuse remained above water. Having done this, the Orion dropped her anchor, and, veering away, brought up head to wind nearly in a line with the Theseus, and abreast, or a little abaft the beam, of the Peuple-Souverain; but unavoidably, on account of her deviation to follow up the Sérieuse, at so great a distance, that her aftermost guns occasionally played upon the larboard bow of the Franklin.

The rear-admiral had judiciously resolved, as already in part stated, to complete the capture or destruction of the French van-ships, ere he made any serious attempt upon the ships in the rear; being well aware that these, from their leeward position, would be unable to afford any immediate support to the former. As the first step in the execution of this plan, the Vanguard edged away towards the outer side of the French line, exposed, in passing, to a raking fire from the van; and at 6 h. 40 m., a few minutes after the Theseus had taken up her position, anchored within about 80 yards of the Spartiate's starboard beam. The Minotaur, anchoring five minutes afterwards next ahead of the Vanguard, found herself opposed to the Aquilon; and the Defence, still preserving the outer line, brought up, at about 7 p. m., abreast of the Peuple-Souverain. The Bellerophon and Majestic, following next in succession, passed on, with the intention of attacking the enemy's centre and rear.

In order to lessen the confusion of a night-attack, and prevent the British vessels from firing into each other, every ship had been directed to hoist at her mizen peak four lights horizontally; and the fleet also went into action with the white or St.-George's

ensign, the red cross in the centre of which rendered it easily distinguishable, in the darkest night, from the tri-coloured flag of the enemy. At about 7 P.M., or soon afterwards, the lights made their appearance throughout the fleet; and it was nearly at the same time that the *Bellerophon* dropped her stern-anchor so as to bring up abreast, instead of on the bow, of the French three-decker. In a very few minutes afterwards the *Majestic* brought up abreast of the *Tonnant*, and soon lost her captain by that ship's heavy fire. Having thus placed at anchor and in hot action 10 British and seven French ships, we will now recommence with the head of the French line, and detail, as far as we are able, the operations that led to the victory which hath since given so much celebrity to the shores of an unknown bay.

The *Guerrier*, receiving a raking broadside in passing from the *Orion* and *Theseus*, and a succession of raking broadsides from the *Zealous*, who had stationed herself so judiciously, lost, within 10 minutes after the fall of her foremast, her two remaining masts; and this without being able to bring guns enough to bear, to fall even a topgallantmast of the ship that was so annoying her. The safe position of the *Zealous* was partly the cause of this; and another cause existed in the unprepared state of the French ships on the supposed unassailable side, even admitting that, by the use of her springs, the *Guerrier* could have brought her larboard guns to bear. After pouring several more unrequited broadsides into his dismasted antagonist, Captain Hood hailed again and again to know if the *Guerrier* would surrender. No answer being returned, the work of slaughter went on, the canister and musketry from the *Zealous* driving the Frenchmen from the upper part of their ship; but the *Guerrier* continued to fire her stern-chasers occasionally at the *Goliath* and *Audacious*, who were assailing her in that direction. At a few minutes past 9 P.M., tired of killing men in this way, Captain Hood sent his first lieutenant on board the French ship, to ask leave to hoist a light and haul it down, as a signal of submission. This was done, and the *Guerrier* became the prize of the *Zealous*.

The *Guerrier*'s bowsprit and the whole of her head were shot away, and the two anchors on her bows each cut in two. Both bows, particularly the larboard one, were much shattered; and, from the latter to the gangway, her maindeck ports were nearly in one, and her gunwale in that part totally cut away. This had caused two of her maindeck beams to fall upon her guns; and most of the masts, having fallen in-board, lay with the rigging, over the dead and wounded of the crew. Yet the *Guerrier*'s cable remained uncut, and still held her fast. Her loss, in killed and wounded together, was estimated at more than half her complement, or from 350 to 400 men; whereas the loss on board the *Zealous* amounted to no more than seven

men wounded, and the ship was quite as perfect in her masts, and nearly so in her rigging, as when, three hours before, she had commenced the engagement.

The *Conquérant*, besides receiving a portion of the fire from the ships that ran by her, and a very warm fire from the quarter-guns of the *Theseus*, found two steady opponents in the *Goliath* and *Audacious*, the latter, for a while, in a raking position. At the end of 10 or 12 minutes, after having, by the united fire of two ships, upon whom, from the positions they had taken, she was unable to bestow a suitable return, had her fore and mizen masts shot away, and her mainmast left in the act of falling, the *Conquérant* hauled down her flag. This ship appears to have been the first that struck; but still, being entirely disabled, she could have resisted no longer. Her loss in killed and wounded we are unable to enumerate; but it is stated to have been nearly as severe as that of the *Guerrier*, including among the wounded her commander, M. Dalbarade. Of the *Conquérant's* two principal opponents, the *Goliath* had suffered the most; having had nearly the whole of her main and mizen rigging shot away, and all her masts badly wounded. The loss on board the *Goliath* was also severe, amounting to 21 killed and 41 wounded. The fore and main masts and main topmast of the *Audacious* were considerably injured; but her loss, owing to her secure position on the larboard bow of her principal opponent, was only one killed and 35 (an unusually large proportion) wounded.

The *Spartiate*, after sustaining the direct fire of the *Theseus*, until the *Vanguard's* position obliged that ship to drop a little further down the line, found herself assailed, on the starboard side, by the whole broadside force of the *Vanguard*, and by an occasional fire on the quarter, from the aftermost guns of the *Minotaur*. Subsequently, too, on the *Conquérant's* surrender, the *Spartiate* became exposed, on her larboard bow, to a fire from the quarter guns of the *Audacious*. Thus surrounded by foes, the *Spartiate's* masts did not long remain standing, and her colours came down nearly at the same time as the *Guerrier's* light. At the onset of the attack upon her, the *Spartiate* had found an able second astern in the *Aquilon*; who, from the slanting position she had obtained by springing her broadside, (having no opponent to occupy her attention on the larboard side), had succeeded in raking the *Vanguard* with destructive effect, until the *Minotaur* crippled the *Aquilon's* means of annoyance. With two such opponents as the *Spartiate* and *Aquilon* upon her, the *Vanguard's* damages might well be serious; and, although none of her masts fell over the side, they were all badly wounded. The loss on board the *Vanguard* was proportionably severe, amounting to 30 killed and 76 wounded, and that of the *Spartiate*, the *Vanguard's* principal opponent, although we are unable to state the amount, was still more severe, including among the badly wounded Captain Emeriul.

The Aquilon, assailed from without the line by the powerful broadsides of the Minotaur (the only ship in the two fleets that, for an upper battery, had a tier of 32-pounder carronades), and from within by the occasional fire of the Theseus, was soon reduced to the dismasted state of her three companions ahead; and was compelled, at about 9 h. 25 m. p. m., to follow their example, with a loss nearly, if not quite as severe, including among the killed her commander, M. Thévenard. The Minotaur, the Aquilon's principal opponent, had 23 killed and 64 wounded; and the Theseus, with whom she was only partially engaged, had five killed and 30 wounded.

The Peuple-Souverain, by the close and animated fire of the Defence, also by a succession of raking broadsides from the Orion, as the latter lay on the Peuple-Souverain's inner quarter, having lost her fore and main masts, and become in other respects greatly disabled, parted her cable and dropped out of the line, reanchoring abreast of, and at about 400 yards distant from, the Orient, with, including her captain among the wounded, a severe loss, but which, as in most of the other cases, we are unable to enumerate.

The loss sustained by the Peuple-Souverain's outside opponent, the Defence, was only four killed and 11 wounded; while that of the Orion, the former's opponent within the line, amounted to 13 killed and 29 wounded. The Orion had her fore and mizen masts shot through in several places, and her yards and rigging greatly disabled. The ship had also a narrow escape from a more imminent danger. In the heat of the action a fire-raft, represented as the Guerrier's launch filled with combustibles, came drifting down with the tide, which runs here at a great rate. The Orion's stern-boat having been shot away, and no means existing to get another boat out for the purpose of towing the raft clear of the ship, preparations were made to boom off the unwelcome visiter and sink it by pigs of ballast; but, fortunately, the raft passed clear of the larboard bow by about 25 yards. Just as the Peuple-Souverain had driven from the line and ceased firing, the fore topmast of the Defence fell over her side; and her three lower masts, as well as bowsprit, were much injured.

The Bellerophon soon found her station a hotter one than she could bear. At about 7 h. 50 m. her mizenmast was shot away; and, in a few minutes afterwards, the mainmast fell on the starboard side of the forecastle. Some combustible materials discharged from the Orient had also set the ship on fire in several places, but the crew succeeded in extinguishing the flames. At about 8 h. 20 m. p. m., being entirely disabled, the Bellerophon cut her stern cable, and, setting her spritsail, wore clear of the powerful three-decker to whose fire she had so long been exposed. Scarcely had the Bellerophon filled her fore topsail and dropped her foresail, than her shattered foremast, unable to bear the weight, fell over her larboard bow. In drifting along the

rear of the French line, the *Bellerophon* received a broadside from the *Tonnant*, and a few distant shots from the *Heureux*. The *Bellerophon*'s loss, therefore, might well amount to 49 killed and 148 wounded.

The *Majestic* had brought up under the guns of an opponent that, although nominally a two-decker, was more than a match for a British 98. In less than half an hour after she had commenced action with the *Tonnant*, the *Majestic* lost her captain by a musket-ball, a proof that this pair of combatants were not far asunder. The command of the *Majestic*, on the death of her captain, devolved upon her first lieutenant, Robert Cuthbert; who continued to fight the ship in the most gallant manner. At about 8 h. 30 m., finding she was drifting athwart the hawse of the *Heureux*, the *Majestic* slipped her stern cable, and, letting go her best bower, brought up head to wind; having the *Heureux* on her starboard quarter, and shortly afterwards, when in consequence of the accident that befel the *Orient* the *Tonnant* cut or slipped her cable, having also the latter ship on her larboard bow. Here we will leave the *Majestic*, while we attend to the three fresh ships, which, a few minutes previous, had reached the scene of action.

Just as the *Alexander* and *Swiftsure* had got nearly abreast of *Aboukir* island, and expected soon to be round the reef that lies off its north-eastern extremity, the wind shifted from north-north-west to north. The *Alexander*, being on the lee bow of her consort, was obliged to tack. This gave the *Swiftsure* the lead, and no time was lost in taking advantage of it. Fortunately for these two ships, but unfortunately for the *Culloden*, the latter, just a quarter of an hour after the action had commenced, had stuck fast on the reef off the island. The signals of the *Culloden* were now a warning to her two friends; and these, as they successively came up, rounded the shoal in safety.

At a few minutes past 8 p. m., having found, amidst the prevailing darkness, a sure beacon in the flashes of the guns of the combatants, the *Swiftsure* came up with a dismasted ship, without light or colours, quitting the scene of slaughter. On the supposition that she was an enemy, the *Swiftsure* was just about to pour in a broadside, when Captain Hallowell hailed, and was repaid for his considerateness by the immediate reply, "*Bellerophon*, going out of action disabled." Instantly the stern-anchor was let go, and the *Swiftsure*, without at the time, from the smoke and darkness, exactly knowing where, brought up about half a ship's length astern of the spot which the *Bellerophon* had just quitted. As soon as she had clewed up (but not, we should suppose, for the sake of her men's lives, "furled"*) her sails, the *Swiftsure* opened a heavy fire, with her foremost guns, at the distance of about 200 yards, upon the

* Brenton, vol. ii., p. 311.

starboard bow of the Orion, and her aftermost ones, at a somewhat greater distance, upon the same quarter of the Franklin; upon whose larboard bow, the Leander, keeping under way in the vacant space left by the *Peuple-Souverain* when she quitted the line (and to which the Leander had but recently arrived, on account of her detention by the *Culloden*), was pouring in a fire with scarcely the possibility of a return. As a proof that the Leander, in the position she had thus taken, was most effectually co-operating with her more powerful friends in bringing the business of the day to a conclusion, we quote from a French account of the battle the following passage: "*De cette manière, tous les boulets du Leander qui n'atteignaient pas le Franklin allaient à bord de l'Orient, du Tonnant, ou d'un des vaisseaux plus en arrière.*"* Shortly afterwards the *Alexander*, coming rapidly up, passed through the wide opening which the driving of the *Tonnant* had left, and dropped her bow-anchor so as to open her starboard broadside directly on the French three-decker's larboard quarter.

Until the Leander took up a position to mask the fire of the Orion, the latter had been cannonading the Franklin; and the *Minotaur* had also found opportunities to bestow a few shots upon that noble two-decker. But, since the *Peuple-Souverain* had quitted the line, the Franklin had found a more unengaged opponent in the Defence; when, suddenly, an event happened, which struck both sides with awe, and suspended, for a while, the hostile operations of the two fleets. It was at 9 p. m., or a few minutes after, that the *Swiftsure*'s people perceived a fire on board of the *Orient*; and which, as it increased, presently bore the appearance of being in the ship's mizen chains. It was, in fact, on the poop deck and in the admiral's cabin; and its cause we shall hereafter endeavour to explain. As many of the *Swiftsure*'s guns as could be brought to bear were quickly directed to the inflamed spot, with, as was soon evident, dreadful precision.

After spreading along the decks, and ascending the rigging, with terrific and uncontrollable rapidity, the flames reached the fatal spot; and, at about 10 p. m., the *Orient* blew up, with a most tremendous explosion. Any description of the awful scene would fall far short: we shall therefore confine ourselves to the effect it produced upon the adjacent ships. The *Alexander*, *Swiftsure*, and *Orion*, as the three nearest, had made every preparation for the event; such as closing their ports and hatchways, removing from the decks all combustible materials, and having ready with buckets a numerous body of firemen. The vibration shook the ships to their kelsons, opened their seams, and, in other respects, did them considerable injury. The flaming mass, except two large pieces of the wreck which

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome ix., p. 92.

dropped, but without any evil consequences, into her fore and main tops, flew over the *Swiftsure*, as was wisely conjectured by her commander, when urged to attempt moving further off. A part also fell on board of the *Alexander*, who lay at a somewhat greater distance from the Orient, and upon her lee quarter; a port-fire setting her main-royal in flames, and some splinters, her jib. In both cases the crew extinguished the flames, but not without cutting away the jib-boom and spritsail-yard. With the little air of wind which the cannonade, and the more mighty concussion that interrupted it, had left, the *Alexander* then dropped to a safer distance. Among the French ships, the *Franklin* received the greater share of the Orient's wreck: her decks were covered with red-hot seams, pieces of timber, and burning ropes; she caught fire, but succeeded in extinguishing it. The *Tonnant* had, just before the explosion, cut or slipped her cable, and dropped clear of the burning wreck. The *Heureux* and *Mercure*, although too far off to be injured, had done the same.

Either amazement at what had happened, or a strong feeling towards self-preservation, or both causes united, made it full ten minutes ere a gun was again fired on either side. By this time, too, the wind, as if just recovering from the trance into which all nature had been hushed by the catastrophe, freshened up; and, as it ruffled the surface of the water, and rattled among the rigging of the ships, reanimated the half-benumbed faculties of the combatants. The French ship *Franklin*, although disabled in most of her guns, was the first to recommence hostilities: she opened a fire from her lower battery upon the *Defence* and *Swiftsure*; who, as they lay close on her starboard bow and quarter, returned it, particularly the *Defence*, with full effect. Being without a second either ahead or astern, and having, besides these two determined opponents, one or two other ships in commanding positions on her opposite bow and quarter, the *Franklin* waited until her main and mizen masts came down by the board; and then, having scarcely a gun to cannonade with, and being reduced by loss in the action to less than half of her complement, struck her colours.

It was now midnight, and the *Tonnant* was the only French ship whose guns continued in active play. Her shot gave great annoyance to the *Swiftsure*, particularly as the latter, owing to the position of the *Alexander*, could make little or no return; but the *Majestic* had been the principal opponent of that formidable French ship. At about 3 A.M. on the 2d, the heavy and unremitting fire of the *Tonnant* brought down, by the board, the *Majestic's* main and mizen masts; but, shortly afterwards, the *Tonnant* herself had her three masts shot away, equally close to the deck. The wreck of these compelled her to cease firing, but failed in inducing her to strike: the *Tonnant* had, indeed, by veering her cable, driven so far to leeward of her second position,

as to have now no opponent near enough to put her resolution to a trial. The *Heureux* and *Mercure*, also, having, as already stated, withdrawn from the line, had left ample room for the *Tonnant* to take up a station ahead of the *Guillaume-Tell* and the two French ships in her rear. This the *Tonnant* did; and a second interval of silence ensued.

At 4 A. M., which was just as the day broke, the firing recommenced between the *Tonnant*, *Guillaume-Tell*, *Généreux*, and *Timoléon*, on the one side, and the *Alexander* and crippled *Majestic* on the other. This soon brought to the spot the *Theseus* and *Goliath*. Shortly after these ships had dropped their anchors the French frigate *Artémise* fired a broadside at the *Theseus*, and then struck her colours. A boat from the latter immediately proceeded to take possession; but the frigate was discovered to be on fire, and soon afterwards blew up. In the mean time the four French line-of-battle ships, and the two remaining frigates inside of them, kept dropping to leeward; so as, presently, to be almost out of gun-shot of the few British ships that had anchored to attack them.

At about 6 A. M. the *Zealous*, *Goliath*, and *Theseus*, got under way by signal; and soon afterwards the *Zealous*, in running down from the head of the bay, was directed by signal to chase the *Justice* French frigate; which, in compliance with the orders of Rear-admiral Villeneuve, was on her way to the *Bellerophon*, at anchor at the bottom of the bay, and supposed to be on shore, for the purpose of summoning the 74 to surrender. In the mean time the *Goliath* and *Theseus*, accompanied by the *Alexander* and *Leander*, stood towards the *Heureux* and *Mercure*; who, on quitting the line, had first anchored considerably within it, and had then run themselves on shore to the southward of the bay. These ships, after the interchange of a few distant shot, struck their colours; the *Heureux* first, then the *Mercure*. The latter was afterwards taken possession of by the *Alexander*, and the former by one of the other ships. On discovering the object of the *Zealous*, the *Justice* gave up her design upon the *Bellerophon* (who was getting ready to give her a suitable reception), and returned to the cluster of ships from among which she had made sail. The *Zealous* thereupon, by signal from the admiral, bore away to join the *Bellerophon*, and protect her from further molestation.

At about 11 A. M. the absence of the *Goliath*, *Theseus*, and *Alexander*, afforded to the *Généreux* and *Guillaume-Tell*, and the two frigates *Justice* and *Diane*, an opportunity to get under way and make sail to the north-east. The *Timoléon*, being too far to leeward to fetch clear, had run herself on shore, losing her foremast by the shock. The four other ships now hauled close on the larboard tack; and immediately the *Zealous*, who from the course she was steering happened to be the nearest British ship, hauled close on the same tack, with the bold in-

tention of bringing this French 80 and 74 and two heavy frigates to action, and, if possible, of retarding their progress until some of her friends should come to her assistance; or, at all events, in the hope of so crippling one of the French ships, as to disable her at least from working out of the bay. The Zealous weathered the four fugitives within musket-shot, and obliged them to bear away to avoid being raked; but received in return a very destructive fire to her rigging and sails. Through her mainsail alone upwards of 40 round shot had passed; and yet no other loss was sustained by her, than one man, who had been slightly wounded by the *Guerrier*, killed, and one wounded. While the Zealous was endeavouring to get about in time to cut off the rearmost frigate, the former's signal of recal was made; and the French ships stretching on, effected their escape. For his gallantry upon this occasion, Captain Hood received the warm acknowledgments of the commander-in-chief.

Of the 13 French ships of the line, one had perished in the flames, eight had surrendered, and two had escaped; and of the remaining two, one, the *Timoléon*, was on shore with her colours flying, the other, the *Tonnant*, having had her second cable cut by the fire of the *Alexander*, lay about two miles from the *Timoléon*, a mere wreck, but also with her colours up, which were flying on the stump of her mainmast. Things remained in this state until the morning of the following day, the 3d; when the *Theseus* and *Leander* approached, and stationed themselves near the *Tonnant*. All further resistance being utterly hopeless, the latter hauled down her ensign: and, on replacing it with a flag of truce, was taken possession of by a boat from the *Theseus*. The principal part of the crew of the *Timoléon* had, during the preceding night, escaped on shore. The remainder, at about noon on the 3d, set fire to their ship; which, exploding soon afterwards, made the eleventh line-of-battle ship lost to the French by, in their nomenclature, the battle of Aboukir, "*le combat d'Aboukir*," but as the conquerors have named it, the battle of the Nile.

The damages sustained by the British ships were chiefly confined to their masts and rigging. The *Bellerophon* was the only ship entirely dismasted, and the *Majestic* the only one, besides her, that had lost any lower mast. The Defence had lost her fore topmast, and the *Alexander* her mizen topmast, and her fore and main topgallantmasts; and on the 3d, at 6 p. m., the latter's main topmast, from the wounds it had received, fell over the top, as on the same morning, had the main topmast of the *Goliath*. The lower masts, yards, and bowsprits of all the ships that had been engaged, were more or less damaged by shot. The Vanguard, it will be recollected, went into action with a jury foremast. The *Bellerophon*'s hull was in a very shattered state. One of the carronades on her poop was broken to pieces. Seven of the quarterdeck guns were entirely disabled; as were six of the

second, and two of the first or lowerdeck guns; and the greater part of her hammocks were more or less cut. The Vanguard had been struck very heavily by shot on her starboard bow; and the Swiftsure, as she was bearing down to engage, received in her larboard bow, several feet below the water-mark, a shot from the Tonnant, which, in spite of the constant use of the chain-pumps, kept four feet water in the hold from the commencement to the end of the action. The Theseus was also hulled, in more than 70 places; and the Majestic was nearly in as shattered a state as the Bellerophon.

The loss of the British was, in the aggregate, tolerably severe. We have enumerated the loss on board most of the ships. We will now, taking the ships in the order in which they advanced to the attack, give a more detailed account. The Goliath had one master's mate (William Davies), one midshipman (Andrew Brown), 12 seamen, and seven marines killed, one lieutenant (William Wilkinson), two midshipmen (Lawrence Graves and James Payne), her schoolmaster, 28 seamen, and nine marines wounded; the Zealous, one seaman killed, and seven wounded; the Orion, one captain's clerk, 11 seamen, and one marine killed, her captain, the boatswain (Peter Sadler), three midshipmen (Philip Richardson, Charles Miell, and — Lanfesty), nine seamen, and two marines wounded; the Audacious, one seaman killed, one lieutenant (John Jeans), her gunner, 31 seamen, and two marines wounded; the Theseus, five seamen killed, one lieutenant (Richard Hawkins), 24 seamen, and five marines wounded; the Vanguard, her captain of marines (William Faddy), two midshipmen (Thomas Seymour and John George Taylor), 20 seamen, and seven marines killed, the rear-admiral, by a contusion in the head, but not reported, two lieutenants (Nathaniel Vassall and John Miller Adye), the admiral's secretary (John Campbell), the boatswain (Mr. Austin), two midshipmen (James Weatherston and George Antrim), 60 seamen, and eight marines wounded; the Minotaur, one lieutenant (John G. Kirchner), one master's mate (Peter Walters), 18 seamen, and three marines killed, one lieutenant (Thomas Irwin), one lieutenant of marines (John Jewell), her second master (Thomas Forster), one midshipman (Martin Wells), 54 seamen, and six marines wounded; the Defence, three seamen and one marine killed, nine seamen and two marines wounded; the Bellerophon, three lieutenants (Robert Savage Daniel, Philip William Launder, and George Joliffe), one master's mate (Thomas Ellison), 32 seamen, and 13 marines killed, her captain, master (Edward Kirby), captain of marines (John Hopkins), boatswain (Mr. Chapman), one midshipman (Nicholas Bettson), 126 seamen, and 17 marines wounded; the Majestic, her captain, one midshipman (Zebedee Ford), boatswain (Andrew Gilmore), 33 seamen, and 14 marines killed, two midshipmen (Charles Seward and Charles Royle), her captain's clerk (Robert Overton), 124 seamen, and 16 marines wounded; the Swiftsure, seven seamen killed, one midshipman

(William Smith), 19 seamen, and two marines wounded; the Alexander, one lieutenant (John Collins), and 13 seamen killed, her captain, captain of marines (John Creswell), master (William Lawson), two midshipmen (George Bully and Luke Anderson), 48 seamen, and five marines wounded; the Leander, 14 seamen wounded: making a total of 218 killed, and 678 wounded.*

Of the damages sustained by the captured French ships, more details, scanty as they are, have already been given, than are contained in any published account. They may now be summed up by stating, that the Guerrier, Conquérant, Spartiate, Aquilon, and Tonnant, were entirely dismasted, and, in the present state of their hulls (the two first especially), not seaworthy; and the Peuple-Souverain retained but her mizenmast, and the Franklin, her foremast, with their hulls in not much better plight than those of their captive companions. As to the Mercure and Heureux, their principal damages were not from shot, but from unning on shore. These ships still lay with topgallant yards across, and, to all appearance, were as perfect as when the action commenced.

It was owing, probably, to the severe wound which Rear-admiral Nelson had received at the onset of the battle (a splinter struck him a little above his right or darkened eye, causing a piece of flesh to hang over the lid, which was afterwards replaced and sewed up), that no account was taken of the loss sustained by the different captured ships. This is perhaps the only general action, besides that of Valentine's day, in which so important an omission is to be complained of in the official despatch. The London newspapers, although they sometimes

* One more in the wounded than appears in the official account, owing to the exclusion of the rear-admiral's name. The following table shows at one view each ship's tonnage, complement, loss, and, to the best of our power in so difficult a research, first lieutenant present in the action.

Ships.	Tons.	Men and Boys.	Loss.		First Lieutenants.
			K.	W.	
Goliath	1604	584	21	41	George Jardine.
Zealous.....	1627	584	1	7	William Henry Webley.
Orion.....	1646	584	13	29	James Barker.
Audacious	1624	584	1	35	Thomas White.
Theseus	1680	584	5	30	Richard Hawkins.
Vanguard	1609	589	30	76	Edward Galwey.
Minotaur.....	1718	634	23	64	Charles Marsh Schomberg.
Defence.....	1603	584	4	11	Richard Jones.
Bellerophon	1613	584	49	148	Robert Cathcart; <i>sen. surviving.</i>
Majestic	1642	584	50	143	Robert Cuthbert.
Swiftsure.....	1621	584	7	22	John Lev. Waters.
Alexander.....	1621	584	14	58	John Yule.
Leander.....	1052	338	0	14	William Richardson.
Total.....	20660	7401	218	678	

clear up points of this nature, afforded in the present instance, but little information, merely stating that, according to one account, the loss amounted to 2000, and, according to another, to 5000 men. The latter number, being within 225 of a sweeping balance, of "taken, drowned, burnt, and missing," at the foot of a loose statement of the complements of 19 French ships, including the 13 engaged, subjoined to the official letter, may be traced to that as its probable source. The origin of the former number is uncertain; but 2000 appears no unreasonable amount for the killed and wounded on board nine ships, eight of which were so dreadfully shattered as those in question.

Within the first hour of the action, the French commander-in-chief, Vice-admiral Brueys, while standing on the *Orient's* poop, received two wounds, one in the face, and the other in the hand. Towards 8 p. m., as he was descending to the quarterdeck, a shot cut him almost in two. This brave officer then desired not to be carried below, but to be left to die upon deck, exclaiming in a firm voice, "*Un amiral français doit mourir sur son banc de quart.*" He survived only a quarter of an hour. Commodore *Casa-Bianca* fell, badly wounded, soon after the admiral had breathed his last. What other loss the *Orient* sustained by the shot of her opponents we are unable to enumerate, but it is represented to have been tolerably severe in both officers and men. By the melancholy event of the ship's explosion, nearly the whole of the survivors of her crew perished. How the accident happened has not been clearly explained. The French say, that the men, having just done painting the ship's sides, had placed the empty and unused oil-jars and paint-buckets on the poop, preparatory to taking them below; and that the wadding from the English guns fell among and set fire to these jars and buckets. Another account states, that the fire was communicated by some of the combustible missiles, used on board of all or most of the French ships; the chief of which was a sort of port-fire or carcass, that burnt fiercely under, as well as above water. In support of this statement, the French themselves declared that, although they threw bucket after bucket of water upon the spot, they could not extinguish the flames.

The lamentable effects of the accident, however, were but too certain. The French say, that about 70 were saved by the boats of the British ships. Of those, one lieutenant, one commissary, or purser, and nine men, appear to have got on board the *Swiftsure*, two men on board the *Bellerophon*, and 16 on board the *Orion*. The *Alexander* saved some, including Adjutant-general Motard, who, although badly wounded in the leg, managed to swim on board of her. Rear-admiral Ganteaume found means to throw himself into a boat, which carried him on board the *Salamine* brig. From her he reached the fort of Aboukir, and subsequently Alexandria. The *Salamine* afterwards stood out of the bay, and joined the squadron of Rear-admiral Villeneuve.

Commodore Casa-Bianca was not so fortunate. Among the two or three accounts given of this officer's death, that to which the French attach most credit is, that at the time of the explosion he was below having his wound dressed, attended by his son, a boy of 10 years of age.

Of the 10 French ships that were at all engaged, the admiral of one, and the captains of two, were killed, and six of the remaining seven captains, besides Rear-admiral Blanquet, wounded. That the captains of the *Heureux* and *Mercure*, who participated so slightly in the action, should have been wounded at all is extraordinary; but it is still more extraordinary that Captain Trullet, whose ship, the *Guerrier*, was the most shattered of any in the two fleets, should have escaped unhurt. This, on consideration, may be attributed to the position of the *Guerrier*'s principal antagonist, the *Zealous*, whose shot, on that account did the most execution in the forepart of the ship. Of the two French captains that were killed, one underwent dreadful sufferings, and exhibited a correspondent share of heroism, before life finally quitted him. Captain Du Petit-Thouars, of the *Tonnant*, had first both his arms, and then one of his legs shot away; and his dying commands to his crew were, not to surrender the ship. As a memento of this officer's patriotism and bravery, Buonaparte ordered one of the principal streets of Cairo to be named Petit-Thouars, and an armed brig at anchor in the port, *Tonnant*.

Before we proceed further, it may be necessary that we should show, how completely *hors de combat* the *Culloden* was placed by the accident that had befallen her. At 6 h. 40 m. p. m., according to her time, the *Culloden*, having just before hauled up to clear the *Leander*, and sounded in 11 fathoms, struck on the ridge of rocks off the island of Aboukir. At that very moment the three masts of the *Guerrier* were discovered to be down. This is so far of consequence as completely to falsify a statement made and insisted on by the French writers, that the *Culloden* took the ground at 5 h. 15 m. p. m., while leading the British fleet into action. One writer, after stating this, adds the following in a note: "Tous les rapports anglais s'accordent à ne faire échouer le *Culloden* qu'après la nuit close, et à attribuer cet accident à l'obscurité, tandis qu'il n'est pas un seul Français présent au combat d'Aboukir qui n'affirme que ce vaisseau était le premier de l'esadre ennemie, et toucha, comme nous le disons, à cinq heures un quart. Cette circonstance est de peu d'importance; mais elle pourrait donner la mesure de la croyance à accorder aux bulletins des Anglais, et fournir un échantillon du caractère de ce peuple, qui pousse la vanité jusqu'à ne pas vouloir avouer qu'un vaisseau britannique puisse, comme un autre, s'échouer de jour en entrant dans une baie inconnue."*

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome ix., p. 90.

Bestowing no more than a smile upon the writer's clever deductions about "the character of the people," we shall endeavour to explain how this nautical illusion may have happened. It will be recollected that, soon after 5 h. 30 m. p. m. (and which might easily be 5 h. 15 m. by the French time), and just as they had arrived abreast of the shoal, the leading British ships hove to, and many of them changed stations. The ships thus grouped together, as may be seen by any good chart of the spot, conceal the point of the shoal from the French fleet. The British fleet stands on in a line; and, as the shoal opens in the rear of that line, a ship is discovered sticking on it. To us the mistake appears a very natural one; but how are we to convince the French writers that we are right, and that they are wrong, when they can cast in our teeth, from a respectable English publication, written too by an admiral, the following sentence: "The wind was perfectly fair, but unfortunately, in rounding the reef, the Culloden, the leading ship, ran aground, and could not be got at all into action?"*

Let us return to the Culloden. As quickly as possible after she struck, a stream anchor and cable were placed in the launch, and dropped at about a cable's length from the stern, in 11 fathoms' water. The Mutine now came and anchored within 500 yards of the Culloden, in six fathoms, in order to afford every assistance in her power. To do this more effectually Captain Hardy ran out two cables, firmly clinched together; and, joining a third, veered away until the brig was near the Culloden. The Mutine then let go another anchor, and, slipping the third cable, passed the end of it on board the 74. The swell, which had greatly increased, made the Culloden strike so hard, that her cable parted, her rudder was knocked off and sank alongside, and the ship made three feet of water an hour. However, on the 2d, before 2 A. M., after striking several times very heavily, the Culloden hauled herself off the rocks by the Mutine's cable, and then made seven feet water, or 120 tons, an hour. A sail was afterwards thrummed, and put under the ship's bottom; and on the morning of the 3d a spare topmast was converted into, and hung as, a temporary rudder.

Having thus made it clear that, for any part she took in the battle of the 1st and 2d of August, the Culloden might as well have been at anchor in Naples bay, as on shore at one extremity of Aboukir bay, we shall now present a general view of the force of the contending parties. Of the 13 ships that remain, after excluding the Culloden, one was not only no line-of-battle ship, but a ship decidedly unable to lay alongside of any ship in the opposite line; yet, as it would be paying a very poor com-

* Ekins's Naval Battles, p. 237.

pliment to the *Leander's* meritorious exertions, to consider that they were wholly without effect, we shall readily include her as one of the contending ships. Hence the British had twelve 74-gun ships and one 50; the French one 120, three 80, and nine 74-gun ships: the latter had, also, four frigates, two brigs, and some bomb-vessels and gun-boats; the former, but one solitary brig. The armaments of French and English ships of the line have been so often adverted to in these pages, that there will be no occasion to analyze the force of every ship of the two fleets. It may suffice to state, that a French 120-gun ship is fully equal to two British 74s, three French 80s to five of them, especially of the 18-pounder class, of which all that were present in this battle consisted, and nine French 74s to at least ten of the English 74s last described. With respect to the crews of the French ships, it has been stated, that each ship, when the action commenced, had a water-party on shore; but the same accounts that furnish this fact, supply us with another, namely, that a part of the absent men got back to their ships, and that the four frigates, whose united crews were at least 1300 men, had received orders to send a portion of their people to the line-of-battle ships. Moreover the head-money certificates, authenticated in the usual way, give the French ships their established complements; and among the prisoners were actually found several masters, pilots, and others, belonging to the numerous fleet of transports at anchor near Rosetta and in the harbour of Alexandria. On the other hand, none of the British ships were over manned; and some, we believe, had not their complements on board; what is extraordinary, too, the worst manned ship in the British fleet was that commanded by the admiral. The *Vanguard* had only been commissioned in the preceding December; and her ship's company, although instinctively brave, were new and inexperienced.

Even the presence of the *Culloden* in the action would still have left a preponderance, if not in number of ships, in number of men and in broadside weight of metal. With the *Culloden* excluded, the superiority of force was more than requisite to rank the victory of the Nile among the most brilliant of those achievements so familiar to the British navy. If any allowance is called for, because the French ships were conquered in detail, and that by a decided superiority of force, we may answer, that the same occurs in most general actions; that, in the present instance, the danger of a cross-fire, from which several of the British ships undoubtedly suffered, as well as that of grounding on the inner shoal, not an officer or man in the British fleet having ever before been in the bay and the only chart in the fleet being a roughly sketched one which the *Swiftsure* had recently taken out of a prize, were nearly equivalent to the advantage of doubling the van of the line. Moreover, had the six French rear-ships, the moment they saw the manœuvre that was about to be practised

on their friends in the van, got under way and stood out, they would have found full employment for the five or six British ships that had not yet got into action: they would, undoubtedly, have captured the *Culloden*, and prevented the *Alexander* and *Swiftsure* from entering the bay. Had those six French ships weighed at any time before 7 P.M., they might, with the wind as it then was, have made a good stretch out of the bay, and, by tacking when the wind, as it soon afterwards did, shifted to north, might have stood for the van of their line with their yards nearly square.

Undoubtedly the sad accident which befel the three-decker gave a decided turn to the action; but it should be recollected that the *Orient*, before she exploded, had, according to the French accounts, sustained a very serious loss in officers and men; that five French ships had already struck; and that two others, the *Franklin* and *Tonnant*, were nearly in a defenceless state. It has been stated, we are aware, that the *Orient* herself hauled down her colours before she blew up;* but no such occurrence happened. The *Orient's* flag at the main was, by several of the British ships, seen in its place when the masts were thrown into the air; and, until that flag was struck, there could have been no surrender. Moreover the men fired from the ship's lowerdeck battery, until they were driven from their quarters by the flames, and until some time after the *Swiftsure* and *Alexander* had ceased firing, to prepare for the explosion that ensued.

With respect to the behaviour of the French, nothing could be more gallant than the defence made by each of the six van-ships, by the *Orient* in the centre, and by the *Tonnant* in the rear. The *Heureux* and *Mercure* appear to have been rather precipitate in running themselves on shore; but the flaming body, that lay ready to explode ahead and to windward of them, justified them in quitting the line. Nor was it the least happy circumstance attending the battle of the Nile, that there was no complaint of individual misconduct to diminish the lustre of the victory. The French writers, as usual, multiplied the English ships in number and force; but the sober-minded part of the community knew well the near equality of the two fleets, and appreciated the unfortunate result of the battle as fairly as could be expected, where so many fine ships, and so much national glory, had been lost.

We will now hasten to acquit ourselves of the unpleasant task of noticing a few inaccuracies, that have crept into some English and foreign accounts of this celebrated action. One writer, after

* Clarke and McArthur's *Life of Nelson*, p. 81, and at p. 93, is the following paragraph: "He (Sir Horatio) also informed Mr. Wyndham, that *l'Orient* certainly struck her colours, and had not fired a shot for a quarter of an hour before she took fire."

stating that the French fleet "was moored in a compact line,"* tells his readers, that the line occupied "an extent of about two miles and a half, leaving a space of two hundred and fifty or three hundred yards from one ship to the other. This distance, proceeds the writer, "was too great." Assuredly it was too great, and so was the real distance, 160 yards: for that very reason, too, the French fleet was not "moored in a compact line." The word "moored" does not seem to be appropriately used. "At single anchor, with springs on their cables," is an expression that accords more with the fact. Unfortunately, the writer who uses this expression is the same that committed the mistake about the Culloden; the same, in whose work appears the following piece of extraordinary information: "Lord Nelson remarked, at a subsequent period, that he had committed one great error; namely, by not having directed the ships to heave *close* to their anchors, and then to have *cut* (the cables) instead of weighing them; as in stowing their anchors, the navigation being so intricate and shallow, two of his ships grounded."† This, to be sure, is contained in a "note," but that note actually forms a part of the text: indeed, the work is almost wholly made up of "NOTES," "REMARKS," and "OBSERVATIONS." Had the attack upon Copenhagen by Lord Nelson in the year 1801 been one of the naval battles noticed by the writer, it is probable he would have found where it was that the rear-admiral had to complain, that two of his ships grounded, for the want of the precaution of cutting, instead of weighing, their anchors.

A French writer, because he is displeased with a highly exaggerated comparison between the force of the Bellerophon and that of the Orient, contained in "Clarke and M'Arthur's Life of Nelson," begins his refutation of the nonsense in this very liberal manner: "Les Anglais, celui peut-être de tous les peuples de l'Europe qui altère le plus la vérité dans ses bulletins, affirmèrent," &c.‡ It is very unfair, in any case, to consider individual opinion as the sentiments of a nation; but with respect to the work, in which the angry Frenchman has discovered the proofs of this national propensity to lying (for that is what his charge amounts to), we can assure him that, in this country, where its merits are of course best known, "Clarke and M'Arthur's Life of Nelson" is not of the slightest authority. The same French writer, who is so severe in his strictures upon the English, admits that Captain Standalet of the Artémise, in setting fire to his frigate after having hauled down his colours to the Theseus, acted "au mépris des lois de la guerre," but adds, "Les Anglais se sont vivement récriés contre la conduite du capitaine de l'Artémise, oubliant que le capitaine du Bellerophon en avait tenu

* Brenton, vol. ii., p. 305.

† Ekins, p. 243.

‡ Victoires et Conquêtes, tome ix., p. 94.

une à peu près semblable.”* Looking back to discover the nature of this charge against Captain Darby, we find that the *Bellerophon* “struck to the Tonnant;” that is, the cries and noise of the *Bellerophon*’s people, when her masts were falling on deck and crushing them by scores, were mistaken for the cry of surrender. Nay, so delicate were the ears of the Frenchmen, that they could distinguish the cries of the officers from those of the men. “Son équipage,” says the account, “et principalement les officiers, jetèrent de grands cris, pour faire connaître qu’il était rendu.”† From our inquiries we believe we can assert (and, if we knew the fact to be otherwise, we should be the last to conceal it), that no surrender took place, or was even contemplated. The crew of the *Bellerophon* were neither the least brave, nor, as was pretty notorious, the least noisy, of any in the British fleet: it is not unlikely, therefore, that when the masts were tumbling about their heads, the men hallooed, and roared, and uttered “de grands cris,” but not any cries, we can vouch, that were meant to signify that they surrendered.

Leaving to heads better versed in state affairs to discuss the political consequences, far and near, that attended the decisive victory which Rear-admiral Nelson and his fleet had gained, we shall merely transcribe from Mr. Williams’s book a translated passage, purporting to be part of a letter from a very intelligent French officer, of some celebrity, M. E. Poussielgue, comptroller of the expenses of the army, and administrator-general of the finances, in Egypt; and which letter, among many others, was intercepted by the British fleet in the Mediterranean. M. Poussielgue says: “But the fatal engagement of Aboukir ruined all our hopes; it prevented us from receiving the remainder of the forces which were destined for us; it left the field free for the English to persuade the Porte to declare war against us; it rekindled that which was hardly extinguished with the Emperor of Germany; it opened the Mediterranean to the Russians, and planted them on our frontiers; it occasioned the loss of Italy, and the invaluable possessions in the Adriatic, which we owed to the successful campaigns of Buonaparte; and, finally, it at once rendered abortive all our projects, since it was no longer possible for us to dream of giving the English any uneasiness in India: add to this, that the people of Egypt, whom we wished to consider as friends and allies, instantaneously became our enemies; and, entirely surrounded as we were by the Turks, we found ourselves engaged in a most difficult defensive war, without a glimpse of the slightest future advantage to be derived from it.”

On the 5th the *Leander*, having on board Captain Berry of the *Vanguard*, with despatches for Earl St.-Vincent off Cadiz, quitted the squadron; but, about 12 days afterwards, was fallen

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome ix., p. 101.

† *Ibid.*, p. 95.

in with and captured by the French 74-gun ship *Généreux*, after an action highly honourable to the British 50-gun ship, and the full details of which will appear under the next head of the work.

The ships of the British squadron at anchor in Aboukir bay now set about repairing their damages, with all possible speed. Every exertion was also used to place the captured ships in a state to undertake the voyage to England with safety. The prisoners taken in them were sent on shore in a cartel, upon the usual terms; but Buonaparte, to show how he respected treaties, formed the men, soon after they landed, into a battalion, which he named the nautic legion, and gave the command of it to the late second captain of the *Franklin*, Jules-François Martinencq. On the 8th the island of Aboukir was taken possession of, and the two mortars, with the two brass 12-pounders, were brought off. The remainder of the guns, with the carriages of the whole, and the platform on which they had been mounted, were destroyed. The island was also newly, and far from inappropriately named, Nelson's island.

On the 10th Sir Horatio, aware of the designs of the French, in case of succeeding at Egypt, to attack the British East India possessions, despatched, over land to Bombay, with the intelligence of the victory, Lieutenant Thomas Duval, of the *Zealous*, an officer selected by Captain Hood.* On the 12th, in the evening, the British 36-gun frigate *Emerald*, Captain Thomas Moutray Waller, and 32-gun frigate *Alcmène*, Captain George Hope, with the *Bonne-Citoyenne* sloop of war, hove in sight in the offing; but, on being chased by the *Swiftsure*, stood off. On the next day, however, the frigates got over their alarm, and joined the squadron. On the 13th the 16-gun brig-sloop *Mutine*, Captain the Honourable Thomas Bladen Capel, who had succeeded Captain Hardy, on the latter's promotion to the *Vanguard*, and was now the bearer of the rear-admiral's duplicate despatches, sailed for Naples.

On the morning of the 14th, after an incredible deal of labour in refitting the ships, the *Orion*, *Bellerophon*, *Minotaur*, *Defence*, *Audacious*, *Theseus*, and *Majestic*, accompanied by the *Franklin*, *Tonnant*, *Aquilon*, *Conquérant*, *Peuple-Souverain* (the two latter scarcely in a seaworthy state), and *Spartiate*, under the orders of Captain Sir James Saumarez, got under way and stood out of the road. The prizes, being rigged with jury-masts and very weakly manned, could hardly work out of the bay. At length they reached the mouth of it; and, after lying at single anchor for the night, again weighed, and proceeded on their voyage. On the 16th the *Heureux*, and on the 18th the *Mer-cure* and *Guerrier*, being all, particularly the last, in too bad a state to be refitted, were burnt, as they lay, the first two aground

* For a brief account of this officer's journey, see Appendix, No. 14.

on the beach, and the last at anchor in the road, of Aboukir bay, the scene of their discomfiture. On the 19th Rear-admiral Nelson, in the Vanguard, accompanied by the Culloden and Alexander, sailed for Naples; leaving Captain Hood with the Zealous, Goliath, Swiftsure, Seahorse (who had joined on the 17th), Emerald, Alcène, and Bonne-Citoyenne, to cruise off the port of Alexandria.

The news of the loss of his fleet reached Buonaparte on the 14th of August, when on his way from Salahieh to Cairo, in a despatch from Rear-admiral Ganteaume, delivered by an aide-de-camp of General Kléber's. While reading the despatch, Buonaparte did not betray in his countenance the least trait of the extraordinary sensations which the account must necessarily have caused in his mind. He called the messenger to him, and demanded, in a loud voice, to hear the details. As soon as they were related, Buonaparte said to the aide-de-camp with the utmost sang-froid, "We have no longer a fleet: well, we must either remain in this country, or quit it as great as the Ancients."* The power which this extraordinary man possessed of disguising his feelings was as remarkable, as the facility with which he could turn a disastrous event to his advantage. Great as he was in some matters, Buonaparte could also be mean, where, by being mean, an object was to be attained. Wishing, for some inexplicable reason, to inculcate the brave admiral who was second in command at Aboukir, Buonaparte, on the 24th of August, issued a general order, in which were these words: "The Franklin struck her flag without being dismasted or having sustained any damage."† Rear-admiral Ganteaume, as soon as he discovered this, hastened to defend the character of his brother officer, and pleaded his cause with so much effect, that Buonaparte, yielding a little, issued a second order, stating that Rear-admiral Blanquet had been wounded in the action; but which still left uncontradicted the false assertion, that the Franklin surrendered when in a perfect state. At the instance of Vice-admiral Bruix, the minister of marine, justice was at length done by the directory to the character of that brave officer; but we cannot discover that Rear-admiral Blanquet was ever afterwards employed.

The crippled state of the Nile prizes made it the middle of September, ere they and their escort arrived at Gibraltar. The Peuple-Souverain was in too bad a state to proceed further, and was therefore, under the name of Guerrier, converted into a guard-ship, the only service in which she could be useful. The five remaining prizes, after obtaining a tolerable repair, set sail for England, and arrived in safety at Plymouth. The British

* "Nous n'avons plus de flotte: eh bien, il faut rester en ces contrées, ou en sortir grands comme les Anciens."—*Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome ix., p. 73.

† "Le Franklin a amené son pavillon sans être démâté et sans avoir reçu aucune avarie."—*Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome ix., p. 107.

government, in order that the captors might not suffer for the prowess they had displayed in riddling the hulls of the captured ships, paid for each of the three destroyed 74s, the *Guerrier*, *Heureux*, and *Mercure*, the sum of 20,000*l.*; which was as much as the least serviceable of the remaining three 74s had been valued at. Of these, the *Conquérant* was about 50 years old, and of no greater tonnage than the *Theseus*, the largest ship, except the *Minotaur*, in the fleet that took her. The *Aquilon*, or, as newly named, *Aboukir*, was built at Lorient in the year 1793, measured 1869 tons, and, but for her shattered state, would have been a useful ship: as it was, both of these ships remained in port until they were broken up. Not so with the remaining 74, the *Spartiate*, nor with the 80-gun ships *Tonnant* and *Franklin*. All three of these ships were built at Toulon; owing to which on account of the superior durability of the Adriatic oak,* their value became greatly enhanced. The *Tonnant* was launched in 1791-2, the *Franklin*, in the spring of 1797, and the *Spartiate*, as recently as the commencement of the year in which she was captured. The following are the principal dimensions of the three ships:

	Length of lower deck.		Breadth extreme.		Depth of hold.		Tons.
	ft.	in.	ft.	in.	ft.	in.	
<i>Tonnant</i>	194	2	51	9 $\frac{1}{4}$	23	3	2281
<i>Franklin</i>	193	10	51	6 $\frac{3}{4}$	23	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	2257
<i>Spartiate</i>	182	7	49	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	21	7	1949

The two 80s were of about the same dimensions as the *Sans-Pareil*, taken by Lord Howe; but the *Franklin*, in point of materials, workmanship, and qualifications, was considered to be the finest two-decked ship in the world. In order to show what an immensely powerful ship a French 80 is, we here couple, with the force of the *Franklin*, that of a British three-decker of the 98-gun class:

	British 98.		French 80.		Weight of each of Franklin's guns.		
	No.	Pdrs.	No.	Pdrs.	Cwt.	qrs.	lbs.
First or lower deck,.....	28 long	32	30 long	36 iron	73	2	18
Second deck	30 "	18	32 "	36 brass	51	0	14
Third deck.....	30 "	12	2 "	24 brass			
Quarterdeck	8 "	12	12 "	12 iron	33	1	16
Forecastle "	2 "	12	2 "	12 brass			
Poop	6 carrs.	18	6 carrs.	36 brass			
	104		92				
Broadside-guns { No.	52.....	46					
	lbs. 1012.....	1287					

* A very intelligent writer, when remarking on the properties and qualities

The Franklin had the ports for, and subsequently mounted, four more guns on her quarterdeck. Without these even, is it not clear that a French 80-gun ship is superior in force to a British 98? This only shows, how necessary it is not to be led away by nominal distinctions.

The name of the Franklin was changed by her new masters to Canopus, that being the ancient name of Eboukhor, or Aboukir, a small town of Lower Egypt, near to the bay in which the battle had been fought. This fine ship still graces the lists of the British navy, not only in her proper self, but in nine noble counterparts, ships that will never be out of vogue while a navy is worth preserving.

We will now give a brief account of the principal honours that were awarded to the conquerors in the battle of the Nile, both by their own country, and by such foreign nations as derived, or considered that they derived, a benefit from the victory. Owing to the capture of the *Leander*, it was not until the arrival of Captain Capel, on the morning of the 2d of October that the British admiralty became acquainted with the result of the action of the 1st of August. Until that same 2d of October, the whole country rang with complaints against Nelson for his "tardiness;" but, the moment the news was promulgated, the English nation thought they could not do enough to make amends for the wrongs they had inflicted on so bright a gem of their favourite service.

On the 6th of October Sir Horatio was created a peer of Great Britain, by the title of Baron Nelson of the Nile, and of Burnham Thorpe in the county of Norfolk; and, on the 20th of November, when the Parliament met, the king thus expressed himself on the subject of the battle: "The unexampled series of our naval triumphs has received fresh splendour from the memorable and decisive action, in which a detachment of my fleet, under the command of Rear-admiral Lord Nelson, attacked, and almost totally destroyed, a superior force of the enemy, strengthened by every advantage of situation. By this great and brilliant victory, an enterprise, of which the injustice, perfidy, and extravagance had fixed the attention of the world, and which was peculiarly directed against some of the most valuable interests of the British empire, has, in the first instance, been turned to the confusion of its authors: and the blow, thus given to the power and influence of France, has afforded an opening, which, if improved by suitable exertions on the part of other powers, may lead to the general deliverance of Europe."

of timber, says, "The oaks of the southern parts of Europe are preferable to any others; those of Provence, the Italian and Turkish sides of the Adriatic sea, have long been esteemed for their superior quality: with these, aided by supplies from Corsica, the ships at Toulon have been built, which are considered to exceed in durability all others constructed of oak."—*Knowles on preserving the Navy*, p. 2.

This was followed by a pension of 2000*l.* per annum upon the rear-admiral and his two next heirs male, from the parliament of England, and of 1000*l.* from that of Ireland; also by a unanimous vote of thanks from both those parliaments. Gold medals were presented to Lord Nelson and his captains; and the first lieutenants of all the ships engaged were promoted to commanders. The word "engaged" striking Lord Nelson as likely to lead to a piece of injustice towards the first lieutenant of the Culloden, the rear-admiral, in a letter to Earl St.-Vincent, expresses himself on the subject thus: "I sincerely hope this is not intended to exclude the first lieutenant of the Culloden; for heaven's sake, for my sake, if it be so, get it altered." The word was, however, retained, if only to prevent any unengaged ship, under different circumstances, from making a precedent of the case; but Lord Spencer directed Earl St.-Vincent to promote the Culloden's lieutenant: which, we believe, was forthwith done; but we cannot speak with certainty, not having been able to procure the officer's name.

Strictly speaking, too, only the captains that had been "engaged" were to have medals; but the king himself expressly authorized Lord Spencer to present one to Captain Troubridge, "for his services both before and since, and for the great and wonderful exertions he made at the time of the action, in saving and getting off his ship." Lord Nelson's opinion of this officer may be summed up in his own energetic words, when writing to Earl St.-Vincent: "The eminent services of our friend deserve the very highest rewards. I have experienced the ability and activity of his mind and body. It was Troubridge who equipped the squadron so soon at Syracuse: it was Troubridge who exerted himself for me after the action: it was Troubridge who saved the Culloden, when none that I know in the service would have attempted it: it is Troubridge whom I have left as myself at Naples; he is, as a friend and as an officer, a *nonpareil*."*

The East India company, with a proper sense of the benefit they derived from the Nile victory, made a present to Lord Nelson of 10,000*l.*; and the cities of London and Liverpool, and other cities and corporate bodies, took the opportunity of testifying their approbation of the rear-admiral's conduct. Foreign countries, also, were not slow in paying their tribute of respect to the conqueror. The grand signior presented Lord Nelson with a diamond aigrette (*chelengh*), and a sable fur with broad sleeves; also with 2000 sequins, to be distributed among the wounded of his crew. The Ottoman Porte instituted a new order, that of the Crescent; and made the English rear-admiral the first knight-companion of it. The mother of the grand signior sent Lord Nelson a rose, set with diamonds of great value; and many other were the presents and compliments which the rear-

* Clarke and M'Arthur's Life of Nelson, vol. ii., p. 119.

admiral received from foreign potentates, as tokens of their respect for his talents and bravery.

Our attention is again called to the Mediterranean. While passing Malta, on his way to Gibraltar with the Nile prizes, Sir James Saumarez fell in with the following Portuguese squadron, under the Marquess de Niza :

Gun-ship			
	Principe-Réal	{	Rear-admiral the Marquess de Niza.
74	Rainha-de-Portugal	{	Captain Puyssigur.
	San-Sebastian	"	Stone.
	Alphonso-Albuquerque...	"	Mitchell.
64	Lion (English)	"	Campbell.
<i>Fires.</i>	Incendiary (ditto)	"	Manley Dixon.
<i>Brig.</i>	Falcao (Portuguese)	"	George Barker.
		"	Duncan.

This squadron, since the early part of July, had been detached by Earl St.-Vincent from off Cadiz, as a reinforcement to Rear-admiral Nelson, but, fortunately for the fame of the latter and his companions in arms, was unable to effect its junction in time to participate in the Nile victory.

Being detained off the island of Malta by light airs and calms, Sir James was waited upon by a deputation of the principal inhabitants, to solicit for a supply of arms and ammunition. The Maltese, at the same time, informed the British commodore that the French garrison at Valetta were driven to great distress, and that there was good reason for believing that the appearance of the English squadron would induce the French to surrender, if they were formally summoned. Accordingly, having obtained the concurrence of the Marquess de Niza, Sir James Saumarez, on the 25th of September, sent in a flag of truce, with a proposal couched in the usual terms. After three hours' deliberation, the French general, Vaubois, returned the following answer: "Vous avez, sans doute, oublié que des Français sont dans la place. Le sort des habitans ne vous regarde point. Quant à votre sommation, les soldats français ne sont point habitués à ce style."

The nature of the service upon which he had been ordered, left Sir James no alternative but to take advantage of the breeze which had just sprung up, and proceed on to his destination. Previously, however, to his final departure, Sir James furnished the islanders with about 1200 muskets, and a suitable quantity of ammunition, taken out of the captured ships; and to this seasonable supply the success that afterwards attended the Maltese, in the efforts they made to recover their liberty, was mainly attributable.

Lord Nelson, soon after his arrival at Naples, detached Captain Alexander John Ball, with his own ship the *Alexander*, and the *Culloden* and *Colossus* 74s, the latter commanded by Captain George Murray, for the purpose of co-operating with

the Marquess de Niza in the blockade of Malta. The effective commencement of this service may be dated from the 12th of October; on which day the French force in the island, and the whole of which had been obliged to retire within the walls of the new city of Valetta, consisted of about 3000 soldiers and sailors, the latter under the command of Rear-admiral Decrès, and of 100 Maltese, the only portion of the inhabitants who would take up arms for their invaders. In the harbour of Valetta, lay the French 80-gun ship *Guillaume-Tell*, and 40-gun frigates *Diane* and *Justice*; also the two ex-Maltese 64s, *Athénien* and *Dégo*, and 36-gun frigate *Carthagénaise*, the whole under the command of Rear-admiral Villeneuve. The *Généreux*, the other French line-of-battle ship which had escaped with the *Guillaume-Tell* from the battle of the Nile, was at Corfu, in company with her prize, the 50-gun ship *Leander*.

About 10,000 of the Maltese were in arms against the French, and occupied, as their head-quarters, the old city of Valetta, on the walls of which the Neapolitan colours were flying. The Maltese patriots possessed 23 pieces of cannon, of which 12 were mounted; they had, also, two armed galleys and four gun-boats. Several skirmishes had taken place between the French and the inhabitants, but the former were too strongly posted to be subdued.

On the 24th of October Lord Nelson, with the *Vanguard* and *Minotaur*, joined Captain Ball and the Marquess de Niza; and, on the 28th, the commandant of the French troops, 217 in number, in the castle of Goza, the neighbouring island to Malta, signed a capitulation, which Captain Ball had previously negotiated, and Lord Nelson now approved. Captain Creswell, of the *Alexander's* marines, immediately took possession of the castle, and the British colours were hoisted upon the walls. On the following day, the 29th, the place was delivered up in form to the deputies of the island; the colours of the Sicilian king were substituted for the British, and his majesty acknowledged as the lawful sovereign. The island of Goza contained about 16,000 inhabitants. In the castle were found 24 pieces of ordnance, consisting of four 6, two 12, and eighteen 18 pounders, all good; also 50 barrels of powder, shot in abundance, and 3200 sacks of corn, an article of great value in the then distressed state of the inhabitants.

Although it comports as little with our taste, as with our talents, to follow the French armies in their overthrow of states and countries, we must dip a little into the military occurrences of the latter part of the present year, in order to render the more intelligible some details of coast operations, necessary to be given before we take our final leave of the Mediterranean sea.

Encouraged by the success of Lord Nelson at the battle of

the Nile, the two weak monarchs, Charles-Emanuel of Sardinia, and Ferdinand IV. of Naples, began bestirring themselves to chase away republicanism from the vicinity of their respective kingdoms. The first hostile movement on the part of Charles Emanuel was the signal for the French to enter Turin. This they did on the 9th of December, and in three days made themselves masters of the whole of Piedmont. In a day or two afterwards the dethroned king, by the permission of the French General Jonbert, retired with his family from his late Piedmontaise dominions, and on the 20th of December arrived at Florence on his way to Sardinia.

King Ferdinand began his hostile demonstrations by sending General Mack with a large army to drive the French General Championnet out of Rome. This was accomplished, and on the 29th of November Ferdinand entered Rome in triumph. His Majesty's stay in that far-famed city was, however, of short duration. On the 15th of December the French repossessed themselves of Rome, and, after destroying the fortifications in and around the city, marched for Naples. In a few days afterwards General Championnet possessed himself of the strong fortresses of Pescara. Aware that the city of Naples would soon share the same fate, King Ferdinand, with the whole of the royal family, and their attendants and valuables, embarked, on the 21st of December, on board Lord Nelson's ship, the *Vanguard*, and, in five days afterwards, arrived at Palermo in Sicily.

It has already been stated that General Buonaparte, when in the summer of 1797 he dissolved the Venetian Republic, possessed himself, on behalf of the French Republic, of several of the islands late belonging to Venice in the Adriatic. These were Corfu, Paxu, Ste.-Maura, Theaki, Cephalonia, Zante, and Cerigo. To these islands were attached, as dependencies on the neighbouring continent, the fortresses of Butrinto, Parga, Preveza, and Vonizza. Early in the month of September intelligence reached General Chabot, who had succeeded General Gentili in the chief command of these islands, that a combined Turkish and Russian fleet was waiting in the Dardanelles for a fair wind, to enter the Mediterranean, and commence hostilities against the French.

By the early part of October a powerful army of Turks and Albanians, under Ali-Pacha and his son Mouktar, had swept away the French from all the Ionian dependencies in Albania; and on the 6th of the month the Turco-Russian fleet, composed of 10 Russian sail of the line, four frigates, and several corvettes and brigs, under Vice-admiral Ouchakow, and of about 30 Turkish vessels, ships of the line, caravellas, corvettes, and brigs, under the orders of Cadir-Bey, appeared off the island of Cerigo. The Turkish division had on board about 8000 troops, but the Russian division very few. By the 10th of October the com-

bined Turks and Russians had possessed themselves, with very little difficulty, the garrisons being weak and the principal inhabitants in their favour, of all the islands except Corfu. The number of killed, wounded, and prisoners of the French, at these islands and on the main land, was computed at 1500.

The time occupied by the enemy's fleet in reducing the other islands had enabled General Chabot to make the best dispositions in his power for defending Corfu. His garrison amounted to only 1500 infantry, and about 300 artillerymen. The naval force in the port consisted of the 74-gun ship *Généreux*, Captain Le Joille, the 50-gun ship *Leander* (but not in a state to be very useful), 28-gun frigate *Brune*, Captain Gabriel Denieport, a bomb-vessel, a brig, and four armed galleys. On the 20th the whole of the combined fleet came to an anchor in the Channel of Corfu, and in the course of a few days disembarked their troops. These commenced erecting batteries, and, when at length they were completed, began a cannonade upon the fortifications around the city. The tardy manner in which the besiegers proceeded in their operations, coupled with the skilful manner in which the French general conducted his defence, left the island still unsubdued at the close of the year. In the mean while the *Généreux* had sailed for Ancona, and the three ex-Venetian 64s, *Stengel*, *La Harpe*, and *Beyrard*, accompanied by some transports, had arrived off the small island of *Faro*, with a reinforcement of 3000 men from Ancona, intended for Corfu; but, finding how affairs in that island were likely to terminate, the commodore of the squadron steered in another direction.

The French naval force in Alexandria, off which port Captain Samuel Hood, with the three 74-gun ships the *Zealous*, *Goliath*, and *Swiftsure*, and frigates *Seahorse*, *Emerald*, and *Alcmène*, was stationed, consisted of the ex-Venetian 64-gun ships *Causse* and *Dubois*, French 38-gun frigate *Junon*, and 36-gun frigates *Alceste* and *Courageuse*, and ex-Venetian 38-gun frigates *Carrère* and *Muiron*, and 32-gun frigates *Leoben*, *Mantone*, and *Montenotte*, four brig-corvettes, and nine gun-boats, manned on the 26th of August, as officially reported in one of Rear-admiral Ganteaume's intercepted despatches, with 4948 officers and seamen; the whole under the command of Rear-admiral Ganteaume, and subsequently of Commodore Dumanoir-le-Pelley.

It will be recollected, that the above-mentioned ships, although they were armed en flûte on leaving Toulon with the expedition, brought out, and were expressly directed to equip themselves with, their full number of guns. This accounts for their crews being so numerous. The *Causse*, for instance, appears by her muster-roll to have had 608 men, the *Junon* 368, and the *Courageuse* 334. Even the transports could muster among them as many as 3017 officers and men. Exclusive of the force stationed at Alexandria, there were 15 heavy gun-vessels, under commo-

dore Perrée, upon the river Nile, following the motions of the army.

On the 22d of August the 32-gun frigate *Alcmène*, Captain George Hope, cruising off Alexandria, captured the French gun-boat *Légère*, charged with despatches for General Buonaparte, but which the commanding officer of the vessel threw overboard just as the *Alcmène* was approaching her. This act was not unperceived by two seamen of the frigate, John Taylor and James Harding; who, at the risk of their lives, the ship then going between five and six knots through the water, dashed overboard and saved the whole of them. Each of these brave fellows was afterwards rewarded by the city of London, with a pension of twenty pounds per annum.

On the 25th of August, at 1 A. M., Captain Foley, of the *Goliath*, despatched the boats of that ship, under the orders of Lieutenant William Debusk, to attack a French armed ketch, which was moored under the guns of the castle of Aboukir. The boats were soon alongside, and a spirited scuffle ensued. Lieutenant Debusk, for some time, fought hand to hand with the French commanding officer. At length after an obstinate resistance of 15 minutes, the French national armed ketch *Torride*, mounting three long 18-pounders and four swivels, with a complement of 70 men, surrendered. Her commander, Lieutenant de vaisseau Martin Bedar, and 10 of his men were badly wounded. The loss on the part of the British amounted to two wounded, including Lieutenant Debusk. The *Torride* may serve for a specimen of the description of gun-boat attached to the French fleet at the battle of the Nile. Ten or 12 such vessels, in a calm, would give very serious annoyance to a line-of-battle ship.

On the 2d of September, while Captain Hood with his squadron was cruising off Alexandria, a cutter made her appearance, standing towards the land. The *Swiftsure* and *Emerald* fired several shot at her, but the cutter persisted in not bringing to, and at length ran aground a little to the westward of the tower of Marabou. The boats were instantly despatched to bring her off; but, in the mean time, the crew of the cutter had made good their landing, and the cutter herself was shortly afterwards beaten to pieces by the high surf. The shore at this time presented, as far as the eye could reach, nothing but barren, uncultivated sands: very shortly, however, several Arabs were seen advancing, some on horseback, others on foot. The French, who had quitted the cutter, now perceived their mistake; but for the fate of nearly the whole of them, the discovery came too late. The British in the boats pulled lustily towards the shore in the hope of saving their unfortunate enemy, but, on account of the breakers, could not effect a landing in safety. A midshipman of the *Emerald*, Francis William Fane, with a noble spirit of humanity, threw himself into the water, and swam through a

high surf to the shore; pushing before him an empty barrel or keg, to which a rope had been affixed. By this means the cutter's commanding officer, Enseigne de vaisseau Blaise Gaudran, and four of his seamen were saved. It now appeared that the cutter was the *Anémone*, of four guns and 60 men, from Malta in six days, and Toulon since the 17th of July; having on board Adjutant-general Camin, and Captain Valette, aide-de-camp to General Buonaparte, also a courier with despatches, and a small detachment of soldiers.

The general, perceiving no possibility of escape from the British boats, had ordered M. Gaudran to run the cutter on shore; but the latter represented the danger to his vessel and those on board, from the high surf, and particularly to all who landed, from the numerous hordes of wild Arabs that infested the coast. The general said he would cut his way through them to Alexandria, which was not more than two or three leagues off. No sooner, however, did the French land, than they perceived the Bedouins, who, till this time, had concealed themselves behind the numerous sand-hills near the spot. Terror and dismay now seized on the general and the unfortunate victims of his rash resolve; nor could the British behold their distress without commiseration, although the French had not only, by refusing to surrender, brought it on themselves, but had actually fired on the British boats long after all hopes of escape were at an end.

A melancholy spectacle soon forced itself upon the British in the boats. The French officers and men were unresistingly stripped, and many of them murdered in cold blood, without any apparent cause. An Arab, on horseback, unslung his carbine, and presenting it at the general, who, with the aide-de-camp, was on his knees entreating for mercy, drew the trigger, but the piece did not go off. The Arab immediately renewed the priming, and, again presenting his carbine at the general, shot the aide-de-camp who was kneeling a short distance in the general's rear: the murderer, then, with a pistol, fired at the latter, who instantly fell. The courier endeavoured to escape, but was pursued and killed. The Arab, who got possession of his despatches, instantly rode away with them, but, as was afterwards understood, restored them to the French for a sum of money. On the appearance of a troop of French horse from Alexandria, the Arabs retired to the desert with their surviving prisoners.

In the early part of October Captain Hallowell was detached to Rhodes, to look after an expected reinforcement of Turkish ships. On the 14th the *Swiftsure* reanchored off Alexandria. During her absence the Portuguese squadron, already named, under the Marquess de Niza, had joined Captain Hood, but, except the *Lion 64*, Captain Dixon, which remained, had since sailed to co-operate with Captain Ball in the blockade of Malta.

On the 19th two Turkish corvettes joined the British squadron off Alexandria, and on the 20th two Russian frigates, and 16 Turkish vessels, chiefly gun-boats. On the next day, or the day after, Captain Hallowell was detached, with these gun-boats, to the bay of Aboukir, for the purpose of making an attack upon the castle of that name, as well as upon the entrenched camp of the French a little to the southward of it, near lake Maadie.

On the 25th the *Swiftsure's* launch, pinnace, and yawl, in company with the Turkish gun-boats, on board of each of which were six British seamen, commenced an attack upon the castle; and in the evening they returned to the ship with one wounded Turk. On the next morning, the 25th, finding that his Turkish allies were very careful of their persons and would not, in consequence, approach near enough to the enemy to produce any effect, Captain Hallowell sent 15 of the *Swiftsure's* men on board each boat. Thus reinforced, the gun-boats continued daily, until the 28th, to cannonade both the castle and the French camp, but with little effect, and with no greater loss to the allies than one marine killed and one seaman wounded.

The principal part of the mischief done to the French camp arose from its having been set on fire by some shells thrown from the gun-boats. Owing to this, a complaint was made by one or more French officers, admitted to a conference on board the *Swiftsure*, that the British had "unfairly" used such missiles in the battle in Aboukir bay. "Captain Hallowell," proceeds Mr. Williams, "instantly ordered the gunner to bring up some of those balls, and asked him from whence he had them. To the confusion of the accusers, he related that they were found on board the *Spartiate*, one of the ships captured on the 1st of August. As these balls were distinguishable by particular marks, though in other respects alike, the captain ordered an experiment to be made, in order to ascertain the nature of them. The next morning I accompanied Mr. Parr, the gunner, to the island of Aboukir: the first we tried proved to be a fire-ball, but of what materials composed, we could not ascertain. As it did not explode, which at first we apprehended, we rolled it into the sea, where it continued to burn under water; a black pitchy substance exuding from it till only an iron skeleton of a shell remained. The whole had been crusted over with a substance that gave it the appearance of a perfect shell. On setting fire to the fusee of the other, which was differently marked, it burst into many pieces: though somewhat alarmed, fortunately none of us were hurt."*

No further use seems to have been made of the Turkish gun-boats; and in the month of December the whole Turkish squadron took its departure from the coast of Egypt. The two

* Williams's *Voyage up the Mediterranean*, p. 145.

Russian frigates did the same: and so did the *Lion*, to join Lord Nelson: consequently at the end of the year, Captain Hood had with him only the *Zealous* and *Swiftsure* 74s, and one or two frigates. We will now see what naval warfare the year has produced between Great Britain and Spain.

Between the fleet of Earl St. Vincent without, and the fleet of Don Joseph Massaredo within, the harbour of Cadiz, those privileged spies, flags of truce, were frequently passing: and the two admirals, and indeed the two nations, behaved to each other with all that courtesy which distinguishes polished from barbarian belligerents. As it was not an inferiority of force, it must have been either an excess of good breeding, or a deficiency of enterprise, that prevented the Spanish fleet from attempting to sail out, while the British fleet cruised off the port. On the 12th of April, however, when a strong off-shore gale presented a favourable opportunity, the *Monarca* 74 and two frigates, with a small merchant convoy in charge, allowed themselves to be driven before it, and got fairly to sea.

On the 24th of May the arrival from England of a reinforcement of eight sail of the line, commanded by Rear-admiral Sir Roger Curtis in the *Prince* 98, allowed the in-shore squadron of the same numerical force, under the orders of Captain Troubridge, to pass into the Mediterranean, as has already been stated. The judicious manner in which the exchange of the two squadrons was effected, so as to deceive the Spaniards, has also been related.* The continued inactive state of the Cadiz fleet leaves us now at liberty to attend to a small expedition, which Earl St.-Vincent, in the latter end of October, detached against the island of Minorca.

On the 7th of November Commodore John Thomas Duckworth appeared off Minorca with his own ship, the *Leviathan* 74, Captain Henry Digby, *Centaur* 74, Captain Thomas Markham, 44-gun ships *Argo*, Captain James Bowen, and *Dolphin*, Captain Josiah Nisbet, 28-gun frigate *Aurora*, Captain Thomas Gordon Caulfield, 20-gun ship *Cormorant*, Captain Lord Mark Robert Kerr, and 16-gun ship-sloop *Peterel*, Captain Charles Long; also the armed transports *Ulysses*, Captain Thomas Pressland, *Calcutta*, Captain Richard Poulden, and *Coromandel*, Lieutenant Robert Simmonds, hired armed cutter *Constitution*, Lieutenant John Whiston, and several merchant transports, having on board a detachment of troops commanded by General the Honourable Charles Stuart, destined for the reduction of the island.

The squadron brought to within five miles of the port of Fournella; but, in consequence of the wind blowing directly out of this harbour, the transports proceeded to Addaya creek, not far distant, accompanied by the *Argo*, *Aurora*, and *Cormo-*

* See p. 152.

rant. In the mean time the two line-of-battle ships, for whom there was neither space nor depth of water in the creek, kept plying on and off the harbour of Fournella, in order to create a diversion in that quarter. As the smaller vessels rounded the northern point of Addaya creek, a battery of eight 12-pounders fired one gun at them; but, as soon as the *Argo* and her two consorts presented their broadsides to view, the people stationed at the battery spiked their guns, blew up their magazine, and fled. The transports, after this, got in without damage, and by 11 A.M. landed one battalion of troops, without the slightest opposition. The men immediately took possession of a neighbouring height; and, with the assistance of a cannonade from the three covering ships, drove off two divisions of Spanish troops that were advancing to regain possession of the battery at the point. By 6 P.M. the whole of the troops, along with eight 6-pounder field-pieces, two howitzers, and eight days' provisions, were safe on shore.

On the same evening the *Leviathan* and *Centaur*, who to facilitate the disembarkation had anchored just off the entrance of the creek, weighed, and, with the *Argo*, turned up to Fournella; while the *Aurora* and *Cormorant*, with seven transports, proceeded, by way of a diversion, off Port-Mahon. On arriving off the harbour of Fournella, the commodore found that the garrison had abandoned the forts: he then, after directing the *Centaur* and *Leviathan* to cruise off Fournella and Addaya, to prevent succours from being thrown in, shifted his broad-pendant to the *Argo*, and, with the able assistance of Captain Bowen, landed the supplies for the army.

After driving off the enemy at Addaya, the troops proceeded on their march to Mercadal; which they entered without resistance, the Spaniards having retired to Ciudadella, and thence to Mahon. On the 9th a detachment of 300 men, under Colonel Paget, marched to Mahon, and compelled Fort-Charles to surrender; whereby the colonel was enabled to remove the boom across the entrance of the harbour, and afford a free passage from without to the *Aurora* and *Cormorant*. The transports that had been in company with these ships, as well as those left in Addaya creek, had in the mean time been removed to Fournella, as a more safe and commodious harbour.

Late on the evening of the 11th Commodore Duckworth, who had shifted his broad-pendant back to the *Leviathan*, and then lay at anchor in Fournella, received information that four ships "supposed to be of the line," were seen between the islands of Minorca and Majorca. The commodore instantly put to sea with the *Leviathan*, *Centaur*, and *Argo*, and the men-of-war transports, *Calcutta*, *Coromandel*, and *Ulysses*, (each ship with a fifth of her crew on shore), and steered towards Ciudadella. At daybreak on the 13th, Ciudadella bearing east by south distant eight or nine miles, five ships were seen from the mast-

head, standing for that port. Chase was instantly given; whereupon the strange squadron, which consisted of the Spanish 40-gun frigates *Flora* and *Proserpine*, and 34-gun frigates *Santa-Cazilda* and *Pomona*, with their prize, the late British sloop *Peterel*, captured at noon on the preceding day, hauled to the wind for Majorca. The *Peterel*, hauling more up than the rest, was pursued and recaptured by the *Argo*; while the remainder of the British ships continued in chase of the four Spanish frigates. At 11 P.M. the *Leviathan*, taking with her the *Calcutta* and *Ulysses*, returned to Ciudadella; as, in the course of the next day, the 14th, did the *Centaur* and *Coromandel*, the Spanish frigates having completely outsailed their pursuers. It appears that the Spaniards had behaved extremely ill to the officers and crew of the *Peterel*, having plundered them of almost every thing. The chief part of the clothes belonging to Captain Long and his officers, however, are represented to have been subsequently recovered. This charge of ill-usage was officially contradicted in the Madrid Gazette of the 12th of the following April, but was, nevertheless, essentially true.

Upon his return, on the morning of the 16th, off Ciudadella, Commodore Duckworth found that, owing to the active measures pursued by General Stuart, the town had been summoned on the 14th, and that on the 15th the whole island had surrendered on terms of capitulation, without the loss of a single British subject. The Spanish troops, composing the different garrisons on the island, amounted to between 3000 and 4000 men. A great quantity of ordnance and ordnance-stores was taken in the forts; and in the arsenal at Mahon was found abundance of naval stores. No Spanish ship of war was afloat in any of the harbours; but the keel and stern-frame of a man-of-war brig was found on the stocks at Port-Mahon, with the whole of her timbers and rigging, and a part of her clothing. The vessel was afterwards completed, and launched as the *Port-Mahon*. She measured 277 tons, and is now the police-depôt moored off Somerset-house. Several gun-boats were also taken, but none of any value. Of merchant vessels there were three; a ship of 540 tons, partly laden with cotton, gum, and drugs, a ship of 200 tons, in ballast, a xebec of 60 tons, laden with horn, and four small tartans.

The conduct of the British seamen and marines, that had been detached from their respective ships to serve on shore, was on this, as we have shown it to have been on many other occasions, of the most exemplary description; so much so, as to call forth from General Stuart the following written testimonial, addressed to Lieutenant William Buchanan, second of the *Leviathan*, under whose orders the men had been placed: "I have the honour to return you, and the gentlemen employed on shore under your command, my sincere thanks for your activity, zeal, and assistance, in forwarding the light artillery of the

army; neither can too much praise be given to the seamen, for their friendly and cheerful exertions under very hard labour, exertions which were accompanied with a propriety of behaviour which I greatly attribute to your management, and which will ever merit my acknowledgments."

For his services on this occasion, General Stuart was made a knight of the bath; but Commodore Duckworth, who, according to a letter from Earl St.-Vincent to Earl Spencer, expected to be created a baronet, received no mark of royal favour. Without waiting to discuss the merits of the commodore's claims, we shall merely state, that he found a false friend in him whom he requested to urge them. Let Earl St.-Vincent be judged by his own words: "Commodore Duckworth will, I am sure, represent me as lukewarm to the profession if I do not at least state his expectations, which, I understand from Captain Digby, are, to be created a baronet. It is certainly very unusual for a person, detached as he was, under a plan and instruction from his commander-in-chief, from which the circumstances attending the enterprise did not require the smallest deviation, to be distinguished in the manner he looks for. Very different was the case of General Stuart, who received his instructions from the secretary of the war department, and was himself a commander-in-chief."* Had Captain Brenton, whom no one can accuse of being "lukewarm" in Earl St.-Vincent's cause, instead of publishing this letter, thrown it into the fire, he would have escaped the charge so expressively conveyed in the poet's deprecation, "Save me from my friends!"

So much had the Camperdown defeat damped the energies and crippled the resources of the Dutch, that no fleet which they could assemble dared to show itself outside of the Texel. Nor, even were every one of the 16 ships that had met Admiral Duncan restored to her station in the Batavian line, would the aggregate force have been able to contend against the united fleets, which now cruised between Holland and England. The command of the British North-sea fleet still remained with Admiral Lord Duncan; who had under his orders 16 sail of the line (four 74s and twelve 64s), besides more than double that number of 50-gun ships, frigates, and sloops. The Russian Vice-admiral Mackaroff cruised also on the same station, with 10 sail of the line, of which number seven were 74-gun ships.

LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

On the 3d of January, at 6 A.M., the British armed sloop or tender *George*, of six guns (3 or 4 pounders) and 40 men, commanded by Lieutenant Michael Mackey, being on her passage

* Brenton, vol. ii., p. 348.

from Demerara to Martinique, discovered on her lee bow, and at once bore down upon, two sail, which proved to be Spanish privateers; one, a cutter, of 12 guns and 109 men, the other a schooner, of six guns and 68 men. An action immediately commenced between the George, then on the starboard, and the two privateers on the larboard tack. At the expiration of 40 minutes, the two latter evinced an intention to board. The helm of the George was instantly put a-lee, in order to preserve the weather-gage; but the sloop unfortunately missed stays, and, in the act of wearing, fell on board the cutter. The schooner having now gained a position on the George's weather quarter, both vessels immediately grappled the sloop, and made two vigorous but unsuccessful attempts to board. Having, in these assaults, killed the George's sailing-master and seven men, and wounded her commander and 16 men, the two privateers, at the third attempt, carried the British vessel; but not without having paid dearly for their victory, their united loss amounting to 32 men killed, and many more wounded.

A more heroic defence than this little affair exhibits has seldom been witnessed. The George, at the moment her colours were struck, had lost more than half of her crew; that crew having been originally less by three-fourths than the number of her opponents.

On the 5th of January, at 11 p.m., Ushant bearing east-north-east distant 94 leagues, the British 18-pounder* 40-gun frigate Pomone, Captain Robert Carthew Reynolds, steering to the eastward with a fresh breeze at west-south-west, crossed a ship standing under easy sail to the north-west. Chase was instantly given; and, as the stranger, deceived probably by the thickness of the weather as to the Pomone's strength, made no effort to escape, the two ships were presently alongside. An action now commenced; nor was it until the strange ship, whose force was only 26 guns, had lost her mizenmast, and received eight shots between wind and water, that her crew called out for quarter.

Possession was forthwith taken of the Cheri privateer, from Nantes, Captain Chassin, mounting, on her main or single deck, 26 long 12, 18, and 24 pounders, mixed, with a complement of 230 men; of whom 15, including her gallant commander, were killed, and 19 wounded. The privateer's fire had done some injury to the Pomone, having killed one, and wounded four of her men; and, besides cutting away much of her standing rigging, had so damaged the fore and main masts, that it became necessary for their immediate preservation to fish them.

As soon as the prisoners had been shifted, and the Pomone's carpenters had plugged the principal shot-holes in the prize, the Pomone prepared to take her in tow; when the officer in com-

* See p. 106.

mand hailed, that she was sinking. All the boats of the frigate went immediately to the Cheri's assistance; but no efforts could save her. Scarcely had the Pomone's people and the wounded been taken from her, than the Cheri sank alongside; affording an indubitable proof that her unfortunate crew had not called for quarter until every hope of success had fled.

On the 8th of January, at daylight, the Burlings bearing east distant 50 leagues, the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Kingfisher* (6-pounders), Captain Charles Herbert Pierrepont, discovered on her weather quarter a strange ship, which soon afterwards bore up and stood towards her. At 9 A.M. the *Kingfisher* tacked; and at 9 h. 30 m. A.M. the stranger, which was the French privateer *Betsey*, of 16 French 6-pounders, hoisted her colours and began firing. The *Kingfisher*, then on the opposite tack, opened her fire in passing; the *Betsey* did the same; but the cannonade was too distant to be very effective. The *Betsey* then wore round; and the *Kingfisher*, being unable to gain the weathergage, shortened sail, in order that her opponent might get abreast of her. The *Betsey* was presently alongside to windward, and a smart action ensued. After it had continued for an hour and a quarter, the *Kingfisher's* jib-boom was shot away, and the *Betsey*, taking advantage of that, and of the prevailing light wind, ran ahead under all sail, firing her stern-chasers as soon as she could bring them to bear. Another jib-boom having been got out, and the wind freshening, the *Kingfisher* was enabled, by 1 P.M., to overtake her opponent, and renew the action. The latter held out for half an hour longer, and then surrendered.

In this well contested and mutually creditable action, the *Kingfisher* sustained but very trifling damage in hull, rigging, or sails; and, out of a complement of 120 men and boys, had only one man slightly wounded. The *Betsey*, out of a complement of 118, lost one seaman killed, her first and second captains, and six seamen wounded, three of them mortally, and the remainder badly.

On the 16th of January, early in the morning, as the British 20-gun ship *Babet*, Captain Jammett Mainwaring, was cruising about midway between the islands of Martinique and Dominique, an armed schooner was observed standing towards her. Soon afterwards the wind died away; and the schooner, having made out the *Babet* to be a man of war, took to her sweeps and rowed off. This afforded to Mr. Samuel Pym, first lieutenant of the ship, an opportunity of volunteering an attempt to capture the schooner by the boats. Accordingly Lieutenant Pym, with the pinnace and launch, containing between them 24 men, proceeded on the service.

After rowing four hours, and reaching a distance of three leagues from the ship, the boats arrived within gun-shot of the schooner; who immediately opened her fire upon them. The pin-

nace, having out-pulled the launch, was the first boat alongside. Lieutenant Pym and his 12 men at once boarded, and in spite of a very strenuous opposition, carried the schooner. She proved to be the *Désirée*, of six carriage-guns (4-pounders, probably) and 46 men; of whom she had three killed, eight drowned, and 15 badly wounded. The pinnace sustained a loss of one seaman killed, one marine drowned, a midshipman, Mr. Aslinhurst, and four seamen badly wounded, and Lieutenant Pym and the remainder of his boat's crew slightly wounded. The launch, much to the regret of those on board of her, did not reach the schooner till her colours were in the act of being struck. Few enterprises of this description, bold as they commonly are, exhibit so much gallantry as the capture of the *Désirée* schooner.

On the 23d of January, in latitude 50° north, longitude 12 west, the British 36-gun frigate *Melampus*, Captain Graham Moore, came up with and engaged the French corvette *Volage*, of 22 guns (20 long 8s and two long 18s) and 195 men; which, after a short but close action, struck her colours. The *Melampus* had two men mortally, and three dangerously wounded; The *Volage*, four killed and eight wounded.

The prize, although a national ship, had been lent to certain merchants of Nantes, and by them been fitted out as a cruiser. Her commander M. Desageneaux, according to his own account, was a capitaine de frégate, and his officers also appear to have belonged to the national marine; but, in the present instance, they all had a *congé*, or furlough for three months, to enable them to serve on board a ship, then in the temporary employ of private individuals. The *Volage* was a fine corvette measuring 523 tons, and was added to the British navy as a 20-gun ship.

On the 3d of February, at daylight, *Vigo* bearing east distant about 17 leagues, the British 14-gun brig-sloop, *Speedy*, (4-pounders), Captain Hugh Downman, discovered a strange brig, with all sail set, bearing down on her. This was the French privateer *Papillon*, a large brig of 360 tons, mounting 14 guns (but pierced for 18), four of them described as long 12s, and the remainder long 8-pounders, with a crew of 160 men. At 3 p. m. the *Papillon*, being about half a mile from the *Speedy*, hauled to the wind, and opened her fire. Whereupon the *Speedy* made sail to close, engaging her adversary until 5 h. 30 m. p. m.; when the latter tacked and stood off. The *Speedy* also went about and continued to engage until 7 h. 30 m. p. m.; when the *Papillon*, profiting by her superiority of sailing and the lightness of the wind, got out of gun-shot. Owing to the great swell that prevailed, the *Speedy* received no other injury than a shot through her fore topmast, and some damage to her rigging. It now fell calm, and the two vessels, in spite of every effort at the *Speedy's* sweeps, separated.

At midnight the privateer fired several guns at, and ultimately

recaptured, a brig which the *Speedy* had the day before taken from the Spaniards; and on board of which the master, Mr. Marshall, with 12 seamen had been placed. No sooner, however, did these discover what fate was awaiting them, than first battenning below the 12 Spaniards that were on board, Mr. Marshall and his men took to their boat, and fortunately reached their vessel although she was four leagues to windward.

On the 4th, at daylight, came a breeze of wind, that enabled the *Speedy* to fetch up to her antagonist. At 8 A.M. the latter, being within gun-shot, tacked and made sail, rowing at the same time with her sweeps. The chase was continued without effect until noon; when the *Papillon*, finding that she had the heels of the British vessel, shortened sail, wore, and stood towards her, with a red flag flying at the main topgallantmast head. At half an hour after noon, having again got within gun-shot, the *Speedy* recommenced the engagement with the wind upon the larboard quarter. At 2 P.M. just as the privateer's fire began to slacken, and the *Speedy* was about to lay her on board, the former wore, and came to the wind on the starboard tack; but, finding the *Speedy* close upon her starboard quarter, the *Papillon* took the advantage of the *Speedy*'s braces and bow-lines being shot away, and put before the wind under all sail. The *Speedy* immediately wore after her; the two vessels firing musketry at each other for 20 minutes. The chase was continued, with every sail the *Speedy* could set, until 7 P.M.; by which time the *Papillon* had run herself completely out of sight. The *Speedy* then hauled to the wind, making short tacks all night, in the hope to fall in with her prize. Fortunately daylight on the 5th showed the latter to windward; and, at 10 A.M. the brig was retaken with 10 Frenchmen on board, part of the crew of the *Papillon*.

The *Speedy* lost one lieutenant (Richard Dutton), her boatswain, and three seamen killed, and four badly wounded. The loss on board the *Papillon*, although from her discontinuing the engagement in all likelihood severe, could not of course be ascertained; especially as the captured portion of her crew had quitted her on the previous night. From the decided disparity of force in this action, the result, although a trophiless one to the British brig, was highly creditable to the bravery and discipline of her officers and crew. The *Speedy* had received so much damage in her masts, bowsprit, main boom, and spars generally, as well as in her rigging, both standing and running, that she was compelled to put into Lisbon to refit.

On the 25th of February, at 7 A.M., Cromer, bearing west-south-west, distant 16 leagues, the British hired armed cutter *Marquis-Cobourg*, of twelve 4-pounders and 66 men and boys, Lieutenant Charles Webb, after a nine hours' chase and a run of 100 miles during half the time before a hard gale of wind at west-north-west, came up with the French lugger-privateer *Revanche*,

of 16 guns and 62 men; and to a smart fire from whose musketry and stern-chasers, the Cobourg had been exposed for the last two hours of the nine. A spirited action now ensued, during which the lugger made two attempts to board the cutter, but was repulsed. After a two hours' running fight, close alongside, a well-directed broadside from the Cobourg shot away the *Revanche's* main and mizen masts by the board, and also her fore yard; whereupon the privateer's men called for quarter.

No sooner was the *Revanche* taken possession of, than she was found to be sinking, the effects of more than 40 shots which the lugger had received between wind and water. The utmost promptitude was used in shifting the prisoners, and getting back the Cobourg's people, who had been placed in possession; nor was it without the utmost difficulty that the whole were saved from going to the bottom in the prize. The Cobourg had sustained considerable damage in her spars, sails, and rigging; but was fortunate enough to escape with only two men wounded. Her fire, on the other hand, had killed seven, and wounded eight men belonging to the lugger, described as the largest that sailed out of Calais.

On the 22d of March, at 7 A. M., as the British 74-gun ship *Canada*, Captain Sir John Borlase Warren, 44-gun frigate *Anson*, Captain Philip Charles Durham, and 38-gun frigate *Phaëton*, Captain the Honourable Robert Stopford, were cruising about eight leagues to the westward of *Pointe-Rousonirez*, coast of France, with a moderate breeze at north-north-east, the *Anson* discovered a strange ship in the east quarter, standing to the southward. This was the French 36-gun frigate *Charente*, Captain Alain-Adélaïde-Marie Bruilhac, a few days from Rochefort, bound to Cayenne, with 193 unfortunate people, banished for their political sins to that unhealthy climate.

The chase continued throughout the day, with light and variable breezes; and at 1 h. 30 m. A. M. on the 23d, the *Phaëton* got near enough to open a fire upon the *Charente*; who, after returning the fire with her stern-chasers, hauled up for the channel des Graves, or southern passage into the river Gironde. This change of course brought the *Charente* within the range of the *Canada's* guns; and several broadsides were interchanged until about 4 A. M., when the *Canada* struck on a sand-bank, and remained fast.

The 74's signal for assistance occasioned a discontinuance of the chase by the *Phaëton* and *Anson*; and the *Charente*, after grounding on the Olives, and being obliged, in consequence, to throw the greater part if not the whole of her guns overboard, reached the river of Bordeaux. What loss, if any, the *Charente* sustained by the fire of the *Phaëton* and *Canada*, we are unable to state; but we believe the ship was greatly damaged by getting on shore: not, however, to the extent, as Sir John Warren in his public letter states, of "being bilged," or the French

frigate would have remained where she had struck, instead of sailing again on a cruise as the *Charente* subsequently did. The *Canada* remained on the sand-bank about two hours and a half: when, having started 20 tons of water and being favoured by the rise of the tide, the ship floated off, making 14 inches of water per hour.

Great credit was undoubtedly due to Captain Bruilhac, for his persevering and, as we have seen, successful efforts to save his ship from capture by a force so superior; and we are a little surprised that no account of the escape of the *Charente* should have found its way into any French naval work, especially as the French minister of marine made a public boast of the *Charente's* performance.

On the 17th of April, the British king's schooner *Recovery*, of ten 3-pounders, and from 40 to 50 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant William Ross, being on a cruise in the West Indies, fell in with the French privateer-schooner *Revanche*, of 10, believed to have been 4 pounders, and 54 men, commanded by Citizen Antoine Martin. The latter hove to for the *Recovery*, who was to windward, and reserved her fire until she got within pistol-shot. At the end of a 45 minutes' mutual cannonade, the *Revanche*, having had all her sails but the standing-jib cut to pieces, attempted to escape by the aid of her sweeps; but the *Recovery*, having her sails perfect, easily kept way with her antagonist, and at length compelled the *Revanche* to surrender.

The French privateer had three men killed and nine wounded, four of them dangerously. The *Recovery* did not have a man hurt, and suffered no greater damage than one gun dismounted and a few small shot in her masts. Lieutenant Ross describes his crew as consisting chiefly of young and inexperienced boys and lads, and yet declares that their conduct would have done honour to the most experienced seamen.

On the 7th of May, as the British 14-gun brig-sloop *Victorieuse*, Captain Edward Stirling Dickson, was passing to leeward of Guadeloupe, having in charge the trade from Trinidad to St.-Kitt's, two French privateers, a schooner of 12 guns and 80 men, and a sloop of six guns and 50 men, bore down for the purpose of carrying the brig by boarding. The *Victorieuse* soon compelled the sloop, which was the *Brutus*, Captain Rousel, to strike her colours; with a loss of four killed, and four wounded. Owing to Captain Dickson's not being able to chase far from his convoy, the schooner effected her escape; but evidently with considerable damage, and no doubt a proportionate loss. The *Victorieuse* sustained no loss whatever.

We do not know the calibers of the guns of these privateers, but, taking the number of men on board each as a guide, we should consider that the guns were 4, or, at most, 6 pounders. With respect to the *Victorieuse*, she was an anomaly as a 14-gun brig. Her establishment of guns and men, as ordered for her on

the 6th of October, 1795, soon after her capture from the French, were 12 long 12-pounders, and two 36-pounder carronades, with a crew of 130 men and boys: and the size of the *Victorieuse* perhaps justified the armament, as she measured 349 tons. A contemporary describes the *Victorieuse* as mounting in this action "fourteen 6-pounders;"* against this statement we have nothing to offer, but the admiralty-order fixing the brig's establishment.

Although somewhat out of chronological order, we will here narrate another creditable performance by Captain Dixon, and those under his command.

On the 3d of December, at 2 A. M., the *Victorieuse* and 14-gun brig-sloop *Zephyr*, Captain William Champain, having received on board, by order of Colonel Picton, commanding at Trinidad, a major and 40 men of the York Rangers, landed the troops, along with a party of seamen near the river Caribe, in the island of Margarita, in order to attack the forts (how many, or of what force, does not appear in the official letter) in the rear, while the two brigs cannonading them in front; but, at daylight, the Spanish commandant sent to beg the British not to fire, as he would give them immediate possession. This he did; and the guns were brought off, and the troops re-embarked. The two brigs then made sail for the port of Gurupano, on the same island, and at 4 P. M. arrived there. Observing a French privateer in the harbour, Captain Dickson sent in a flag of truce, to say to the commandant of the fort, that the British were determined to take out the privateer, and warning him not to fire at them. The commandant replied that he would protect the vessel, which was the *Couleuvre*, of six guns and 80 men, and that the British should give him up the guns they had taken at Rio-Caribe.

No time was now to be lost; and, having landed Major Laureil with the troops, also 30 seamen detached from the two brigs, and commanded by Lieutenants William Case and — M'Rensey, Captain Dickson anchored with the *Victorieuse* and *Zephyr*, and opened a smart fire on both forts, one of which mounted four, the other two guns. In 10 minutes the troops and seamen, amounting together to no more than 70 men, carried the lower fort; and immediately the Spanish flag at the upper fort was hauled down and replaced by a French one. At the end of five minutes more, this fort also surrendered. The number of men that garrisoned the two forts, was estimated at 300; and 'who, as well as the crew of the privateer effected their escape. The *Couleuvre* and the guns on shore were carried off, and the forts destroyed. The casualties to the British were two men killed and two wounded, and some slight damage to the masts and rigging of the *Victorieuse*.

* Brenton, vol. ii., p. 441.

On the 4th of May, at 4 A. M., as a small British squadron, composed of the 38-gun frigate *Arethusa*, Captain Thomas Wolley, 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Niger*, Captain Edward Griffith, and 44-gun ship *Argo*, Captain James Bowen, was cruising off the mouth of the river *Seine*, a fishing-boat pulled alongside the *Argo*, and was found to have on board Captain Sir Sidney Smith, Lieutenant John Westley Wright, and two French gentlemen, one of whom was Sir Sidney's particular friend, Mr. Phelipeaux. This party had effected their escape from the temple at Paris, by means, as it would appear, of a forged order of removal to another prison, planned and executed by Mr. Phelipeaux. Sir Sidney and his companions proceeded straight to Rouen; and, embarking there in a boat, reached the British squadron as already related. The moment he learnt who were the persons received out of the French fishing-boat, Captain Wolley directed Captain Bowen to part company for England; and on the 6th, in the evening, the *Argo* came to at Spithead.

On the 16th of June the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Aurora*, Captain Henry Digby, cruising off the bay of *Cumes* on the north-west coast of Spain, sent two of her boats, under the orders of Lieutenant Henry Lloyd, to destroy some vessels which had just run in there for shelter. The boats, covered in their approach by the frigate, succeeded in burning a brigantine laden with hemp and iron, and in scuttling a schooner laden with various merchandise, and got back to the *Aurora* with three men wounded, two of them slightly, by musketry from the village or town at the bottom of the bay, and by a wall-piece mounted on an adjacent height.

On the 19th, while standing in for Cape Prior, in thick hazy weather, with the wind from the westward, the *Aurora* discovered an enemy's ship, carrying 18 or 20 guns, and five merchant brigs, standing along the land to the eastward, in the direction of the harbour of *Cedeira*; which, at about 4 P. M., the armed ship and convoy all entered. The *Aurora* immediately stood in after the vessels, and at 4 h. 30 m. opened a fort on the north-east side of the town; which, as well as the ship, now with French colours flying, commenced a fire upon the *Aurora*. This the frigate promptly returned, but, soon losing the wind and being nearly land-locked, found it necessary, with the way she still possessed, to tack, and stand out. At about 6 P. M. the *Aurora*, by towing and sweeping, got out of the harbour without damage or loss; having left two of the brigs on shore, the corvette or privateer at the extremity of the harbour, and the fort damaged, and, it was thought, silenced.

On the 22d the *Aurora*, being then on the south shore of the bay of *Biscay*, off Cape *Machichicao*, chased a ship, apparently a corvette or privateer of 20 guns, scudding before a north-west wind. At about 3 h. 30 m. P. M., on discovering the *Aurora* to be a frigate, the ship hauled in for the land, and, hoisting

French colours, anchored with three cables ahead in an opening under a fort at or near to a place called Baquio. At 4 P. M. the *Aurora* brought to within half gun-shot of the ship, and opened upon her so well-directed and effectual a fire, that by the fourth broadside her cables and masts were shot away, and she soon afterwards drifted on shore, the sea making a fair breach over her. The British frigate now made sail, to weather the eastern land, and at length succeeded, carrying out from 13 to 19 fathoms' water, the fort firing at her all the while, but without effect.

On the 21st of June, at daybreak, his Britannic majesty's packet *Princess-Royal*, Captain John Skinner, of six guns (two 6s and four 4s) and 32 men and boys, exclusive of 17 passengers, nine days from Falmouth, on her way to New-York with a mail, fell in with the French brig-privateer *Aventurier*, of 16 guns (14 long 4-pounders, and two 12-pounder carronades) and 85 men and boys. At 5 A. M. the privateer made sail after the packet; who, on her part, crowded all sail to get away, but without much effect, the prevailing light air and smooth sea giving an advantage to the former in the use of her numerous sweeps. At 7 P. M. the *Aventurier*, hoisting English colours, fired a shot, which the *Princess-Royal* returned. The privateer fired another shot, and then dropped in the wake of the packet, as if intending to defer the attack until daylight.

On the 22d, at 3 h. 30 m. A. M., the *Aventurier* came suddenly up within pistol-shot, and fired a broadside, accompanied by musketry. This the *Princess-Royal*, having brought five of her six guns, including the two 6-pounders, to bear on one side, returned with spirit. One of the 6-pounders was commanded by a lieutenant, who was going out to join the 64-gun ship *St. Albans*; and the male passengers kept 14 muskets in constant use. Captain Skinner was unable to use one, having lost his right arm on board a frigate in the former war. After a two hours' engagement, the French privateer took to her sweeps and rowed off. One of the packet's 6-pounders was now brought to bear as a stern-chaser, and struck the privateer twice in the counter, to the evident confusion of the people on board. At 6 A. M. the privateer being entirely out of gun-shot, the packet ceased firing, and commenced repairing her damages, which were rather serious. Her sails and rigging were much cut, also her spare spars and boats: several round shot had struck the hull, and one large one had entered the counter; but yet the *Princess-Royal* had not a man hurt. On board the privateer, were 30 English and American prisoners. From some of these it was afterwards ascertained, that the *Aventurier* had all her masts shot through and her sails and rigging much cut, had received 19 shot in her hull below the wales, and sustained a loss of two men killed and four wounded. Her injuries, indeed,

were so great, that the privateer was compelled to break up her cruise and return to Bordeaux to refit. Such a result did great credit to the skill, as well as gallantry, of the packet's crew; nor must we omit to state that, when all the 4-pound cartridges were consumed, Captain Skinner's sister and her maid employed themselves in the bread-room in making new ones.

On the 26th of June, at 4 P. M., the British 38-gun frigate *Seahorse*, Captain Edward James Foote, cruising off the coast of Sicily, fell in with the French 36-gun frigate *Sensible*, Captain Bourdé. Being charged with despatches, and having the general of division Baraguay-d'Hilliers and his suite, with a quantity of valuables on board, which she had brought from Malta and was carrying to Toulon, the *Sensible* crowded sail to escape. The chase, the latter part of it a running fight, continued until 4 A. M. on the 27th; when, the island of Pantellaria bearing west-north-west distant 12 leagues, the *Seahorse* came up with the *Sensible*. A close action now commenced, and continued for eight minutes; when the *Sensible*, having, besides much damage in her masts and rigging, received several shot in her hull, 36 of them between wind and water, and sustained a severe loss in killed and wounded, hauled down her colours.

The *Seahorse*, out of a complement, including some seamen belonging to the *Culloden*, of 292 men and boys, had one seaman and one drummer killed, her first lieutenant (David Wilmot, slightly), 13 seamen, one corporal, and one private of marines wounded. According to the British official account, the *Sensible*, out of a crew, including a few passengers, of 300, had 18 men killed, her first and second captains, and 35 men wounded; but, according to the French accounts, the *Sensible's* loss amounted to 25 killed, and 55 wounded.

The fact, that the *Seahorse* mounted 46 guns, consisting of long 18 and 9 pounders, and (14 it appears) 32-pounder carronades, and the *Sensible*, 36 guns, consisting of long 12 and 6 pounders, and (four, we believe) brass 36-pounder carronades, renders it tolerably certain that, even had the French frigate been quite free to act on the offensive, the superiority of her opponent's force would have led to a defeat. The *Sensible's* heavy loss, too, proves that she did not surrender until she had felt the effects of that superiority; and yet the French minister of marine thus publicly notices the capture of the *Sensible*: "It is time that the navy should know, that it is not enough to justify the loss of a ship, that it surrenders only to superior force; it is necessary that a long, an obstinate, and a terrible resistance should alleviate the sorrow of a defeat, and soften the regret of the republic. The executive directory will not suffer themselves to be seduced by any consideration repugnant to this determination, which I now communicate to you. It will give its confidence only to officers who shall deserve it by their talents

and courage." We think we could point out some instances of French captures, to which this spirited denunciation more suitably applies than to the case of the Seahorse and Sensible.

A better feeling, however, appears afterwards to have prevailed. General Baraguay-d'Hilliers succeeded in convincing the directory that the French frigate had been bravely defended against a very superior force, and had been surrendered only when no other alternative remained. In consequence of this, a court-martial was ordered upon Captain Bourdé. It sat at Toulon, and honourably acquitted him. In this instance a clear exposition of the relative force of the ships, and a compliment to the behaviour of the weaker combatant, in the British official account, might have prevented the French directory from passing so unmerited a censure upon a brave officer.

According to some extracts from the French journals of November, 1797, the *Sensible*, with the 38-gun frigate *Junon*, 24-gun "corvette" (or which may be Anglicised 28-gun frigate) *Brune*, 20-gun corvette *Fauvette*, and 14-gun brig *Railleur*, had been hired by Messieurs Petit and company, merchants of Toulon. As this may elucidate what we had occasion to say on this subject at a former page, we shall give a translated abstract of the charter-party. "These five vessels, well known for their superior sailing, belong to the navy of the republic, and at present are at Toulon: they form *part* of those which the government has lent for the purpose of cruising, upon conditions, of which the principal are these: the vessels to be completely fitted out by the government; the freighters being only obliged to provide for and pay the crew. The cost of revictualling and touching at any place to be also at the charge of the freighters; but the costs for repairs of masts, for cordage, ordnance, and ordnance-stores, to be defrayed by the republic. The freighters to propose the commanders, who must be approved by the minister of marine. The freighters to choose the station for cruising, and the places at which the vessels are to stop. The net produce of the prizes to be divided as follows: one-third to the crew, and a third of the remaining two-thirds to the republic. The sale of the prizes to be confided to the freighters. If, during the existence of any such contract, or hiring, peace should be concluded between the belligerent powers, and the freighters should not have covered their advance, the vessels in use shall continue at their disposal for any commercial expedition. Any dispute that may arise to be referred to arbitration." The Egyptian expedition had seemingly restored all the hired ships to the owners, the French republic.

Earl St.-Vincent, when the Seahorse joined the fleet with her prize, manned the *Sensible* with six sailors from each ship, and had her completely equipped for sea in 12 hours. The admiral, also, made a commander of Lieutenant Wilmot, and appointed him to the Alliance frigate-flûte. Among the effects found on

board the *Sensible* at her capture, was a brass cannon formerly taken from the Turks, and which Louis XIV. had presented to the knights of Malta; also a gilt silver model of a galley. After her arrival at Spithead in the following February, the *Sensible*, on account probably of her age and weakness, was not fitted out as a cruising frigate: as a troop-ship, however, she became useful for some years.

When Rear-admiral Sercey arrived at the Isle of France in June, 1796,* and during his subsequent stay there, the 36-gun frigate *Preneuse* and ship-corvette *Brûle-Gueule* were absent on a cruise in the Mosambique channel. Hence it was only on his return to Port-Louis from Batavia in February, 1797, that he was joined by those two ships. With his force thus augmented to seven frigates and a large corvette, the rear-admiral sailed from the Isle of France in the latter end of the summer, having on board the troops, in number, including the artillery, very few short of 1000, that had accompanied the two agents from France; and which troops the French squadron was now carrying to Batavia, ostensibly to succour the Dutch, but in reality to rid the colony of their presence, they having already attempted to excite an insurrection among the blacks. Rear-admiral Sercey carried the troops to their destination, disembarked them there, and returned to the Isle of France, without any occurrence of consequence.

On the 19th of January, 1798, two ambassadors from Tippoo-Saib arrived at the Isle of France, to solicit succours. They were accompanied by a Frenchman named Debay, as an interpreter, and by another Frenchman named Ribaud; who having, in the latter end of 1796, with the privateer he commanded, been forced by stress of weather into Mangalore, was arrested and thrown into prison. Questioned soon afterwards by Tippoo, as to the inclination and means possessed by France to second him in the war which he meditated against the British, Ribaud, in order to obtain his liberty, exaggerated the resources of the republic, and assured the sultan, not only that he might, on the part of France, reckon upon a powerful co-operation, but that there were already at the Isle of France an immense body of troops, which only waited his orders. These reports of the wily Frenchman determined Tippoo to commence hostilities, and led, as we shall hereafter see, to his ruin.

The principal part of the troops on the island had already been transported to Batavia. All therefore that the governor could now do, was to forward to France, with the utmost expedition, the letters from Tippoo-Saib. Accordingly the frigates *Vertu* and *Régénérée* were ordered upon this service; the latter commanded, as before, by Captain Willaumez, the former by Commodore Magon, late of the *Preneuse*; and who, at the par-

* See vol. i., p. 354.

ticular desire of Rear-admiral Sercey, had exchanged with Captain l'Hermite. These two frigates set sail from the Isle of France on the 23d of January, but, unfortunately for an object that required despatch, not by themselves. Early in the month two ships belonging to the Philippine company, laden with silk, indigo, spices, and other precious merchandise, to the estimated value of four millions of piastres, had arrived at Port-Louis from Manilla. For 60,000 piastres, the colonial government agreed to convoy these galleons to Spain; and, with the two heavy-sailing hulks in company, the *Vertu* and *Régénérée* proceeded on their voyage:

We will now relate an exploit performed in the quarter whence these two richly-laden ships had recently arrived; an exploit in some degree connected with the proceedings of Rear-admiral Sercey's squadron, inasmuch as it owed its success to a simulation of two of his ships. On the 5th of January the British 38-gun frigate *Sibylle*, Captain Edward Cooke, and 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Fox*, Captain Pulteney Malcolm, sailed from the road of Macao, for the purpose of reconnoitring the Spanish force in the Philippines, and, in particular, to endeavour to possess themselves of two richly-laden ships supposed to be nearly ready to sail from Manilla, the capital of the island of Luconia. On the 11th the two frigates made the island, and on the 12th, while coasting down it with French colours flying, captured a small vessel from the port off which they were bound. After taking out of her 3900 dollars, and ascertaining from her master that, of the Spanish squadron, reported by him to consist of four sail of the line and four frigates, in Cavita, the port belonging to the city of Manilla, one ship only of each class was in a state to put to sea, Captain Cooke allowed the vessel to proceed on her voyage. It being intended to pass for two frigates of M. Sercey's squadron, the *Sibylle*, we presume, for the *Seine*, and the *Fox* for the *Prudente* or *Régénérée*, the two captains began taking measures to disguise their ships.

On the 13th, at about 8 P. M., every thing being ready, the *Sibylle* and *Fox* entered the bay of Manilla, and, passing the small island of Corrigidore, whereon the signal-house stands, without detection, came to an anchor at about 11 P. M. in 14 fathoms, each ship keeping the topsails at her mast-heads, to be ready for a sudden start. On the 14th, at 5 h. 30 m. A. M., the two frigates weighed, and, hoisting French colours, began working up the bay. At sunrise three gun-boats made their appearance to leeward, also bound up the bay. At 9 A. M. the *Fox* opened the ships in Cavita road, which were seen to consist of three sail of the line and three frigates: of the six ships, four were without masts, and the remaining two, with only their lower masts in. The road of Cavita was about three miles distant from the leading frigate, the *Fox*; and, at 11 A. M., when the latter was about the same distance from the town of Manilla,

lying nearly becalmed, a Spanish guard-boat, rowing 12 oars, and having a crew of 15 officers and men, including the second captain of the 34-gun frigate *Maria-de-la-Cabeya*, at anchor in Cavita, came on board, to inquire what ships the strangers were, and whence they came. Mr. Bernard, the pilot of the *Fox*, and who spoke French and Spanish, informed the visiting officer that the two frigates belonged to M. Sercey's squadron; that they had been cruising on the coast of China, and that, the crews being sickly, they were come to Manilla for refreshment, as well as to form a junction with the Spanish squadron, a part of which, a hope was expressed, would accompany them to sea. The Spanish captain said, in reply, that he had been directed by the governor to acquaint them that their wants should be supplied; but that he believed none of the ships in the port could be got ready in less than two months, as they were in want of every species of stores, and their crews were sickly.

At this moment Captain Cooke came on board, and Captain Malcolm introduced him as Commodore Latour; a name that, as the Spanish captain was doubtless as ignorant of that officer's death as the two British captains, answered as well as any other. To the new commodore many questions were put; and, having in full recollection the ability he had about four years before displayed at Toulon, we can have no doubt that Captain Cooke acted his part to the life. A very interesting, and, to one of the parties at least, very instructive conversation ensued, and lasted nearly an hour, during which the ceremony of drinking success to the united exertions of the Spaniards and French against the British, was not forgotten. Having pumped every thing they wanted out of their unsuspecting guest, and observing other boats approaching from the shore, Captains Cooke and Malcolm made known who they really were. The Spanish captain nearly fainted with astonishment; but a bumper of Madeira, coupled with an assurance that he should not be detained as a prisoner, recovered him.

Meantime the two boats had pulled alongside. One was Admiral Don Martin Alaba's barge, rowing 20 oars, with 23 officers and men, including the governor's nephew; the other a felucca, rowing 20 oars, with 23 officers and men, and among them one of Admiral Alaba's aides-de-camp, bringing compliments of congratulation on the safe arrival of their friends the French, with information, that all the latter could want or wish would be supplied; and that launches, with anchors and cables to assist the frigates into the harbour, were getting ready.

As soon as these new visitors had joined their friends in the *Fox's* cabin, no other point being now to be gained by deception, they also were made acquainted with the *rusé* that had been played off upon them. If they were surprised and mortified at first, the rear-admiral and his suite were still more so on witnessing, as they soon did, the success of another part of the

plan, so happily conceived and executed by their enterprising enemies. While, for instance, this farce was enacting in the cabin, the Spanish boats' crews had been handed to the deck below. A party of British seamen then exchanged clothes with them, and, stepping into the Spanish boat, pushed off, in company with some of the boats belonging to the two frigates, towards three Spanish gun-boats, that lay just without the river leading to the town. The people in the gun-boats, being taken by surprise, were unable to resist the impetuosity of the British boarders, and actually surrendered, without a trigger's being pulled. One boat was No. 31, of 30 oars, carrying one long brass 36-pounder and four swivels, with a complement of 52 men; and the two others were Nos. 33 and 34, one of 28, the other of 30 oars, each mounting one long 24-pounder and four swivels, with a complement of 50 men. A part of the crews, however, were either not on board, or succeeded in reaching the shore, as only 118 officers and men were brought away.

The capture of the gun-boats being perceived from the shore, and thought rather unaccountable, another felucca-rigged boat, rowing 18 oars, with 21 officers and men, including among them the captain of the port, came off, to know why the boats were detained, and to say that, if they were not immediately restored, the authorities in the town would consider the two frigates as enemies, and act accordingly. Previously to any serious reply to this message, the last-mentioned Spanish officer and his men were handed below. Up to this time the weather had remained perfectly calm, and might account for the frigates not entering the road to anchor; but now a breeze sprang up that facilitated discovery, and put a stop to all further stratagem.

From the different Spanish officers that had been brought on board, much information was obtained respecting the naval force in the port; which consisted, by their account, of the 74-gun ships *Europa*, *Magnanime*, and *San-Pedro-Apostol*, and the 34-gun frigate *Maria-de-la-Cabeya*, all under equipment at the arsenal, but not, for the reasons already mentioned, in a state to put to sea. There were also several gun-boats, all new, coppered, and, to judge from those captured, very well appointed. It appeared, likewise, that the merchant ships *Rey-Carlos* and *Marquesetta*, whose reputed rich cargoes had brought the two English frigates to the Philippines, were then lying in the *Cavita*. The former was supposed to be aground; and the latter was represented to have relanded her treasure on the appearance, some days back, of a suspicious vessel, ascertained to have been the 44-gun ship *Resistance*, Captain Edward Pakenham.

At 4 P. M. Captain Malcolm gave the Spanish officers a good dinner; and their men were at the same time regaled below with fresh China beef and grog in abundance. The discovery, that the two frigates were enemies, had now extended itself all round

the bay. The kind usage to the prisoners while on board, and the circumstance of now permitting them to go on shore in the captured guard-boat, barge, and two feluccas, without parole or restriction of any sort, could not fail to impress, as well upon the prisoners themselves, who were in number 200, as upon the natives in general of these remote islands, very favourable ideas of the British character. The particular season of the year, in which this successful ruse was practised, being that wherein the Spaniards, from the prevalence of the monsoons, considered themselves in comparative security, a few additional ships and men might have captured the town and vessels of war, and destroyed the arsenal. As it was, the *Sibylle* and *Fox* had made a good morning's work: they had taken seven boats, about 200 men, three great guns, 12 swivels, 27 muskets, 32 cutlasses, 18 half-pikes, 13 pistols, 153 round shot, 137 grape shot, and 100 shells, with, of course, a proportion of powder and of musket-cartridges; all without the slightest casualty.

On the same evening, the two British frigates, accompanied by the three prize gun-boats, in charge of the three lieutenants, Thomas Fortescue Kennedy, Charles Elphinstone, and George Rutherford, anchored off the island of Corrigidore; and on the next morning, the 15th, they quitted the bay, and, the *Sibylle* with one, and the *Fox*, with two gun-boats in tow, stood to the southward, in the hope to precede, if possible, any information that they were among the islands. On the night of the 19th, one of the two gun-boats towed by the *Fox*, in a heavy squall, broke adrift. The *Fox* immediately brought to and continued to fire guns and show lights during the whole night; but all in vain, the gun-boat having foundered with the loss of all her crew, consisting of Lieutenant Rutherford, one midshipman (Mr. Nicholson), nine seamen, and one boy. At day-light, on the 20th, the frigates made sail and coasted Mindora, Pany, Negros, and Magindano, without any occurrence worth notice.

On the 22nd, at day-light, being within a few miles of Samboangon, on the island of Majindinao, a settlement which they purposed to lay under contribution for water, wood, and refreshments, the frigates hoisted Spanish colours; but, while steering towards it, the *Sibylle* grounded on the north-west point of the small island of Santa-Cruz. The *Fox* and the two gun-boats then stood on; but, at 6 h. 20 m. A. M., being becalmed, were obliged to anchor just abreast of, and at the distance of about a mile and a half from, the fort of Samboangon. At about this time the *Sibylle* got off; but the state of the tide, coupled with the want of wind, prevented her from joining. A boat now approached the *Fox* from the shore, and, when, within hail, inquired the name and other particulars of the frigate. Receiving no satisfactory answer, the Spaniards pulled back to the shore, which, although several muskets were fired at them, they reached in safety. At 6 h. 30 m. A. M. the British vessels hoisted their

proper colours, and the Fox and the two gun-boats opened a fire upon the fort, which was returned as well by the latter as by a two-gun battery to the westward, but, owing to the distance, with very little effect. At 8 A. M. a fresh breeze sprang up from the land, and, aided by the tide, then running at the rate of three knots to the westward, drove the Fox off the bank on which she had anchored.

At noon, a fresh breeze springing up from the westward, the Sibylle and Fox, accompanied by the two gun-boats, made all sail towards the fort. At about 2 h. 5 m. P. M. the Sibylle fired an 18-pounder at the western battery to try the distance, and in five minutes more, being abreast of the fort of Samboangon, brought to and commenced the action. Shortly afterwards the Fox began firing at the western battery; and, at 3 P. M., being abreast of, and about half a mile distant from it, and about three quarters of a mile from the fort, dropped her anchor astern, but rather inside, of her consort. The Fox and the western battery, which mounted 12 or 14 guns, were soon as hotly engaged as the fort itself and the Sibylle. The fire from the battery abreast of the Fox being both heavy and well-directed, while the shot from the latter seemed to produce little or no effect, Captain Malcolm, at 3 h. 20 m. P. M., accompanied by the first lieutenant of the Fox, in conformity to directions previously received from Captain Cooke, proceeded, in three of the Fox's boats (and which were soon followed by three from the Sibylle), to endeavour to effect a landing to the westward of the battery.

As the boats approached, a shot from the battery struck and went through the Fox's cutter, killing two seamen, and wounding a master's mate (Mr. Davis), two seamen, and one marine. Fortunately, the cutter, when she swamped, was in shoal water and close to a sand-bank; upon which, Captain Malcolm and the remainder of the crew presently landed. Here the captain found, as well the surviving men of the cutter, as the crew of the launch, that had grounded on the same bank, and intended pushing for the shore; but, deep water being found inside the bank, and a strong party of men observed posted on the beach, the attempt was abandoned, and the party, at about 3 h. 30 m. P. M., returned to the ships. At 3 h. 40 m. a shot from the battery cut away two strands of the Fox's cable. Having received other considerable damage on board, the Fox now cut the remaining strand of her cable, and stood out of gun-shot to the southward. The Sibylle about the same time cut her cable, and removed further from the fort.

Of this fort and the adjoining batteries, the strength had evidently been much underrated by the commanding officer of the two frigates; one of which, the Sibylle, had her master (Richard Stanning) and one marine killed, and one wounded. It was the other frigate, however, which, owing to her nearness to the western battery, bore the brunt of the attack. One shot,

as already stated, cut the Fox's cable: another passed through the mizenmast, about 12 feet from the head; another carried away the supporters of the wheel, and another the bits on the quarterdeck; about 28 others struck the ship's side. Her main stay and six of her lower shrouds, were also cut away, and her running rigging and sails much injured. With respect to the loss sustained on board, the Fox had two seamen killed, the captain's clerk and 10 seamen wounded; making, with the loss in the cutter, a total of four killed and 15 wounded.

At 9 p. m. the two frigates anchored about six miles to the eastward of Samboangon town. On the 23d, in the morning, by which time the Fox had fished her mizenmast and repaired the most material of her damages, the two frigates got under way and stood to the northward. On the same evening, the two gun-boats after all the stores had been taken out of them, were destroyed, as being unfit to proceed on the voyage to Canton. On the 27th, the frigates being much in want of water which they had been compelled to relinquish taking by force at Samboangon, put into the harbour of Pullock, situated to the northward of Majindinao. On the 31st, at daybreak, three boats from each frigate were sent to bring away the last load. At 9 a. m. some of the men belonging to the Sibylle's boats (those of the Fox had come on board) were perceived running to the beach and making signals. Instantly all the boats, manned and armed, of both frigates, led by their respective captains, pulled towards the shore. Here two seamen were found killed by the natives, one mortally wounded, and nine missing, supposed to have been carried into the woods. The remainder of the party, including Lieutenant Majeur, who commanded it, were fortunately rescued. Every effort to recover the men having failed, Captain Cooke ordered the village of the natives to be set on fire, and their corn cut down, and then weighed and set sail for Mindanao. On arriving here, Captain Cooke was promised by the sultan that he would use his influence to recover, if they were alive, the missing men. The sultan eventually fulfilled his promise, and the men were restored, but not in time for the Fox and Sibylle to bring them away, Captain Cooke being obliged to hasten on to Canton, to be ready to convoy the homeward-bound trade.

On the 8th of March Tippoo-Saib's two ambassadors, with about 150 colonial volunteers (here was a reinforcement for a sultan who could bring into the field 70,000 horse and foot)! sailed in the Preneuse for Mangalore. On the 20th of April, having two days before received intelligence that two Indiamen were at Tellicherry, taking in a cargo of pepper, Captain L'Hermite looked into the port, but, finding only one ship there, doubted the accuracy of his information, and cruised off the coast for a day or two under English colours.

A periague, which the Preneuse captured on the morning of

the 21st, having assured the French captain that the ship in sight, however formidable in appearance, was nothing but an Indiaman, the *Preneuse*, disguised still as an English frigate, stood for the road of Tellicherry. In his way thither Captain L'Hermite fell in with another Indiaman steering for the same anchorage. The *Preneuse* now reduced her sails and yawed about, so as to let this ship enter the road first. At about 2 h. 30 m. p. m., while this manœuvre was practising, a thunder-storm came on; and at 3 p. m. the *Preneuse* was struck with lightning. The electric fluid entered at the frigate's main truck and, running down the mast into the hold, reascended to the main deck, killed one man, and wounded 15 or 16, and then passed out at one of the ports. Towards 4 p. m., just as the Indiaman had cast anchor, within about 100 fathoms of the one already in the road, the *Preneuse* steered between the two, and changing her colours to French, fired a broadside into each. The ship that had just anchored fired a broadside in return, cut her cable, and loosed her sails, with the intention of running on shore. The other ship, owing to her position, could only return one or two guns: in short, the two vessels were captured. One proved to be the *Woodcot* of 802 tons, Captain Andrew Hannay, the other the *Raymond*, of 793 tons, Captain Henry Smedley; both armed, and the latter, with a detachment of company's troops on board.

Having taken of the commandant of Tellicherry a receipt for his prisoners, 600 in number, and the half described as Europeans, Captain L'Hermite manned his two prizes and despatched them to the Isle of France, and then proceeded on his mission to Mangalore. Here the frigate arrived on the 24th of April, and, quitting the road on the 26th, steered for Java. At Batavia Captain L'Hermite arrived in the middle of June, and found there Rear-admiral Sercey; who had recently arrived in the *Brûle-Gueule*, with the intention of making the Dutch island his temporary head-quarters.* We will now see how far the *Vertu* and *Régénérée*, with their valuable charge, have got on their voyage home.

Before we quit the eastern hemisphere to accompany the French frigates *Vertu* and *Régénérée* on their voyage to Europe, we will give some account of a very melancholy ship-loss, with which the Straits of Banca were this year visited. On the evening of the 23d of July the *Resistance*, which ship we mentioned as making her appearance off Manilla, anchored in the Straits, to await the approach of a Malay sloop, which Captain Pakenham had detained, on a suspicion that she was Dutch property, and which he was now about to restore to the Malay captain. On the 24th, at 1 A. M., the sloop joined, and dropped anchor under the stern of the ship. It appears from the narra-

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome viii., p. 304.

tive of a seaman of the *Resistance* named Thomas Scott, one of the few survivors of the awful catastrophe which ensued, that, as he was sleeping on the larboard side of the quarterdeck, he was suddenly awakened by a fierce blaze that seized his clothes and hair, and which was succeeded, in an instant, by a tremendous explosion, from the shock of which, as he afterwards conjectured, he became utterly senseless for several minutes. From the appearance of daylight about an hour after he had been blown up, Scott supposed the accident to have happened at about four o'clock in the morning. The whole number of survivors, including Scott, appears to have been 13, of whom the highest in rank was a quartermaster. The number that had perished amounted to about 314 officers, seamen, and marines, three English women married on board, one Malay woman of Amboyna, and 14 Spanish prisoners taken in a prize; total 332 souls.

The subsequent sufferings of Scott and his companions, as related by himself, were very great. On recovering a little from the stupor into which the shock had thrown him, he found himself half-suffocated with water, floating and struggling for his existence, in company with several other persons. He made shift, as did 12 of those near him, to reach the hammock-netting of the ship on the starboard side, which was just above the water. At the dawn of day the people belonging to the sloop, then not out of hail astern, and who must have heard the shouts of the wretched beings that were clinging to the wreck, weighed anchor, and, callous to every impulse of humanity, stood over to the island of Borea. It would appear from this, either that no prize-crew had been placed on board the sloop, but merely the master taken out of her, or that the British, notwithstanding it was one o'clock in the morning when the sloop joined, had been withdrawn from her, and her own people put in possession.

The mild state of the weather enabled the 13 survivors, most of whom were badly scorched, to construct a raft to convey them to the low land of Sumatra, distant about three leagues from the spot, and about six from the Dutch settlement of Palambang. In the afternoon they committed themselves to the raft, with only a single pumpkin for food for the whole of them. A gale soon afterwards got up, and dashed the raft to pieces. Four of the seamen, including Scott, took to an anchor-stock which had formed part of the raft, and which they now steadied by means of two spars lashed across. These men, after first being nearly famished, and then nearly massacred, reached the Sumatra coast. There they all became prisoners to a party of Malays. Scott appears to have been the only one that subsequently became released from captivity. The eight poor wretches (or rather seven, for one had died), who remained on the shattered raft, were never heard of afterwards.

On the 24th of April, at 3 P.M., the British 12-pounder 32-

gun frigate Pearl, Captain Samuel James Ballard, while running in for the Isles of Loss with a moderate breeze from the west-south-west, discovered a large ship at anchor under Factory island, four others at anchor between the islands, and an armed brig under sail. What the armed brig and one of the ships were we are unable to say; but the ship under Factory island we take to have been the *Régénérée*, and the "frigate, with yards and topmasts down," described in the Pearl's log as one of those at anchor between the islands, her consort the *Vertu*. At 5 h. 30 m. P. M. the latter, having hoisted her colours, opened a heavy fire upon the Pearl; who, at 6 P. M., while running, as she was compelled to do, between the two frigates, fired at both, and then hauled up in three fathoms through the eastern passage. At 7 P. M. the Pearl ceased firing, but found herself chased by the *Régénérée*; who continued the pursuit all that night, and until the next evening at dark, when she disappeared. On the afternoon of the next day, the 27th, the Pearl anchored in St.-George's bay, Sierra-Leone. The fire to which she had been exposed, in running past the French frigates, had shot away her foretopgallant yard, and several lower shrouds and other rigging, cut through her fore yard, hulled her in several places, some between wind and water, dismounted two of her carronades, and mortally wounded one man.

We must leave these two French frigates and their sluggish convoy at the Isles of Loss, while we attend to another frigate of Rear-admiral Sercey's squadron. On the 24th of April, the 40-gun frigate *Seine*, still commanded by Lieutenant Julien-Gabriel Bigot, with about 280 refractory troops on board, set sail from Port-Louis, for the same destination as the *Vertu* and *Régénérée*. On the 29th of June, at 7 A. M., the *Penmarcks* in sight to leeward, the British 38-gun frigate *Jason*, Captain Charles Stirling, 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Pique*, Captain David Milne, and 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Mermaid*, Captain James Newman Newman, cruising in company, descried and chased a French frigate in the south-south-west, or windward quarter. The *Mermaid* immediately stood to the northward, to cut off the stranger from the land. The latter, however, which was the *Seine*, after a fortunate passage of three months, just about to enter, as her people flattered themselves, a port of France, tacked soon afterwards, and steered to the southward; whereby the *Mermaid*, at best but an indifferent sailer, was completely thrown out. The *Pique* kept her wind; and the *Jason* steered about two points free, in order to prevent the enemy from entering Lorient.

The chase continued throughout the day; and at 9 P. M. the *Pique* got within gun-shot of the enemy, and kept up a constant fire with her bow-guns. At about 11 P. M., the *Pique* ranged up alongside the French frigate, and gave and received a broadside. A running fight now ensued, and the *Pique* and

Seine, keeping abreast of each other, continued an unremitting interchange of broadsides, for two hours and 35 minutes; when the British frigate, having had her main topmast shot away, dropped astern.

The Jason now coming up, Captain Stirling hailed the Pique, and desired her commander to anchor; but Captain Milne, not hearing what was said, and anxious to see the last of an opponent whom he had so long singly engaged, pushed up, under all the sail he could carry, on the larboard side of the Jason. There the Pique unfortunately grounded. Almost at the same instant, the land near *Pointe de la Trenche* was seen close upon the Jason's larboard bow; and, before the ship would answer her helm, she also took the ground near to the Seine, who, it was perceived, had likewise grounded, and was entirely dismasted. As the tide rose, the Jason hung only forward, and therefore swang with her stern fairly exposed to the enemy's broadside. Of this the Seine took proper advantage, and poured into the Jason several raking broadsides; which, besides inflicting nearly the whole loss she sustained, wounded her masts, and cut and tore to pieces her rigging and sails. In a little while, however, the Jason got some guns run out abaft; and the Pique, having by squaring her yards, forged a little ahead of the Jason, was enabled to point four of her foremost 12-pounders clear of the latter. On receiving a few shot from the guns of both opponents thus brought to bear, and seeing the Mermaid fast approaching, the Seine struck her colours.

The Pique, besides having lost her fore topmast, was exceedingly shattered in her masts, rigging, and sails, and had unfortunately lain near enough to receive some of the Seine's shots as they passed over the Jason; but, until towards the close of the combat, as already mentioned, the former could not return a shot without firing into or through her companion. Every attempt to get the Pique afloat was exerted in vain, and she bilged. The Jason was more successful, being heaved off into deep water by the Mermaid; who, notwithstanding every effort to get up, did not arrive in time to participate in the action.

The Jason lost her second lieutenant (Anthony Richard Robotier), one corporal of marines, and five seamen killed, her commander, two midshipmen (Frederick Bedford and Samuel Luscombe), and nine seamen wounded. The Pique had one seaman killed, and one missing, her boatswain, boatswain's mate, one seaman, and three marines wounded; total in the two ships, nine (including the one missing) killed, and 18 wounded. The loss on board the Seine, out of a complement including soldiers, of 610 men, is represented to have been as many as 170 killed (including, we believe, several that were drowned), and about 100 wounded.

The Pique, a very inferior antagonist to the Seine, bore the brunt of the action; but the Jason, no doubt, contributed her

powerful aid in bringing it to a consummation. The Mermaid, on the other hand, was unable to take any share in the engagement. The heavy loss sustained by the French ship, places Lieutenant Bigot's defence in a highly creditable light; and it must be admitted, that the troops on board the Seine, with their women, children, and baggage, were rather an encumbrance than a benefit.

On the 30th, at daylight, the British 38-gun frigate *Phaëton*, Captain the Honourable Robert Stopford, 36-gun frigate, *San-Fiorenzo*, Captain Sir Harry Neale, and 12-pounder 32-gun frigate, *Triton*, Captain John Gore, hove in sight, and were called in by signal from the *Jason*, it appearing that two large frigates, a brig, and several gun-boats were coming out from Rochelle, with the view of driving away or capturing the British frigates. The French were induced, however, to put back, on witnessing the junction of Captain Stopford's squadron. Had the latter not been present, the state of the British frigates, with only the Mermaid in a condition to give battle, would have been extremely critical.

In the course of this day, by throwing overboard her guns, and by the *San-Fiorenzo's* assistance, the *Seine* was hove off, and, being a very strong ship, escaped without any material damage, beyond what she had sustained by shot. The *Pique* could not be got off. She was therefore destroyed, and her crew turned over to the prize; which, on her arrival in port, Captain Milne, his officers, and ship's company, were allowed, very justly, to commission as the British 38-gun frigate *Seine*.

We are pleased to see it stated in a respectable French work, that Lieutenant Bigot, on being carried to England, was treated with all the respect and attention due to his bravery and good conduct. He was also sent back to his country by the first exchange; and the directory, to evince their opinion of his merits, promoted Lieutenant Bigot to be a capitaine de vaisseau without passing through the intermediate rank of a capitaine de frégate.

On the 13th of May, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate, *Flora*, Captain Robert Gambier Middleton, chased the French Venetian-built brig-corvette, *Mondovi*, of 18 guns (12 brass 6, and four iron 12-pounders), and 68 men, commanded by Lieutenant Jean-Baptiste Bonavie, into the port of Cerigo in the island of that name, in the Archipelago.

Being resolved to attempt the capture or destruction of the corvette, and yet finding it impracticable, owing to the narrow entrance to the harbour and the commanding situation of the forts, to follow her with the frigate, Captain Middleton intrusted the service to the *Flora's* boats under the orders of first Lieutenant William Russel, assisted by Lieutenant William Hepenstall, Lieutenant Richard Parry of the marines, Mr. Morton,

master's mate, Mr. Tancock, the gunner, and Messieurs Petley and Hawkins, midshipmen.

On the same evening the boats quitted the *Flora*; and, in the face of a severe fire from the forts, the *Mondovi* herself, and several vessels in the harbour, the British gallantly boarded and cut out the corvette, with no greater loss on their part than one private marine killed, the lieutenant of marines (Mr. Richard Parry), master's mate, gunner, and five seamen wounded. The loss sustained by the *Mondovi* amounted to one seaman killed, four seamen drowned, from having jumped overboard as supposed, and eight seamen and soldiers dangerously wounded.

On the 26th of July, at 10 h. 30 m. A. M., the British 28-gun frigate *Brilliant*, Captain Henry Blackwood, standing close into the bay of Santa-Cruz, with the wind a fresh breeze at east by north, in order to discover if a strange sail, which she had chased on the preceding evening, had arrived there, saw two French frigates lying at an anchor. The latter, which were the *Vertu* and *Régénérée*, still on their way to France,* immediately slipped their cables and gave chase. The *Brilliant* stood off under all sail, cutting away her anchors and boats to facilitate her escape; but, in the mean time, got ready for action. At half-past noon, finding her pursuers were gaining upon her, she cut down the stern to make room for two 9-pounders as chasers, and got two 6-pounders aft on the quarterdeck for the same purpose. At 2 h. 30 m. the south point of the Grand Canary bore east-south-east six or seven leagues. At five P. M. the *Brilliant* began firing her stern-chasers, but, finding they did not reach, ceased until 6 h. 15 m. P. M.; when she recommenced her fire, and continued it with spirit. The *Régénérée*, who was ahead and to leeward of her consort, now opened her bow-chasers; and both ships were evidently coming up fast with the *Brilliant*.

It was now that the latter resolved, by a bold manœuvre, to attempt to extricate herself. At 7 h. 30 m. P. M., being then on the larboard tack, the *Brilliant* bore up athwart the bows of the *Régénérée*, and gave her a broadside, which shot away her maintopsail halyards, and badly wounded her bowsprit and foremast. After the exchange of a few broadsides, the *Brilliant* hauled to the wind on the starboard tack; leaving the *Régénérée*, with her main topsail down, and incapable, for the present of renewing the pursuit. The *Vertu*, having tacked, was now on the *Brilliant*'s weather quarter, and soon opened upon her a heavy but ineffectual fire, which the latter answered by her stern-chasers. By midnight the wind had subsided to a perfect calm; and the *Régénérée*, who had again made sail in chase, now joined her consort in the distant cannonade. At three

* See p. 211.

quarters of an hour after midnight, a breeze sprang up from the north-east; and soon afterwards the *Brilliant*, losing sight of her pursuers in the dark, bore away south by east. An interchange of signals between the two French frigates, by rockets, and false fires, followed this alteration in the British frigate's course, but no further attempt at pursuit that the latter could discover.

The *Brilliant* suffered very little damage, and no loss, by the enemy's shot; but, in the chase, she sprang her foremast and spanker-boom. On the 3d of August Captain Blackwood fell in with the 36-gun frigate *Flora*, Captain Robert Gambier Middleton; and the two frigates, one of them having prisoners to exchange, proceeded off Santa-Cruz. Arriving there on the 10th, Captain Middleton sent in a flag of truce; which brought out nine men who had been prisoners on board the *Vertu*. These gave an account of the names and some other particulars of the ships which the *Brilliant* had engaged. Part of the information was, that the *Régénérée's* bowsprit, foremast, and main topmast, owing chiefly to their wounded state, had fallen overboard, while the ship was in the act of tacking after the *Brilliant*, a short time before the latter bore away to the southward.

Had the *Flora* joined company during the chase, the combat would most probably have been brought to a decisive issue; and, as an additional reward to the British, should the day have been theirs, intelligence might have been obtained of the two rich Spanish galleons, which the two French frigates had taken under their convoy; and which they escorted safe to their destination.

On the 4th of July, at 9 h. 45 m. P. M., the French ex-Venetian brig-corvette *Lodi*, of 18 long 6-pounders and at least 130 men, commanded by Lieutenant Sennequier, while running through the Piombino channel, on her way from Leghorn, which she had quitted that morning, to Alexandria, with despatches for General Buonaparte, was hailed and attacked by an armed brig. As soon as she had ascertained that the vessel approaching her so fearlessly was an enemy, the *Lodi* endeavoured to obtain a raking position ahead of her; but the British brig frustrated the attempt by running her own bowsprit through the *Lodi's* boom-mainsail.

A furious action now commenced; on the part of the *Lodi* by vivid and constant discharges of musketry, in which the officers and troops on board as passengers greatly assisted, and on the part of the British brig, who probably in the arm of musketry felt sensibly her deficiency, by discharges of grape and canister shot from such of her great guns as would bear. Twice the British attempted to put an end to the combat by boarding; but a part of the assailants, each time, fell dead into the sea, and the remainder were driven back to their brig, covered with

wounds. The French, now, as if taught by the ill success of their opponents, where their own chief strength lay, made a vigorous attempt to board the British brig, but were repulsed with slaughter.

Before the French were prepared or perhaps inclined to repeat the attempt, the two brigs separated, and each, we presume, soon found the means of bringing her cannon exclusively into play. At 2 A.M. on the 5th the fire of the British brig, having gradually slackened, ceased, and Captain Sennequier took this opportunity of hailing to know if she would surrender. The only reply he obtained was a discharge of musketry, accompanied by a few cannon-shot. Soon after this the British brig endeavoured to get off, and had scarcely made sail for that purpose, when a broadside from the *Lodi* brought down her foremast and main topmast.

This, one might suppose, left the *Lodi* nothing to do but to take possession of her prize. Far from it; the British brig, with only the stump of her mainmast standing, got away, and the *Lodi*, with rigging and sails cut, no doubt, but with both her masts standing in their places, in vain "*fit tous les efforts pour le poursuivre,*" and could not overtake her until she had sheltered herself under the neutral coast of Tuscany. The *Lodi*, thereupon, with the loss of two seamen killed, her commander, two other naval officers, some military officers, and 25 soldiers and sailors wounded, made the best of her way to Alexandria; where, in due time, she arrived safe. Here such a representation was made of the combat, which the *Lodi* had sustained with the British sloop of war "*Aigle*, of a force much superior to hers," "*d'une force bien supérieure à la sienne,*" that Lieutenant de vaisseau Sennequier was immediately promoted by the directory to the rank of capitaine de frégate.*

Being well aware that there was no "*Aigle*" belonging to the British navy but a frigate, and no "*Eagle*," except an old 64 at Chatham, and a 4-gun "*Dutch hoy*," lying in Poole harbour, and having been taught by experience that French writers are very apt to mistake English proper names, we searched the log of every British brig-sloop cruising in the Mediterranean in the year 1798, but could discover no traces of an action fought by her at the time and place above-mentioned. A search through the London journals proved equally fruitless. At length a Paris newspaper, under the head of Leghorn, informed us that on the 28th of July, 1798, the English privateer-brig "*Aquila*, Captain Colonna," of 14 guns and 57 men, entered the port in distress, having on the 4th, in the Piombino channel, fought with a French brig, from eleven at night till half-past three in the morning, and that the former had lost a great many killed and wounded.

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome x., p. 383.

Owing to the late period at which this information reached us, it has not been in our power to discover who were the owners of the *Eagle* privateer: a subject of regret, as, in all probability, we should then have been enabled to give more full and satisfactory details of an action so highly creditable to the British captain and his crew. At all events, sufficient has appeared to show clearly, that Lieutenant Sennequier, instead of being rewarded for having escaped from, ought to have been cashiered for not having captured the British privateer, which, after so long and well fought an action on her part, his most decided superiority of force had reduced to so crippled and defenceless a state.

On the 11th of July, the British 44-gun ship, *Regulus*, Captain George Eyre, cruising off the north-west end of the island of Porto-Rico, discovered five vessels at anchor in Aguada bay, under the protection of some batteries. Being resolved to attempt their capture or destruction, Captain Eyre manned a prize-schooner in company, and sent her with the boats of the *Regulus* under the orders of Lieutenant John Good, assisted by Lieutenant William Holman and master's mate, Thomas Finch, to execute the service; the *Regulus* herself standing in to cover and protect her boats in their advance.

Owing to the failure of wind, neither the ship nor the schooner were able to get near enough to afford any material assistance. Lieutenant Good, however, by his judicious arrangement and spirited conduct, executed the service with the boats alone; bringing out three of the largest vessels, a ship, a brig, and an armed schooner. Had there been the smallest breath of wind, the remaining two vessels having been boarded and in possession for a considerable time, would also have been carried off; but, it falling a dead calm at the moment the cables were cut, and there not being a sufficiency of boats to tow so many vessels, it became necessary to quit two of the vessels, in order to secure the three which appeared to be of the most importance.

Notwithstanding an incessant fire kept up by the batteries, close to which, for their security, the vessels had been moored, the British had only one man hurt, but that was the master's mate already named, and who was killed by a grape-shot.

On the 15th of July, at 9 A. M., Carthage bearing about west by north, distant 29 leagues, the British 64-gun ship, *Lion*, Captain Manley Dixon, steering east, with a crowd of sail, the wind moderate at west-south-west, descried, in the south-east quarter, standing towards her, four strange ships, which we may at once introduce as the

Gun-frig.

34	{	Pomona	{	Commodore don Felix O'Neil.
		Proserpine	{	Captain don F. Villamil.
		Santa-Cazilda	"	don Quaj. Bial.
		Santa-Dorotea	"	don D. Errara.
			"	don M. Gerraro.

The *Lion* immediately shortened sail, and hauled up, so as to secure the weathergage; then bore down upon the four Spanish frigates, formed in close order of battle on the larboard line of bearing, the third frigate from the van, the *Dorotea*, with her fore topmast gone. In order to secure a general action, Captain Dixon meditated his first attack on this ship; which, being left astern by her comrades, the *Lion* was not long in cutting off. The three remaining frigates tacked in succession, and passed the *Lion* very gallantly within musket-shot; but, as their line, after tacking, was by no means a close one, they each received a well-directed broadside, the effect of which was evident by their standing a long time on the same tack. Captain Dixon still kept in chase of the *Dorotea*; who, notwithstanding the loss of her fore topmast, sailed nearly as well as the *Lion*, and galled her considerably in the rigging by her stern-chasers.

The three frigates, having at last tacked, made a second attempt, but not so close as the former, to succour their friend, and were each repaid by a broadside in return. At length the *Lion* closed with the *Dorotea*, and poured in a destructive fire, the yard-arms of the two ships passing just clear of each other. Still the latter held out. Her consorts made a third, but a distant and feeble effort to cover; and then hauled close by the wind and stood to the north-west. The *Lion*, whose rigging and sails were much cut, succeeded, with difficulty, in wearing round on the same tack as the *Dorotea*; who, having, in addition to the loss of her fore topmast, had her mizenmast shot away, her mainmast and rudder damaged, and her rigging and sails cut to pieces, and being, besides, abandoned by her three comrades, very wisely substituted the British for the Spanish ensign.

As an additional proof that Captain Gerraro had maintained the action with becoming bravery, the loss on board his ship, out of a crew, supernumeraries included, of 371 men and boys, amounted to 20 men killed and 32 wounded. The loss sustained by the *Lion* was very trifling, amounting to no more than one young midshipman (Joseph Patey), wounded slightly in the shoulder, and who would not quit his quarters, and one seaman wounded dangerously.

It took Captain Dixon during the remainder of the day to repair the rigging and sails of the *Lion*, and to place the prize in a state to be conducted to her new destination. The *Santa Dorotea* measured 958 tons, and was afterwards added to the British navy, under the same name, as a 12-pounder 36-gun frigate.

On the 3d of August while the British 38-gun frigate *Melpomène*, Captain Sir Charles Hamilton, and 14-gun brig-sloop, *Childers*, Captain James O'Bryen, were cruising off *Isle Bas*, on the coast of France, the former determined, with the boats of the two ships, to attempt cutting out from the port of

Corigiou, a national armed brig, and several merchant vessels at anchor with her. At 10 p. m., five boats, manned with about 70 men, and placed under the orders of Lieutenant Thomas George Shortland, of the *Melpomène*, quitted the ships; and, amidst heavy rain, vivid lightning, and frequent squalls, all highly favourable to the enterprise, pulled for the French harbour. At 3 a. m. on the 4th, the boats were alongside of, and, after more resistance than had been anticipated, carried, the French 14-gun brig (4-pounders), *Aventurier*, commanded by Lieutenant René-Gillaume Raffi, and manned with a crew of 79 men. The gallant defence made by the brig cost the French 16 men wounded, several of them mortally; while the loss on the part of the British amounted to no more than one seaman killed, and one missing, and one midshipman (Mr. Frost) and three seamen wounded.

A difficult part of the enterprise still remained to be executed. The forts that commanded the Corigiou inlet, alarmed at what had taken place, now opened their fire; and the wind, having veered round to north-north-west, blew a fresh gale directly into the passage, the narrowness and intricacy of which rendered any attempt to beat out doubly hazardous. The brig, however, was presently under sail; and leaving the merchant vessels to some more favourable opportunity, Lieutenant Shortland, after being exposed, during two hours, to a heavy fire from the French batteries, brought out his prize without incurring any additional loss. The Childers had stood in to cover the boats, but, owing to the badness of the night and the dangers of the coast, with considerable risk. Viewed in every point, this boat-attack was a highly creditable affair to all who were engaged in it, not excepting the officers and crew of the French brig. Soon after his return into port, Lieutenant Shortland, for the gallantry he had displayed on the occasion, was most deservedly promoted to the rank of commander.

On the 7th of August, at 5 p. m., Cape Windmill, near Gibraltar, bearing north-east by north distant four or five leagues, the British brig-sloop *Espoir*, of fourteen 6-pounders and 80 men and boys, Captain Loftus Otway Bland, having in charge a part of the *Oran* convoy, discovered a large ship seemingly steering to cut off some of the vessels. The *Espoir* immediately hauled out from the convoy, and made all sail to meet the stranger, evidently a man of war; and who, at a little before 7 p. m., hove to for the former. The *Espoir*, as soon as she arrived within musket-shot, hoisted her colours; but the *Liguria*, instead of displaying hers, waited till the *Espoir* reached her weather quarter, and then hailed.

On the hail's being answered, an officer on board the *Liguria* desired the commander of the *Espoir*, in very good English, to go to leeward and strike, or he would sink him, enforcing his threat by one shot, and instantly afterwards by the *Liguria's*

whole broadside; a salute, which, in well practised hands, might have rendered all further hailing unnecessary, unless on the part of the *Espoir* to save her drowning crew. As a proof, the *Liguria* mounted 26 carriage-guns, of various calibers, namely, 12 long "18-pounders," four long "12-pounders," and 10 long 6-pounders; also 12 long wall-pieces, and four swivels; and her crew consisted of 120 men of all nations.

The *Espoir*, notwithstanding her decided inferiority of force, was not slow in returning her adversary's broadside; and the two vessels continued a very heavy fire of great guns and musketry, until 10 h. 45 m. P. M., when the captain of the *Liguria*, Don Francisco de Orso, hailed the *Espoir*, begging her not to fire any more, as he was a Genoese. Captain Bland replied, that the *Espoir* was a British man of war, and ordered him to lower all his sails, and come on board. No attention being paid to this mandate, and the *Liguria* shooting ahead, as if to gain a raking position, the *Espoir* again brought her broadside to bear; and Captain Bland, judging very properly that his opponent's force was not to be trifled with, gave it to her with full effect. The *Liguria* again returned the fire; but, on the *Espoir*'s shooting ahead and tacking to fire her opposite broadside, the *Liguria*'s captain once more hailed, begging the *Espoir* not to fire again, and saying that he was badly wounded, but would obey Captain Bland's orders immediately. This was about 11 P. M., and instantly the *Liguria* lowered down her sails, and all firing ceased.

In this action of her own seeking, the pirate (for such the *Liguria* was) lost her boatswain and six men killed, her commander (dangerously) and 13 men wounded. The *Espoir* lost her master, Mr. Solsby, killed, and six men wounded, two of them badly.

It was fortunate for the *Espoir* that the Genoese were not, as we noticed before, practised men-of-war's men; or the brig's temerity, in risking a combat with an enemy of so formidable a force, might have ended in her discomfiture. The promptitude, bravery, and seamanship displayed throughout this long and harassing engagement, reflected great honour on Captain Bland, his officers, and brig's company. On the other hand, some allowance must be made for the indifferent crew, as well as for the inconvenient variety of calibers among the guns, of the Genoese ship. Few actions have been made more of by the painter than the action of the *Espoir* and *Liguria*. An engraving from the pencil of Pocock, representing "L'Espoir sloop of 14 guns, and her prize, the *Liguria* of 44 guns," appears in the *Naval Chronicle*, vol. vi., p. 277. The latter ship is there represented with 22 guns on the main deck, 18 on the quarterdeck, and two or four on the forecastle. One can hardly suppose that so respectable a man as Mr. Pocock would have put his name to a drawing, unless it was founded on reality.

But the matter might have been placed beyond a doubt, had Captain Bland, in his official letter, described the situation of the different guns of his prize; particularly, how many of them she mounted on the main deck. Were it not for Mr. Pocock's drawing, the inference would be, that the *Liguria* mounted 16 guns (12 and 8 pounders, rather than 18 and 12) on the main deck, and 10 sixes on the quarterdeck and forecastle, with the wall-pieces and swivels, for which there was ample room, arranged in the usual manner. The ship then might have measured about 450 or 500 tons, and would still have been more than a match for the *Espoir*, whose size was only 215 tons.

On his return home, Captain Bland, very deservedly, was made a post-captain. His commission as such bears date on the 25th of September, 1798, and his commission as a commander, on the 1st of October, 1797; yet a contemporary says that, for his action with the *Liguria*, "Lieutenant" Bland was promoted to the rank of "commander and post-captain,"* two steps which, now at least, require a twelvemonth to intervene.

On the 7th of August, at daybreak, the British 44-gun frigate *Indefatigable*, Captain Sir Edward Pellew, cruising between the river Gironde and the Isle of Ré, fell in with, and, after a 24 hours' chase and the discharge of a few guns, captured, the French ship-corvette *Vaillante*, of 20 long 8-pounders and 175 men, commanded by Lieutenant la Porte, and bound to Cayenne; to which she was carrying 25 banished priests, 27 convicts, and Madame Rovère and family.

Being a fine new coppered and copper-fastened ship of 508 tons, the *Vaillante* became an acquisition to the British navy; to which, under the name of *Danaë*, and established with 20 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long sixes on the main deck, and 12 carronades 12-pounders, on the quarterdeck and fore-castle, total 34 guns, with a net complement of 153 men and boys, she was forthwith transferred.

Here is a forcible illustration of the way in which the British usually equip French ships of war, particularly corvettes: they give them more guns, and fewer men, than they were ever intended to carry. If, when thus burdened with top-hamper,† the ship sails badly or upsets, the fault is laid to the manner of her construction, and a general anathema is pronounced upon "French corvettes." A contemporary, indeed, declares that "hundreds" of valuable British seamen perished in them, and that they were "totally unfit for his majesty's service."‡ He cites as examples, the *Cheri*, *Dorade*, *Trompeuse*, *Railleux*, and *Gentile*. The *Cheri* was a privateer, and went down, as has

* Brenton, vol. ii., p. 331.

† The *Danaë's* twelve 12-pounder carronades, with their carriages and slides, would weigh 90 cwt.

‡ Brenton, vol. ii., p. 277.

already appeared, from shot-holes received in action. Of the *Dorade*, as a British cruiser, we never heard. The *Trompeuse* and *Railleur* were privateers; and the *Gentile* was a frigate, captured in 1795 and broken up in 1802. What can be alleged against such "flush-decked corvettes" in the British service as the *Arab*, *Cormorant*, *Gaieté*, *Constance*, and, above all, *Bonne-Citoyenne*?

On the 12th of August, at noon, latitude $46^{\circ} 12'$ north, longitude $18^{\circ} 23'$ west, the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Hazard*, mounting 24 or 26 guns, long sixes and 12-pounder carronades, Captain William Butterfield, gave chase to, and at 4 p.m. came within gun-shot of, the French armed ship, *Neptune*, mounting 10, but pierced for 20 guns; those 10 guns believed to have been 6-pounders, and which, Captain Butterfield in his letter says, were all fought on one side. The *Neptune* hauled up her courses, hoisted French colours, and fired a shot at the *Hazard*. Immediately an action ensued, during which the *Neptune*, having on board, exclusive of 53 seamen, 270 troops, made several attempts under cover of a heavy fire of musketry, to board the *Hazard*; but the crew of the latter repulsed the assailants with considerable loss, and, at the end of one hour and 50 minutes, compelled the French ship to strike her colours.

The *Hazard* received a few shot in her hull, and had her rigging slightly injured. Her loss amounted to only six men wounded. The *Neptune*, on the other hand, was a good deal cut up in hull, masts, and rigging, and lost, according to the representation of her officers, between 20 and 30 in killed and wounded together. A privateer, with French colours flying, was in sight to leeward during the whole of the action. Captain Butterfield's situation, even after he had made the French ship his prize, could not have been the most comfortable; as he had nearly 300 prisoners to keep in subjection, with a crew, owing to a prize which the *Hazard* had manned and sent away, of scarcely 100 men and boys.

At the close of our account of the battle of the Nile, it was stated that the British 50-gun ship *Leander*, Captain Thomas Boulden Thompson, had sailed on the 6th of August, from before Alexandria, with Rear-admiral Sir Horatio Nelson's despatches, addressed to the commander-in-chief on the Mediterranean station.

On the 18th, at daybreak, being within five or six miles of the west end of Goza di Candia, the *Leander* discovered in the south-east quarter, standing directly for her, a large sail, evidently a ship of the line; and which, although the *Leander* lay becalmed, was bringing up a fine breeze from the southward. The *Leander* being upwards of 80 men short of complement, and having on board several that were wounded in the Nile action, Captain Thompson did not feel himself justified in seeking a contest with a ship so superior in point of size and force; and

therefore took every practicable means to avoid it. The Leander's inferiority of sailing, however, rendered an action inevitable; and it was only left to steer such a course, as would enable her to receive her powerful adversary to the best advantage.

That adversary was the French 74-gun ship *Généreux*, chef de division Lejoille, bound to Corfu, and armed, with the addition of two brass 36-pounder carronades on the forecastle, making 80 guns in all, the same as No. 4 in the table at vol. i. p. 54; while the Leander's force consisted of only 22 long 24-pounders on the lower deck, the same number of 12-pounders on the second deck, six long 6-pounders, on the quarterdeck and forecastle, and two, or rather one, for the other had been dismounted at the battle of the Nile, 12-pounder carronade on the poop, total 51 guns.*

At 8 A.M. the *Généreux*, still retaining exclusive possession of the breeze, and having by way of deception hoisted Neapolitan colours, approached within random-shot of the Leander, then steering, under every stitch of canvass she could spread, with the wind on the larboard beam. The French 74 now changed her colours to Turkish; but, from the first, her national character had been known. At 9 A.M. the *Généreux* ranged up, within half gun-shot, on the Leander's larboard and weather quarter. Finding that an action was inevitable, the Leander shortened sail, and hauled up until her broadside could be brought to bear. The *Généreux* now fired a shot ahead of the Leander and the latter immediately replied to it by a broadside.

A vigorous cannonade thus commenced on both sides; and the two ships continued nearing each other, keeping up a constant and heavy fire, until 10 h. 30 m. A.M., when the *Généreux* evinced a disposition to run her opponent on board. Such was the shattered state of the latter's rigging, sails, and yards, and so light the breeze, that the latter could make no movement to evade the shock. The French 74, accordingly, struck the British 50 on the larboard bow, and, dropping alongside, with a crash that bent double several of the Leander's lowerdeck ports, continued there for some time.

A spirited and well-directed fire, however, from the Leander's remnant of marines, stationed on the poop, and commanded by the sergeant (no officer having arrived on board to succeed Lieutenant Robinson killed at Teneriffe), and from the small-arm men on the quarterdeck, prevented the crew of the *Généreux*, numerous as they were, from taking advantage of the juxtaposition of the ships; and the Frenchmen every time they attempted to board, were driven back with loss. Meanwhile

* A contemporary mistates the force of both ships. He gives the *Généreux* two guns too many on each of her principal decks, and calls her 8-pounders 12s. For the Leander's six 6-pounders, he substitutes eight 9s. Brenton, vol. ii., p. 322.

such of the great guns of both ships, as would bear, continued in full activity.


After an interval of calm, a light air sprang up, still from the southward; and the *Généreux*, being from her lofty sails the first to feel its effects, forged ahead, and disentangled herself from the *Leander*, now lying with her mizenmast over the starboard quarter, her fore topmast over the larboard bow, and both her lower yards on the booms. The *Généreux*, soon afterwards, coming up in the wind on the starboard tack, the *Leander*, who by the aid of her spritsail had succeeded in wearing, was enabled to luff under the stern of her antagonist. The opportunity was not lost, and the *Leander* deliberately discharged into the *Généreux* every gun upon her starboard broadside, which the wreck of her spars did not cover.

The breeze again died away, and the sea became as smooth as glass; but no intermission took place in the mutual cannonade: it continued with unabated fury, until 3 h. 30 m. P. M. By this time the *Généreux* having, by the aid of a light breeze, paid round off upon her heel, stood athwart the hawse of the *Leander*, and stationed herself on the latter's larboard bow.* Here, unfortunately, the greater part of the guns, the foremost ones in particular, lay disabled with the wreck of the fallen spars. This gave a check to the *Leander*'s firing, and the *Généreux* took that opportunity of hailing, to know if the British ship surrendered.

The *Leander* was now totally ungovernable, having her lower yards on the booms, and no stick standing, save the bowsprit and the shattered remains of the fore and main masts: the ship's hull was also cut to pieces, and her decks were strewn on every side with killed and wounded. The *Généreux*, on the other hand, having lost only her mizen topmast, was gradually passing along the *Leander*'s larboard beam, as if intending to take up a position across her stern. In the defenceless state of the British ship, what other reply to the question of surrender could be given, than an affirmative? It was given, by holding out a pike with a French jack at the end of it, and the *Généreux* took possession of her comparatively insignificant, but far from easily-won prize: not, however, by a boat, for the *Leander* had left the *Généreux* no boat in a situation to take the water, but by the French ship's boatswain, and one of her enseignes, or midshipmen, after they had swum on board.

An action so celebrated, and so truly creditable to the weaker party, we are happy to be able to illustrate with a diagram.

* "Starboard" in the Gazette, but we believe a misprint.



In this six hours' close and bloody conflict, the *Leander* lost three midshipmen (Peter Downs, — Gibson, and Edward Haddon), 24 seamen, one sergeant (Dair), and seven private marines killed, her commander (badly, in three places), Captain Berry (slightly*), two lieutenants (Watkinson Bridges Taylor and William Swiney), her master (Michael Lee), boatswain (Mr. Mathias, badly), one master's mate (John Leckey), one midshipman (Mr. Nailor), 41 seamen, and nine private marines wounded—total, 35 killed and 57 wounded. This was a full third of her gallant crew; for, having left one lieutenant, one midshipman, and fifty men on board the prizes of Aboukir bay, and been originally short of her complement, the *Leander* had commenced the action with only 282 men and boys, including her 14 wounded in the Nile battle, and, we believe, her two passengers, Captain Edward Berry and a Mr. William Hill.

The *Généreux*, having received on board a portion of the *Timoléon's* crew,† as well as, on the day previous, when she parted company with the *Guillaume-Tell*, a number of men from her, had commenced the action with 936 men and boys. Of these, according to the information given by some of her officers to the late officers of the *Leander*, the *Généreux* sustained a loss of about 100, including her first lieutenant, killed, and 188 wounded; sufficient in amount, even admitting it to be slightly overrated, to prove that the 74's thick sides were not impenetrable to the 50-gun ship's comparatively light, but liberally bestowed, and well-directed shot. Some of the crew of the *Généreux* were even killed upon her orlop deck; and nothing but the smoothness of the water saved the French ship's foremast, which had been struck by 23 of the *Leander's* shot,

* By "part of a man's skull, which was driven through his arm."—*Naval Chronicle*, vol. xv., p. 180.

† See p. 173.

and was left at last with only one shroud of a side to support it.

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		LEANDER.	GENEREUX.
Broadside-guns	{ No. .	26	40
	{ lbs. .	432	1024
Crew	No. .	282	936
Size	tons. .	1052	1926

Where is there a single-ship action which has conferred greater honour upon the conqueror than in this instance lights upon the conquered? Such a defence is unparalleled, even in the British navy, where to be brave is scarcely a merit. Nothing, however, is without its alloy. Captain Thompson had the misfortune to be compelled to yield up his brave crew and himself to, we are sorry to say, a man who, by his subsequent treatment of his prisoners, disgraced both the profession he served in, and the country that employed him.

No sooner had the French midshipman and boatswain got on board the prize, than they began laying their hands upon every thing within their reach. The chief matter of surprise here is, that the *Leander's* people should have permitted such spoliations, when, in the twinkling of an eye, they might have thrown the plunderers back into the element out of which they had just before raised them. Never was there a finer illustration of the opinion entertained by honourable minds, of the duties which a state of surrender imposes, than the non-resistance of the *Leander's* crew under treatment so oppressive; the lions were now changed to lambs; and all the British crew did was, to hasten in patching up a boat, as well to convey Captain Thompson and his principal officers on board of the *Généreux*, as to bring back from the latter some officer of high rank, and, it was hoped, of more honourable feelings, than the one they had been forced to receive.

Captain Thompson and his officers soon found, to their cost, how fallaciously they had judged of the French captain and his lieutenants. By these the British were plundered of every thing, save very little more than the clothes on their backs. Captain Thompson owned a very large stock of shirts; but Captain Lejoille would allow him to retain three only, tied up in a handkerchief; and, in exchange for all the remainder of his clothes, gave him an old great-coat; the wretch refused to the gallant officer even his cot, although badly wounded.

In vain did Captain Thompson and his officers expostulate with the captain on this harsh treatment: in vain they reminded him of the very opposite treatment experienced by the French officers taken prisoners at the battle of the Nile. Captain Lejoille, with perfect nonchalance, answered, "*J'en suis fâché, mais le fait est, que les Français sont bons au pillage.*" Captain Berry expressed a wish to have returned to him a pair of pistols,

of which he had been plundered. They were produced by the man who had taken them, and were immediately secured by the conscientious Lejoille, who told Captain Berry that he would give him a pair of French pistols to protect him on his journey home; that promise, it need scarcely be added, was never fulfilled.*

In short, Captain Thompson and his people experienced, while on board this French ship of the line, acts of cruelty that would have disgraced a Barbary corsair. The French carried their inhumanity to such a pitch, that, just as the surgeon of the *Leander* had commenced performing the necessary operations upon the wounded, they robbed him of his instruments; and the severe wounds of Captain Thompson had nearly proved fatal, by a refusal to allow his surgeon to visit him! It was actually not until after the *Généreux* and her prize had arrived at Corfu, which was on the 1st of September, that Captain Thompson could get the attendance of Mr. Mulberry to extract the musket-ball which had entered his arm; nor was that even then accomplished, until the latter gentleman had been smuggled on board the French ship unknown to her barbarian of a captain.

A sailor's wardrobe being scarcely worth plundering, Captain Lejoille found other means of turning to his advantage the resources of the poor fellows who had been in that capacity on board the *Leander*. Those who had been allowed to remain in the prize, were obliged to rig her with jury-masts, and refit her for the voyage to Corfu; and those who had been transhipped to the *Généreux*, were compelled to splice the whole of that ship's damaged rigging, before any other food was served out to them than bread and water.

On the 28th of August, while the *Généreux*, having the *Leander* in tow, was proceeding with her to Corfu, the 16-gun brig-sloop *Mutine*, Captain the Honourable Thomas Bladen Capel, bound as we have already stated, to Naples, with duplicates of the despatches with which the *Leander* had been charged, hove in sight; and such was the alarm on board the *Généreux*, at even this puny force, that the Frenchmen were preparing to secure the prisoners below, cast off the prize, and make the best of her way into port without her. Had the *Mutine* been rigged with three masts instead of two, and approached somewhat nearer than she did, the *Généreux*, in all probability, would have fled, and the *Leander* been recaptured. Captain Capel, however, as appears by the subjoined letter to Rear-admiral Nelson, written on the arrival of the *Mutine* at Naples, mistook the two vessels for ships of greater force; and that under circumstances of rather an extraordinary nature. "On the 28th of August," says Captain Capel, "in latitude

* Naval Chronicle, vol. xiv., p. 10.

37° 45', longitude 16° 50', I fell in with two line-of-battle ships, one under three jury topmasts, the second had a jury mizen topmast, having the other ship in tow. I passed so close as to make their hulls out distinctly. I also showed them French colours, which they answered by the same; and I have not the smallest doubt, from those circumstances, and the perfect recollection I have of the *Guillaume-Tell* and the *Généreux*, that it was those ships: they were steering to the north-east, apparently for Corfu.*

The sufferings of the *Leander's* men did not cease with the arrival of the two ships at Corfu. The republican authorities there seem to have considered the example of Captain Lejoille and his officers worthy of imitation to the very letter; and, with all their characteristic hardihood, the seamen, more especially the wounded portion of them, nearly perished under the load of ill-treatment which was continued to be heaped upon them.†

At length the principal part of the officers, late belonging to the *Leander*, were allowed to return home on their parole; but Captain Lejoille actually detained the carpenter, Thomas Jarrat, because he refused to furnish him with the dimensions of the *Leander's* masts and yards. Several of the seamen also were compelled to remain at Corfu; and when, at a subsequent day, a Turco-Russian squadron was blockading the *Généreux* in the port, Captain Lejoille tried to persuade some of the *Leander's* men, of whose prowess he had received so indubitable a proof, to assist him in forcing his way out to sea. But the noble fellows lent a deaf ear to all the French captain's promises of reward; and, in particular, a maintopman, named George Bannister, replied, "No, you d—d French r—l, give us back our little ship, and we'll fight you again till we sink."

Had Captain Thompson found an enemy in such a man as Captain Bergeret,‡ or in any one of those by whom Captain Bligh of the *Alexander* had been captured,§ or, in short, any among 50 other French officers that might be named, his persevering defence of his ship, his noble support of the flag under which he served, would have gained him the esteem of his conqueror. Far from plundering, he would have protected him. Far from belying him, he would have told a plain tale of his own good fortune. Far from wishing to degrade his prisoner,

* Clarke and M'Arthur's *Life of Nelson*, vol. ii., p. 97.

† See letter from Mr. Stanley, the British Consul at Trieste, in *Naval Chronicle*, vol. xiv., p. 11.

‡ While a prisoner in England, (see vol. i., p. 464,) Captain Bergeret was permitted to go to France on his parole, to endeavour to effect an exchange between himself and Sir Sidney Smith; but, failing in his object, he returned to England. Sir Sidney having in the mean time escaped, the British government, with a proper feeling, gave Captain Bergeret his liberty.

§ See vol. i. p. 183.

that he might make him a stepping-stone to his own exaltation, he would have paid him the homage one brave man pays to another; he would even have endeavoured to heighten, rather than to diminish, the splendour of a resistance, which to overcome had cost him so dearly.

In the former edition of this work we gave an extract from, and commented rather severely upon, a letter, or rather the translation of a letter, bearing the signature of the captain of the *Généreux*, and transcribed at length in several English publications. We have since sought in vain among the French newspapers for the original of this letter, and begin to doubt whether it ever appeared at all in a French dress. The alleged writer, we now find, has long ceased to be among the living. We will not, therefore, make use of the contents of what has the appearance of being a spurious production, to heap additional disgrace upon the memory of Captain Lejoille.

In a respectable French historical work, from which we are in the habit of occasionally quoting, is a brief notice of the Leander's capture, as fairly stated in one part, as it is unfairly, or rather, to those who know the facts, ludicrously stated in another. The account represents the Leander to have mounted 50 guns, "*cinquante canons*," and to have fought the *Généreux* "four hours." Then follows in a note the following just remark; "*Le poids des boulets d'une bordée du vaisseau français était double de celui des boulets d'une bordée du Leander, et la coque de ce vaisseau offrait infiniment moins de résistance. Notre impartialité nous fait un devoir de mentionner cette circonstance, qui devient honorable pour les défenseurs du vaisseau ennemi.*"

This is truly refreshing, after the highly exaggerated accounts of the *Généreux's* performance, which we recollect to have read in two or three numbers of the *Moniteur*. We wish the writer's "impartiality" had stimulated him to make further inquiry before he gave insertion to what follows, and which we shall first present in English: "Lejoille possessed yet further claims (alluding to his alleged valorous conduct at the battle of the Nile) to the esteem of his enemies, by the manner in which he treated the two English captains whom the chances of war had thrown into his power. After having paid them every imaginable attention, he sent them on their parole to England, the moment the captain of the Leander was sufficiently recovered of his wounds to support the journey." "*Lejoille acquit encore de nouveaux droits à l'estime de ses ennemis par la manière dont il traita les deux capitaines anglais que le sort des armes avait fait tomber en son pouvoir. Après avoir eu pour eux toutes les attentions imaginables, il les renvoya sur parole en Angleterre, aussitôt que le commandant du Leander fut assez bien rétabli de ses blessures pour supporter le voyage.*"*

At length Captains Thompson and Berry, with most of the *Leander's* officers, reached their native country. The court-martial, which sat on Captain Thompson, his officers and men, for the loss of their ship, was held on the 17th of December, 1798, at Sheerness, on board the *America* 64. The following was the sentence pronounced: "The court having heard the evidence brought forward in support of Captain Thompson's narrative of the capture of the *Leander*, and having very maturely and deliberately considered the whole, is of opinion, that the gallant and almost unprecedented defence of Captain Thompson, of his majesty's late ship *Leander*, against so superior a force as that of the *Généreux*, is deserving of every praise his country and this court can give; and that his conduct, with that of the officers and men under his command, reflects not only the highest honour on himself and them, but on their country at large, and the court does therefore most honourably acquit Captain Thompson, &c." The president, Captain George Tripp, then addressed the captain nearly as follows: "Captain Thompson, I feel the most lively pleasure in returning you the sword with which you have so bravely maintained the honour of your king and country; the more so, as I am convinced that when you are again called upon to draw it in their defence, you will add fresh laurels to the wreath you have already so nobly won." The thanks of the court were also given to Captain (knighted on the 12th) Sir Edward Berry; and Captain Thompson, upon his return to the shore, was saluted with three cheers by all the ships in the harbour.

Thus had Captain Thompson received from the sentence of a court-martial, as honourable an acquittal as his heart could desire; and he soon afterwards received, from the hand of his sovereign, a boon which the proudest victor usually, but not more rightfully claims, the honour of knighthood.

As every officer, who was on board the *Leander* in her action with the *Généreux*, is entitled to have his name included in the account, we are happy in having it in our power to record the names of the greater part, if not the whole, of those not already mentioned in the return of loss. Her first lieutenant was William Richardson; her second and third, and her master, appear among the wounded. Two master's mates were Jeremiah Russel and John Whitehead; a third is among the wounded. Her midshipmen were, Charles Hardy, William Reynolds, George Lemprière, John Coates, and Cæsar William Richardson; exclusive of the three killed and the one wounded; clerk, Charles Bullman; surgeon, boatswain, and carpenter have been already named. The gunner was John Burns, and the purser, Daniel Hogg. Marine officer there was none on board but sergeant Dair, and he gallantly fell at his post.

It is not a little singular that, towards the close of the preceding war, this same *Leander* had an engagement with a French

74. At midnight, on the 18th of January, 1783, while cruising in the West Indies, the *Leander*, Captain John Willet Payne (the same who commanded the *Russel* in Lord Howe's action), fell in with the French 74-gun ship *Pluton*, Captain d'Albert de Rioms, partially disabled, it appears, either by a gale or an action. The *Leander* herself commenced the attack, and soon obtained a capital raking position on the 74's starboard bow. After a smart contest of two hours, the *Pluton* sheered off, with the loss of one lieutenant and four seamen killed, and 11 seamen wounded. The loss on board the *Leander* amounted to 13 killed and wounded; the latter so badly, that two only of them survived.

On the 22d of August, at noon, the British 38-gun frigate, *Naiad*, Captain William Pierrepont, cruising off Cape Finisterre, discovered and chased a French frigate in the east-north-east, but at dark lost sight of her. Soon after midnight, however, the *Naiad* again saw the French frigate steering south-east, and continued the pursuit, with light breezes, during the remainder of the night, and until 2 p.m. the next day; when the British 44-gun frigate, *Magnanime*, Captain, the Honourable Michael De Courcy, hove in sight, and joined in the chase.

At about 5 p.m. the French 36-gun frigate, *Décade*, Captain Villeneuve, began firing her stern-chasers at her pursuers, particularly at the *Naiad*, the more advanced ship of the two; and who, at 6 h. 15 m. p.m., commenced a fire in return. After a running fight of about an hour from its commencement, but by which, as it appears, no damage or loss was inflicted on either side, the *Décade* hauled down her colours.

The frigate was last from Cayenne; whither she had carried the banished persons whom the Charente, on account of her accident, had been obliged to reland.* The *Décade* had on board a crew of 326 men, but had left at Cayenne ten of her guns: consequently, she mounted but 30 at the most, while the *Naiad* alone mounted 46, and of a heavier caliber. The prize measured 915 tons, and was added to the British navy as a 12-pounder, 36-gun frigate.

On the 7th of September, at noon, the British 38-gun frigate, *Phaëton*, Captain, the Honourable Robert Stopford, and 44-gun frigate *Anson*, Captain Philip Charles Durham, cruising in company off the French coast in the neighbourhood of the river Gironde, fell in with, and after a chase of 24 hours, captured the French 32-gun frigate *Flore*, eight days from Bordeaux, on a cruise.

Although called a frigate in Captain Stopford's letter, the *Flore*, it would appear, was not, at the time of her capture, a national frigate, but a privateer, similar to the *Citoyenne-Française*, the ship which, the first year of the war, had the

* See p. 296.

action with the *Iris*.* The *Flore*, however, had been a national frigate, and a very remarkable one, as the following account of her will show.

In the year 1757, the French frigate, *Vestale*, measuring 698 tons English, and pierced to carry 32 long 12 and 6 pounders, was launched at the port of *Hâvre*. In the spring of 1761, the *Vestale* was captured, off the *Penmarcks*, by the 28-gun frigate, *Unicorn*, the look-out ship of a British squadron cruising off *Brest*, and was added to the British navy by the name of *Flora*. In the year 1778, the *Flora* was sunk by the British, at the evacuation of *Rhode-Island*, in order that she might not fall into the hands of the Americans. The latter, however, with their accustomed ingenuity, weighed the frigate, and then sold her to her original masters, the French government; from whose service, on account probably of her age and comparatively small dimensions, she appears to have been finally dismissed at the conclusion of the peace in 1783.

On the 24th of October, at 8 A. M., the *Texel* bearing south by east, distant 10 leagues, the British 18-pounder, 36-gun frigate, *Sirius*, Captain Richard King, while reconnoitring that port, fell in with two Dutch ships of war, one the 36-gun frigate, *Furie*, Captain Pletz, the other, the 24-gun corvette, *Waakzaamheid*, Captain Neirop; but the ships were not in a situation for mutual support, being about two miles apart. Passing within gun-shot of the former, which was the leewardmost, the *Sirius* stood on until she could nearly fetch the *Waakzaamheid*. At about 9 A. M., Captain King, having thus, as was his object, prevented the junction of the two ships, fired at and brought to the *Waakzaamheid*, who immediately discharged a lee gun, and hauled down her colours.

As soon as possession was taken of the *Waakzaamheid*, the prisoners removed, and a prize-crew put on board, the *Sirius* made sail after the *Furie*; who, the instant she had witnessed the bloodless surrender of her commodore (for Captain Neirop was the senior officer), bore up, and, by the time the *Sirius* was ready for pursuit, had nearly escaped out of sight. By 5 P. M., however, the *Sirius* had the good fortune to overtake the escaping ship. A running action now ensued, at times within musket-shot distance, the *Furie* returning the heavy fire of the *Sirius*, with a smart but ill-directed discharge of cannon and musketry. This continued for about half an hour; when the *Furie*, having her hull, masts, rigging, and sails much cut up, surrendered. The damage done to the *Sirius* was but trifling, she having only received a shot through her bowsprit, had her rigging and sails a little injured, and one man wounded by a musket-ball.

The guns of the *Sirius*, a frigate of 1049 tons, were 44 in

* See vol. i., p. 91.

number, similar to those of the *Phœbe* at a preceding page. The 36 guns of the *Furie*, a frigate of 827 tons, were long Dutch twelves and sixes; and the 26 guns of the *Waakzaamheid*, a ship of 504 tons, were all, except two brass sixes, long Dutch eights: two of these also brass and, we believe, mounted in the bridle-ports. Even then, 24 ports, calculated for 8 or 9 pounder guns, appear to be a great many for a ship of 504 tons. It is true, that the *Waakzaamheid* had two ports of a side on a lower or birth-deck; but the official letter expressly states, that she mounted 24 guns on her main deck.

The *Furie*, out of a complement, including 165 soldiers, of 328 men and boys, suffered a loss of eight men killed and 14 wounded. The *Waakzaamheid*, as we have seen, made no defence; therefore her crew, including 122 French soldiers, of 222 men and boys, escaped unhurt. This renders it unnecessary to exhibit any formal statement of the comparative force of the combatants: suffice it that, could the two Dutch ships have united their strength in defence of their flag, they would still have been hardly a match for the *Sirius*.

The two prizes contained on board, between them, 6000 stands of arms, besides other ordnance stores; which, along with the troops, they were carrying to Ireland. Both ships were purchased for the use of the British navy. One, under the name of *Wilhelmina* (a *Fury* being already in the service), became a 12-pounder 32-gun frigate; the other, under her own hard name, was, for the short time she reigned as a cruiser, attached to the 20-gun class. As a proof, too, that we had reason to doubt her having mounted, when captured, 24 guns on the main deck, 20 only were established there when the *Waakzaamheid* was fitted out in the British service.

In the latter part of November, as the British privateer-schooner *Herald*, of Jersey, Captain Thomas Pistock, was cruising off the Neapolitan coast, three French privateers commenced a furious attack upon her. Captain Pistock, by an animated address, so inspirited the *Herald's* crew, that, after an action of three hours' duration, the *Herald* beat off all three of her opponents, leaving them with shattered hulls, and a loss, between them, as reported to have been afterwards ascertained, of 30 in killed and wounded; while the British vessel had the good fortune not to lose a man.

The *Herald* was only of 80 tons, and mounted 10 guns, 3, 4, and 6 pounders, with a complement of 28 men; whereas the largest of the French privateers mounted, it is said, five long 18-pounders (one on a traversing carriage), and the other two, four 8-pounders each: consequently the united crews of the three must have amounted to at least 180 men. It is related also that, on the night of the action, a felucca, with 22 men, suddenly appeared alongside the *Herald*, with the view of carrying

her by boarding; but that a well-directed broadside from the *Herald* sent the felucca and all that were in her to the bottom.

On his arrival at Naples shortly afterwards, Captain Pistock received from all ranks, for his spirited behaviour, the highest marks of attention and respect. The Duke of Sussex, who was then at Naples, is said to have twice honoured Captain Pistock with an invitation to breakfast, and to have presented him with a hanger of considerable value, marked with the initials of his royal highness's name; and one of the prince's suite, a Mr. Veers, gave a pair of pistols to the gallant privateer's-man. The latter was also received with great attention by Sir William Hamilton, the British envoy. The brave crew of the *Herald* did not pass unnoticed; as the British merchants at Naples raised by subscription, and distributed between them, the sum of 200 dollars.

On the 7th of December, as the British 22-gun ship *Perdrix*, Captain William Charles Fahie, mounting 20 French 6-pounders and two English 12-pounder carronades, was cruising to leeward of the island of St.-Thomas, an American master gave information that his vessel, the preceding evening, had been boarded by a French ship of war, seven leagues to the eastward of Virgin-Gorda. Captain Fahie used every exertion to get to windward of the last-named island; but, owing to the prevailing strong gales, accompanied at times by heavy squalls, the *Perdrix* did not, until the 10th, effect that object. On the 11th, at daylight, a ship was discovered from the mast-head in the south-east quarter, and soon ascertained to be a cruiser. Not a moment was lost in pursuing her; and, after a 16 hours' chase, the *Perdrix* brought to close action the French privateer-ship *Armée-d'Italie*, Captain Colachy, mounting 18 guns, four of them long 12, and the remainder long 8 pounders. An animated fire was kept up for 42 minutes; when the latter, being reduced to an unmanageable wreck, struck her colours.

The damages of the *Perdrix* were confined to her rigging and sails, and, out of a crew of 153 men and boys, she escaped with only one man wounded; while the loss on board the *Armée-d'Italie*, whose crew numbered 117, amounted to six men killed and five wounded. Captain Fahie, in his official letter, highly commends the conduct of the two lieutenants of the *Perdrix*, Edward Ottley and James Smith; also of Mr. Moses Crawford, the master, and Mr. Samuel Pigenet, the purser, the latter of whom volunteered to serve on deck.

On the 5th of December the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Ambuscade*, mounting eight 24-pounder carronades beyond her 32 long-guns, or 40 guns in all, Captain Henry Jenkins, leaving some of her men in charge of a prize with which she had just arrived at Portsmouth, again set sail on a cruise off the French coast. In a few days afterwards the Am-

buscade captured a brig and a chasse-marée, and placed in charge of the former her second lieutenant and a party of her best men, receiving on board, from the two vessels, about 30 French prisoners. At this time her third lieutenant, Joseph Briggs, was confined to his cabin with a dangerous illness, and, of her complement of 212, including a large proportion of boys, no more than 190 remained.

Thus circumstanced, the Ambuscade, on the 14th, at 7 A. M., while lying to off the port of Bordeaux, in momentary expectation of being joined by the 32-gun frigate Stag, Captain Joseph Sydney Yorke, discovered a sail coming down from the seaward. None seemed to doubt that this was the Stag; and, as the ship approached end-on, no opportunity was afforded of judging from the appearance of her hull. Accordingly, at the usual hour, the officers and men went unconcerned to breakfast. At a little before 9 A. M. the stranger had approached nearly within gun-shot; when, suddenly, she hauled close to the wind, and made all sail to get away. The mistake was now discovered: the hands were turned up; and, in a little while, the Ambuscade was under a press of sail in chase. In order to quicken her progress to windward, the hammocks were piped down. After this the Ambuscade gained upon the chase; and at length, between 11 and 12 in the forenoon, got near enough to fire a shot. This was immediately returned by the stranger, whom we may now introduce as the French 28-gun frigate, or, in the old nomenclature, when the quarterdecks of this class were not armed, "24-gun corvette," Baïonnaise, mounting 24 long French eights upon the main deck, and six long sixes, with two brass 36-pounder carronades, upon the quarterdeck, total 32 carriage-guns, besides eight large swivels mounted upon her barricade. The Baïonnaise was commanded by Lieutenant de vaisseau Jean-Baptiste-Edmond Richer, and had on board, including an officer and 30 troops which she had brought from Cayenne, a crew of at least 250 men and boys. Indeed, according to the "rôle d'équipage," found on board this same ship when destroyed by a British ship of war at a subsequent day, her established crew alone amounted to 280.

Each ship, as soon as she had fired a shot in the manner related, hoisted her colours. Soon afterwards the Baïonnaise shortened sail, and the action commenced. After it had continued about an hour, to the evident disadvantage of the French ship, one of the Ambuscade's maindeck 12-pounders, abreast of the gangway, burst. By this unfortunate accident the gangway was knocked to pieces, the boats on the boom stove, the lower sill of the port blown away even with the deck, and 11 men badly wounded. An accident of the kind never fails to damp the ardour of the bravest and best disciplined ship's company: what then must have been its effect upon a set of men so

utterly worthless, with very few exceptions, as those of the *Ambuscade*?

In the midst of the confusion consequent upon this disaster, the *Baïonnaise* made sail. The *Ambuscade* followed presently, and recommenced the action to leeward; but, coming up with a crowd of canvass, shot far ahead. The *Baïonnaise*, by this time, had sustained considerable damage in her hull, rigging, and spars, as well as a heavy loss in officers and men, including among the wounded her captain and first lieutenant; when, according to the French accounts, the commandant of the troops suggested to the only sea-officer remaining on deck, the probable success of an attempt to board.

The plan being concurred in, the helm of the French ship was put up, and the *Baïonnaise* ran foul of her opponent, carrying away, with her bowsprit, the *Ambuscade*'s starboard quarter-deck bulwark, mizen shrouds and mizen mast, and unshipped the wheel. We are left to conjecture in what state the *Ambuscade* was, to have permitted this: at all events, the ship could not have been under command. The *Baïonnaise* then dropped under the *Ambuscade*'s stern; but still remained foul, having, by the fluke of her anchor or a grappling-iron, caught the latter's rudder-chain. The French troops, from the bowsprit, the head of which had fallen with the jib-boom and spritsail yard, now commanded, with their powerful musketry, the whole range of the *Ambuscade*'s quarterdeck.

A smart fire, in return, was kept up by the remnant of the British marines. So much, however, to the disadvantage of the *Ambuscade*, that, in a very short time, her first lieutenant, Dawson Main, received a musket-shot in his groin, and was handed below, where he almost immediately expired. Directly afterwards Captain Jenkins received a shot that carried away the top of his thigh-bone. He also was necessarily taken below. Almost at the same instant Lieutenant Sinclair, of the marines, received a wound in his thigh, and then another in the shoulder: he, too, was compelled to quit his quarters. Scarcely had he been handed below, when the master, Mr. Brown, was shot through the head, and fell on the deck amidst a heap of killed and wounded. The only surviving lieutenant, Joseph Briggs, had come out of his sick cot to take a part in the action: he was wounded in the head. After this, the command devolved upon Mr. William Bowman Murray, the purser.

The gunner now came on deck, and reported that the ship was on fire abaft; whereupon the majority of the surviving crew, apprehensive of the magazine, quitted their quarters and went below; where they remained, in spite of every endeavour of Mr. Murray to rally them. The alarm was occasioned by the explosion of some cartridges, carelessly left upon the rudder-head during the discharge of a gun through the cabin windows

into the bow of the *Baïonnaise*; an accident which, besides the fatal panic it caused, badly wounded every man at the gun, and blew out a part of the *Ambuscade's* stern, and shattered the jollyboat that had been hanging there. In the height of all this confusion, the French soldiers, followed by the crew of the *Baïonnaise*, of whose bowsprit they made a bridge, rushed upon the now nearly abandoned quarterdeck of the *Ambuscade*; and, after a very short struggle, possessed themselves of the British frigate.

The loss sustained by the *Ambuscade* amounted to 10 killed, and 36 wounded; including, among the former, her first lieutenant and master, and, among the latter, her captain very dangerously, third and only surviving lieutenant, and a lieutenant of marines. The loss on the part of the *Baïonnaise* appears, by the French accounts, to have amounted to 30 killed, and 30 badly wounded; including, among the former, the officer in command of the troops, and, among the latter, Captain Richer and his first lieutenant. The number of slightly wounded is not stated; but the whole wounded, if they bore something less even than in the usual proportion to the killed, could not have amounted to fewer than from 60 to 70 men.

Few actions in the accounts of them, have been worse handled than that of the *Ambuscade* and *Baïonnaise*. The English historians have been either too sensitive to touch upon it, or more than usually negligent in supplying themselves with details. Captain Schomberg, who in vol. iii., comprises his account in about 30 lines, calls the *Baïonnaise* a French "privateer" of 32 guns. It was, however, some excuse, that even the sentence of the court-martial upon Captain Jenkins, as published, avoided naming the ship by which the *Ambuscade* had been captured. In the dreadfully wounded state of Captain Jenkins and his few surviving officers, it was as much as he and they could do, merely to enumerate the guns mounted by the *Baïonnaise*. This they did, stating them at 32, but of what calibers, or whether a part of them were not swivels, they left unexplained. Next came a paragraph in the *Moniteur*, stating in an official manner, that the English frigate *Ambuscade*, of 40 guns, had been captured by the French corvette *Baïonnaise*, of 20 guns. Thus was the British public left to decide to which account they would give credit; one of them not very flattering, the other quite humiliating, to the national pride.

We have now before us a French engraving of this action, underneath which is inscribed, "*La Baïonnaise, corvette française, de vingt-quatre canons de huit, prenant à l'abordage l'Embuscade, frégate anglaise, de vingt-six canons de seize, le vingt-neuf Décembre, 1798. Dessinée et gravée par les ordres de Monsieur l'Amiral Bruix, ministre de la marine et des colonies.*" The statement, that one ship mounted "24 guns," waits but to be explained until we read that the other mounted "26 guns." The

fact is, much to the credit of Admiral Bruix, where a different mode of stating the guns would have cast a greater slur upon the British vessel, the maindeck guns of each ship are all that are enumerated. The print represents a full broadside view of the *Baïonnaise*, without a single port obscured by smoke. She has 12 guns run out on her main deck, with a bow or bridle port, making 13 ports in all. Her forecastle is without a bulwark, and, of course without guns; but the exposed side of her quarterdeck shows four ports, with guns in them, the aftermost one apparently a carronade: four swivels also appear, mounted in their usual place along the top of the barricade. Here, then, we have, as admitted by the French themselves, 30 long guns and two carronades; comprising the number stated, not only by the officers of the *Ambuscade*, but by those of the *Ardent*, which ship, at a subsequent day, drove on shore and destroyed this same *Baïonnaise*.

We may here remark, that the drawing is executed in a masterly manner, and is minute even to a block. The stern of the English ship, of which there is a full view, agrees, in all the carved work, and in every other particular, with the stern of the *Ambuscade*, according to the sheer-draught of the ship at the navy-office, which we have inspected. This commendable accuracy affords a lesson to English naval painters. The *Baïonnaise*, at each of whose lower yard-arms a grappling-iron is suspended, perfectly resembles in her general appearance, as far as our information extends, the several captured ships of her class. These were the *Bienvenue*, *Mignonne*, *Belette*, *Blonde*, *Tourterelle*, *Unité*, *Républicaine*, and a few others; all of which ships mounted, like the *Baïonnaise*, 24 long eights on the main deck. Besides these guns, the *Tourterelle* had six, and the *Républicaine* eight, brass 36-pounder carronades on the quarter-deck; the others, long 6-pounders, with or without carronades. The established complement of the class appears to have been at this time, however it may afterwards have been increased in the case of the *Baïonnaise*, 220 men and boys; and the size of the captured ships, except in the cases of the *Bienvenue* and *Mignonne*, whose measurements, having been taken in foreign dock-yards, are, as we shall hereafter show, not to be relied upon, varied only between 579 and 581 tons. The *Ambuscade* measured 684 tons; and, believing the picture, from which this engraving was taken, to have been that "displayed in the Louvre, and shown in the Luxembourg in 1821," we cannot concur with a contemporary in the statement, that "the size of the British ship was as much magnified beyond, as that of her opponent was diminished below, the real fact."* On the contrary, we think that here, as in the minutiae of detail already noticed, English naval artists have something to learn.

* Brenton, vol. ii., p. 372.

We wish we could speak as favourably of an account in a recently published French work of general respectability, as we have been induced to do of Vice-admiral Bruix's picture. The gist of that account is, that the Baïonnaise "de vingt canons de 8" captured the Ambuscade, "portant quarante-deux bouches à feu de 18, 24, et 6."* We have known cases wherein a French minister of marine's account, on a point of pure naval concern especially, might even exceed the bounds of moral probability, and yet be maintained as true by a French historical writer. We now find, that it is only when no other French account exceeds it in exaggeration, that such implicit reliance is placed.

The disparity of force, in guns at all events, which did really exist between the Ambuscade and Baïonnaise, should, and, but for a succession of untoward accidents, doubtless would, have led to a very different result. The bursting of a gun on board a ship is irremediable. Who knows but that the next gun, and every gun in succession along the side, may prove equally treacherous. They are all of the same caliber, were put on board at the same time, and cast at the same foundry. If the man who had loaded the gun survived the explosion, he would naturally insist, whatever was the fact, that no more than the proper charge had been used. Hence, the ship's company would attribute the misfortune to some flaw in the gun; whether the effect of original construction, or of age or negligence, no matter. After the occurrence of such an accident, the remaining guns are seldom well loaded, or well pointed. Many shots would have been thrown away, and much injury from the enemy's unabated fire be sustained, ere that confidence, which is so necessary towards success, would again reign throughout the ship.

The gun-force of the Ambuscade, even while the cannonade lasted, was of little comparative effect; and as soon as the Baïonnaise got on board her adversary, it gave place to musketry. Here a new species of contest commenced; a contest in which the French ship from superior numbers had some, and, from superior tactics and other circumstances, many advantages. Thirty veterans of the famous regiment of Alsace, headed by an enterprising officer, and assisted by a French crew of more than seven times their number, stood opposed to about 20 young marines, and 170 seamen (officers, men, and boys), of whom three fourths, we mean of the men, were the scum of the British navy. Nor had the sailors been improved in discipline, or in love for the service, by the partial and ill-judged conduct of Captain Jenkins; who, it seems, had brought with him from the 74-gun ship Carnatic a party of seamen, whom he styled the "Gentlemen Carnatics;" distinguishing those he found on board the frigate, by the opprobrious epithet of "Blackguard Ambus-

* Victoires et Conquêtes, tome x., p. 427.

cedes." Captain Jenkins thus raised two parties in his ship; and it may easily be conceived by which he was abandoned in the hour of trial. The early fall of the principal officers, the explosion in the cabin, and the reported fire in the neighbourhood of the magazine, were turned to advantage by the cowardly and disaffected; and the Ambuscade was lost, under circumstances discreditable to the ship, and to every one belonging to her. There can be no doubt that Captain Jenkins, and his officers, and several of the Ambuscade's seamen and marines, were brave men: they proved themselves so in the blood they spilt at their quarters. But what excuse can be offered for not having ascertained, by the customary mode of signals, the true character of the strange ship when she first hove in sight? Had that been done, much confusion would have been avoided, and the Ambuscade might have obtained the weathergage, and thereby kept her adversary from boarding. Another ten minutes' cannonade from her 12-pounders would then, in all probability, owing to the loss which the fire of the first ten had already inflicted on the French ship, have totally reversed the issue of the battle. Why were the hammocks not brought on deck and restowed? Of what use were they, if not to shelter the men from the enemy's musketry?

After the action the two ships proceeded to Rochefort; where, on the 20th, they arrived in safety. The rejoicings of the French were loud and general; and who can say they were ill founded? It was literally, that an English frigate had been captured by a French corvette. The executive directory, to express their sense of the merits of the action, decreed that there should be paid to the officers and crew of the *Baïonnaise*, to be distributed according to the prize-law, 3500 francs (about 146*l.* sterling) for every long gun and carronade on board the Ambuscade; and the government immediately promoted Captain Richer from "lieutenant," over the next step, to "capitaine de vaisseau." This, it will be admitted, was no more than he merited; and, had the officer in command of the troops survived the action, he too would undoubtedly have been promoted. The Ambuscade was added to the French navy under the same name translated into French (*Embuscade*), but she was not, as stated in the *Moniteur*, "*une frégate neuve*," having been built as long ago as the year 1773.

Captain Jenkins and his surviving officers and ship's company as soon as they returned to England, were, as a matter of course, brought to a court-martial for the loss of the Ambuscade. The court sat on the 26th, 27th, and 28th of August, on board the *Gladiator*, in Portsmouth harbour. At the expiration of three days of the most minute and patient investigation, a sentence of acquittal was pronounced upon the captain and his surviving officers, and the loss of the ship was attributed to many of the circumstances already detailed. Part of the ship's

company were praised for their meritorious exertions, and the remainder animadverted upon for conduct of a quite opposite character. The court, however, not possessing the means of discrimination, and fearful of involving the innocent with the guilty, acquitted the whole ship's company. Captain Jenkins was still suffering under the effects of the dreadful wound he had received, and looked extremely ill. This probably operated in mitigating the sentence. Otherwise the captain no doubt would have been, if not more seriously dealt with, severely reprimanded, for the undisciplined state of his ship, and for the unseamanlike manner in which the action, from first to last, had been conducted.

COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS.—WEST INDIES.

It being found expedient for the British troops to evacuate Port-au-Prince, St.-Marc, and Arcahaye, in the island of St.-Domingo, Brigadier-general the Honourable Thomas Maitland, the British commanding officer on shore, sent a flag of truce on the 22d of April, to the Republican General Toussaint-Louverture, with a proposal for the suspension of arms, not to exceed five weeks, and for a guarantee in favour of the lives and properties of all those inhabitants who might choose to remain. These terms being agreed to, and properly ratified, the troops, stores, and such of the inhabitants as were desirous to quit, were embarked on board the *Thunderer* 74, *Abergavenny*, 54, and other British ships of war; and on the 9th of May, the republican French were put in possession of the ceded places. The ships then proceeded to Cape Nicolas-Mole, where the troops and French refugees were safely disembarked. Shortly after this the three French 36-gun frigates *Bravoure*, *Cocarde*, and *Sirène*, arrived at Cape François from Europe with supplies, and on the 4th of December got safe back to Lorient.

In the month of August the Spaniards evinced a disposition to attack the British settlement at the bay of Honduras. The regular force on shore at the post was composed of small detachments of the 63d and 6th West-India regiments and of the royal artillery, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Thomas Barrow; and the naval force consisted of only one British vessel of war, the 16-gun ship-sloop *Merlin*, Captain John Ralph Moss, lying at anchor in the port of Belize. Besides the *Merlin*, however, the following colonial gun-boats had just been fitted up, the *Towzer*, *Tickler*, and *Mermaid*, sloop-rigged, the latter with one long 9, and each of the others with one long 18 pounder, and 25 men; the schooners *Swinger* and *Teazer*, the one with four 6 and two 4-pounders, and the other with six 6-pounders, and 25 men each; and eight gun-flats, with one 9-pounder in the prow and 16 men each: making, with one supernumerary, 254 men, including officers. The *Towzer* and *Tickler* were com-

manded by two masters of merchantmen, and partly manned with their sailors: the remainder of the officers and men belonging to the flotilla consisted of volunteers from the colonial troops.

The force with which the Spaniards were preparing to make the attack consisted of about 20 schooners and sloops, armed, the greater part of them with one long 24-pounder in the bow, and two long 18s in the stern, besides from eight to 22 swivels along the waist. There were, also, 10 or 11 transports or victuallers, schooner and sloop rigged, each armed with heavy bow and stern guns, and swivels on the sides. The seamen employed on board this flotilla numbered, as was understood, about 500, and were under the orders of Captain Bocca-Negra: the troops amounted to about 2000, and were commanded by Field-marshal Arthur O'Neil.

On the 3d of September the Spaniards endeavoured to force a passage over Montego-key shoal, with five vessels, two of which carried long 18 or 24 pounders, and the provisions and stores of all of which, in order to lighten them, had been shifted to other vessels. The Tickler, Swinger, and Teazer, instantly proceeded to annoy these five Spanish vessels, and by dark, compelled them to retire. This afforded to the commanding officer of the British vessels the opportunity of drawing and destroying all the stakes and beacons which the Spaniards had placed in the narrow and intricate channel, and without the use of which none but vessels of a very light draught of water could pass. On the following day, the 4th, the attempt to pass the shoal was renewed, and defeated in a similar manner. On the 5th the same Spanish vessels, accompanied by two others, and by several launches filled with troops, endeavoured to get over the same shoal by another passage, but were repulsed, apparently with loss. On this, as well as on the two preceding days, the Spaniards expended an immense quantity of ammunition to no manner of purpose; while the British fired comparatively little, but with a steady precision that produced a sensible effect.

Having no doubt that the next effort of the Spaniards would be against St.-George's key, from which they might easily go down to the Belize, only nine miles distant, and there destroy the town and harass the inhabitants, Captain Moss, in the night of the 5th, weighed, and by noon on the following day, worked up to the key. Twelve of the heaviest among the Spanish vessels were then under way, for the purpose of making the attempt; but, on seeing the Merlin and the flotilla of gun-boats so near, the Spaniards hauled to the wind and returned to their former anchorage, between Long-key and Key-chapel.

The Spanish vessels continued working and anchoring among the shoals, at the distance of four or five miles from the Merlin and gun-boats, until the 10th; when, at 1 p. m., nine sail of armed sloops and schooners, each with a launch astern full of

men, bore down through the channel that led to the Merlin. Five smaller vessels, also with troops on board, were at anchor to windward, at the distance of about a mile and a half; and the remainder of the Spanish flotilla lay at Long-key Spit, as if awaiting the issue of the contest. The Spanish vessels approached, in line abreast, using both sails and oars; and, on arriving within long gun-shot, dropped anchor. It seeming to be their intention to board the Towzer and Tickler, which vessels lay much nearer to them than the bulk of the flotilla, Captain Moss, at 1 h. 30 m. p. m., made the signal to engage. The British immediately opened an animated and apparently destructive fire, which was returned by the Spaniards, and the cannonade lasted two hours and a half. At the end of that time the Spaniards, in evident confusion, cut their cables, and sailed and rowed off, assisted by a number of launches, which took in tow the greater part of their vessels. No man was hurt on the part of the British; but the Spaniards, from the hasty manner of their retreat, appeared not to have been so fortunate. Owing to the shoal water, the Merlin was unable to follow the Spanish vessels; and the remainder of the British flotilla, without her support, would have been no match for them. The whole therefore effected their escape. The Spaniards remained under Key-chapel until the night of the 15th, when they moved off with a light southerly wind. Some of the vessels went to Baccalar, and others to Campeachy; nor did the Spaniards again venture to attack the British possessions in Honduras bay.