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Basil, M DCC LXXXVIII [1788]

Universitätsbibliothek Basel

Shelf Mark: AO III 13-16

Persistent Link: <https://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-87728>

The history of the reign of the emperor Charles V. - Book VI

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THE
HISTORY
OF THE
REIGN
OF THE
EMPEROR CHARLES V.
BOOK VI.

UNFORTUNATELY for the reputation of Francis I. among his contemporaries, his conduct, at this juncture, appeared a perfect contrast to that of his rival, as he laid hold on the opportunity afforded him, by the Emperor's having turned his whole force against the common enemy, to revive his pretensions in Italy, and to plunge Europe into a new war. The treaty of Cambray, as has been observed, did not remove the causes of enmity between the two contending Princes; it covered up, but did

Book VI.
1535.
The causes
of a new
war between
the Empe-
ror and
Francis.

BOOK VI. not extinguish the flames of discord. Francis,
1535. in particular, who waited with impatience for a proper occasion of recovering the reputation as well as territories which he had lost, continued to carry on his negociations in different courts against the Emperor, taking the utmost pains to heighten the jealousy which many Princes entertained of his power or designs, and to inspire the rest with the same suspicion and fear: Among others, he applied to Francis Sforza, who, though indebted to Charles for the possession of the duchy of Milan, had received it on such hard conditions, as rendered him not only a vassal of the Empire, but a tributary dependant upon the Emperor. The honour of having married the Emperor's niece, did not reconcile him to this ignominious state of subjection, which became so intolerable even to Sforza, a weak and poor-spirited Prince, that he listened with eagerness to the first proposals Francis made of rescuing him from the yoke. These proposals were conveyed to him by Maraviglia, or Merveille, as he is called by the French historians, a Milanese gentleman residing at Paris; and soon after, in order to carry on the negociation with greater advantage, Merveille was sent to Milan, on pretence of visiting his relations, but with secret credentials from Francis as his envoy. In this character he was received by Sforza. But notwithstanding his care to keep that circum-

stance concealed, Charles suspecting, or having received information of it, remonstrated and threatened in such an high tone that the Duke and his ministers, equally intimidated, gave the world immediately a most infamous proof of their servile fear of offending the Emperor. As Merveille had neither the prudence nor the temper which the function wherein he was employed required, they artfully decoyed him into a quarrel, in which he happened to kill his antagonist, one of the Duke's domesticks, and having instantly seized him, they ordered him to be tried for that crime, and to be beheaded. Francis, no less astonished at this violation of a character held sacred among the most uncivilized nations, than enraged at the insult offered to the dignity of his crown, threatened Sforza with the effects of his indignation, and complained to the Emperor, whom he considered as the real author of that unexampled outrage. But meeting with no satisfaction from either, he appealed to all the Princes of Europe, and thought himself now entitled to take vengeance for an injury, which it would have been indecent and pusillanimous to let pass with impunity.

BEING thus furnished with a pretext for beginning a war, on which he had already resolved, he multiplied his efforts in order to draw in other Princes to take part in the quarrel. But all his

Book VI.
1535.

Dec. 1533.

Francis de-
stitute of
allies.

BOOK VI. measures for this purpose were disconcerted by
 1535, unforeseen events. After having sacrificed the
 honour of his house by the marriage of his son
 with Catharine of Medici, in order to gain Cle-
 ment, the death of that Pontiff had deprived
 him of all the advantages which he expected to
 derive from his friendship. Paul, his successor,
 though attached by inclination to the Imperial
 interest, seemed determined to maintain the neu-
 trality suitable to his character as the common
 father of the contending Princes. The King of
 England, occupied with domestick cares and pro-
 jects, declined, for once, engaging in the affairs
 of the continent, and refused to assist Francis,
 unless he would imitate his example, in throw-
 ing off the Papal supremacy. These disappoint-
 ments led him to solicit, with greater earnest-
 ness, the aid of the Protestant Princes associated
 by the league of Smalkalde. That he might
 the more easily acquire their confidence, he en-
 deavoured to accommodate himself to their pre-
 dominant passion, zeal for their religious tenets.
 He affected a wonderful moderation with regard
 to the points in dispute; he permitted Bellay,
 his envoy in Germany, to explain his sentiments
 concerning some of the most important articles,
 in terms not far different from those used by the
 Protestants²; he even condescended to invite

His nego-
 ciations
 with the
 German
 Protestants.

² Freheri Script. Rer. German. iii. 354, &c. Sleid.
 Hist. 178. 183. Seckend. lib. iii. 103.

Melancthon, whose gentle manners and pacifick spirit distinguished him among the Reformers, to visit Paris, that by his assistance he might concert the most proper measures for reconciling the contending sects, which so unhappily divided the church². These concessions must be considered rather as arts of policy, than the result of conviction; for whatever impression the new opinions in religion had made on his sisters, the Queen of Navarre and Dutches of Ferrara, the gaiety of Francis's own temper, and his love of pleasure, allowed him little leisure to examine theological controversies.

BUT soon after he lost all the fruits of this disingenuous artifice, by a step very inconsistent with his declarations to the German Princes. This step, however, the prejudices of the age, and the religious sentiments of his own subjects, rendered it necessary for him to take. His close union with the King of England, an excommunicated heretick; his frequent negotiations with the German Protestants; but above all, his giving publick audience to an envoy from Sultan Solyman, had excited violent suspicions concerning the sincerity of his attachment to religion. To have attacked the Emperor, who, on all occasions, made high pretensions to zeal

Irritates them.

² Camerarii Vita Ph. Melancthonis, 12°. Hag. 1655. p. 12.

BOOK VI. in defence of the Catholick faith, and at the very
1535. juncture when he was preparing for his expedition against Barbarossa, which was then considered as a pious enterprize, could not have failed to confirm such unfavourable sentiments with regard to Francis, and called on him to vindicate himself by some extraordinary demonstration of his reverence for the established doctrines of the church. The indiscreet zeal of some of his subjects, who had imbibed the Protestant opinions, furnished him with such an occasion as he desired. They had affixed to the gates of the Louvre, and other publick places, papers containing indecent reflections on the doctrines and rites of the Popish church. Six of the persons concerned in this rash action were discovered and seized. The King, in order to avert the judgments which it was supposed their blasphemies might draw down upon the nation, appointed a solemn procession. The holy sacrament was carried through the city in great pomp; Francis walked uncovered before it, bearing a torch in his hand; the Princes of the blood supported the canopy over it; the nobles marched in order behind. In the presence of this numerous assembly, the King, accustomed to express himself on every subject in strong and animated language, declared that if one of his hands were infected with heresy he would cut it off with the other, and would not spare even his own

children, if found guilty of that crime. As a Book VI.
dreadful proof of his being in earnest, the six un- 1535.
happy persons were publickly burnt before the
procession was finished, with circumstances of
the most shocking barbarity attending their exe-
cution³.

THE Princes of the league of Smalkalde, filled with resentment and indignation at the cruelty with which their brethren were treated, could not conceive Francis to be sincere, when he offered to protect in Germany those very tenets, which he persecuted with such rigour in his own dominions; so that all Bellay's art and eloquence in vindicating his master, or apologizing for his conduct, made but little impression upon them. They considered likewise, that the Emperor, who hitherto had never employed violence against the doctrines of the Reformers, nor even given them much molestation in their progress, was now bound by the agreement at Ratisbon, not to disturb such as had embraced the new opinions; and the Protestants wisely regarded this as a more certain and immediate security, than the precarious and distant hopes with which Francis endeavoured to allure them. Besides, the manner in which he had behaved to his allies at the peace of Cambray, was too recent to be

³ Belcarii Comment. Rer. Gallic. 646. Sleid. Hist. 175, &c.

BOOK VI. forgotten, and did not encourage others to rely
 1535. much on his friendship or generosity. Upon
 all these accounts, the Protestant Princes refused
 to assist the French King in any hostile attempt
 against the Emperor. The Elector of Saxony,
 the most zealous among them, in order to avoid
 giving any umbrage to Charles, would not per-
 mit Melancthon to visit the court of France,
 although that Reformer, flattered perhaps by
 the invitation of so great a monarch, or hoping
 that his presence there might be of signal ad-
 vantage to the Protestant cause, discovered a strong
 inclination to undertake the journey *.

The French
 army advan-
 ces towards
 Italy.

BUT though none of the many Princes who
 envied or dreaded the power of Charles, would
 second Francis's efforts in order to reduce and
 circumscribe it, he, nevertheless, commanded
 his army to advance towards the frontiers of
 Italy. As his sole pretext for taking arms was
 that he might chastise the Duke of Milan for his
 insolent and cruel breach of the law of nations,
 it might have been expected that the whole
 weight of his vengeance was to have fallen on
 his territories. But on a sudden, and at their
 very commencement, the operations of war took
 another direction. Charles, Duke of Savoy, one
 of the least active and able Princes of the line

* Camerarii Vita Melan. 142, &c. 415. Seckend. lib. iii.
 107.

from which he descended, had married Beatrix of Portugal, the Empress's sister. By her great talents, she soon acquired an absolute ascendant over her husband: and proud of her affinity to the Emperor, or allured by the magnificent promises with which he flattered her ambition, she formed an union between the Duke and the Imperial court, extremely inconsistent with that neutrality, which wise policy as well as the situation of his dominions had hitherto induced him to observe in all the quarrels between the contending Monarchs. Francis was abundantly sensible of the distress to which he might be exposed, if, when he entered Italy, he should leave behind him the territories of a Prince, devoted so obsequiously to the Emperor, that he had sent his eldest son to be educated in the court of Spain, as a kind of hostage for his fidelity. Clement the Seventh, who had represented this danger in a strong light during his interview with Francis at Marseilles, suggested to him, at the same time, the proper method of guarding against it, having advised him to begin his operations against the Milanese, by taking possession of Savoy and Piedmont, as the only certain way of securing a communication with his own dominions. Francis, highly irritated at the Duke on many accounts, particularly for having supplied the Constable Bourbon with the money that enabled him to levy the body of troops

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1535.

Takes possession of the Duke of Savoy's dominions.

BOOK VI. which ruined the French army in the fatal battle
1535. of Pavia, was not unwilling to let him now feel both how deeply he repented, and how severely he could punish these injuries. Nor did he want several pretexts which gave some colour of equity to the violence that he intended. The territories of France and Savoy lying contiguous to each other, and intermingled in many places, various disputes, unavoidable in such a situation, subsisted concerning the limits of their respective property; and besides, Francis, in right of his mother Louise of Savoy, had large claims upon the Duke her brother, for her share in their father's succession. Being unwilling, however, to begin hostilities without some cause of quarrel more specious than these pretensions, many of which were obsolete, and others dubious, he demanded permission to march through Piedmont in his way to the Milanese, hoping that the Duke, from an excess of attachment to the Imperial interest, might refuse this request, and thus give a greater appearance of justice to all his operations against him. But, if we may believe the historians of Savoy, who appear to be better informed with regard to this particular than those of France; the Duke readily, and with a good grace, granted what it was not in his power to deny, promising free passage to the French troops as was desired; so that Francis, as the only method now left of justifying the

measures which he determined to take, was BOOK VI.
 obliged to insist for full satisfaction with regard 1535.
 to every thing that either the crown of France or
 his mother Louise could demand of the house
 of Savoy'. Such an evasive answer, as might
 have been expected, being made to this requi-
 sition, the French army under the admiral Brion
 poured at once into the Duke's territories at
 different places. The countries of Bresse and
 Bugey, united at that time to Savoy, were over-
 run in a moment. Most of the towns in the
 dutchy of Savoy opened their gates at the ap-
 proach of the enemy; a few which attempted to
 make resistance were easily forced; and before
 the end of the campaign, the Duke saw himself
 stripped of all his dominions, but the province
 of Piedmont, in which there were not many
 places in a condition to be defended.

To complete the Duke's misfortunes, the city The city of
 of Geneva, the sovereignty of which he claimed, Geneva re-
 and in some degree possessed, threw off his yoke, covers its
 and its revolt drew along with it the loss of the liberty.
 adjacent territories. Geneva was, at that time,
 an Imperial city; and though under the direct
 dominion of its own bishops, and the remote
 sovereignty of the Dukes of Savoy, the form of
 its internal constitution was purely republican,

^s Histoire Généalogique de Savoye, par Guichenon. 2
 tom. fol. Lyon. 1660, i. 639, &c.

BOOK VI. being governed by syndics and a council chosen
1535. by the citizens. From these distinct and often
clashing jurisdictions, two opposite parties took
their rise, and had long subsisted in the state;
the one composed of the advocates for the pri-
vileges of the community, assumed the name of
Eignotz, or confederates in defence of liberty;
and branded the other, which supported the epis-
copal or ducal prerogatives, with the name of
Mammelukes or slaves. At length, the Protestant
1532. opinions beginning to spread among the citizens,
inspired such as embraced them with that bold
enterprizing spirit which always accompanied or
was naturally produced by them in their first ope-
rations. As both the Duke and Bishop were
from interest, from prejudice, and from political
considerations, violent enemies of the Reforma-
tion, all the new converts joined with warmth
the party of the *Eignotz*; and zeal for religion,
mingling with the love of liberty, added strength
to that generous passion. The rage and animos-
ity of two factions, shut up within the same
walls, occasioned frequent insurrections, which
terminating mostly to the advantage of the
friends of liberty, they daily gained ground.

The Duke and Bishop, forgetting their an-
cient contests about jurisdiction, had united
against their common enemies, and each attack-
ed them with his proper weapons. The Bishop

excommunicated the people of Geneva as guilty of a double crime; of impiety, in apostatizing from the established religion; and of sacrilege, in invading the rights of his see. The Duke attacked them as rebels against their lawful Prince, and attempted to render himself master of the city, first by surprize, and then by open force. The citizens, despising the thunder of the Bishop's censures, boldly asserted their independence against the Duke; and partly by their own valour, partly by the powerful assistance which they received from their allies, the canton of Berne, together with some small supplies both of men and money, secretly furnished by the King of France, they defeated all his attempts. Not satisfied with having repulsed him, or with remaining always upon the defensive themselves, they now took advantage of the Duke's inability to resist them, while overwhelmed by the armies of France, and seized several castles and places of strength which he possessed in the neighbourhood of Geneva; thus delivering the city from those odious monuments of its former subjection, and rendering the publick liberty more secure for the future. At the same time the canton of Berne invaded and conquered the Pays de Vaud, to which it had some pretensions. The canton of Friburgh, though zealously attached to the Catholick religion, and having no subject of contest with the Duke, laid hold on

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1535.

1534.

BOOK VI. part of the spoils of that unfortunate Prince. A
 1535. great portion of these conquests or usurpations being still retained by the two cantons, add considerably to their power, and have become the most valuable part of their territories. Geneva, notwithstanding many schemes and enterprizes of the Dukes of Savoy to re-establish their dominion there, still keeps possession of its independence, and in consequence of that blessing, has attained a degree of consideration, wealth and elegance, which it could not otherwise have reached.

The Emperor
 unable
 to assist the
 Duke of
 Savoy.

AMIDST such a succession of disastrous events, the Duke of Savoy had no other resource but the Emperor's protection, which upon his return from Tunis, he demanded with the most earnest importunity; and as his misfortunes were occasioned chiefly by his attachment to the Imperial interest, he had a just title to immediate assistance. Charles, however, was not in a condition to support him with that vigour and dispatch which the exigency of his affairs called for. Most of the troops employed in the African expedition, having been raised for that service alone, were disbanded as soon as it was

^a Hist. de la Ville de Geneve, par Spon. 12°. Utr. 1685. p. 99. Hist. de la Reformation de Suisse, par Rouchat, Gen. 1728. tom. iv. p. 294, &c. tom. v. p. 216, &c. Mém. de Bellay, 181.

finished;

finished; the veteran forces under Antonio de Leyva were hardly sufficient for the defence of the Milanese; and the Emperor's treasury was entirely drained by his vast efforts against the Infidels.

BUT the death of Francis Sforza, occasioned, according to some historians, by the terror of a French invasion, which had twice been fatal to his Family, afforded the Emperor full leisure to prepare for action. By this unexpected event, the nature of the war, and the causes of discord, were totally changed. Francis's first pretext for taking arms, in order to chastise Sforza for the insult offered to the dignity of his crown, was at once cut off; but as that Prince died without issue, all Francis's rights to the duchy of Milan, which he had yielded only to Sforza and his posterity, returned back to him in full force. As the recovery of the Milanese was the favourite object of that Monarch, he instantly renewed his claim to it; and if he had supported his pretensions by ordering the powerful army quartered in Savoy to advance without losing a moment towards Milan, he could hardly have failed to secure the important point of possession. But Francis, who became daily less enterprising as he advanced in years, and who was overawed at some times into an excess of caution by the remembrance of his past misfortunes, endeav-

Oct. 24.
Death of
Sforza Duke
of Milan.

BOOK VI. voured to establish his rights by negotiation,
1535. not by arms; and from a timid moderation,
Francis's fatal in all great affairs, neglected to improve
pretensions the favourable opportunity which presented it-
to that self. Charles was more decisive in his opera-
dutchy. tions, and in quality of sovereign, took pos-
session of the dutchy, as a vacant fief of the Em-
pire. While Francis endeavoured to explain and
assert his title to it, by arguments and memo-
rials, or employed various arts in order to recon-
cile the Italian powers to the thoughts of his re-
gaining footing in Italy, his rival was silently tak-
ing effectual steps to prevent it. The Emperor,
however, was very careful not to discover too
early any intention of this kind; but seeming to
admit the equity of Francis's claim, he appeared
solicitous only about giving him possession in
such a manner as might not disturb the peace of
Europe, or overturn the balance of power in Italy,
which the politicians of that country were so fond
of preserving. By this artifice he deceived Francis,
and gained so much confidence with the rest of
Europe, that almost without incurring any sus-
picion, he involved the affair in new difficulties,
and protracted the negotiations at pleasure.
Sometimes he proposed to grant the investiture
of Milan to the Duke of Orleans, Francis's
second son, sometimes to the Duke of Angou-
lême, his third son; as the views and inclinations
of the French court varied, he transferred his

choice alternately from the one to the other, with such profound and well-conducted dissimulation, that neither Francis nor his ministers seem to have penetrated his real intention; and all military operations were entirely suspended, as if nothing had remained but to enter quietly into possession of what they demanded.

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DURING the interval gained in this manner. Charles, on his return from Tunis, assembled the states both of Sicily and Naples, and as they thought themselves greatly honoured by the presence of their sovereign, and were no less pleased with the apparent disinterestedness of his expedition into Africa, than dazzled by the success which had attended his arms, prevailed on them to vote him such liberal subsidies as were seldom granted in that age. This enabled him to recruit his veteran troops, to levy a body of Germans, and to take every other proper precaution for executing or supporting the measures on which he had determined. Bellay, the French envoy in Germany, having discovered the intention of raising troops in that country, notwithstanding all the pretexts employed in order to conceal it, first alarmed his master with this evident proof of the Emperor's insincerity⁷. But Francis was so possessed at that time with the

1536.

Charles's preparations for war.

⁷ Mém. de Bellay, 192.

BOOK VI. 1536. rage of negotiation, in all the artifices and refinements of which his rival far surpassed him, that instead of beginning his military operations, and pushing them with vigour, or seizing the Milanese before the Imperial army was assembled, he satisfied himself with making new offers to the Emperor, in order to procure the investiture by his voluntary deed. His offers were, indeed, so liberal and advantageous, that if ever Charles had intended to grant his demand, he could not have rejected them with decency. He dexterously eluded them by declaring that, until he consulted the Pope in person, he could not take his final resolution with regard to a point which so nearly concerned the peace of Italy. By this evasion he gained some farther time for ripening the schemes which he had in view.

The Emperor enters Rome.
April 6.

THE Emperor at last advanced towards Rome, and made his publick entry into that city with extraordinary pomp; but it being found necessary to remove the ruins of an ancient temple of Peace, in order to widen one of the streets, through which the cavalcade had to pass, all the historians take notice of this trivial circumstance, which they are fond to interpret as an omen of the bloody war that followed. Charles, it is certain, had by this time banished all thoughts of peace; and at last threw off the mask, with which he had so long covered his designs from

the court of France, by a declaration of his sentiments no less singular than explicit. The French ambassadors having in their master's name demanded a definitive reply to his propositions concerning the investiture of Milan, Charles promised to give it next day in presence of the Pope and Cardinals assembled in full consistory. These being accordingly met, and all the foreign ambassadors invited to attend, the Emperor stood up, and addressing himself to the Pope, expatiated for some time on the sincerity of his own wishes for the peace of Christendom, as well as his abhorrence of war, the miseries of which he enumerated at great length, with studied and elaborate oratory; he complained that all his endeavours to preserve the tranquillity of Europe had hitherto been defeated by the restless and unjust ambition of the French King; that even during his minority he had proofs of the unfriendly and hostile intentions of that Monarch, that afterwards, he had openly attempted to wrest from him the Imperial crown which belonged to him by a title no less just than natural; that he had next invaded his kingdom of Navarre; that not satisfied with this, he had attacked his territories as well as those of his allies both in Italy and the Low Countries; that when the valour of the Imperial troops rendered irresistible by the protection of the Almighty, had checked his progress, ruined his armies, and

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1536.

His publick
invektive
against
Francis.

BOOK VI. seized his person, he continued to pursue by de-
 1536. ceit what he had undertaken with injustice; that
 he had violated every article in the treaty of
 Madrid to which he owed his liberty, and as
 soon as he returned to his dominions took mea-
 sures for rekindling the war which that pacifi-
 cation had happily extinguished; that when new
 misfortunes compelled him to sue again for
 peace at Cambray, he concluded and observed
 it with equal insincerity; that soon thereafter he
 had formed dangerous connexions with the here-
 tical Princes in Germany, and incited them to
 disturb the tranquillity of the Empire; that now
 he had driven the Duke of Savoy, his brother-
 in-law and ally, out of the greater part of his ter-
 ritories; that after injuries so often repeated, and
 amidst so many sources of discord, all hope of
 amity or concord became desperate; and though
 he was still willing to grant the investiture of
 Milan to one of the Princes of France, there was
 little probability of that event's taking place, as
 Francis, on the one hand, would not consent to
 what he judged necessary for securing the tran-
 quillity of Europe, nor, on the other, could he
 think it reasonable or safe to give a rival the un-
 conditional possession of all that he demanded.
 Let us not, however, added he, continue wan-
 tonly to shed the blood of our innocent subjects;
 let us decide the quarrel man to man, with what
 arms he pleases to chuse, in our shirts, on an

Challenges
 him to
 single com-
 bat.

island, a bridge, or aboard a galley moored in a river; let the dutchy of Burgundy be put in deposit on his part, and that of Milan on mine; these shall be the prize of the conqueror; and after that, let the united forces of Germany, Spain, and France, be employed to humble the power of the Turk, and to extirpate heresy out of Christendom. But if he, by declining this method of terminating our differences, renders war inevitable, nothing shall divert me from prosecuting it to such extremity, as shall reduce one of us to be the poorest gentleman in his own dominions. Nor do I fear that it will be on me this misfortune shall fall; I enter upon action with the fairest prospect of success; the justice of my cause, the union of my subjects, the number and valour of my troops, the experience and fidelity of my generals, all combine to ensure it. Of all these advantages, the King of France is destitute; and were my resources no more certain, and my hopes of victory no better founded than his, I would instantly throw myself at his feet, and with folded hands, and rope about my neck, implore his mercy^s.

THIS long harangue the Emperor delivered with an elevated voice, a haughty tone, and the greatest vehemence of expression and gesture. The French ambassadors, who did not fully

^s Bellay, 199. Sandov. Histor. del Emper. II. 226.

BOOK VI. comprehend his meaning, as he spake in the
1536. Spanish tongue, were totally disconcerted, and
at a loss how they should answer such an unexpected
invective; when one of them began to vindicate his
master's conduct, Charles interposed abruptly, and
would not permit him to proceed. The Pope, without
entering into any particular detail, satisfied himself with a short
but pathetick recommendation of peace, together
with an offer of employing his sincere endeavours
in order to procure that blessing to Christendom;
and the assembly broke up in the greatest astonishment
at the extraordinary scene which had been exhibited.
In no part of his conduct, indeed, did Charles ever deviate so
widely from his general character. Instead of that
prudent recollection, that composed and regular
deportment so strictly attentive to decorum, and so
admirably adapted to conceal his own passions, for
which he was at all other times conspicuous, he
appears on this occasion before the most august
assembly in Europe, boasting of his own power and
exploits with insolence; inveighing against his
enemy with indecency; and challenging him to
combat with an ostentatious valour, more becoming
a champion in romance, than the first Monarch in
Christendom. But the well-known and powerful
operation of continued prosperity, as well as of
exaggerated praise, even upon the firmest minds,

The motives
of this rash
measure.

sufficiently account for this seeming inconsistency. BOOK VI.
1536.
After having compelled Solyman to retreat, and having stripped Barbarossa of a kingdom, Charles began to consider his arms as invincible. He had been entertained, ever since his return from Africa, with repeated scenes of triumphs and publick rejoicings; the orators and poets of Italy, the most elegant at that time in Europe, had exhausted their genius in panegyrick, to which the astrologers added magnificent promises of a more splendid fortune still in store. Intoxicated with all these, he forgot his usual reserve and moderation, and was unable to restrain this extravagant folly of vanity, which became the more remarkable, by being both so uncommon and so publick.

HE himself seems to have been immediately sensible of the impropriety of his behaviour, and when the French ambassadors demanded next day a more clear explanation of what he had said concerning the combat, he told them that they were not to consider his proposal as a formal challenge to their master, but as an expedient for preventing bloodshed; he endeavoured to soften other expressions in his discourse; and spoke in terms full of respect towards Francis. But though this slight apology was far from being sufficient to remove the offence which had been given, Francis, by an unaccountable in-

BOOK VI. fatuation, continued to negotiate, as if it had
 1536. still been possible to bring their differences to a period by an amicable composition. Charles, finding him so eager to run into the snare, favoured the deception, and by seeming to listen to his proposals gained time to prepare for the execution of his own designs.

Charles
 invades
 France.

May 6.

At last, the Imperial army assembled on the frontiers of the Milanese, to the amount of forty thousand foot, and ten thousand horse, while that of France encamped near Vercelli in Piedmont, being greatly inferior in number, and weakened by the departure of a body of Swiss, whom Charles artfully persuaded the Popish cantons to recal, that they might not serve against the Duke of Savoy, their ancient ally. The French general, not daring to risque a battle, retired as soon as the Imperialists advanced. The Emperor put himself at the head of his forces, which the Marquis del Guasto, the Duke of Alva, and Ferdinand de Gonzaga commanded under him, though the supreme direction of the whole was committed to Antonio de Leyva, whose abilities and experience justly entitled him to that distinction. Charles soon discovered his intention not to confine his operations to the recovery of Piedmont and Savoy,

* Mém. de Bellay, 205, &c.

but to push forward and invade the southern provinces of France. This scheme he had long meditated, and had long been taking measures for executing it with such vigour as might ensure success. He had remitted large sums to his sister, the governess of the Low Countries, and to his brother, the King of the Romans, instructing them to levy all the forces in their power, in order to form two separate bodies, the one to enter France on the side of Picardy, the other on the side of Champagne; while he, with the main army, fell upon the opposite frontier of the kingdom. Trusting to these vast preparations, he thought it impossible that Francis could resist so many unexpected attacks, on such different quarters; and began his enterprize with such confidence of its happy issue, that he desired Jovius the historian, to make a large provision of paper sufficient to record the victories which he was going to acquire.

His ministers and generals, instead of entertaining the same sanguine hopes, represented to him in the strongest terms the danger of leading his troops so far from his own territories, to such a distance from his magazines, and into provinces which did not yield sufficient subsistence for their own inhabitants. They entreated him to consider the inexhaustible resources of France in maintaining a defensive war, and the active

Book VI. zeal with which a gallant nobility would serve a

1536. Prince whom they loved, in repelling the enemies of their country; they recalled to his remembrance the fatal miscarriage of Bourbon and Pescara, when they ventured upon the same enterprize under circumstances which seemed as certainly to promise success; the Marquis del Gualto in particular, fell on his knees, and conjured him to abandon the undertaking as desperate. But many circumstances combined in leading Charles to disregard all their remonstrances. He could seldom be brought, on any occasion, to depart from a resolution which he had once taken; he was too apt to under-rate and despise the talents of his rival the King of France, because they differed so widely from his own; he was blinded by the presumption which accompanies prosperity; and relied, perhaps, in some degree on the prophecies which predicted the increase of his own grandeur. He not only adhered obstinately to his own plan, but determined to advance towards France without waiting for the reduction of any part of Piedmont, except such towns as were absolutely necessary for preserving his communication with the Milanese.

Recovers
part of the
Duke of
Savoy's do-
minions.

THE Marquis de Saluces, to whom Francis had entrusted the command of a small body of troops left for the defence of Piedmont, rendered

this more easy than Charles had any reason to expect. That nobleman, educated in the court of France, distinguished by continual marks of the King's favour, and honoured so lately with a charge of such importance, suddenly, and without any provocation or pretext of disgust, revolted from his benefactor. His motives to this treacherous action, were as childish as the deed itself was base. Being strongly possessed with a superstitious faith in divination and astrology, he believed with full assurance, that the fatal period of the French nation was at hand; that on its ruins the Emperor would establish an universal monarchy; that therefore he ought to follow the dictates of prudence, in attaching himself to his rising fortune, and could incur no blame for deserting a Prince whom heaven had devoted to destruction ¹⁰. His reason became still more odious, by his employing that very authority with which Francis had invested him, in order to open the kingdom to his enemies. Whatever was proposed or undertaken by the officers under his command for the defence of their conquests, he rejected or defeated. Whatever properly belonged to himself as commander in chief, to provide or perform for that purpose, he totally neglected. In this manner, he rendered towns even of the greatest consequence

¹⁰ Bellay, 222, a. 246, b.

BOOK VI. untenable, by leaving them destitute either of
 1536. provisions, or ammunition, or artillery, or a
 sufficient garrison; and the Imperialists must
 have reduced Piedmont in as short a time as
 was necessary to march through it, if Montpezat,
 the governor of Fossano, had not, by an extra-
 ordinary effort of courage and military conduct,
 detained them almost a month, before that in-
 considerable place.

Francis's
 plan for the
 defence of
 his king-
 dom.

By this meritorious and seasonable service, he
 gained his master sufficient time for assembling
 his forces, and for concerting a system of de-
 fence against a danger which he now saw to be
 inevitable. Francis fixed upon the only proper
 and effectual plan for defeating the invasion of a
 powerful enemy; and his prudence in chusing
 this plan, as well as his perseverance in execut-
 ing it, deserve the greater praise, as it was
 equally contrary to his own natural temper, and
 to the genius of the French nation. He deter-
 mined to remain altogether upon the defensive;
 never to hazard a battle, or even a great skir-
 mish, without certainty of success; to fortify his
 camps in a regular manner; to throw garrisons
 only into towns of great strength; to deprive
 the enemy of subsistence, by laying waste the
 country before them; and to save the whole
 kingdom, by sacrificing one of its provinces.
 The execution of this plan he committed en-

tirely to the marechal Montmorency, who was BOOK IV.
 the author of it; a man wonderfully fitted by 1536.
 nature for such a trust. Haughty, severe, con- Entrusts
 fident in his own abilities, and despising those of Montmo-
 other men; incapable of being diverted from rency with
 any resolution by remonstrances or entreaties; the execu-
 and in prosecuting any scheme, regardless alike tion of it.
 of love and of pity.

MONTMORENCY made choice of a strong He encamps
 camp under the walls of Avignon, at the con- at Avignon.
 fluence of the Rhone and Durance, one of
 which plentifully supplied his troops with all
 necessaries from the inland provinces, and the
 other covered his camp on that side, where it
 was most probable the enemy would approach.
 He laboured with unwearied industry to render
 the fortifications of this camp impregnable, and
 assembled there a considerable army, though
 greatly inferior to that of the enemy; while the
 King with another body of troops encamped at
 Valence, higher up the Rhone. Marseilles and
 Arles were the only towns he thought it neces-
 sary to defend; the former, in order to retain
 the command of the sea; the latter, as the bar-
 rier of the province of Languedoc; and each of
 these he furnished with numerous garrisons of
 his best troops, commanded by officers, on
 whose fidelity and valour he could rely. The
 inhabitants of the other towns as well as of the

BOOK VI. open country, were compelled to abandon their
 1536. houses, and were conducted to the mountains, to the camp at Avignon, or to the inland provinces. The fortifications of such places as might have afforded shelter or defence to the enemy, were thrown down. Corn, forage, and provisions of every kind, were carried away or destroyed; all the mills and ovens were ruined, and the wells filled up or rendered useless. The devastation extended from the Alps to Marseilles, and from the sea to the confines of Dauphiné; nor does history afford any instance among civilized nations, in which this cruel expedient for the publick safety was employed with the same rigour.

Charles enters Provence.

MEANWHILE, the Emperor arrived with the van of his army on the frontiers of Provence, and was still so possessed with confidence of success, that during a few days, when he was obliged to halt until the rest of his troops came up, he began to divide his future conquests among his officers; and as a new incitement to serve him with zeal, gave them liberal promises of offices, lands, and honours in France¹¹. The face of desolation, however, which presented itself to him, when he entered the country, began to damp his hopes; and convinced him that

¹¹ Bellay, 266, a.

a Monarch, who, in order to distress an enemy, had voluntarily ruined one of his richest provinces, would defend the rest with obstinate despair. Nor was it long before he became sensible, that Francis's plan of defence was as prudent as it appeared to be extraordinary. His fleet, on which Charles chiefly depended for subsistence, was prevented for some time by contrary winds, and other accidents to which naval operations are subject, from approaching the French coast; even after its arrival, it afforded at best a precarious and scanty supply to such a numerous body of troops¹²; nothing was to be found in the country itself for their support; nor could they draw any considerable aid from the dominions of the Duke of Savoy, exhausted already by maintaining two great armies. The Emperor was no less embarrassed how to employ, than how to subsist his forces; for, though he was now in possession of almost an entire province, he could not be said to have the command of it, while he held only defenceless towns; and while the French, besides their camp at Avignon, continued masters of Marseilles and Arles. At first he thought of attacking the camp, and of terminating the war by one decisive blow; but skilful officers, who were appointed to view it, declared the attempt to be utterly impracticable.

¹² Sandov. ii. 231.

BOOK VI. He then gave orders to invest Marseilles and
 1536. Arles, hoping that the French would quit their
 Belieges advantageous post in order to relieve them:
 Marseilles. but Montmorency adhering firmly to his plan,
 remained immoveable at Avignon, and the Imperialists met with such a warm reception from the garrisons of both towns, that they relinquished their enterprizes with loss and disgrace. As a last effort, the Emperor advanced once more towards Avignon, though with an army harassed by the perpetual incursions of small parties of the French light troops, weakened by diseases, and dispirited by disasters, which seemed more intolerable, because they were unexpected.

Montmo- DURING these operations Montmorency found
 rency's for- himself exposed to greater danger from his own
 titude in troops than from the enemy; and their inconsi-
 adhering to derate valour went near to have precipitated the
 his plan of kingdom into those calamities, which he with
 defence. such industry and caution had endeavoured to avoid. Unaccustomed to behold an enemy ravaging their country almost without controul; impatient of such long inaction; unacquainted with the slow and remote, but certain effects of Montmorency's system of defence; the French wished for a battle with no less ardour than the Imperialists. They considered the conduct of their general as a disgrace to their country. His caution they imputed to timidity; his circum-

spection to want of spirit ; and the constancy Book VI.
 with which he pursued his plan, to obstinacy or 1536.
 pride. These reflections, whispered at first
 among the soldiers and subalterns, were adopted,
 by degrees, by officers of higher rank ; and as
 many of them envied Montmorency's favour
 with the King, and more were dissatisfied with
 his harsh disgusting manner, the discontent soon
 became great in his camp, which was filled with
 general murmurings and almost open complaints
 against his measures. Montmorency, on whom
 the sentiments of his own troops made as little
 impression as the insults of the enemy, adhered
 steadily to his system, though, in order to re-
 concile the army to his maxims, no less contrary
 to the genius of the nation, than to the ideas of
 war among undisciplined troops, he assumed an
 unusual affability in his deportment, and often
 explained with great condescension the motives
 of his conduct, the advantages which had already
 resulted from it, and the certain success with
 which it would be attended. At last Francis
 joined his army at Avignon, which having re-
 ceived several reinforcements, he now considered
 as of strength sufficient to face the enemy. As
 he had put no small constraint upon himself, in
 consenting that his troops should remain so
 long upon the defensive, it can hardly be doubt-
 ed but that his fondness for what was dar-
 ing and splendid, added to the impatience both

BOOK VI. of officers and soldiers, would at last have over-
 1536. ruled Montmorency's salutary caution ¹³.

The retreat
 and wretch-
 ed condition
 of the Im-
 perial army.

HAPPILY the retreat of the enemy delivered the kingdom from the danger which any rash resolution might have occasioned. The Emperor, after spending two inglorious months in Provence, without having performed any thing suitable to his vast preparations, or that could justify the confidence with which he had boasted of his own power, found that, besides Antonio de Leyva, and other officers of distinction, he had lost one half of his troops by diseases, or by famine; and that the rest were in no condition to struggle any longer with calamities, by which so many of their companions had perished. Necessity, therefore extorted from him orders to retire; and though he was some time in motion before the French suspected his intention, a body of light troops, assisted by crowds of peasants, eager to be revenged on those who had brought such desolation on their country, hung upon the rear of the Imperialists, and by seizing every favourable opportunity of attacking them, threw them often into confusion. The road by which they fled, for they pursued their march with such disorder and precipitation, that it scarcely deserves the name of a retreat, was strewn with arms or baggage, which in their

¹³ Mém. de Bellay, 269, &c. 312, &c.

hurry and trepidation they had abandoned, and covered with the sick, the wounded, and the dead; infomuch that Martin Bellay, an eye-witness of their calamities, endeavours to give his readers some idea of it, by comparing their miseries to those which the Jews suffered from the victorious and destructive arms of the Romans¹⁴. If Montmorency at this critical moment had advanced with all his forces, nothing could have saved the whole Imperial army from utter ruin. But that general, by standing so long and so obstinately on the defensive, had become cautious to excess; his mind tenacious of any bent it had once taken, could not assume a contrary one as suddenly as the change of circumstances required; and he still continued to repeat his favourite maxims, that it was more prudent to allow the lion to escape, than to drive him to despair; and that a bridge of gold should be made for a retreating enemy.

THE Emperor having conducted the shattered remains of his troops to the frontiers of Milan, and appointed the marquis del Guasto to succeed Leyva in the government of the dutchy, set out for Genoa. As he could not bear to expose himself to the scorn of the Italians, after such a sad reverse of fortune; and did not choose,

¹⁴ Mém. de Bellay, 316. Sandov. Hist. del Emper. ii. 232.

BOOK VI. under his present circumstances, to revisit those cities through which he had so lately passed in triumph for one conquest, and in certain expectation of another; he embarked directly for November. Spain ¹⁵.

Operations
in Picardy.

NOR was the progress of his arms on the opposite frontier of France such as to alleviate in any degree the losses which he had sustained in Provence. Bellay by his address and intrigues had prevailed on so many of the German Princes to withdraw the contingent of troops which they had furnished to the King of the Romans, that he was obliged to lay aside all thoughts of his intended irruption into Champagne. Though a powerful army levied in the Low Countries entered Picardy, which they found but feebly guarded, while the strength of the kingdom was drawn towards the south; yet the nobility taking arms with their usual alacrity, supplied by their spirit the defects of the King's preparations, and defended Peronne, and other towns which were attacked, with such vigour, as obliged the enemy to retire without making any conquest of importance ¹⁶.

THUS Francis, by the prudence of his own measures, and by the union and valour of his

¹⁵ Jovii Histor. lib. xxxv. p. 174, &c.

¹⁶ Mém. de Bellay, 318, &c.

subjects, rendered abortive those vast efforts in- BOOK VI.
 which his rival had almost exhausted his whole 1536.
 force. As this humbled the Emperor's arrogance
 no less than it checked his power, he was mor-
 tified more sensibly on this occasion than on any
 other, during the course of the long contests be-
 tween him and the French Monarch.

ONE circumstance alone embittered the joy Death of the
Dauphin.
 with which the success of the campaign inspired
 Francis. That was the death of the Dauphin,
 his eldest son, a Prince of great hopes, and ex-
 tremely beloved by the people on account of his
 resemblance to his father. This happening sud-
 denly, was imputed to poison, not only by the
 vulgar, fond of ascribing the death of illustrious
 personages to extraordinary causes, but by the
 King and his ministers. The count de Monte- Imputed to
poison.
 cuculi, an Italian nobleman, cup-bearer to the
 Dauphin, being seized on suspicion and put to
 the torture, openly charged the Imperial gene-
 rals, Gonzaga and Leyva, with having insti-
 gated him to the commission of that crime: he
 even threw out some indirect and obscure accusa-
 tions against the Emperor himself. At a time
 when all France was animated with implacable
 hatred against Charles, this uncertain and extorted
 charge was considered as an incontestible proof
 of guilt; while the confidence with which both
 he and his officers asserted their own innocence,

BOOK VI. together with the indignation as well as horror
 1536. which they expressed on their being supposed capable of such a detestable action, were little attended to, and less regarded¹⁷. It is evident, however, that the Emperor could have no inducement to perpetrate such a crime, as Francis was still in the vigour of life himself, and had two sons, beside the Dauphin, grown up to a good age. That single consideration, without mentioning the Emperor's general character, unblemished by the imputation of any deed resembling this in atrocity, is more than sufficient to counterbalance the weight of a dubious testimony uttered during the anguish of torture¹⁸. According to the most unprejudiced historians, the Dauphin's death was occasioned by his having drunk too freely of cold water after overheating himself at tennis; and this account, as it is the most simple, is likewise the most credible. But if his days were cut short by poison, it is not improbable that the Emperor conjectured rightly, when he affirmed that it had been administered by the direction of Catharine of Medici, in order to secure the crown to the Duke of Orleans, her husband¹⁹. The advantages resulting to her by the Dauphin's death, were obvious as well as great; nor did her

¹⁷ Mém. de Bellay, 289.

¹⁸ Sandov. Hist. del Emper. ii. 231.

¹⁹ Vera y Zuniga Vida de Carlos V. p. 75.

boundless and daring ambition ever scruple at Book VI.
any action necessary towards attaining the ob- 1536.
jects which she had in view.

NEXT year opened with a transaction very 1537.
uncommon, but so incapable of producing any Decree of
effect, that it would not deserve to be mentioned, the parlia-
if it were not a striking proof of the personal ment of
animosity which mingled itself in all the hos- Paris against
tilities between Charles and Francis, and which the Empe-
often betrayed them into such indecencies to- ror.
wards each other, as lessened the dignity of
both. Francis, accompanied by the peers and
princes of the blood, having taken his seat in
the parliament of Paris with the usual solemn-
ities, the advocate-general appeared; and after
accusing Charles of Austria (for so he affected
to call the Emperor), of having violated the
treaty of Cambray, by which he was absolved
from the homage due to the crown of France
for the counties of Artois and Flanders, insisted
that this treaty being now void, he was still to
be considered as a vassal of the crown, and by
consequence, had been guilty of rebellion in
taking arms against his sovereign; and therefore
he demanded that Charles should be summoned
to appear in person, or by his counsel, before
the parliament of Paris, his legal judges, to an-
swer for his crime. The request was granted;
a herald repaired to the frontiers of Picardy, and

BOOK VI. summoned him with the accustomed formalities,
 1537. to appear against a day prefixed. That term being expired, and no person appearing in his name, the parliament gave judgment, "That Charles of Austria had forfeited by rebellion and contumacy those fiefs; declared Flanders and Artois to be re-united to the crown of France;" and ordered their decree for this purpose to be published by sound of trumpet on the frontiers of these provinces²⁰.

Campaign
 opens in-
 the Low-
 Countries.
 March. SOON after this vain display of his resentment, rather than of his power, Francis marched towards the Low Countries, as if he had intended to execute the sentence which his parliament had pronounced, and to seize those territories which it had awarded to him. As the Queen of Hungary, to whom her brother the Emperor had committed the government of that part of his dominions, was not prepared for so early a campaign, he at first made some progress, and took several towns of importance. But being obliged soon to leave his army, in order to superintend the other operations of war, the Flemings having assembled a numerous army, not only recovered most of the places which they had lost, but began to make conquests in their turn. At

²⁰ Lettres et Mémoires d'Etat, par Ribier, 2 tom. Blois. 1666. tom. i. p. 1.

last they invested Terouenne, and the Duke of Orleans, now Dauphin, by the death of his brother, and Montmorency, whom Francis had honoured with the constable's sword, as the reward of his great services during the former campaign, determined to hazard a battle in order to relieve it. While they were advancing for this purpose, and within a few miles of the enemy, they were stopt short by the arrival of an herald from the Queen of Hungary, acquainting him that a suspension of arms was now agreed upon.

BOOK VI.
1537.
A suspension of arms there;

THIS unexpected event was owing to the zealous endeavours of the two sisters, the Queens of France and of Hungary, who had long laboured to reconcile the contending Monarchs. The war in the Netherlands had laid waste the frontier provinces of both countries, without any real advantage to either. The French and Flemings equally regretted the interruption of their commerce, which was beneficial to both. Charles as well as Francis, who had each strained to the utmost, in order to support the vast operations of the former campaign, found that they could not now keep armies on foot in this quarter, without weakening their operations in Piedmont, where both wished to push the war with the greatest vigour. All these circumstances facilitated the negotiations of the two Queens; a

July 30.

BOOK VI. truce was concluded, to continue in force for
1537. ten months, but it extended no farther than the
Low Countries²¹.

and in
Piedmont.

IN Piedmont the war was still prosecuted with great animosity; and though neither Charles nor Francis could make the powerful efforts to which this animosity prompted them, they continued to exert themselves like combatants, whose rancour remains after their strength is exhausted. Towns were alternately lost and retaken; skirmishes were fought every day; and much blood was shed, without any decisive action, that gave the superiority to either side. At last the two Queens, determining not to leave unfinished the good work which they had begun, prevailed, by their importunate solicitations, the one on her brother, the other on her husband, to consent also to a truce in Piedmont for three months. The conditions of it were, that each should keep possession of what was in his hands, and after leaving garrisons in the towns, should withdraw his army out of the province; and that plenipotentiaries should be appointed to adjust all matters in dispute by a final treaty²².

Motives of
it.

THE powerful motives which inclined both Princes to this accommodation, have been often mentioned. The expences of the war had far

²¹ Mémoires de Ribier, 56. ²² Ibid. 62.

exceeded the sums which their revenues were capable of supplying, nor durst they venture upon any great addition to the impositions then established, as subjects were not yet taught to bear with patience the immense burdens to which they have become accustomed in modern times. The Emperor, in particular, though he had contracted debts which in that age appeared prodigious²³, had it not in his power to pay the large arrears long due to his army. At the same time he had no prospect of deriving any aid in money or men either from the Pope or Venetians, though he had employed promises and threats, alternately, in order to procure it. But he found the former not only fixed in his resolution of adhering steadily to the neutrality which he had always declared to be suitable to his character, but passionately desirous of bringing about a peace. He perceived that the latter were still intent on their ancient object of holding the balance even between the rivals, and solicitous not to throw too great a weight into either scale.

WHAT made a deeper impression on Charles than all these, was the dread of the Turkish arms, which by his league with Solymán, Francis had drawn upon him. Though Francis,

Of which, Francis's alliance with the Turkish Emperor the

²³ Ribier, i. 294.

Book VI. without the assistance of a single ally, had a war
1537. to maintain against an enemy greatly superior
most con- in power to himself, yet so great was the horror
siderable. of Christians, in that age, at any union with
Infidels, which they considered not only as dishonourable but profane, that it was long before he could be brought to avail himself of the obvious advantages resulting from such a confederacy. Necessity at last surmounted his delicacy and scruples. Towards the close of the preceding year, La Forest, a secret agent at the Ottoman Porte, had concluded a treaty with the Sultan, whereby Solyman engaged to invade the kingdom of Naples, during the next campaign, and to attack the King of the Romans in Hungary with a powerful army, while Francis undertook to enter the Milanese at the same time with a proper force. Solyman had punctually performed what was incumbent on him. Barbarossa with a great fleet appeared on the coast of Naples, filled that kingdom, from which all the troops had been drawn towards Piedmont, with consternation, landed without resistance near Taranto, obliged Castro, a place of some strength, to surrender, plundered the adjacent country, and was taking measures for securing and extending his conquests, when the unexpected arrival of Doria, together with the Pope's galleys, and a squadron of the Venetian fleet, made it prudent for him to retire. In Hungary

the progress of the Turks was more formidable. Book VI.
 Mahmet, their general, after gaining several 1537.
 small advantages, defeated the Germans in a
 great battle at Essek on the Drave²⁴. Happily
 for Christendom, it was not in Francis's power
 to execute with equal exactness what he had sti-
 pulated; nor could he assemble at this juncture
 an army strong enough to penetrate into the Mi-
 lanese. By this he failed in recovering possession
 of that dutchy; and Italy was not only saved
 from the calamities of a new war, but from
 feeling the desolating rage of the Turkish arms,
 as an addition to all that it had suffered²⁵. As
 the Emperor knew that he could not long resist
 the efforts of two such powerful confederates,
 nor could expect that the same fortunate acci-
 dents would concur a second time to deliver
 Naples, and to preserve the Milanese: As he
 foresaw that the Italian states would not only
 tax him loudly with insatiable ambition, but
 might even turn their arms against him, if he
 should be so regardless of their danger as obsti-
 nately to protract the war, he thought it neces-
 sary, both for his safety and reputation, to give
 his consent to a truce. Nor was Francis willing
 to sustain all the blame of obstructing the re-
 establishment of peace, or to expose himself on

²⁴ Istvanheffi Hist. Hung. lib. xiii. p. 139.

²⁵ Jovii. Histor. lib. xxxv. p. 183.

BOOK VI. that account to the danger of being deserted by
 1537. the Swifs and other foreigners in his service. He
 even began to apprehend that his own subjects
 would serve him coldly, if by contributing to
 aggrandize the power of the Infidels, which it
 was his duty, and had been the ambition of his
 ancestors to depress, he continued to act in direct
 opposition to all the principles which ought to
 influence a Monarch distinguished by the title of
 Most Christian King. He chose, for all these
 reasons, rather to run the risk of disobliging his
 new ally the Sultan, than, by an unseasonable
 adherence to the treaty with him, to forfeit
 what was of greater consequence.

Negocia-
 tions of a
 peace be-
 tween
 Charles and
 Francis.

BUT though both parties consented to a truce,
 the plenipotentiaries found insuperable difficul-
 ties in settling the articles of a definitive treaty.
 Each of the Monarchs, with the arrogance of
 a conqueror, aimed at giving law to the other;
 and neither would so far acknowledge his infe-
 riority, as to sacrifice any point of honour, or
 to relinquish any matter of right; so that the
 plenipotentiaries spent the time in long and fruit-
 less negotiations, and separated after agreeing to
 prolong the truce for a few months.

The Pope
 conducts
 these in per-
 son.

THE Pope, however, did not despair of ac-
 complishing a point in which the plenipotentiaries
 had failed, and took upon himself the sole bur-
 den

den of negotiating a peace. To form a confederacy capable of defending Christendom from the formidable inroads of the Turkish arms, and to concert effectual measures for the extirpation of the Lutheran heresy, were two great objects which Paul had much at heart, and he considered the union of the Emperor with the King of France as an essential preliminary to both. To be the instrument of reconciling these contending Monarchs, whom his predecessors by their interested and indecent intrigues had so often embroiled, was a circumstance which could not fail of throwing distinguishing lustre on his character and administration. Nor was he without hopes that, while he pursued this laudable end, he might secure advantages to his own family, the aggrandizing of which he did not neglect, though he aimed at it with a less audacious ambition than was common among the Popes of that century. Influenced by these considerations, he proposed an interview between the two Monarchs at Nice, and offered to repair thither in person, that he might act as mediator in composing all their differences. When a Pontiff of a venerable character, and of very advanced age, was willing, from his zeal for peace, to undergo the fatigues of such a distant journey, neither Charles nor Francis could with decency decline the interview. But though both came to the place of rendezvous, so great was

BOOK VI.

1538.

BOOK VI. the difficulty of adjusting the ceremonial, or such
 1538. the remains of distrust and rancour on each side, that they refused to see one another, and every thing was transacted by the intervention of the Pope, who visited them alternately. With all his zeal and ingenuity he could not find out a method of removing the obstacles which prevented a final accommodation, particularly those arising from the possession of the Milanese; nor was all the weight of his authority sufficient to overcome the obstinate perseverance of either Monarch in asserting his own claims. At last, that he might not seem to have laboured altogether without effect, he prevailed on them to sign a truce for ten years, upon the same condition with the former, that each should retain what was now in his possession, and in the mean time should send ambassadors to Rome, to discuss their pretensions at leisure ²⁶.

A truce for
 ten years
 concluded
 at Nice.
 June 18.

THUS ended a war of no long continuance, but very extensive in its operations, and in which both parties exerted their utmost strength. Though Francis failed in the object that he had principally in view, the recovery of the Milanese, he acquired nevertheless, great reputation by the wisdom of his measures as well as

²⁶ Recueil des Traitez, ii. 210. Relazione di Nicolo Tiepolo dell' abboccamento di Nizza, chez Du Mont Corps Diplomat. part. ii. p. 174

the success of his arms in repulsing a formidable invasion; and by securing possession of one half of the Duke of Savoy's dominions, he added no inconsiderable accession to his kingdom. Whereas Charles, repulsed and baffled, after having boasted so arrogantly of victory, purchased an inglorious truce, by sacrificing an ally who had rashly confided too much in his friendship and power. The unfortunate Duke murmured, complained, and remonstrated against a treaty so much to his disadvantage, but in vain; he had no means of redress, and was obliged to submit. Of all his dominions, Nice, with its dependencies, was the only corner of which he himself kept possession. He saw the rest divided between a powerful invader and the ally to whose protection he had trusted, while he remained a sad monument of the imprudence of weak Princes, who by taking part in the quarrel of mighty neighbours, between whom they happen to be situated, are crushed and overwhelmed in the shock.

A FEW days after signing the treaty of truce, the Emperor set sail for Barcelona, but was driven by contrary winds to the island St. Margaret on the coast of Provence. When Francis, who happened to be not far distant, heard of this, he considered it as an office of civility to invite him to take shelter in his dominions, and proposed a personal interview with him at

Book VI.

1538.

(Interview)
between
Charles and
Francis at
Aigues-
mortes.

BOOK VI. Aigues-mortes. The Emperor, who would not
1538. be out-done by his rival in complaisance, instantly repaired thither. As soon as he cast anchor in the road, Francis, without waiting to settle any point of ceremony, but relying implicitly on the Emperor's honour for his security, visited him on board his galley, and was received and entertained with the warmest demonstrations of esteem and affection. Next day the Emperor repaid the confidence which the King had placed in him. He landed at Aigues-mortes with as little precaution, and met with a reception equally cordial. He remained on shore during the night, and in both visits they vied with each other in expressions of respect and friendship ²⁷. After twenty years of open hostilities, or of secret enmity; after so many injuries reciprocally inflicted or endured; after having formally given the lie and challenged one another to single combat; after the Emperor had inveighed so publicly against Francis as a Prince void of honour or integrity; and Francis had accused him as accessory to the murder of his eldest son, such an interview appears altogether singular and even unnatural. But the history of these Monarchs abounds with such surprising transitions. From

²⁷ Sandov. Hist. vol. ii. 238. Relation de l'entrevue de Charl. V. & Fran. I. par M. de la Rivoire. Hist. de Langued. par D. D. De Vic & Vaissette. tom. v. Preuves. p. 93.

implacable enmity they appeared to pass, in a moment, to the most cordial reconciliation; from suspicion and distrust to perfect confidence; and from practising all the dark arts of a deceitful policy, they could assume, of a sudden, the liberal and open manners of two gallant gentlemen.

THE Pope, besides the glory of having restored peace to Europe, gained, according to his expectation, a point of great consequence to his family, by prevailing on the Emperor to betroth Margaret of Austria, his natural daughter, formerly the wife of Alexander di Medici, to his grandson Octavio Farnese, and in consideration of this marriage, to bestow several honours and territories upon his future son-in-law. A very tragical event, which happened about the beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and thirty-seven, had deprived Margaret of her first husband. That young Prince, whom the Emperor's partiality had raised to the supreme power in Florence, upon the ruins of the publick liberty, neglected entirely the cares of government, and abandoned himself to the most dissolute debauchery. Lorenzo di Medici his nearest kinsman was not only the companion but director of his pleasures, and employing all the powers of a cultivated and inventive genius in this dishonourable ministry, added such elegance

The assassination of Alexander di Medici.

BOOK VI. as well as variety to vice as gained him an absolute ascendant over the mind of Alexander. But
1538. while Lorenzo seemed to be sunk in luxury, and affected such an appearance of indolence and effeminacy, that he would not wear a sword, and trembled at the sight of blood, he concealed under that disguise, a dark, designing, audacious spirit. Prompted either by the love of liberty, or allured by the hope of attaining the supreme power, he determined to assassinate Alexander his benefactor and friend. Though he long revolved this design in his mind, his reserved and suspicious temper prevented him from communicating it to any person whatever; and continuing to live with Alexander in their usual familiarity, he, one night, under pretence of having secured him an assignation with a lady of high rank whom he had often solicited, drew that unwary Prince into a secret apartment of his house, and there stabbed him, while he lay carelessly on a couch expecting the arrival of the lady whose company he had been promised. But no sooner was the deed done, than standing astonished, and struck with horror at its atrocity, he forgot, in a moment, all the motives which had induced him to commit it. Instead of rousing the people to recover their liberty by publishing the death of the tyrant, instead of taking any step towards opening his own way to the dignity now vacant, he locked the door of the

apartment, and, like a man bereaved of reason and presence of mind, fled with the utmost precipitation out of the Florentine territories. It was late next morning before the fate of the unfortunate Prince was known, as his attendants, accustomed to his irregularities, never entered his apartment early. Immediately the chief persons in the state assembled. Being induced partly by the zeal of cardinal Cibo for the house of Medici, to which he was nearly related, partly by the authority of Francis Guicciardini, who recalled to their memory and represented in striking colours the caprice as well as turbulence of their ancient popular government, they agreed to place Cosmo di Medici, a youth of eighteen, the only male heir of that illustrious house, at the head of the government; though at the same time such was their love of liberty, that they established several regulations in order to circumscribe and moderate his power.

1538.

Cosmo di
Medici
placed at the
head of the
Florentine
state.

MEANWHILE Lorenzo having reached a place of safety, made known what he had done, to Philip Strozzi and the other Florentines who had been driven into exile, or who had voluntarily retired, when the republican form of government was abolished, in order to make way for the dominion of the Medici. By them, the deed was extolled with extravagant praises, and the virtue of Lorenzo was compared

His govern-
ment oppos-
ed by the
Florentine
exiles.

BOOK VI. with that of the elder Brutus, who disregarded
1538. the ties of blood, or with that of the younger, who forgot the friendship and favours of the tyrant, that they might preserve or recover the liberty of their country ²⁸. Nor did they rest satisfied with empty panegyrics; they immediately quitted their different places of retreat, assembled forces, animated their vassals and partisans to take arms, and to seize this opportunity of re-establishing the publick liberty on its ancient foundation. Being openly assisted by the French ambassador at Rome, and secretly encouraged by the Pope, who bore no goodwill to the house of Medici, they entered the Florentine dominions with a considerable body of men. But the persons who had elected Cosmo possessed not only the means of supporting his government, but abilities to employ them in the most proper manner. They levied, with the greatest expedition, a good number of troops; they endeavoured by every art to gain the citizens of greatest authority, and to render the administration of the young Prince agreeable to the people. Above all, they courted the Emperor's protection, as the only firm foundation of Cosmo's dignity and power. Charles, knowing the propensity of the Florentines to the friendship of France, and how much all the partisans of a republican government detested

²⁸ Lettere de' Principi, tom. iii. p. 52.

him as the oppressor of their liberties, saw it to be greatly for his interest to prevent the re-establishment of the ancient constitution in Florence. For this reason, he not only acknowledged Cosmo as head of the Florentine state, and conferred on him all the titles of honour with which Alexander had been dignified, but engaged to defend him to the utmost; and as a pledge of this, ordered the commanders of such of his troops as were stationed on the frontiers of Tuscany, to support him against all aggressors. By their aid, Cosmo obtained an easy victory over the exiles, whose troops he surprised in the night-time, and took most of the chiefs prisoners: an event which broke all their measures, and fully established his own authority. But though he was extremely desirous of the additional honour of marrying the Emperor's daughter, the widow of his predecessor, Charles, secure already of his attachment, chose rather to gratify the Pope, by bestowing her on his nephew²⁹.

DURING the war between the Emperor and Francis, an event had happened which abated in some degree the warmth and cordiality of friendship which had long subsisted between the

The friendship between Francis and Henry VIII. begins to abate.

²⁹ Jovii Hist. c. xcvi. p. 218, &c. Belcarii Comment. l. xxii. p. 696. Istoria de' suoi tempi di Giov. Bat. Adriani. Ven. 1587. p. 10.

Book VI. latter and the King of England. James the Fifth
 1538. of Scotland, an enterprising young Prince, having heard of the Emperor's intention to invade Provence, was so fond of shewing that he did not yield to any of his ancestors in the sincerity of his attachment to the French crown, and so eager to distinguish himself by some military exploit, that he levied a body of troops with an intention of leading them in person to the assistance of the King of France. Though some unfortunate accidents prevented his carrying any troops into France, nothing could divert him from going thither in person. Immediately upon his landing, he hastened to Provence, but had been detained so long in his voyage that he came too late to have any share in the military operations, and met the King on his return after the retreat of the Imperialists. But Francis was so greatly pleased with his zeal, and no less with his manners and conversation, that he could not refuse him his daughter Magdalen, whom he demanded in marriage. It mortified Henry extremely to see a Prince of whom he was immoderately jealous, form an alliance, from which he derived such an accession of reputation as well as security³⁰. He could not, however, with decency, oppose Francis's bestowing his daughter upon a Monarch descended from a race of

Jan. 1.
 1537.

³⁰ Hist. of Scotland, vol. i. p. 77.

Princes, the most ancient and faithful allies of the French crown. But when James, upon the sudden death of Magdalen, demanded as his second wife Mary of Guise, he warmly solicited Francis to deny his suit, and in order to disappoint him, asked that lady in marriage for himself. When Francis preferred the Scottish King's sincere courtship to his artful and malevolent proposal, he discovered much dissatisfaction. The pacification agreed upon at Nice, and the familiar interview of the two rivals at Aigues-mortes, filled Henry's mind with new suspicions, as if Francis had altogether renounced his friendship for the sake of new connections with the Emperor. Charles, thoroughly acquainted with the temper of the English King, and watchful to observe all the shiftings and caprices of his passions, thought this a favourable opportunity of renewing his negotiations with him, which had been long broken off. By the death of Queen Catharine, whose interest the Emperor could not with decency have abandoned, the chief cause of their discord was removed; so that without touching upon the delicate question of her divorce, he might now take what measures he thought most effectual for regaining Henry's good-will. For this purpose, he began with proposing several marriage-treaties to the King. He offered his niece, a daughter of the King of Denmark, to Henry himself; he de-

Book VI.

1538.

The Empe-
ror courts
Henry.

BOOK VI. 1538. mandated the Princess Mary for one of the Princes of Portugal, and was even willing to receive her as the King's illegitimate daughter³¹. Though none of these projected alliances ever took place, or perhaps were ever seriously intended, they occasioned such frequent intercourse between the courts, and so many reciprocal professions of civility and esteem, as considerably abated the edge of Henry's rancour against the Emperor, and paved the way for that union between them which afterwards proved so disadvantageous to the French King,

Progress of
the Reformation.

THE ambitious schemes in which the Emperor had been engaged, and the wars he had been carrying on for some years, proved, as usual, extremely favourable to the progress of the Reformation in Germany. While Charles was absent upon his African expedition, or intent on his vast projects against France, his chief object in Germany was to prevent the dissensions about religion from disturbing the publick tranquillity, by granting such indulgence to the Protestant Princes as might induce them to concur with his measures, or at least hinder them from taking part with his rival. For this reason, he was careful to secure to the Protestants the possession of all the advantages which they had gained by the articles of pacification at Nuremberg, in the

³¹ Mém. de Ribier, t. i. 496.

year one thousand five hundred and thirty-two²²; Book VI. and except some slight trouble from the proceedings of the Imperial chamber, they met with nothing to disturb them in the exercise of their religion, or to interrupt the successful zeal with which they propagated their opinions. Mean- while the Pope continued his negotiations for convoking a general council; and though the Protestants had expressed great dissatisfaction with his intention to fix upon Mantua as the place of meeting, he adhered obstinately to his choice, issued a bull on the second of June, one thousand five hundred and thirty-six; appointing it to assemble in that city on the twenty-third of May the year following; he nominated three cardinals to preside in his name; enjoined all Christian Princes to countenance it by their authority, and invited the prelates of every nation to attend in person. This citation of a council, an assembly which from its nature and intention demanded quiet times, as well as pacifick dispositions, at the very juncture when the Emperor was on his march towards France, and ready to involve a great part of Europe in the confusions of war, appeared to every person extremely unreasonable. It was intimated, however, to all the different courts by nuncios dispatched of

1538.
Negotiations and intrigues with respect to a general council.

²² Du Mont Corps Diplom. tom. iv. part 2. p. 138.

BOOK VI. purpose ³³. With an intention to gratify the
 1538. Germans, the Emperor, during his residence
 in Rome, had warmly solicited the Pope to call
 a council; but being at the same time willing to
 try every art in order to persuade Paul to de-
 part from the neutrality which he preserved be-
 tween him and Francis, he sent Heldo his vice-
 chancellor into Germany, along with a nuncio
 dispatched thither; instructing him to second
 all the nuncio's representations, and to enforce
 Feb. 25. them with the whole weight of the Imperial au-
 1537. thority. The Protestants gave them audience
 at Smalkalde, where they had assembled in a
 body, in order to receive them. But after
 weighing all their arguments they unanimously
 refused to acknowledge a council summoned in
 the name and by the authority of the Pope
 alone; in which he assumed the sole right of pre-
 siding; which was to be held in a city not only
 far distant from Germany, but subject to a
 Prince, a stranger to them, and closely connect-
 ed with the court of Rome; and to which their
 divines could not repair with safety, especially
 after their doctrines had been stigmatized in the
 very bull of convocation with the name of
 heresy. These and many other objections against
 the council, which appeared to them unanswer-
 able, they enumerated in a large manifesto,

³³ Pallavic. Hist. Conc. Trid. 113.

which they published in vindication of their conduct ³⁴. BOOK VI.
1538.

AGAINST this the court of Rome exclaimed as a flagrant proof of their obstinacy and presumption, and the Pope still persisted in his resolution to hold the council at the time and in the place appointed. But some unexpected difficulties being started by the Duke of Mantua, both about the right of jurisdiction over the persons who resorted to the council, and the security of his capital amidst such a concourse of strangers, the Pope, after fruitless endeavours to adjust these, first prorogued the council for Octob. 3.
1538. some months, and afterwards transferring the place of meeting to Vicenza in the Venetian territories, appointed it to assemble on the first of May in the following year. As neither the Emperor nor French King, who had not then come to any accommodation, would permit their subjects to repair thither, not a single prelate appeared on the day prefixed, and the Pope, that his authority might not become altogether contemptible by so many ineffectual intimations, put off the meeting by an indefinite prorogation ³⁵.

³⁴ Sleidan. l. xii. 123, &c. Seckend. Com. lib. iii. p. 143, &c.
³⁵ F. Paul, 117. Pallavic. 117.

BOOK VI. BUT, that he might not seem to have turned
 1538. his whole attention towards a reformation
 A partial which he was not able to accomplish, while he
 reformation of abuses by neglected that which was in his own power,
 the Pope. he deputed a certain number of cardinals and
 bishops, with full authority to inquire into the
 abuses and corruptions of the Roman court; and
 to propose the most effectual method of removing
 them. The scrutiny, undertaken with reluctance,
 was carried on slowly and with remissness. All defects
 were touched with a gentle hand, afraid of probing too
 deep, or of discovering too much. But even by this partial
 examination, many irregularities were detected, and many
 enormities exposed to light, while the remedies which they
 suggested as most proper, were either inadequate, or were
 never applied. The report and resolution of these deputies,
 though intended to be kept secret, were transmitted by
 some accident into Germany, and being immediately made
 publick, afforded ample matter for reflection and triumph
 to the Protestants³⁶. On the one hand they demonstrated
 the necessity of a reformation in the head as well as the
 members of the church, and even pointed out many of the
 corruptions against which Luther and his followers had
 remonstrated with the greatest vehemence. They shewed, on the other

³⁶ Sleidan, 233.

hand,

hand, that it was vain to expect this reformation from ecclesiasticks themselves, who, as Luther strongly expressed it, piddled at curing warts, while they overlooked or confirmed ulcers³⁷.

BOOK VI.
1539.

THE earnestness with which the Emperor seemed, at first, to press their acquiescing in the Pope's scheme of holding a council in Italy, alarmed the Protestant Princes so much, that they thought it prudent to strengthen their confederacy, by admitting several new members who solicited that privilege, particularly the King of Denmark. Heldo, who, during his residence in Germany, had observed all the advantages which they derived from that union, endeavoured to counterbalance its effects by an alliance among the Catholick powers of the Empire. This league distinguished by the name of *Holy*, was merely defensive; and though concluded by Heldo in the Emperor's name, was afterwards disowned by him, and subscribed by very few Princes³⁸.

A league formed in opposition to that at Smalkalde.

THE Protestants soon got intelligence of this association, notwithstanding all the endeavours of the contracting parties to conceal it; and their zeal, always apt to suspect and to dread,

alarms the Protestants.

³⁷ Seck. l. iii. 164.
des Traitez.

³⁸ Seck. l. iii. 171. Recueil

BOOK VI. even to excess, every thing that seemed to
1539. threaten religion, instantly took the alarm as if
the Emperor had been just ready to enter upon
the execution of some formidable plan for the
extirpation of their opinions. In order to disap-
point this, they held frequent consultations, they
courted the Kings of France and England with
great assiduity, and even began to think of rais-
ing the respective contingents both in men and
money which they were obliged to furnish by the
treaty of Smalkalde. But it was not long be-
fore they were convinced that these apprehen-
sions were without foundation, and that the
Emperor, to whom repose was absolutely neces-
sary after efforts so much beyond his strength in
the war with France, had no thoughts of dis-
turbng the tranquillity of Germany. As a proof
of this, at an interview with the Protestant
April 19. Princes in Francfort, his ambassadors agreed that
all concessions in their favour, particularly those
contained in the pacification of Nuremberg,
should continue in force for fifteen months;
that during this period all proceedings of the
Imperial chamber against them should be sus-
pended; that a conference should be held by a
few divines of each party, in order to discuss the
points in controversy, and to propose articles of
accommodation which should be laid before the
next diet. Though the Emperor, that he might
not irritate the Pope, who remonstrated against

the first part of this agreement as impolitick, and against the latter as an impious encroachment upon his prerogative, never formally ratified this convention, it was observed with considerable exactness, and greatly strengthened the basis of that ecclesiastical liberty, for which the Protestants contended³⁹.

BOOK VI.
1539.

A FEW days after the convention at Francfort, George Duke of Saxony died, and his death was an event of great advantage to the Reformation. That Prince, the head of the Albertine, or younger branch of the Saxon family, possessed, as marquis of Misnia and Thuringia, extensive territories, comprehending Dresden, Leipstick, and other cities now the most considerable in the electorate. From the first dawn of the Reformation, he had been its enemy as avowedly as the electoral Princes were its protectors, and had carried on his opposition not only with all the zeal flowing from religious prejudices, but with a virulence inspired by personal antipathy to Luther, and imbibed by the domestick animosity subsisting between him and the other branch of his family. By his death without issue, his succession fell to his brother Henry, whose attachment to the Protestant religion surpassed, if possible, that of his predecessor to popery. Henry no sooner took

April 24.
Reformation
tion esta-
blished in
every part of
Saxony.

³⁹ F. Paul, 82. Sleid. 247. Seck. 1. iii. 200.

BOOK VI. possession of his new dominions, than, disregarding a clause in George's will, dictated by his bigotry, whereby he bequeathed all his territories to the Emperor and King of the Romans, if his brother should attempt to make any innovation in religion, he invited some Protestant divines, and among them Luther himself, to Leipfick. By their advice and assistance, he overturned in a few weeks the whole system of ancient rites, establishing the full exercise of the reformed religion, with the universal applause of his subjects, who had long wished for this change, which the authority of their Duke alone had hitherto prevented^{**}. This revolution delivered the Protestants from the danger to which they were exposed by having an inveterate enemy situated in the middle of their territories; and their dominions now extended in one great and almost unbroken line from the shore of the Baltick to the banks of the Rhine.

A mutiny
of the Imperial
troops.

SOON after the conclusion of the truce at Nice, an event happened, which satisfied all Europe that Charles had prosecuted the war to the utmost extremity that the state of his affairs would permit. Vast arrears were due to his troops, whom he had long amused with vain hopes and promises. As they now foresaw what

^{**} Sleidan, 249.

little attention would be paid to their demands, when by the re-establishment of peace their services became of less importance, they lost all patience, broke out into an open mutiny, and declared that they thought themselves entitled to seize by violence what was detained from them contrary to all justice. Nor was this spirit of sedition confined to one part of the Emperor's dominions; the mutiny was almost as general as the grievance which gave rise to it. The soldiers in the Milanese plundered the open country without controul, and filled the capital itself with consternation. Those in garrison at Goletta threatened to give up that important fortress to Barbarossa. In Sicily the troops proceeded to still greater excesses; having chased away their officers, they elected others in their stead, defeated a body of men whom the viceroy sent against them, took and pillaged several cities, conducting themselves all the while, in such a manner, that their operations resembled rather the regular proceedings of a concerted rebellion, than the rashness and violence of a military mutiny. But by the address and prudence of the generals, who partly by borrowing money in their own name, or in that of their master, partly by extorting large sums from the cities in their respective provinces, raised what was sufficient to discharge the arrears of the soldiers,

BOOK VI. these insurrections were quelled. The greater
 1539. part of the troops being disbanded, such a number only being kept in pay as was necessary for garrisoning the principal towns, and protecting the sea-coasts from the insults of the Turks ⁴¹.

Cortes of
 Castile held
 at Toledo.

It was happy for the Emperor that the abilities of his generals extricated him out of these difficulties, which it exceeded his own power to have removed. He had depended, as his chief resource for discharging the arrears due to his soldiers, upon the subsidies which he expected from his Castilian subjects. For this purpose, he assembled the Cortes of Castile at Toledo, and having represented to them the great expence of his military operations, together with the vast debts in which these had necessarily involved him, he proposed to levy such supplies as the present exigency of his affairs demanded, by a general excise on commodities. But the Spaniards already felt themselves oppressed with a load of taxes unknown to their ancestors. They had often complained that their country was drained not only of its wealth but of its inhabitants, in order to prosecute quarrels in which it was not interested, and to fight battles from which it could reap no benefit, and they determined not to add voluntarily to their

The complaints and dissatisfaction of that assembly.

⁴¹ Jovii. Histor. l. xxxvii. 203, Sandov. Ferreras, ix. 209.

own burdens, or to furnish the Emperor with the means of engaging in new enterprizes no less ruinous to the kingdom than most of those which he had hitherto carried on. The nobles, in particular, inveighed with great vehemence against the imposition proposed, as an encroachment upon the valuable and distinguished privilege of their order, that of being exempted from the payment of any tax. They demanded a conference with the representatives of the cities concerning the state of the nation. They contended that if Charles would imitate the example of his predecessors, who had resided constantly in Spain, and would avoid entangling himself in a multiplicity of transactions foreign to the concerns of his Spanish dominions, the stated revenues of the crown would be fully sufficient to defray the necessary expences of government. They represented to him, that it would be unjust to lay new burdens upon the people, while this prudent and effectual method of re-establishing publick credit, and securing national opulence, was totally neglected⁴². Charles, after employing arguments, entreaties, and promises, but without success, in order to overcome their obstinacy, dismissed the assembly with great indignation. From that period neither the nobles nor the prelates have been called to these assemblies,

Book VI.

1539.

The ancient
constitution
of the Cortes
subverted.

⁴² Sandov. Hist. vol. ii. 269.

BOOK VI. on pretence that such as pay no part of the public taxes, should not claim any vote in laying them on. None have been admitted to the Cortes but the procurators or representatives of eighteen cities. These, to the number of thirty six, being two from each community, form an assembly which bears no resemblance either in power or dignity or independence to the ancient Cortes, and are absolutely at the devotion of the court in all their determinations⁴³. Thus the imprudent zeal with which the Castilian nobles had supported the regal prerogative, in opposition to the claims of the commons during the commotions in the year one thousand five hundred and twenty-one, proved at last fatal to their own body. By enabling Charles to depress one of the orders in the state, they destroyed that balance to which the constitution owed its security, and put it in his power, or in that of his successors, to humble the other, and to strip it of its most valuable privileges.

The Spanish
grandees
still possessed
high privileges.

AT that time, however, the Spanish grandees still possessed extraordinary power as well as privileges, which they exercised and defended with an haughtiness peculiar to themselves. Of this the Emperor himself had a mortifying proof during the meeting of the Cortes at Toledo. As

⁴³ Sandov. *ibid.* La Science du Gouvernement, par M. de Real, tom. ii. p. 102.

he was returning one day from a tournament accompanied by most of the nobility, one of the serjeants of the court, out of officious zeal to clear the way for the Emperor, struck the Duke of Infantado's horse with his batton, which that haughty grandee resenting, drew his sword, beat and wounded the officer. Charles, provoked at such an insolent deed in his presence, immediately ordered Ronquillo the judge of the court to arrest the Duke; Ronquillo advanced to execute his charge, when the constable of Castile interposing, checked him, claimed the right of jurisdiction over a grandee as a privilege of his office, and conducted Infantado to his own apartment. All the nobles present were so pleased with the boldness of the constable in asserting the rights of their order, that deserting the Emperor, they attended him to his house with infinite applauses, and Charles returned to the palace without any person along with him but the cardinal Tavera. The Emperor, however sensible of the affront, saw the danger of irritating a jealous and high-spirited order of men, whom the slightest appearance of offence might drive to the most unwarrantable extremes. For that reason, instead of straining at any ill-timed exertion of his prerogative, he prudently connived at the arrogance of a body too potent for him to controul, and sent next morning to the Duke of Infantado, offering to inflict what

BOOK VI. punishment he pleased on the person who had affronted him. The Duke considering this as a full reparation to his honour, instantly forgave the officer; bestowing on him, besides, a considerable present as a compensation for his wound. Thus the affair was entirely forgotten⁴⁴; nor would it have deserved to be mentioned, if it were not a striking example of the haughty and independent spirit of the Spanish nobles in that age, as well as an instance of the Emperor's dexterity in accommodating his conduct to the circumstances in which he was placed.

Insurrection
at Ghent.

CHARLES was far from discovering any such condescension or lenity towards the citizens of Ghent, who not long after broke out into open rebellion against his government. An event which happened in the year one thousand five hundred and thirty-six, gave occasion to this rash insurrection so fatal to that flourishing city. At that time the Queen dowager of Hungary, governess of the Netherlands, having received orders from her brother to invade France with all the forces which she could raise, she assembled the States of the United Provinces, and obtained from them a subsidy of twelve hundred thousand florins to defray the expence of that undertaking. Of this sum, the county of Flanders was obliged to pay a third part as its

⁴⁴ Sandov. ii. 274. Ferreras, ix. 212. Miniana, 113.

porportion. But the citizens of Ghent, the most considerable city in that country, averse to a war with France, with which they carried on an extensive and gainful commerce, refused to pay their quota, and contended, that in consequence of stipulations between them and the ancestors of their present sovereign the Emperor, no tax could be levied upon them, unless they had given their exprefs consent to the imposition of it. The governers, on the other hand, maintained, that as the subsidy of twelve hundred thousand florins had been granted by the States of Flanders, of which their representatives were members, they were bound, of course, to conform to what was enacted by them, as it is the first principle in society, on which the tranquillity and order of government depend, that the inclinations of the minority must be over-ruled by the judgment and decision of the superior number.

THE citizens of Ghent, however, were not willing to relinquish a privilege of such high importance as that which they claimed. Having been accustomed, under the government of the house of Burgundy, to enjoy extensive immunities, and to be treated with much indulgence, they disdained to sacrifice to the delegated power of a regent, those rights and liberties which they had often and successfully asserted against their

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1539.

Pretensions
of the citizens.Proceedings
against
them.

BOOK VI. greatest Princes. The Queen, though she endeavoured at first to sooth them, and to reconcile them to their duty by various concessions, was at last so much irritated by the obstinacy with which they adhered to their claim, that she ordered all the citizens of Ghent, on whom she could lay hold in any part of the Netherlands, to be arrested. But this rash action made an impression very different from what she expected, on men, whose minds were agitated with all the violent passions which indignation at oppression and zeal for liberty inspire. Less affected with the danger of their friends and companions, than irritated at the governess, they openly despised her authority, and sent deputies to the other towns of Flanders, conjuring them not to abandon their country at such a juncture, but to concur with them in vindicating its rights against the encroachments of a woman, who either did not know or did not regard their immunities. All but a few inconsiderable towns declined entering into any confederacy against the governess; they joined, however, in petitioning her to put off the term for payment of the tax so long, that they might have it in their power to send some of their number into Spain, in order to lay their title to exemption before their sovereign. This she granted with some difficulty. But Charles received their commissioners with an haughtiness to which they were not accustomed

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from their ancient Princes, and enjoining them BOOK VI.
to yield the same respectful obedience to his 1539.
sister, which they owed to him in person, re-
mitted the examination of their claim to the
council of Malines. This court, which is pro-
perly a standing committee of the parliament or
states of the country, and which possesses the
supreme jurisdiction in all matters civil as well
as criminal⁴⁵, pronounced the claim of the citi-
zens of Ghent to be ill-founded, and appointed
them forthwith to pay their proportion of the
tax.

ENRAGED at this decision, which they con-
sidered as notoriously unjust, and rendered de-
sperate on seeing their rights betrayed by that
very court which was bound to protect them, the
people of Ghent ran to arms in a tumultuary
manner; drove such of the nobility as resided
among them out of the city; secured several
of the Emperor's officers; put one of them
to the torture, whom they accused of having
stolen or destroyed the record, that contained
the privileges of exemption from taxes which
they pleaded; chose a council to which they
committed the direction of their affairs; gave
orders for repairing and adding to their fortifi-
They take
arms, and
offer to sub-
mit to
France.

⁴⁵ Descrizione di tutti i paesi bassi di Lud. Guicciardini,
Ant. 1571. fol. p. 53.

BOOK VI. cations; and openly erected the standard of rebellion against their sovereign⁴⁶. Sensible, however, of their inability to support what their zeal had prompted them to undertake, and desirous of securing a protector against the formidable forces by which they might expect soon to be attacked, they sent some of their number to Francis, offering not only to acknowledge him as their sovereign, and to put him in immediate possession of Ghent, but to assist him with all their forces in recovering those provinces in the Netherlands, which had anciently belonged to the crown of France, and had been so lately reunited to it by the decree of the parliament of Paris. This unexpected proposition coming from persons who had it in their power to have performed instantly one part of what they undertook, and who could contribute so effectually towards the execution of the whole, opened vast as well as alluring prospects to Francis's ambition. The counties of Flanders and Artois were of greater value than the dutchy of Milan, which he had so long laboured to acquire with passionate but fruitless desire; their situation with respect to France rendered it more easy to conquer or to defend them; and they might be formed into a separate principality for the Duke

⁴⁶ Mémoires sur la révolte des Gantois en 1539, par Jean d'Hollander, écrits en 1547. A la Haye 1747. P. Heuter. Rer. Austr. lib. xi. p. 262. Sandov. Histor. tom. ii. p. 282.

of Orleans, no less suitable to his dignity than Book VI.
 that which his father aimed at obtaining. To 1539.
 this, the Flemings, who were acquainted with
 the French manners and government, would
 not have been averse; and his own subjects,
 weary of their destructive expeditions into Italy,
 would have turned their arms towards this quar-
 ter with more good-will, and with greater vi-
 gour. Several considerations, nevertheless, pre- Francis de-
 vented Francis from laying hold of this oppor- clines their
 tunity, the most favourable in appearance which offer.
 had ever presented itself, of extending his domi-
 nions or distressing the Emperor. From the
 time of their interview at Aigues-mortes, Charles
 had continued to court the King of France with
 wonderful attention; and often flattered him
 with hopes of gratifying at last his wishes con-
 cerning the Milanese, by granting the investi-
 ture of it either to him or to one of his sons. But
 though these hopes and promises were thrown
 out with no other intention than to detach him
 from his confederacy with the Grand Seignior,
 or to raise suspicions in Solyman's mind by the
 appearance of a cordial and familiar intercourse
 subsisting between the courts of Paris and Ma-
 drid, Francis was weak enough to catch at the
 shadow by which he had been so often deceived,
 and from eagerness to seize it, relinquished what
 must have proved a more substantial acquisition.
 Besides this, the Dauphin jealous to excess of

BOOK VI. his brother, and unwilling that a Prince who
 1539. seemed to be of a restless and enterprizing nature
 should obtain an establishment, which from its
 situation might be considered almost as a do-
 mestick one, made use of Montmorency, who, by
 a singular piece of good fortune, was at the
 same time the favourite of the father and of the
 son, to defeat the application of the Flemings,
 and to divert the King from espousing their cause.
 Montmorency, accordingly, represented in strong
 terms, the reputation and power which Francis
 would acquire by recovering that footing which
 he had formerly in Italy, and that nothing could
 be so efficacious to overcome the Emperor's aver-
 sion to this, as his adhering sacredly to the truce,
 and refusing on this occasion to countenance his
 rebellious subjects. Francis, apt of himself to
 over-rate the value of the Milanese, because he
 estimated it from the length of time as well as
 from the great efforts which he had employed
 in order to re-conquer it, and fond of every
 action which had the appearance of generosity,
 assented without difficulty to sentiments so agree-
 able to his own, rejected the proposition of the
 citizens of Ghent, and dismissed their deputies
 with an harsh answer⁴⁷.

⁴⁷ Mém. de Bellay, p. 263. P. Heuter. Rer. Austr. lib.
 xi. 263.

NOT satisfied with this, by a farther refinement in generosity, he communicated to the Emperor his whole negotiation with the contents, and all that he knew of their schemes and intentions⁴⁸. This convincing proof of Francis's disinterestedness relieved Charles from the most disquieting apprehensions and opened a way to extricate himself out of all his difficulties. He had already received full information of all the transactions in the Netherlands, and of the rage with which the people of Ghent had taken arms against his government. He was thoroughly acquainted with the genius and qualities of his subjects in that country; with their love of liberty; their attachment to their ancient privileges and customs; as well as the invincible obstinacy with which their minds, slow but firm and persevering, adhered to any measure on which they had leisure to fix. He easily saw what encouragement and support they might have derived from the assistance of France; and though now free from any danger on that quarter, he was still sensible that some immediate as well as vigorous interposition was necessary, in order to prevent the spirit of disaffection from spreading in a country where the number of cities, the multitude of people, together with the great wealth diffused among them by com-

BOOK VI.

1539.

Communicates their intentions to the Emperor.

⁴⁸ Sandov. Histor. tom. ii. 284.

BOOK VI.

1539.

Charles's
deliberations
concerning
his journey
to the Ne-
therlands.

Proposes to
pass through
France.

merce, rendered it peculiarly formidable, and would supply it with inexhaustible resources. No expedient, after long deliberation, appeared to him so effectual as his going in person to the Netherlands; and the governess his sister being of the same opinion, warmly solicited him to undertake the journey. There were only two different routes which he could take; one by land, through Italy and Germany, the other entirely by sea, from some port in Spain to one in the Low Countries. But the former was more tedious than suited the present exigency of his affairs; nor could he in consistency with his dignity or even his safety pass through Germany without such a train both of attendants and of troops, as would have added greatly to the time that he must have consumed in his journey; the latter was dangerous at this season, and while he remained uncertain with respect to the friendship of the King of England, was not to be ventured upon, unless under the convoy of a powerful fleet. This perplexing situation, in which he was under a necessity of chusing, and did not know what to chuse, inspired him at last with the singular and seemingly extravagant thought of passing through France, as the most expeditious way of reaching the Netherlands. He proposed in his council to demand Francis's permission for that purpose. All his counsellors joined with one voice in condemning the measure as no less

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rash than unprecedented, and which must infal- Book VI.
 libly expose him to disgrace or to danger; to 1539.
 disgrace, if the demand were rejected in the
 manner that he had reason to expect; to danger,
 if he put his person in the power of an enemy
 whom he had often offended, who had ancient
 injuries to revenge, as well as subjects of present
 contest still remaining undecided. But Charles,
 who had studied the character of his rival with
 greater care, and more profound discernment
 than any of his ministers, persisted in his plan,
 and flattered himself that it might be accom-
 plished not only without danger to his own per-
 son, but even without the expence of any con-
 cession detrimental to his crown.

WITH this view he communicated the matter To which
 to the French ambassador at his court, and sent Francis
 Granvelle his chief minister to Paris, in order to consents.
 obtain from Francis permission to pass through
 his dominions, and to promise that he would
 soon settle the affair of the Milanese to his satis-
 faction. But at the same time he entreated that
 Francis would not exact any new promise, or
 even insist on former engagements, at this jun-
 cture, lest whatever he should grant, under his
 present circumstances, might seem rather to be
 extorted by necessity, than to flow from friend-
 ship or the love of justice. Francis, instead of
 attending to the snare which such a slight artifice

BOOK VI. scarcely concealed, was so dazzled with the splendour of overcoming an enemy by acts of generosity, and so pleased with the air of superiority which the rectitude and disinterestedness of his proceedings gave him on this occasion, that he at once assented to all that was demanded. Judging of the Emperor's heart by his own, he imagined that the sentiments of gratitude, arising from the remembrance of good offices and liberal treatment, would determine him more forcibly to fulfil what he had so often promised, than the most precise stipulations that could be inserted in any treaty.

His reception in that kingdom.

UPON this, Charles, to whom every moment was precious, set out, notwithstanding the fears and suspicions of his Spanish subjects, with a small but splendid train of about an hundred persons. At Bayonne, on the frontiers of France, he was received by the Dauphin and the Duke of Orleans, attended by the constable Montmorency. The two Princes offered to go into Spain, and to remain there as hostages for the Emperor's safety; but this he rejected, declaring that he relied with implicit confidence on the King's honour, and had never demanded nor would accept of any other pledge for his security. In all the towns through which he passed, the greatest possible magnificence was displayed; the magistrates presented him the keys of the

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gates; the prison-doors were set open; and, by the royal honours paid to him, he appeared more like the sovereign of the country than a stranger. The King advanced as far as Chatelherault to meet him; their interview was distinguished by the warmest expressions of friendship and regard. They proceeded together towards Paris, and presented to the inhabitants of that city, the extraordinary spectacle of two rival Monarchs, whose enmity had disturbed and laid waste Europe during twenty years, making their solemn entry together with all the symptoms of a confidential harmony, as if they had forgotten for ever past injuries, and would never revive hostilities for the future⁴⁹.

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1539.

1540.

CHARLES remained six days at Paris; but amidst the perpetual caresses of the French court, and the various entertainments contrived to amuse or to do him honour, he discovered an extreme impatience to continue his journey, arising as much from an apprehension of danger which constantly oppressed him, as from the necessity of his presence in the Low Countries. Conscious of the dissimulation of his own intentions, he trembled when he reflected that some fatal accident might betray them to his rival, or lead him to suspect them; and though his arti-

The Emperor's solicitude,

⁴⁹ Thuan. Hist. lib. i. c. 14. Mém. de Bellay, 264.

BOOK VI. fices to conceal these should be successful, he
 1540. could not help fearing that motives of interest might at last triumph over the scruples of honour, and tempt Francis to avail himself of the advantage now in his hands. Nor were there wanting persons among the French ministers, who advised the King to turn his own arts, against the Emperor, and as the retribution due for so many instances of fraud or falsehood, to seize and detain his person until he granted him full satisfaction with regard to all the just claims of the French crown. But no consideration could induce Francis to violate the faith which he had pledged, nor could any argument convince him that Charles, after all the promises that he had given, and all the favours which he had received, might still be capable of deceiving him. Full of this false confidence he accompanied him to St. Quintin, and the two Princes, who had met him on the borders of Spain, did not take leave of him until he entered his dominions in the Low Countries.

and disingenuity. As soon as the Emperor reached his own territories, the French ambassadors demanded the
 January 24. accomplishment of what he had promised concerning the investiture of Milan; but Charles, under the plausible pretext that his whole attention was then engrossed by the consultations necessary towards suppressing the rebellion in

Ghent, put off the matter for some time. But Book VI.
in order to prevent Francis from suspecting his 1540.
sincerity, he still continued to talk of his resolu-
tions with respect to that matter in the same
strain as when he entered France, and even
wrote to the King much to the same purpose,
though in general terms, and with equivocal ex-
pressions, which he might afterwards explain
away or interpret at pleasure⁵⁰.

MEANWHILE, the unfortunate citizens of ^{Reduction}
Ghent, destitute of leaders capable either of ^{of Ghent;}
directing their councils, or conducting their
troops; abandoned by the French King and un-
supported by their countrymen; were unable to
resist their offended sovereign, who was ready to
advance against them with one body of troops
which he had raised in the Netherlands, with
another drawn out of Germany, and a third
which had arrived from Spain by sea. The near
approach of danger made them, at last, so sen-
sible of their own folly, that they sent ambassa-
dors to the Emperor, imploring his mercy, and
offering to set open their gates at his approach.
Charles without vouchsafing them any other an-
swer, than that he would appear among them
as their sovereign, with the sceptre and the
sword in his hand, began his march at the head

⁵⁰ Mémoires de Ribier, i. 504.

BOOK VI. of his troops. Though he chose to enter the city on the twenty-fourth of February, his birthday, he was touched with nothing of that tenderness or indulgence which was natural towards the place of his nativity. Twenty-six of the

and punish-
ment of the
citizens.
April 20.

principal citizens were put to death; a greater number was sent into banishment; the city was declared to have forfeited all its privileges and immunities; the revenues belonging to it were confiscated; its ancient form of government was abolished; the nomination of its magistrates was vested for the future in the Emperor and his successors; a new system of laws and political administration was prescribed¹¹, and in order to bridle the seditious spirit of the citizens, orders were given to erect a strong citadel, for defraying the expence of which a fine of an hundred and fifty thousand florins was imposed on the inhabitants, together with an annual tax of six thousand florins for the support of the garrison¹². By these rigorous proceedings, Charles not only punished the citizens of Ghent, but set an awful example of severity before his other subjects in the Netherlands, whose immunities and privileges, partly the effect, partly the cause of their extensive commerce, circumscribed the royal

¹¹ Les coutumes & loix du Comté de Flandre, par Alex. le Grand, 3 tom. fol. Cambray, 1719, tom. i. p. 169.

¹² Haræi Annales Brabantiae, vol. i. 616.

prerogative within very narrow bounds, and Book VI.
often stood in the way of measures which he . 1540.
wished to undertake, or fettered and retarded
him in his operations.

CHARLES having thus vindicated and re-esta- Charles re-
blished his authority in the Low Countries, and fuses to ful-
being now under no necessity of continuing the fil his en-
same scene of falsehood and dissimulation with gagements
to Francis.
which he had long amused Francis, began gra-
dually to throw aside the veil under which he had
concealed his intentions with respect to the Mi-
lanese. At first, he eluded the demands of the
French ambassadors, when they again reminded
him of his promises; then he proposed, by way
of equivalent for the dutchy of Milan, to grant
the Duke of Orleans the investiture of Flanders,
clogging the offer, however, with impracticable
conditions, or such as he knew would be reject-
ed⁵³. At last, being driven from all his evasions
and subterfuges by their insisting for a categori-
cal answer, he peremptorily refused to give up
a territory of such value, or voluntarily to make
such a liberal addition to the strength of an ene-
my by diminishing his own power⁵⁴. He denied
at the same time, that he had ever made any
promise which could bind him to an action so
foolish, and so contrary to his own interest⁵⁵.

⁵³ Mém. de Ribier, i. 509. 514. ⁵⁴ Ribier, i. 519.

⁵⁵ Bellay, 365-6.

BOOK VI.

1540.

OF all the transactions in the Emperor's life this, without doubt, reflects the greatest dishonour on his reputation⁵⁶. Though Charles was not extremely scrupulous at other times about the means which he employed for accomplishing his ends, or always observant of the strict precepts of veracity and honour, he had hitherto maintained some regard for the maxims of that less precise and rigid morality by which Monarchs think themselves entitled to regulate their conduct. But, on this occasion, the scheme that he formed of deceiving a generous and open-hearted Prince; the illiberal and mean artifices by which he carried it on; the insensibility with which he received all the marks of his friendship, as well as the ingratitude with which he requited them; are all equally becoming the dignity of his character, and inconsistent with the grandeur of his views.

THIS transaction exposed Francis to as much scorn as it did the Emperor to censure. After the experience of a long reign, after so many opportunities of discovering the duplicity and artifices of his rival, the credulous simplicity with which he trusted him at this juncture seemed to merit no other return than it actually met with. Francis, however, remonstrated and ex-

⁵⁶ Jovii Hist. lib. xxxix. p. 238, a.

claimed, as if this had been the first instance in which the Emperor had deceived him. Feeling, as is usual, the insult which was offered to his understanding still more sensibly than the injury done to his interest, he discovered such resentment, as made it obvious that he would lay hold on the first opportunity of being revenged, and that a war, no less rancorous than that which had so lately raged, would soon break out anew in Europe.

THIS year is rendered memorable by the establishment of the Order of Jesuits; a body whose influence on ecclesiastical as well as civil affairs hath been so considerable, that an account of the genius of its laws and government justly merits a place in history. When men take a view of the rapid progress of this society towards wealth and power; when they contemplate the admirable prudence with which it has been governed; when they attend to the persevering and systematick spirit with which its schemes have been carried on; they are apt to ascribe such a singular institution to the superior wisdom of its founder, and to suppose that he had formed and digested his plan with profound policy. But the Jesuits, as well as the other monastick orders, are indebted for the existence of their order not to the wisdom of their founder, but to his enthusiasm. Ignatio Loyola, whom I have already

Book VI.
1540.
The Pope
authorizes
the institu-
tion of the
Order of
Jesuits.

BOOK VI. mentioned on occasion of the wound which he received in defending Pampeluna⁵⁷, was a fanatick distinguished by extravagancies in sentiment and conduct, no less incompatible with the maxims of sober reason, than repugnant to the spirit of true religion. The wild adventures, and visionary schemes, in which his enthusiasm engaged him, equal any thing recorded in the legends of the Romish saints; but are unworthy of notice in history.

Fanaticism
of Loyola
its founder.

PROMPTED by this fanatical spirit, or incited by the love of power and distinction, from which such pretenders to superior sanctity are not exempt, Loyola was ambitious of becoming the founder of a religious order. The plan, which he formed of its constitution and laws, was suggested, as he gave out, and as his followers still teach, by the immediate inspiration of heaven⁵⁸. But notwithstanding this high pretension, his design met at first with violent opposition. The Pope, to whom Loyola had applied for the sanction of his authority to confirm the institution, referred his petition to a committee of Cardinals. They represented the establishment to be unnecessary as well as dangerous, and Paul refused to grant his approbation of it. At last, Loyola

⁵⁷ Vol. ii. Book ii. p. 192.

⁵⁸ *Compte rendu des Constitutions des Jésuites, au Parlement de Provence, par M. de Monclar, p. 285.*

removed all his scruples by an offer which it was impossible for any Pope to resist. He proposed that besides the three vows of poverty, of chastity, and of monastick obedience, which are common to all the orders of regulars, the members of his society should take a fourth vow of obedience to the Pope, binding themselves to go whithersoever he should command for the service of religion, and without requiring any thing from the Holy See for their support. At a time when the papal authority had received such a shock by the revolt of so many nations from the Romish church; at a time when every part of the popish system was attacked with so much violence and success, the acquisition of a body of men, thus peculiarly devoted to the See of Rome, and whom it might set in opposition to all its enemies was an object of the highest consequence. Paul, instantly perceiving this, confirmed the institution of the Jesuits by his bull; granted the most ample privileges to the members of the society; and appointed Loyola to be the first general of the order. The event hath fully justified Paul's discernment, in expecting such beneficial consequences to the See of Rome from this institution. In less than half a century, the society obtained establishments in every country that adhered to the Roman catholic church; its power and wealth increased amazingly; the number of its members became

BOOK VI.

1540.

The Pope's
motives for
confirming
the order.

Sept. 27.

BOOK VI. great; their character as well as accomplishments
 1540. were still greater; and the Jesuits were celebrated
 by the friends, and dreaded by the enemies of
 the Romish faith, as the most able and enterprizing
 order in the church.

Its constitu-
 tion and ge-
 nius merit
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 attention.

THE constitution and laws of the society were
 perfected by Laynez and Aquaviva, the two
 generals who succeeded Loyola, men far supe-
 rior to their master in abilities, and in the science
 of government. They framed that system of
 profound and artful policy which distinguishes
 the order. The large infusion of fanaticism,
 mingled with its regulations, should be imputed
 to Loyola its founder. Many circumstances con-
 curred in giving a peculiarity of character to
 the order of Jesuits, and in forming the mem-
 bers of it not only to take greater part in the
 affairs of the world than any other body of
 monks, but to acquire superior influence in the
 conduct of them.

The object
 of the order
 singular.

THE primary object of almost all the monastick
 orders is to separate men from the world, and
 from any concern in its affairs. In the solitude
 and silence of the cloister, the monk is called
 to work out his own salvation by extraordinary
 acts of mortification and piety. He is dead to
 the world, and ought not to mingle in its trans-
 actions. He can be of no benefit to mankind,

but by his example and by his prayers. On the contrary, the Jesuits are taught to consider themselves as formed for action. They are chosen soldiers, bound to exert themselves continually in the service of God, and of the Pope, his vicar on earth. Whatever tends to instruct the ignorant; whatever can be of use to reclaim or to oppose the enemies of the Holy See, is their proper object. That they may have full leisure for this active service, they are totally exempted from those functions, the performance of which is the chief business of other monks. They appear in no processions; they practise no rigorous austerities; they do not consume one half of their time in the repetition of tedious offices⁵⁹. But they are required to attend to all the transactions of the world, on account of the influence which these may have upon religion; they are directed to study the dispositions of persons in high rank, and to cultivate their friendship⁶⁰; and by the very constitution as well as genius of the order, a spirit of action and intrigue is infused into all its members.

BOOK VI.

1540.

As the object of the society of Jesuits differed from that of the other monastick orders, the diversity was no less in the form of its government. Peculiarities in the form of its policy, particularly

⁵⁹ *Compte Rendu*, par M. de Monclar, p. xiii. 290. Sur la destruct. des Jesuites, par M. D'Alembert, p. 42.

⁶⁰ *Compte par M. de Monclar*, p. xii.

BOOK VI. ment. The other orders are to be considered as
 1540. voluntary associations, in which whatever affects
 with respect the whole body, is regulated by the common
 to the power suffrage of all its members. The executive power
 of the gene- is vested in the persons placed at the head of
 ral. each convent, or of the whole society; the
 legislative authority resides in the community.
 Affairs of moment, relating to particular con-
 vents, are determined in conventual chapters;
 such as respect the whole order are considered
 in general congregations. But Loyola, full of the
 ideas of implicit obedience, which he had de-
 rived from his military profession, appointed that
 the government of his order should be purely
 monarchical. A general, chosen for life by
 deputies from the several provinces; possessed
 power that was supreme and independent, ex-
 tending to every person, and to every case.
 He, by his sole authority, nominated provincials,
 rectors, and every other officer employed in the
 government of the society, and could remove
 them at pleasure. In him was vested the sove-
 reign administration of the revenues and funds
 of the order. Every member belonging to it
 was at his disposal; and by his uncontrollable
 mandate, he could impose on them any task,
 or employ them in what service soever he
 pleased. To his commands they were required to
 yield not only outward obedience, but to resign
 up to him the inclinations of their own wills,
 and

and the sentiments of their own understandings. They were to listen to his injunctions, as if they had been uttered by Christ himself. Under his direction, they were to be mere passive instruments, like clay in the hands of the potter, or like dead carcasses incapable of resistance⁶¹. Such a singular form of policy could not fail to impress its character on all the members of the order, and to give a peculiar force to all its operations. There is not in the annals of mankind any example of such a perfect despotism, exercised not over monks shut up in the cells of a convent, but over men dispersed among all the nations of the earth.

BOOK VI.

1540.

As the constitutions of the order vest, in the General, such absolute dominion over all its members, they carefully provide for his being perfectly informed with respect to the character and abilities of his subjects. Every novice who offers himself as a candidate for entering into the order, is obliged to *manifest his conscience* to the superior, or to a person appointed by him; and is required to confess not only his sins and defects, but to discover the inclinations, the passions, and the bent of his soul. This manifestation must be renewed every six months⁶². The

Circumstances which enable him to exercise it with the greatest advantage.

⁶¹ Compte rendu au Parlem. de Bretagne, par M. de Chaulotais, p. 41, &c. Compte par M. de Monclar. 83. 185,

343:
⁶² Compte par M. de Monclar. p. 121, &c.

BOOK VI. society not satisfied with penetrating in this manner into the innermost recesses of the heart, directs each member to observe the words and actions of the novices; they are constituted spies upon their conduct; and are bound to disclose every thing of importance concerning them to the superior. In order that this scrutiny into their character may be as complete as possible, a long noviciate must expire, during which they pass through the several gradations of ranks in the society, and they must have attained the full age of thirty-three years, before they can be admitted to take the final vows, by which they become *professed* members⁶³. By these various methods, the superiors, under whose immediate inspection the novices are placed, acquire a thorough knowledge of their dispositions and talents. In order that the General, who is the soul that animates and moves the whole society, may have under his eye every thing necessary to inform or direct him, the provincials and heads of the several houses are obliged to transmit to him regular and frequent reports concerning the members under their inspection. In these they descend into minute details with respect to the character of each person, his abilities natural or acquired, his temper, his experience in affairs,

⁶³ Compte par M. de Moncl. 215. 241. Sur la destr. des Més. par M. D'Alemb. p. 39.

and the particular department for which he is best fitted ⁶⁴. These reports, when digested and arranged, are entered into registers, kept of purpose that the General may, at one comprehensive view, survey the state of the society in every corner of the earth; observe the qualifications and talents of its members; and thus choose, with perfect information, the instruments, which

BOOK VI.
1540.

⁶⁴ M. de Chalotais has made a calculation of the number of these reports, which the General of the Jesuits must annually receive according to the regulations of the society. These amount in all to 6584. If this sum be divided by 37, the number of provinces in the order, it appears that 177 reports concerning the state of each province are transmitted to Rome annually. *Compte*, p. 52. Besides this, there may be extraordinary letters, or such as are sent by the monitors or spies whom the General and Provincials entertain in each house. *Compte par M. de Moncl.* p. 431. *Hist. des Jesuites*, Amst. 1761. tom. iv. p. 56. The provincials and heads of houses not only report concerning the members of the society, but are bound to give the General an account of the civil affairs in the country wherein they are settled, as far as their knowledge of these may be of benefit to religion. This condition may extend to every particular, so that the General is furnished with full information concerning the transactions of every Prince and state in the world. *Compte par M. de Moncl.* 443. *Hist. des Jesuit.* *ibid.* p. 58. When the affairs with respect to which the provincials or rectors write are of importance, they are directed to use cyphers, and each of them has a particular cypher from the General. *Compte par M. Chalotais*, p. 54.

BOOK VI. his absolute power can employ in any service for which he thinks meet to destine them⁶⁵.
1540.

Progress of
the power
and influ-
ence of the
order.

As it was the professed intention of the order of Jesuits to labour with unwearied zeal in promoting the salvation of men, this engaged them, of course, in many active functions. From their first institution, they considered the education of youth as their peculiar province; they aimed at being spiritual guides and confessors; they preached frequently in order to instruct the people; they set out as missionaries to convert unbelieving nations. The novelty of the institution, as well as the singularity of its objects procured the order many admirers and patrons. The governors of the society had the address to avail themselves of every circumstance in its favour, and in a short time, the number as well as influence of its members increased wonderfully. Before the expiration of the sixteenth century, the Jesuits had obtained the chief direction of the education of youth in every catholic country in Europe. They had become the confessors of almost all its monarchs, a function of no small importance in any reign, but under a weak Prince, superior even to that of minister. They were the spiritual guides of almost every person eminent for rank or power. They pos-

⁶⁵ Compte par M. de Moncl. p. 215. 439.—Compte par M. de Chalotais, p. 52. 222.

fessed the highest degree of confidence and in-
 terest with the papal court, as the most zealous
 and able champions for its authority. The ad-
 vantages which an active and enterprising body
 of men might derive from all these circumstances
 are obvious. They formed the minds of men
 in their youth. They retained an ascendant
 over them in their advanced years. They pos-
 sessed, at different periods, the direction of the
 most considerable courts in Europe. They
 mingled in all affairs. They took part in every
 intrigue and revolution. The General, by
 means of the extensive intelligence which he re-
 ceived, could regulate the operations of the
 order with the most perfect discernment, and by
 means of his absolute power could carry them
 with the utmost vigour and effect".

BOOK VI.
 1540.

TOGETHER with the power of the order, its
 wealth continued to increase. Various expedi-
 ents were devised for eluding the obligation of

Progress of
 its wealth.

"When Loyola in the year 1540 petitioned the Pope to
 authorize the institution of the order, he had only ten dis-
 ciples. But in the year 1608, sixty-eight years after their
 first institution, the number of Jesuits had increased to ten
 thousand five hundred and eighty-one. In the year 1710,
 the order possessed twenty-four *professed* houses; fifty-nine
 houses of probation; three hundred and forty residencies;
 six hundred and twelve colleges; two hundred missions; one
 hundred and fifty seminaries and boarding-schools; and
 consisted of 19,998 Jesuits. Hist. des Jesuites, tom. i. p. 20.

BOOK VI. the vow of poverty. The order acquired ample
 1540. possessions in every catholick country; and by
 the number as well as magnificence of its publick
 buildings, together with the value of its property,
 moveable or real, it vied with the most opulent
 of the monastick fraternities. Besides the sources
 of wealth common to all the regular clergy, the
 Jesuits possessed one which was peculiar to
 themselves. Under pretext of promoting the suc-
 cess of their missions, and of facilitating the sup-
 port of their missionaries, they obtained a special
 licence from the court of Rome, to trade with
 the nations which they laboured to convert. In
 consequence of this, they engaged in an extensive
 and lucrative commerce, both in the East and
 West Indies. They opened warehouses in differ-
 ent parts of Europe, in which they vended their
 commodities. Not satisfied with trade alone, they
 imitated the example of other commercial socie-
 ties, and aimed at obtaining settlements. They
 acquired possession accordingly of a large and
 fertile province in the southern continent of
 America, and reigned as sovereigns over some
 hundred thousand subjects⁶⁷.

Pernicious
 effects of
 these on
 civil society.

UNHAPPILY for mankind, the vast influence
 which the order of Jesuits acquired by all these

⁶⁷ Hist. des Jes. iv. 168—196, &c.

different means, has been often exerted with Book VI.
 the most pernicious effect. Such was the ten- 1540.
 dency of that discipline observed by the society
 in forming its members, and such the funda-
 mental maxims in its constitution, that every
 Jesuit was taught to regard the interest of the
 order as the capital object, to which every con-
 sideration was to be sacrificed. This spirit of
 attachment to their order, the most ardent, per-
 haps, that ever influenced any body of men⁶²,
 is the characteristick principle of the Jesuits, and
 serves as a key to the genius of their policy, as
 well as to the peculiarities in their sentiments and
 conduct.

As it was for the honour and advantage of
 the society, that its members should possess an
 ascendant over persons in high rank or of great
 power, the desire of acquiring and preserving
 such a direction of their conduct, with greater
 facility, has led the Jesuits to propagate a system
 of relaxed and pliant morality, which accommo-
 dates itself to the passions of men, which justifies
 their vices, which tolerates their imperfections,
 which authorizes almost every action that the
 most audacious or crafty politician would wish
 to perpetrate.

⁶² Compte par M. de Moncl. p. 285.

BOOK VI.

1540.

As the prosperity of the order was intimately connected with the preservation of the papal authority, the Jesuits, influenced by the same principle of attachment to the interests of their society, have been the most zealous patrons of those doctrines, which tend to exalt ecclesiastical power on the ruins of civil government. They have attributed to the court of Rome a jurisdiction as extensive and absolute as was claimed by the most presumptuous pontiffs in the dark ages. They have contended for the entire independence of ecclesiasticks on the civil magistrate. They have published such tenets concerning the duty of opposing Princes who were enemies of the catholic faith, as countenanced the most atrocious crimes, and tended to dissolve all the ties which connect subjects with their rulers.

As the order derived both reputation and authority from the zeal with which it stood forth in defence of the Romish church against the attacks of the reformers, its members, proud of this distinction, have considered it as their peculiar function to combat the opinions, and to check the progress of the Protestants. They have made use of every art, and have employed every weapon against them. They have set themselves in opposition to every gentle or tolerating measure in their favour. They have

incessantly stirred up against them all the rage of ecclesiastical and civil persecution. BOOK VI.
1540.

MONKS of other denominations have, indeed, ventured to teach the same pernicious doctrines, and have held opinions equally inconsistent with the order and happiness of civil society. But they, from reasons which are obvious, have either delivered such opinions with greater reserve, or have propagated them with less success. Whoever recollects the events which have happened in Europe during two centuries, will find that the Jesuits may justly be considered as responsible for most of the pernicious effects arising from that corrupt and dangerous casuistry, from those extravagant tenets concerning ecclesiastical power, and from that intolerant spirit, which have been the disgrace of the church of Rome throughout that period, and which have brought so many calamities upon civil society."

BUT amidst many bad consequences flowing from the institution of this order, mankind, it must be acknowledged, have derived from it some considerable advantages. As the Jesuits made the education of youth one of their capital objects, and as their first attempts to establish colleges for the reception of students were vio-

Some advantages resulting from the institution of this order.

" Encyclopédie, Art. *Jésuites*, tom. viii. 513.

BOOK VI. lently opposed by the universities in different countries, it became necessary for them, as the most effectual method of acquiring the publick favour, to surpass their rivals in science and industry. This prompted them to cultivate the study of ancient literature with extraordinary ardour. This put them upon various methods for facilitating the instruction of youth; and by the improvements which they made in it, they have contributed so much towards the progress of polite learning, that on this account they have merited well of society. Nor has the order of Jesuits been successful only in teaching the elements of literature, it has produced likewise eminent masters in many branches of science, and can alone boast of a greater number of ingenious authors, than all the other religious fraternities taken together ⁷⁰.

Particularly
to literature.

⁷⁰ M. d'Alembert has observed that though the Jesuits have made extraordinary progress in erudition of every species; though they can reckon up many of their brethren who have been eminent mathematicians, antiquaries, and critics; though they have even formed some orators of reputation; yet the order has never produced one man, whose mind was so much enlightened with sound knowledge, as to merit the name of a philosopher. But it seems to be the unavoidable effect of monastick education to contract and fetter the human mind. The partial attachment of a monk to the interest of his order, which is often incompatible with that of other citizens; the habit of implicit obedience

BUT it is in the new world that the Jesuits have exhibited the most wonderful display of their abilities, and have contributed most effectually to the benefit of the human species. The conquerors of that unfortunate quarter of the globe had nothing in view, but to plunder, to enslave, and to exterminate its inhabitants. The Jesuits alone have made humanity the object of their settling there. About the beginning of the last century they obtained admission into the fertile province of Paraguay, which stretches across the southern continent of America, from the bottom of the mountains of Potosi, to the confines of the Spanish and Portuguese settlements on the banks of the river de la Plata. They found the inhabitants in a state little different from that which takes place among men when they first begin to unite together; strangers to the arts; subsisting precariously by hunting

BOOK VI
1540.
More especially from the settlement of the Jesuits in Paraguay.

to the will of a Superior, together with the frequent return of the wearisome and frivolous duties of the cloister, debase his faculties, and extinguish that generosity of sentiment and spirit, which qualifies men for thinking or feeling justly with respect to what is proper in life and conduct. Father Paul of Venice is, perhaps, the only person educated in a cloister, that ever was altogether superior to its prejudices, or who viewed the transactions of men, and reasoned concerning the interests of society, with the enlarged sentiments of a philosopher, with the discernment of a man conversant in affairs, and with the liberality of a gentleman.

BOOK VI. or fishing; and hardly acquainted with the first
1540. principles of subordination and government. The Jesuits set themselves to instruct and to civilize these savages. They taught them to cultivate the ground, to rear tame animals, and to build houses. They brought them to live together in villages. They trained them to arts and manufactures. They made them taste the sweets of society; and accustomed them to the blessings of security and order. These people became the subjects of their benefactors; who have governed them with a tender attention, resembling that with which a father directs his children. Respected and beloved almost to adoration, a few Jesuits presided over some hundred thousand Indians. They maintained a perfect equality among all the members of the community. Each of them was obliged to labour not for himself alone, but for the publick. The produce of their fields, together with the fruits of their industry of every species, were deposited in common storehouses, from which each individual received every thing necessary for the supply of his wants. By this institution, almost all the passions which disturb the peace of society, and render the members of it unhappy, were extinguished. A few magistrates, chosen by the Indians themselves, watched over the publick tranquillity and secured obedience to the laws. The sanguinary punishments frequent under other

governments were unknown. An admonition Book VI.
 from a Jesuit; a slight mark of infamy; or, 1540.
 on some singular occasion, a few lashes with a
 whip, were sufficient to maintain good order
 among these innocent and happy people ⁷¹.

BUT even in this meritorious effort of the
 Jesuits for the good of mankind, the genius and
 spirit of their order have mingled and are dis-
 cernible. They plainly aimed at establishing in
 Paraguay an independent empire, subject to the
 society alone, and which, by the superior excel-
 lence of its constitution and police, could scarce-
 ly have failed to extend its dominion over all the
 southern continent of America. With this view,
 in order to prevent the Spaniards or Portuguese
 in the adjacent settlements, from acquiring any
 dangerous influence over the people within the
 limits of the province subject to the society, the
 Jesuits endeavoured to inspire the Indians with
 hatred and contempt of these nations. They cut
 off all intercourse between their subjects and the
 Spanish or Portuguese settlements. They pro-
 hibited any private trader of either nation from
 entering their territories. When they were
 obliged to admit any person in a publick charac-
 ter from the neighbouring governments, they

⁷¹ Hist. du Paraguay par Pere de Charlevoix, tom. ii. 42,
 &c. Voyage au Perou par Don G. Juan & D. Ant. de Ul-
 loa, tom. i. 540, &c. Par. 4to. 1752.

BOOK VI. did not permit him to have any conversation with
 1540. their subjects, and no Indian was allowed even to enter the house where these strangers resided, unless in the presence of a Jesuit. In order to render any communication between them as difficult as possible, they industriously avoided giving the Indians any knowledge of the Spanish, or of any other European language; but encouraged the different tribes, which they had civilized, to acquire a certain dialect of the Indian tongue, and laboured to make that the universal language throughout their dominions. As all these precautions, without military force, would have been insufficient to have rendered their empire secure and permanent, they instructed their subjects in the European arts of war. They formed them into bodies of cavalry and infantry, completely armed and regularly disciplined. They provided a great train of artillery, as well as magazines stored with all the implements of war. Thus they established an army so numerous and well-appointed, as to be formidable in a country, where a few sickly and ill-disciplined battalions composed all the military force kept on foot by the Spaniards or Portuguese ⁷².

⁷² Voyage de Juan & de Ulloa, tom. i. 549. Recueil de toutes les Pièces qui ont paru sur les Affaires des Jesuites en Portugal, tom. i. p. 7, &c.

THE Jesuits gained no considerable degree of power during the reign of Charles V. who, with his usual sagacity, discerned the dangerous tendency of the institution, and checked its progress⁷³. But as the order was founded in the period of which I write the history, and as the age to which I address this work hath seen its fall, the view which I have exhibited of the laws and genius of this formidable body will not, I hope, be unacceptable to my readers; especially as one circumstance has enabled me to enter into this detail with particular advantage. Europe had observed, for two centuries, the ambition and power of the order. But while it felt many fatal effects of these, it could not fully discern the causes to which they were to be imputed. It was unacquainted with many of the singular regulations in the political constitution or government of the Jesuits, which formed the enterprising spirit of intrigue that distinguished its members, and elevated the body itself to such a height of power. It was a fundamental maxim with the Jesuits, from their first institution, not to publish the rules of their order. These they kept concealed as an impenetrable mystery. They never communicated them to strangers; nor even to the greater part of their own members. They refused to produce them when re-

1540.
Reason for
giving so
full a view
of the go-
vernment
and progress
of the order.

⁷³ Compte par M. de Moncl. 312.

BOOK VI.
1540.

quired by courts of justice⁷⁴; and by a strange solecism in policy, the civil power in different countries authorized or connived at the establishment of an order of men, whose constitution and laws were concealed with a solicitude, which alone was a good reason for having excluded them. During the prosecutions lately carried on against them in Portugal and France, the Jesuits have been so inconsiderate as to produce the mysterious volumes of their institute. By the aid of these authentick records, the principles of their government may be delineated, and the sources of their power investigated with a degree of certainty and precision, which, previous to that event, it was impossible to attain⁷⁵. But as I have pointed out the dangerous tendency of the constitution and spirit of the order with the freedom becoming an historian, the candour

⁷⁴ Hist. des Jes. tom. iii. 236, &c. Compte par M. de Chalot. p. 38.

⁷⁵ The greater part of my information concerning the government and laws of the order of Jesuits, I have derived from the reports of M. de Chalotais and M. de Monclar. I rest not my narrative, however, upon the authority even of these respectable magistrates and elegant writers, but upon innumerable passages which they have extracted from the constitutions of the order, deposited in their hands. Hospinian, a Protestant Divine of Zurich, in his *Historia Jesuitica*, printed A. D. 1619, published a small part of the constitutions of the Jesuits, of which by some accident he had got a copy; p. 13—54.

and

and impartiality no less requisite in that character call on me to add one observation, That no class of regular clergy in the Romish church has been more eminent for decency, and even purity of manners, than the major part of the order of Jesuits ⁷⁶. The maxims of an intriguing, ambitious, interested policy, might influence those who governed the society, and might even corrupt the heart, and pervert the conduct of some individuals, while the greater number, engaged in literary pursuits, or employed in the functions of religion, was left to the guidance of those common principles which restrain men from vice, and excite them to what is becoming and laudable. The causes which occasioned the ruin of this mighty body, as well as the circumstances and effects with which it has been attended in the different countries of Europe, though objects extremely worthy the attention of every intelligent observer of human affairs, do not fall within the period of this history.

No sooner had Charles re-established order in the Low Countries, than he was obliged to turn his attention to the affairs of Germany. The Protestants pressed him earnestly to appoint that conference between a select number of the divines of each party, which had been stipulated

⁷⁶ Sur la destruct. des Jes. par M. D'Alembert, p. 55.

- BOOK VI. in the convention at Francfort. The Pope considered such an attempt to examine or decide the points in dispute as derogatory to his right of being the supreme judge in controversy; and being convinced that it would either be ineffectual by determining nothing, or prove dangerous by determining too much, he employed every art to prevent the meeting. The Emperor, however, finding it more for his interest to sooth the Germans, than to gratify Paul, paid little regard to his remonstrances. In a diet held at Haguenaw, matters were ripened for the conference. In another diet assembled at Worms, the conference was begun, Melancthon on the one side and Eckius on the other, sustaining the principal part in the dispute; but after they had made some progress, though without concluding any thing, it was suspended by the Emperor's command, that it might be renewed with greater solemnity in his own presence in a diet summoned to meet at Ratisbon. This assembly was opened with great pomp, and with a general expectation that its proceedings would be vigorous and decisive. By the consent of both parties, the Emperor was entrusted with the power of nominating the persons, who should manage the conference, which it was agreed should be conducted not in the form of a publick disputation, but as a friendly scrutiny or examination into the articles which had given rise to
- 1540.
- A conference between the Popish and Protestant divines, June 25. Dec. 6.
- 1541.

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the present controversies. He appointed Eckius, Gropper and Pflug, on the part of the Catholicks; Melancthon, Bucer, and Pistorius, on that of the Protestants; all men of distinguished reputation among their own adherents, and, except Eckius, all eminent for their moderation, as well as desirous of peace. As they were about to begin their consultations, the Emperor put into their hands a book, composed, as he said, by a learned divine in the Low Countries, with such extraordinary perspicuity and temper, as, in his opinion, might go far to unite and comprehend the two contending parties. Gropper, a canon of Cologne, whom he had named among the managers of the conference, a man of address as well as of erudition, was afterwards suspected to be the author of this short treatise. It contained positions with regard to twenty-two of the chief articles in theology, which included most of the questions then agitated in the controversy between the Lutherans and the church of Rome. By ranging his sentiments in a natural order, and expressing them with great simplicity; by employing often the very words of scripture, or of the primitive fathers; by softening the rigour of some opinions, and explaining away what was absurd in others; by concessions, now on one side, and now on the other; and especially by banishing as much as possible scholastick phrases, those words and terms of art in controversy,

BOOK VI.

1541.

which serve as badges of distinction to the different sects, and for which theologians often contend more fiercely than for opinions themselves; he framed his work in such a manner, as promised fairer than any thing that had hitherto been attempted, to compose and to terminate religious dissensions⁷⁷.

fruitless.

BUT the attention of the age was turned, with such acute observation, towards theological controversies, that it was not easy to impose on it by any gloss, how artful or specious soever. The length and eagerness of the dispute had separated the contending parties so completely, and had set their minds at such variance, that they were not to be reconciled by partial concessions. All the zealous Catholics, particularly the ecclesiasticks who had a seat in the diet, joined in condemning Gropper's treatise as too favourable to the Lutheran opinions, the poison of which heresy it conveyed, as they pretended, with greater danger, because it was in some degree disguised. The rigid Protestants, especially Luther himself, and his patron the Elector of Saxony, were for rejecting it as an impious compound of error and truth, craftily prepared that it might impose on the weak, the timid, and the unthinking. But the divines, to whom the ex-

⁷⁷ Goldast. *Constit. Imper.* ii. p. 182.

amination of it was committed, entered upon BOOK VI.
 that business with greater deliberation and tem- 1541.
 per. As it was more easy in itself, as well as
 more consistent with the dignity of the church
 to make concessions, and even alterations with re-
 gard to speculative opinions, the discussion where-
 of is confined chiefly to schools, and which pre-
 sent nothing to the people that either strikes their
 imagination or affects their senses, they came to
 an accommodation about these without much
 labour, and even defined the great article con-
 cerning justification to their mutual satisfaction.
 But, when they proceeded to points of jurisdic-
 tion, where the interest and authority of the
 Roman See were concerned, or to the rites and
 forms of external worship, where every change
 that could be made must be publick, and draw
 the observation of the people, there the Catho-
 licks were altogether untractable; nor could the
 church either with safety or with honour abolish
 its ancient institutions. All the articles relative
 to the power of the Pope, the authority of coun-
 cils, the administration of the sacraments, the
 worship of saints, and many other particulars did
 not, in their nature, admit of any tempera-
 ment; so that after labouring long to bring
 about an accommodation with respect to these,
 the Emperor found all his endeavours ineffectual.
 Being impatient, however, to close the diet, he
 at last prevailed on a majority of the members

BOOK VI. to approve of the following recess; "That the articles concerning which the divines had agreed in the conference, should be held as points decided, and be observed inviolably by all; that the other articles about which they had differed, should be deferred to the determination of a general council, or if that could not be obtained, to a national synod of Germany; and if it should prove impracticable, likewise, to assemble a synod, that a general diet of the Empire should be called within eighteen months, in order to give some final judgment upon the whole controversy; that the Emperor should use all his interest and authority with the Pope, to procure the meeting either of a general council or synod; that, in the mean time, no innovations should be attempted, no endeavours should be employed to gain profelytes; and neither the revenues of the church, nor the rights of the monasteries, should be invaded".

gives offence both to Papists and Protestants.

ALL the proceedings of this diet, as well as the recess in which they terminated, gave great offence to the Pope. The power which the Germans had assumed, of appointing their own divines to examine and determine matters of controversy, he considered as a very dangerous invasion on his rights; the renewing of their

* Sleidan, 267, &c. Pallav. l. iv. c. 11. p. 136. F. Paul, p. 86. Seckend. l. iii. 256.

ancient proposal concerning a national synod, BOOK VI.
 which had been so often rejected by him and his 1541.
 predecessors, appeared extremely undutiful; but
 the bare mention of allowing a diet, composed
 chiefly of laymen, to pass judgment with respect
 to articles of faith, was deemed no less criminal
 and profane, than the worst of those heresies
 which they seemed zealous to suppress. On the
 other hand, the Protestants were no less dissatis-
 fied with a recess, that considerably abridged the
 liberty which they enjoyed at that time. As they
 murmured loudly against it, Charles, unwilling Charles
courts the
Protestants,
 to leave any seeds of discontent in the Empire,
 granted them a private declaration, in the most
 ample terms, exempting them from whatever
 they thought oppressive or injurious in the recess,
 and ascertaining to them the full possession of all
 the privileges which they had ever enjoyed⁷⁹.

EXTRAORDINARY as these concessions may Affairs of
Hungary.
 appear, the situation of the Emperor's affairs at
 this juncture made it necessary for him to grant
 them. He foresaw a rupture with France to be
 not only unavoidable, but near at hand, and durst
 not give any such cause of disgust or fear to the
 Protestants, as might force them, in self-defence,
 to court the protection of the French King,

⁷⁹ Sleid. 283. Seckend. 366. Dumont Corps Diplom.
 iv. p. ii. p. 210.

BOOK VI. from whom, at present, they were much alienated. The rapid progress of the Turks in Hungary, was a more powerful and present cause of the moderation which Charles discovered. A great revolution had happened in that kingdom; John Zapol Scæpus having chosen, as has been related, rather to possess a tributary kingdom, than to renounce the royal dignity to which he had been accustomed, had, by the assistance of his mighty protector Solyman, wrested from Ferdinand a great part of the country, and left him only the precarious possession of the rest. But being a Prince of pacifick qualities, the frequent attempts of Ferdinand, or of his partisans among the Hungarians, to recover what they had lost, greatly disquieted him; and the necessity on these occasions, of calling in the Turks, whom he considered and felt to be his masters rather than auxiliaries, was hardly less mortifying. In order, therefore, to avoid these distresses, as well as to secure quiet and leisure for enjoying the arts and amusements in which he delighted, he secretly came to an agreement with his competitor, on this condition; That Ferdinand should acknowledge him as King of Hungary, and leave him, during life, the unmolested possession of that part of the kingdom now in his power; but that, upon his demise, the sole right of the whole should devolve upon Ferdi-

A. D. 1535.

nand⁸⁰. As John had never been married, and was then far advanced in life, the terms of the contract seemed very favourable to Ferdinand. But, soon after, some of the Hungarian nobles, solicitous to prevent a foreigner from ascending their throne, prevailed on John to put an end to a long celibacy, by marrying Isabella, the daughter of Sigismund, King of Poland. John had the satisfaction, before his death, which happened within less than a year after his marriage, to see a son born to inherit his kingdom. To him without regarding his treaty with Ferdinand, which he considered, no doubt, as void, upon an event not foreseen when it was concluded, he bequeathed his crown; appointing the Queen and George Martinuzzi, bishop of Waradin, guardians of his son, and regents of the kingdom. The greater part of the Hungarians immediately acknowledged the young Prince as King, to whom, in memory of the founder of their monarchy, they gave the name of Stephen⁸¹.

BOOK VI.

1541.

Death of the King of Hungary.

FERDINAND, though extremely disconcerted by this unexpected event, resolved not to abandon the kingdom which he had acquired by his compact with John. He sent ambassadors to the Queen to claim possession, and to offer the

Ferdinand's efforts to obtain the crown.

⁸⁰ Istuanhaffii Hist. Hung. lib. xii. p. 135.

⁸¹ Jovii Hist. lib. xxxix. p. 239, a. &c.

BOOK VI. province of Transylvania as a settlement for her
 1541. son, preparing at the same time to assert his
 right by force of arms. But John had com-
 mitted the care of his son to persons, who had
 too much spirit to give up the crown tamely, and
 who possessed abilities sufficient to defend it.
 The Queen, to all the address peculiar to her
 own sex, added a masculine courage, ambition,
 and magnanimity. Martinuzzi, who had raised
 himself from the lowest rank in life to his pre-
 sent dignity, was one of those extraordinary
 men, who, by the extent as well as variety of their
 talents, are fitted to act a superior part in bust-
 ling and factious times. In discharging the
 functions of his ecclesiastical office, he put on
 the semblance of an humble and austere sanctity.
 In civil transactions, he discovered industry,
 dexterity, and boldness. During war he laid
 aside the cassock, and appeared on horseback
 with his scymitar and buckler, as active; as of-
 tentatious, and as gallant as any of his country-
 men. Amidst all these different and contradic-
 tory forms which he could assume, an insatiable
 desire of dominion and authority was conspicu-
 ous. From such persons it was obvious what
 answer Ferdinand had to expect. He soon per-
 ceived that he must depend on arms alone for
 recovering Hungary. Having levied for this
 purpose a considerable body of Germans, whom
 his partisans among the Hungarians joined with

Character
 and power
 of Marti-
 nuzzi.

their vassals, he ordered them to march into that part of the kingdom which adhered to Stephen. Martinuzzi, unable to make head against such a powerful army in the field, satisfied himself with holding out the towns, all of which, especially Buda, the place of greatest consequence, he provided with every thing necessary for defence; and in the mean time he sent ambassadors to Solyman, beseeching him to extend towards the son, the same Imperial protection which had so long maintained the father on his throne. The Sultan, though Ferdinand used his utmost endeavours to thwart this negotiation, and even offered to accept of the Hungarian crown on the same ignominious condition of paying tribute to the Ottoman Porte, by which John had held it, saw such prospects of advantage from espousing the interest of the young King, that he instantly promised him his protection; and commanding one army to advance forthwith towards Hungary, he himself followed with another. Meanwhile the Germans, hoping to terminate the war by the reduction of a city in which the King and his mother were shut up, had formed the siege of Buda. Martinuzzi, having drawn thither the strength of the Hungarian nobility, defended the town with such courage and skill, as allowed the Turkish forces time to come up to its relief. They instantly

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Calls in the
Turks.

BOOK VI. attacked the Germans, weakened by fatigue, diseases, and desertion, and defeated them with great slaughter²².

Solyman's
ungenerous
conduct.

SOLYMAN soon after joined his victorious troops, and being weary of so many expensive expeditions undertaken in defence of dominions which were not his own, or being unable to resist this alluring opportunity of seizing a kingdom, while possessed by an infant, under the guardianship of a woman and a priest, he allowed interested considerations to triumph with too much facility over the principles of honour and the sentiments of humanity. What he planned ungenerously, he executed by fraud. Having prevailed on the Queen to send her son, whom he pretended to be desirous of seeing, into his camp, and having at the same time invited the chief of the nobility to an entertainment there, while they, suspecting no treachery, gave themselves up to the mirth and jollity of the feast, a select band of troops by the Sultan's orders seized one of the gates of Buda. Being thus master of the capital, of the King's person, and of the leading men among the nobles, he ordered the Queen, together with her son, to be conducted to Transylvania, which province he allotted to them, and, appointing a Bascha to preside in Buda

²² Istuanhaffii Hist. Hung. lib. xiv. p. 150.

with a large body of soldiers, annexed Hungary BOOK VI.
to the Ottoman Empire. The tears and com- 1541.
plaints of the unhappy Queen had no influence
to change his purpose, nor could Martinuzzi
either resist his absolute and uncontrollable com-
mand, or prevail on him to recall it *.

BEFORE the account of this violent usurpation Ferdinand's
overtures to
Solyman.
reached Ferdinand, he was so unlucky as to
have dispatched new ambassadors to Solyman
with a fresh representation of his right to the
crown of Hungary, as well as a renewal of his
former overture to hold the kingdom of the
Ottoman Porte, and to pay for it an annual tri-
bute. This ill-timed proposal was rejected with
scorn. The Sultan elated with success, and
thinking that he might prescribe what terms he
pleased to a Prince who voluntarily proffered
conditions so unbecoming his own dignity, de-
clared that he would not suspend the operations
of war, unless Ferdinand instantly evacuated all
the towns which he still held in Hungary, and
consented to the imposition of a tribute upon
Austria, in order to reimburse the sums which
his presumptuous invasion of Hungary had
obliged the Ottoman Porte to expend in defence
of that kingdom **.

* Istuanhaffii, lib. xiv. p. 56. Jovii histor. lib. xxxix.
p. 2476, &c.

** Istuanhaffii hist. Hung. lib. xiv. p. 153.

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IN this state were the affairs of Hungary. As the unfortunate events there had either happened before the dissolution of the diet at Ratisbon, or were dreaded at that time, Charles saw the danger of irritating and inflaming the minds of the Germans, while a formidable enemy was ready to break into the Empire; and perceived that he could not expect any vigorous assistance either towards the recovery of Hungary, or the defence of the Austrian frontier, unless he courted and satisfied the Protestants. By the concessions which have been mentioned, he gained this point, and such liberal supplies both of men and money were voted for carrying on the war against the Turks, as left him under little anxiety about the security of Germany during next campaign^{ss}.

Emperor
visits Italy.

IMMEDIATELY upon the conclusion of the diet, the Emperor set out for Italy. As he passed through Lucca he had a short interview with the Pope, but nothing could be concluded concerning the proper method of composing the religious disputes in Germany, between two Princes, whose views and interest with regard to that matter were at this juncture so opposite. The Pope's endeavours to remove the causes of discord between Charles and Francis, and to

^{ss} Sleid. 283.

extinguish those mutual animosities which threat- BOOK VI.
 ened to break out suddenly into open hostility, 1541.
 were not more successful.

THE Emperor's thoughts were bent so entire- His expedi-
 ly, at that time, on the great enterprize which tion against
 he had concerted against Algiers, that he listen- Algiers, and
 ed with little attention to the Pope's schemes or motives of
 overtures, and hastened to join his army and
 fleet ⁸⁶.

ALGIERS still continued in that state of dependence on the Turkish empire to which Barbarossa had subjected it. Ever since he, as captain Basha, commanded the Ottoman fleet, Algiers had been governed by Hascen-Aga, a renegado eunuch, who, by passing through every station in the Corfair's service, had acquired such experience in war, that he was well fitted for a station which required a man of tried and daring courage. Hascen, in order to shew how well he deserved that dignity, carried on his piratical depredations against the Christian States with amazing activity, and out-did, if possible, Barbarossa himself in boldness and cruelty. The commerce of the Mediterranean was greatly interrupted by his cruisers, and such frequent alarms given to the coast of Spain, that there was a necessity of erecting watch-towers at pro-

⁸⁶ Sandov. histor. tom. ii. 298.

BOOK VI. per distances, and of keeping guards constantly
 1541. on foot, in order to descry the approach of his
 squadrons, and to protect the inhabitants from
 their descents⁹⁷. Of this the Emperor's subjects
 had long complained, representing it as an enter-
 prise corresponding to his power, and becoming
 his humanity, to reduce Algiers, which,
 since the conquest of Tunis, was the common
 receptacle of all the free-booters; and to exter-
 minate that lawless race, the implacable ene-
 mies of the Christian name. Moved partly by
 their entreaties, and partly allured by the hope
 of adding to the glory which he had acquired
 by his last expedition into Africa, Charles, be-
 fore he left Madrid, in his way to the Low Coun-
 tries, had issued orders both in Spain and Italy
 to prepare a fleet and army for this purpose.
 No change in circumstances, since that time,
 could divert him from this resolution, or prevail
 on him to turn his arms towards Hungary;
 though the success of the Turks in that country
 seemed more immediately to require his presence
 there; though many of his most faithful adhe-
 rents in Germany urged that the defence of the
 Empire ought to be his first and peculiar care;
 though such as bore him no good-will ridiculed
 his preposterous conduct in flying from an ene-
 my almost at hand; that he might go in quest of

⁹⁷ Jovii hist. l. xl. p. 266.

a remote and more ignoble foe. But to attack the Sultan in Hungary, how splendid soever that measure might appear, was an undertaking which exceeded his power, and was not consistent with his interest. To draw troops out of Spain or Italy, to march them into a country so distant as Hungary, to provide the vast apparatus necessary for transporting thither the artillery, ammunition, and baggage of a regular army, and to push the war in that quarter, where it could not be brought to any issue during several campaigns, were undertakings so expensive and unwieldy as did not correspond with the low condition of the Emperor's treasury. While his principal force was thus employed, his dominions in Italy and the Low Countries must have lain open to the French King, who would not have allowed such a favourable opportunity of attacking them to go unimproved. Whereas the African expedition, the preparations for which were already finished, and almost the whole expence of it defrayed, would depend upon a single effort, and besides the security and satisfaction which the success of it must give his subjects, would detain him during so short a space, that Francis could hardly take advantage of his absence, to invade his dominions in Europe.

BOOK VI. ON all these accounts, Charles adhered to his first plan, and with such determined obstinacy, that he paid no regard to the Pope who advised, or to Andrew Doria who conjured him not to expose his whole armament to almost unavoidable destruction, by venturing to approach the dangerous coast of Algiers at such an advanced season of the year, and when the autumnal winds were so violent. Having embarked on board Doria's gallies at Porto-Venere in the Genoese territories, he soon found that this experienced sailor had not judged wrong concerning the element with which he was so well acquainted; for such a storm arose that it was with the utmost difficulty and danger he reached Sardinia, the place of general rendezvous. But as his courage was undaunted, and his temper often inflexible, neither the remonstrances of the Pope and Doria, nor the danger to which he had already been exposed by disregarding them, had any other effect than to confirm him in his fatal resolution. The force, indeed, which he had collected was such as might have inspired a Prince less adventurous, and less confident in his own schemes, with the most sanguine hopes of success. It consisted of twenty thousand foot, and two thousand horse, Spaniards, Italians, and Germans, mostly veterans, together with three thousand volunteers, the flower of the Spanish

and Italian nobility, fond of paying court to the Emperor by attending him in this favourite expedition, and eager to share in the glory which they believed he was going to reap; to these were added a thousand soldiers sent from Malta by the order of St. John, led by an hundred of its most gallant Knights.

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THE voyage, from Majorca to the African^{Lands in Africa.} coast, was not less tedious, or full of hazard, than that which he had just finished. When he approached the land, the roll of the sea, and vehemence of the winds, would not permit the troops to disembark. But at last, the Emperor, seizing a favourable opportunity, landed them without opposition, not far from Algiers, and immediately advanced towards the town. To oppose this mighty army, Hascen had only eight hundred Turks, and five thousand Moors, partly natives of Africa, and partly refugees from Granada. He returned, however, a fierce and haughty answer when summoned to surrender. But with such a handful of soldiers, neither his desperate courage, nor consummate skill in war, could have long resisted forces superior to those which had defeated Barbarossa at the head of sixty thousand men, and which had reduced Tunis, in spite of all his endeavours to save it.

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The disasters which
befell his
army,

BUT howsoever far the Emperor might think himself beyond the reach of any danger from the enemy, he was suddenly exposed to a more dreadful calamity, and one against which human prudence and human efforts availed nothing. On the second day after his landing, and before he had time for any thing but to disperse some light-armed Arabs who molested his troops on their march, the clouds began to gather, and the heavens to appear with a fierce and threatening aspect. Towards evening, rain began to fall, accompanied with violent wind, and the rage of the tempest increasing, during the night, the soldiers, who had brought nothing ashore but their arms, remained exposed to all its fury, without tents, or shelter, or cover of any kind. The ground was soon so wet that they could not lie down on it; their camp being in a low situation was overflowed with water, and they sunk at every step to the ankles in mud; while the wind blew with such impetuosity, that, to prevent their falling, they were obliged to thrust their spears into the ground, and to support themselves by taking hold of them. Hascen was too vigilant an officer to allow an enemy in such distress to remain unmolested. About the dawn of morning, he sallied out with soldiers, who, having been screened from the storm under their own roofs, were fresh and vigorous. A body of Italians who were stationed nearest the city, dispirited

and benumbed with cold, fled at the approach of the Turks. The troops at the post behind them, discovered greater courage, but as the rain had extinguished their matches and wet their powder, their muskets were useless, and having scarcely strength to handle their other arms, they were soon thrown into confusion. Almost the whole army, with the Emperor himself in person, was obliged to advance, before the enemy could be repulsed, who, after spreading such general consternation, and killing a considerable number of men, retired at last in good order.

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BUT all feeling or remembrance of this loss and fleet and danger were quickly obliterated by a more dreadful as well as affecting spectacle. It was now broad day; the hurricane had abated nothing of its violence, and the sea appeared agitated with all the rage of which that destructive element is capable; all the ships, on which alone the whole army knew that their safety and subsistence depended, were seen driven from their anchors, some dashing against each other, some beat to pieces on the rocks, many forced ashore, and not a few sinking in the waves. In less than an hour, fifteen ships of war, and an hundred and forty transports with eight thousand men perished; and such of the unhappy crews as escaped the fury of the sea, were murdered without mercy, by the Arabs, as soon as they reached

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land. The Emperor stood in silent anguish and astonishment beholding this fatal event, which at once blasted all his hopes of success, and buried in the depths the vast stores which he had provided, as well for annoying the enemy, as for subsisting his own troops. He had it not in his power to afford them any other assistance or relief than by sending some troops to drive away the Arabs, and thus delivering a few who were so fortunate as to get ashore from the cruel fate which their companions had met with. At last the wind began to fall, and to give some hopes that as many ships might escape, as to save the army from perishing by famine, and transport them back to Europe. But these were only hopes; the approach of evening covered the sea with darkness, and it being impossible for the officers aboard the ships which had outlived the storm, to send any intelligence to their companions who were ashore, they remained during the night in all the anguish of suspense and uncertainty. Next day, a boat dispatched by Doria made shift to reach land, with information, that having weathered out the storm, to which, during fifty years knowledge of the sea, he had never seen any equal in fierceness and horror, he had found it necessary to bear away with his shattered ships to Cape Metafuz. He advised the Emperor, as the face of the sky was still lowering and tempestuous, to march with all

speed to that place, where the troops could re- BOOK VI.
embark with greater ease. 1541.

WHATEVER comfort this intelligence afford- Obliged to
ed Charles, from being assured that part of retreat.
his fleet had escaped, was balanced by the new
cares and perplexity in which it involved him
with regard to his army. Metafuz was at least
three days march from his present camp; all
the provisions which he had brought ashore at
his first landing were now consumed; his sol-
diers, worn out with fatigue, were hardly able
for such a journey, even in a friendly country;
and being dispirited by a succession of hardships,
which victory itself would scarcely have rendered
tolerable, they were in no condition to undergo
new toils. But the situation of the army was
such, as allowed not one moment for delibera-
tion, nor left it in the least doubtful what to
choose. They were ordered instantly to march,
the wounded, the sick, and the feeble being
placed in the center; such as seemed most vi-
gorous were stationed in the front and rear.
Then the sad effects of what they had suffered
began to appear more manifestly than ever, and
new calamities were added to all those which
they had already endured. Some could hardly
bear the weight of their arms; others, spent
with the toil of forcing their way through deep
and almost impassable roads, sunk down and

BOOK VI. died; many perished by famine, as the whole
 1541. army subsisted chiefly on roots and berries, or
 the flesh of horses, killed by the Emperor's order,
 and distributed among the several battalions; many were drowned in brooks, which were swollen so much by the excessive rains, that in passing them they waded up to the chin; not a few were killed by the enemy, who, during the greatest part of their retreat, alarmed, harassed, and annoyed them night and day. At last they arrived at Metafuz; and the weather being now so calm as to restore their communication with the fleet, they were supplied with plenty of provisions; and cheered with the prospect of safety.

His fortitude of mind.

DURING this dreadful series of calamities, the Emperor discovered great qualities, many of which an almost uninterrupted flow of prosperity had hitherto afforded him no opportunity of displaying. He appeared conspicuous for firmness and constancy of spirit, for magnanimity, fortitude, humanity, and compassion. He endured as great hardships as the meanest soldier; he exposed his own person wherever danger threatened; he encouraged the desponding, visited the sick and wounded; and animated all by his words and example. When the army embarked, he was among the last who left the shore, although a body of Arabs hovered at no great distance, ready to fall on the rear. By

these virtues, Charles atoned, in some degree, BOOK VI.
for his obstinacy and presumption in undertak- 1541.
ing an expedition so fatal to his subjects.

THE calamities which attended this unfor- Returns to
tunate enterprize did not end here; for no sooner Europe.
were the forces got on board, than a new storm
arising, though less furious than the former, scat-
tered the fleet, and obliged them, separately,
to make towards such ports in Spain or Italy as
they could first reach; thus spreading the ac-
count of their disasters, with all the circum-
stances of aggravation and horror, which their
fear or fancy suggested. The Emperor himself,
after escaping great dangers, and being forced
into the port of Bugia in Africa, where he was Decem. 2.
obliged by contrary winds to remain several
weeks, arrived at last in Spain, in a condition
very different from that in which he had return-
ed from his former expedition against the In-
fidels^{ss}.

^{ss} Carol. V. Expeditio ad Argyriam per Nicolaum Villag-
nonem Equitem Rhodium ap. Scardium, v. ii. 365. Jovii
Hist. l. xl. p. 269, &c. Vera y Zuniga vida de Carlos V.
p. 83. Sandov. Hist. ii. 299, &c.