

**www.e-rara.ch**

**Saducismus triumphatus or full and plain evidence concerning witches and apparitions. In two parts. The first treating of their possibility. The second of their real existence**

**Glanvill, Joseph**

**[London], 1682**

**Stiftung der Werke von C.G.Jung, Zürich**

Persistent Link: <https://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-9744>

An appendance to this first part, concerning the possibility of apparitions and witchcraft. Containing the easie, true, and genuine notion, an consistent explication of the nature of a spirit, [...].

---

**www.e-rara.ch**

Die Plattform e-rara.ch macht die in Schweizer Bibliotheken vorhandenen Drucke online verfügbar. Das Spektrum reicht von Büchern über Karten bis zu illustrierten Materialien - von den Anfängen des Buchdrucks bis ins 20. Jahrhundert.

e-rara.ch provides online access to rare books available in Swiss libraries. The holdings extend from books and maps to illustrated material - from the beginnings of printing to the 20th century.

e-rara.ch met en ligne des reproductions numériques d'imprimés conservés dans les bibliothèques de Suisse. L'éventail va des livres aux documents iconographiques en passant par les cartes - des débuts de l'imprimerie jusqu'au 20e siècle.

e-rara.ch mette a disposizione in rete le edizioni antiche conservate nelle biblioteche svizzere. La collezione comprende libri, carte geografiche e materiale illustrato che risalgono agli inizi della tipografia fino ad arrivare al XX secolo.

---

**Nutzungsbedingungen** Dieses Digitalisat kann kostenfrei heruntergeladen werden. Die Lizenzierungsart und die Nutzungsbedingungen sind individuell zu jedem Dokument in den Titelinformationen angegeben. Für weitere Informationen siehe auch [Link]

**Terms of Use** This digital copy can be downloaded free of charge. The type of licensing and the terms of use are indicated in the title information for each document individually. For further information please refer to the terms of use on [Link]

**Conditions d'utilisation** Ce document numérique peut être téléchargé gratuitement. Son statut juridique et ses conditions d'utilisation sont précisés dans sa notice détaillée. Pour de plus amples informations, voir [Link]

**Condizioni di utilizzo** Questo documento può essere scaricato gratuitamente. Il tipo di licenza e le condizioni di utilizzo sono indicate nella notizia bibliografica del singolo documento. Per ulteriori informazioni vedi anche [Link]

A N  
A P P E N D A G E  
To this First PART,  
Concerning the  
P O S S I B I L I T Y  
O F  
A P P A R I T I O N S  
A N D  
Witchcraft.

Containing  
The Easie, True, and Genuine  
N O T I O N, and consistent  
Explication of the Nature  
O F A  
S P I R I T,

Whereby  
The POSSIBILITY of the EXISTENCE  
of SPIRITS, APPARITIONS, and  
WITCHCRAFT is further confirmed.

---

L O N D O N: Printed, 1682.

A REFINED  
To this first PART  
Consisting of  
POSSIBILITIES  
OF  
APPEARANCES  
AND

WITCHAMENTS

The Nature, and Genus  
of the  
Explanation of the Nature  
OF A  
SPIRITS  
The POSSIBILITY of the EXISTENCE  
of SPIRITS, APPEARANCES, and  
WITCHAMENTS

---

LONDON: Printed, 1682.

---

T H E  
Easie, True, and Genuine  
N O T I O N  
And Consistent  
E X P L I C A T I O N  
Of the N A T U R E of a  
S P I R I T.

---

S E C T. I.

*The Opinions of the NULLIBISTS and  
HOLENMERIANS proposed.*

**T**HAT we may explicate the *Essence or Notion* of *Incorporeal Beings or Spirits*, with the greater satisfaction and success, we are first to remove two vast Mounds of Darkeness, wherewith the ignorance of some hath encumbred and obscured their nature.

And the first is of those who though they readily acknowledge there are such things as *Incorporeal Beings or Spirits*, yet do very peremptorily contend

contend that they are *no where* in the whole World. Which opinion though at the very first sight it appears very ridiculous, yet it is stiffly held by the maintainers of it, and that not without some Fastuosity and Superciliousness, or at least some more sly and tacite contempt of such Philosophers as hold the contrary, as of men less intellectual and too too much indulging to their *Imagination*. Those other therefore because they so boldly affirm that a *Spirit* is *Nullibi*, that is to say, *Nowhere*, have deservedly purchased to themselves the Name or Title of *Nullibists*.

The other Mound of Darkness laid upon the nature of a *Spirit*, is by those who willingly indeed acknowledge that *Spirits* are *somewhere*; but add further, That they are not only entirely or totally in their whole *Ubi* or place, (in the most general sence of the word) but are totally in every part or point thereof, and describe the peculiar nature of a *Spirit* to be such, that it must be *Totus in toto & totus in qualibet sui parte*. Which therefore the *Greeks* would fitly and briefly call *ἑστίαν ὁλονμερῆν*, [an Essence that is all of it in each part] and this propriety thereof (*ἡ ἀσωμάτων ἑστῶν τὴν ἑλενμέρειαν*) the *Holenmerism* of *Incorporeal Beings*. Whence also these other Philosophers diametrically opposite to the former, may most significantly and compendiously be called *Holenmerians*.

## S E C T. II.

*That Cartesius is the Prince of the Nullibists, and wherein chiefly consists the force of their Opinion.*

THE Opinions of both which kind of Philosophers having sufficiently explained, we will now propose and confute the Reasons of each of them; and first of the *Nullibists*. Of whom the chief Author and Leader seems to have been that pleasant Wit *Renatus Des Cartes*, who by his jocular *Metaphysical Meditations*, has so luxated and distorted the rational Faculties of some otherwise sober and quick-witted persons, but in this point by reason of their over-great admiration of *Des Cartes* not sufficiently cautious, that deceived, partly by his counterfeit and prestigious subtilty, and partly by his Authority; have perswaded themselves that such things were most *true* and *clear* to them; which had they not been blinded with these prejudices, they could never have thought to have been so much as possible. And so they having been so industriously taught, and diligently instructed by him, how they might not be imposed upon, no not by the most powerful and most ill-minded fallacious Deity, have heedlessly, by not sufficiently standing upon their guard, been deceived and illuded by a meer man, but of a pleasant and abundantly-cunning and abstruse Genius; as shall clearly appear after we  
have

have searched and examined the reasons of this Opinion of the *Nullibists* to the very bottom.

The whole force whereof is comprised in these three Axioms, The first, *That whatsoever thinks is Immaterial*, and so on the contrary. The second, *That whatever is extended is Material*. The third, *That whatever is unextended is Nowhere*. To which third I shall add this fourth, as a necessary and manifest Confectary thereof, *viz. That whatsoever is somewhere is extended*. Which the *Nullibists* of themselves will easily grant me to be most true. Otherwise they could not feriously contend for their Opinion, whereby they affirm Spirits to be *nowhere*; but would be found to do it only by way of an oblique and close derision of their Existence, saying indeed they *exist*, but then again hiddenly and cunningly denying it, by affirming they are *nowhere*. Wherefore doubtlesly they affirm them to be *nowhere*, if they are in good earnest, for this reason only; for fear they granting them to be *somewhere*, it would be presently extorted from them, even according to their own Principles, that they are *extended*, as whatever is Extended, is Material, according to their second Axiome. It is therefore manifest that we both agree in this, that whatever real Being there is that is *somewhere*, is also *Extended*.

## S E C T. III.

*The Sophistical weakness of that reasoning of the Nullibists, who, because we can conceive Cogitation without conceiving in the mean while Matter, conclude, That whatsoever thinks is Immaterial.*

WITH which truth notwithstanding we being furnished and supported, I doubt not but we shall with ease quite overthrow and utterly root out this opinion of the *Nullibists*. But that their levity and credulity may more manifestly appear, let us examine the Principles of this Opinion by parts, and consider how well they make good each member.

The first is, *Whatever thinks is Immaterial*, and on the contrary. The conversion of this Axiome I will not examine, because it makes little to the present purpose. I will only note by the by, that I doubt not but it may be false, although I easily grant the Axiome it self to be true. But it is this new Method of demonstrating it I call into question, which from hence, that we can conceive *Cogitation*, in the mean time not conceiving *Matter*, concludes that *Whatever thinks is Immaterial*. Now that we can conceive *Cogitation* without conceiving *Matter*, they say is manifest from hence, That although one should suppose there were no Body in the Universe, and should not flinch from that position, yet notwithstanding he would not cease to be certain,

tain, that there was *Res cogitans*, a *thinking Being*, in the World, he finding himself to be such. But I further add, though he should suppose there was no *Immaterial Being* in nature, (nor indeed *Material*) and should not flinch from that position, yet he would not cease to be certain that there was a *thinking Being*, (no not if he should suppose himself not to be a thinking Being) because he can *suppose* nothing without *Cogitation*. Which I thought worth the while to note by the by, that the great levity of the *Nullibists* might hence more clearly appear.

But yet I add further, that such is the nature of the Mind of man, that it is like the Eye, better fitted to contemplate other things than it self; and that therefore it is no wonder that thinking nothing of its own Essence, it does fixedly enough and intently consider in the mean time and contemplate all other things, yea, those very things with which she has the nearest affinity, and yet without any reflection that her self is of the like nature. Whence it may easily come to pass, when she is so wholly taken up in contemplating other things without any reflection upon her self, that either carelessly she may consider her self in general as a *meer thinking Being*, without any other Attribute, or else by resolvedness afterwards, and by a force on purpose offered to her own faculties. But that this reasoning is wonderfully weak and trifling as to the proving of the Mind of man to be nothing else; that is to say, to have no other Attributes but *meer Cogitation*, there is none that does not discern.

## S E C T. IV.

The true Method that ought to be taken for the proving that *MATTER* cannot think.

**L**Astly, if *Cartesius* with his *Nullibists* would have dealt *bona fide*, they ought to have omitted all those ambagious windings and Meanders of feigned *Abstraction*, and with a direct stroke to have fallen upon the thing it self, and so to have sifted *Matter*, and searched the nature of *Cogitation*, that they might thence have evidently demonstrated that there was some inseparable Attribute in *Matter* that is repugnant to the *Cogitative* faculty, or in *Cogitation* that is repugnant to *Matter*. But out of the meer diversity of *Idea's* or *Notions* of any Attributes, to collect their separability or *real* distinction, yea their contrariety and repugnancy, is most foully to violate the indispensable *Laws* of *Logick*, and to confound *Diversa* with *Opposita*, and make them all one. Which mistake to them that understand *Logick* must needs appear very course and absurd.

But that the weakness and vacillancy of this Method may yet more clearly appear, let us suppose that which yet Philosophers of no mean name seriously stand for and assert, *viz.* That *Cogitative* substance is either *Material* or *Immaterial*; does it not apparently follow thence, that a thinking substance may be precisely conceived without

without the conception of *Matter*, as *Matter* without the conception of *Cogitation*, when notwithstanding in one of the members of this distribution they are joynd sufficiently close together?

How can therefore this newfangled Method of *Cartesius* convince us that this Supposition is false, and that the distribution is illegitimate? Can it from thence, that *Matter* may be conceived without *Cogitation*, and *Cogitation* without *Matter*? The first all grant, and the other the distribution it self supposes; and yet continues sufficiently firm and sure. Therefore it is very evident, that there is a necessity of our having recourse to the known and ratified Laws of *Logick*, which many Ages before this new upstart Method of *Des Cartes* appeared, were established and approved by the common suffrage of Mankind; Which teach us that in every legitimate distribution the parts ought *consentire cum toto*, & *disentire inter se*, to agree with the Whole, but disagree one with another. Now in this Distribution that they do sufficiently disagree, it is very manifest. It remains only to be proved, that one of the parts, namely that which supposes that a *Cogitative* substance may be *Material*, is repugnant to the nature of the Whole. This is that clear, solid and manifest way or method according to the known Laws of *Logick*; but that new way, a kind of Sophistry and pleasant mode of trifling and prevaricating.

## S E C T. V.

*That all things are in some sort extended, demonstrated out of the Corollary of the third Principle of the Nullibists.*

**A**S for the second Axiome or Principle, *viz.* *That whatsoever is extended is Material*; for the evincing the falsity thereof, there want no new Arguments, if one have but recourse to the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Chapters of *Enchiridium Metaphysicum*, where, by unanswerable reasonings it is demonstrated, That there is a certain Immaterial and Immoveable *Extensum* distinct from the Moveable Matter. But however, out of the Confessary of their third Principle, we shall prove at once, that all Spirits are Extended as being somewhere, against the wild and ridiculous Opinion of the *Nullibists*.

Whose third Principle, and out of which immediately and precisely they conclude Spirits to be no where, is, *Whatsoever is unextended, is no where*. Which I very willingly grant; but on this condition, that they on the other side concede (and I doubt not but they will) That *whatsoever is somewhere is also extended*; from which Confessary I will evince with Mathematical certainty, That God and our Soul, and all other Immaterial Beings, are in some sort extended: For the *Nullibists* themselves acknowledge and assert, that the Operations wherewith the Soul acts on the Body,

are in the Body; and that Power or Divine Ver-  
 tue wherewith God acts on the Matter and  
 moves it, is present in every part of the Matter.  
 Whence it is easily gathered, That the Operation  
 of the Soul and the moving Power of God is some-  
 where, *viz.* in the *Body*, and in the *Matter*. But  
 the Operation of the *Soul* wherewith it acts on  
 the *Body* and the *Soul itself*, and the Divine Pow-  
 er wherewith *God* moves the *Matter* and *God*  
*himself*, are together, nor can so much as be ima-  
 gined separate one from the other; namely, the  
*Operation* from the *Soul*, and the *Power* from *God*.  
 Wherefore if the Operation of the Soul is some-  
 where, the Soul is somewhere, *viz.* there where  
 the Operation. And if the Power of God be  
 somewhere, God is somewhere, namely, there  
 where the Divine Power is; *He* in every part of  
 the *Matter*, the *Soul* in the humane *Body*. Who-  
 soever can deny this, by the same reason he may  
 deny that common Notion in Mathematicks,  
 Quantities that are singly equal to one third, are  
 equal to one another.

## S E C T. VI.

The apert confession of the Nullibists that the E S S E N C E of a Spirit is where its O P E R A T I O N is; and how they contradict themselves; and are forced to acknowledge a Spirit extended.

**A**ND verily that which we contend for, the Nullibists seem apertly to assert, even in their own express words, as it is evident in *Lambertus Velthusius* in his *De Initiiis Prima Philosophiæ* in the Chapter *De Ubi*. Who though he does manifestly affirm that God and the Mind of Man by their Operations are in every part or some one part of the Matter; and that in that sense, namely, in respect of their Operations, the Soul may be truly said to be *somewhere*, God *everywhere*; as if that were the only mode of their presence: yet he does expressly grant that the Essence is no where separate from *that* whereby God or a Created Spirit is said to be, the one *everywhere*, the other *somewhere*; that no man may conceit the Essence of God to be where the rest of his Attributes are not. That the Essence of God is in Heaven, but that his *Vertue* diffuses it self beyond Heaven. No, by no means, saith he, Wheresoever God's Power or Operation is, there is the Nature of God; forasmuch as God is a Substance devoid of all composition. Thus far *Velthusius*. Whence I assume, But the Power or Operation of God is in or present to the Matter; Therefore the  
Essence

*Essence of God* is in or present to the *Matter*, and is there where the *Matter* is, and therefore *Some-where*. Can there be any deduction or illation more close and coherent with the Premises?

And yet that other most devoted follower of the *Cartesian* Philosophy, *Ludovicus Dela Forge*, cannot abstain from the offering us the same advantage of arguing, or rather from the inferring the same conclusion with us in his Treatise *De Mente Humana*, Chap. 12. where occur these words: Lastly, when I say that *God* is present to all things by his *Omnipotency*, (and consequently to all the parts of the *Matter*) I do not deny but that also by his *Essence* or *Substance* he is present to them: For all those things in *God* are one and the same.

Dost thou hear, my *Nullibist*, what one of the chiefest of thy *Condisciples* and most religious *Symmists* of that stupendious secret of *Nullibism* plainly professes, namely, that *God*, is present to all the parts of *Matter* by his *Essence* also, or *Substance*? And yet you in the mean while blush not to assert, that neither *God*, nor any created *Spirit* is any where; than which nothing more contradictory can be spoke or thought, or more abhorring from all reason. Wherefore whenas the *Nullibists* come so near to the truth, it seems impossible they should, so all of a sudden, start from it, unless they were blinded with a superstitious admiration of *Des Cartes* his *Metaphysicks*, and were deluded, effascinated and befooled with his jocular Subtilty and prestigious *Abstracti- ons* there: For who in his right wits can acknow-  
ledge

ledge that a Spirit by its Essence may be present to Matter, and yet be *nowhere*, unless the Matter were nowhere also? And that a Spirit may penetrate, possess, and actuate some determinate Body, and yet not be in that Body? In which if it be, it is plainly necessary it be somewhere.

And yet the same *Ludovicus De la Forge* does manifestly assert, that the Body is thus possess'd and actuated by the Soul, in his Preface to his Treatise *de Mente Humana*, while he declares the Opinion of *Marsilius Ficinus* concerning the manner how the Soul actuates the Body in *Marsilius* his own words, and does of his own accord assent to his Opinion. What therefore do these *Forms* to the Body when they communicate to it their *Esse*? They throughly penetrate it with their *Essence*, they bequeath the *Vertue* of their *Essence* to it. But now whereas the *Esse* is deduced from the *Essence*, and the *Operation* flows from the *Vertue*, by conjoyning the *Essence* they impart the *Esse*, by bequeathing the *Vertue* they communicate the *Operations*; so that out of the congress of Soul and Body, there is made one *Animal Esse*, one *Operation*. Thus he. The Soul with her *Essence* penetrates and pervades the whole Body, and yet is not where the Body is, but no where in the Universe!

With that manifest repugnancy therefore to their other *Assertions* the *Nullibists* hold this ridiculous Conclusion, we have sufficiently seen, and how weak their chiefest prop is, That *whatever is Extended is Material*; which is not only confuted by irrefragable Arguments, *Chap. 6, 7.* and

8. *Enchirid. Metaphys.* but we have here also, by so clearly proving that all *Spirits* are *somewhere*, utterly subverted it, even from that very Concession or Opinion of the *Nullibists* themselves, who concede or aver that *whatsoever is somewhere is extended.* Which *Spirits* are and yet are not *Material.*

---

S E C T. VII.

*The more light reasonings of the Nullibists whereby they would confirm their Opinion. The first of which is, That the Soul thinks of those things which are nowhere.*

**B**UT we shall not pass by their more slight reasonings in so great a matter, or rather so monstrous. Of which the first is, That the Mind of Man thinks of such things as are *nowhere*, nor have any relation to place, no not so much as to *Logical* place or *Ubi.* Of which sort are many truths as well *Moral* as *Theological* and *Logical,* which being of such a nature that they are *no where*, the Mind of Man which conceives them is necessarily *no where* also. But how crazily and inconsequently they collect that the humane Soul is *nowhere*, for that it thinks of those things that are *nowhere*, may be apparent to any one from hence, and especially to the *Nullibists* themselves; because from the same reason it would follow that the *Mind* of Man is *somewhere*, because sometimes,

times; if not always in a manner, it thinks of those things which are *somewhere*, as all *Material* things are. Which yet they dare not grant, because it would plainly follow from thence, according to their Doctrine, that the Mind or Soul of Man were *extended*, and so would become *corporeal* and devoid of all *Cogitation*. But besides, These things which they say are *nowhere*, namely, certain *Moral, Logical, and Theological* Truths, are really *somewhere*; viz. in the *Soul* it self which conceives them; but the *Soul* is in the *Body*, as we proved above. Whence it is manifest that the *Soul* and those Truths which she conceives are as well *somewhere* as the *Body* it self. I grant that some Truths as they are *Representations*, neither respect *Time* nor *Place* in whatever sense. But as they are *Operations*, and therefore *Modes* of some *Subject* or *Substance*, they cannot be otherwise conceived than in some substance. And forasmuch as there is no substance which has not some amplitude, they are in a substance which is in some sort extended; and so by reason of their *Subject* they are necessarily conceived to be somewhere, because a *Mode* is inseparable from a *Subject*.

Nor am I at all moved with that giddy and rash tergiversation which some betake themselves to here, who say we do not well in distinguishing betwixt *Cogitation* (such as are all conceived verities) and the *Substance* of the *Soul* *cogitating*: For *cogitation* it self is the very *Substance* of the *Soul*, as *Extension* is of *Matter*; and that therefore

104 *The true Notion of a Spirit.*

fore the *Soul* is as well *nowhere* as any *Cogitation*, which respects neither time nor place, would be, if it were found in no *Subject*. But here the *Nullibists*, who would thus escape, do not observe that while they acknowledge the *Substance* of the *Soul* to be *Cogitation*, they therewithal acknowledge the *Soul* to have a *Substance*, whence it is necessary it have some amplitude. And besides, This Assertion whereby they assert *Cogitation* to be the very substance of the *Soul*, is manifestly false. For many Operations of the *Soul*, are, as they speak, *specifically* different; Which therefore succeeding one after another, will be so many *Substances* *specifically* different. And so the *Soul* of *Socrates* will not always be the same *specifical* *Soul*, and much less the same *numerical*; Than which what can be imagined more delirant, and more remote from common sense?

To which you may add, That the *Soul* of man is a *permanent* Being, but her *Cogitations* in a *flux* or *succession*; How then can the very substance of the *Soul* be its successive Operations? And when the *Substance* of the *Soul* does so perpetually cease or perish, what I beseech you will become of *Memory*? From whence it is manifestly evident, that there is a certain *permanent* *Substance* of the *Soul*, as much distinct or different from her succeeding *Cogitations*, as the *Matter* itself is from its successive *figures* and *motions*.

S E C T. VIII.

The second reason of the Nullibists, viz. That  
**COGITATION** is easily conceived without  
**EXTENSION.**

**T**HE second Reason is somewhat co-incident with some of those we have already examined; but it is briefly proposed by them thus; There can be no conception, no not of a *Logical Place*, or *Ubi*, without *Extension*. But *Cogitation* is easily conceived without conceiving any *Extension*: Wherefore the Mind cogitating, exempt from all *Extension*, is exempt also from all *Locality* whether *Physical* or *Logical*; and is so loosened from it, that it has no *relation* nor *applicability* thereto; as if those things had no relation nor applicability to other certain things without which they might be conceived.

The weakness of this argumentation is easily apprehended from hence, That the *Intensness* of heat or motion is considered without any respect to its *extension*, and yet it is referred to an extended Subject, viz. To a Bullet shot, or red hot Iron. And though in intent and defixed thoughts upon some either difficult or pleasing Object, we do not at all observe how the time passeth, nor take the slightest notice of it, nothing hinders notwithstanding but those *Cogitations* may be applied to time, and it be rightly said, that about six a clock, suppose, in the Morning they began, and continued till eleven; and in like manner the

the place may be defined where they were conceived, *viz.* within the Walls of such an ones Study, although perhaps all that time this so fixt Contemplator did not take notice whether he was in his *Study*, or in the *Fields*.

And to speak out the matter at once, From the *precision* of our thoughts to infer the *real* precision or *separation* of the things themselves, is a very putid and puerile Sophism; and still the more enormous and wild, to collect also thence, that they have no relation or applicability one to another. For we may have a clear and distinct *apprehension* of a thing which may be connected with another by an *essential* Tye, that Tye being not taken notice of, (and much more when they are connected only with a *circumstantial* one) but not a full and adequate *apprehension*, and such as sees through and penetrates all the degrees of its Essence with their properties; Which unless a man reach to, he cannot rightly judge of the real separability of any nature from other natures.

From whence it appears how foully *Cartesius* has imposed, if not upon himself, at least upon others, when from this mental precision of *Cogitation* from *Extension*, he defined a Spirit (such as the humane Soul) by *Cogitation* only, *Matter* by *Extension*, and divided all *Substance* into *Cogitant* and *Extended*, as into their first species or kinds. Which distribution notwithstanding is as absonous and absurd, as if he had distributed *Animal* into *Sensitive* and *Rational*. Whenas all *Substance* is extended as well as all *Animals* *sensitive*

tive. But he fixed his Animadversion upon the *Specifick* nature of the humane Soul; the *Generickal* nature thereof, either on purpose or by inadvertency, being not considered nor taken notice of by him, as hath been noted in *Enchiridion Ethicum*, lib. 3. cap. 4. sect. 3.

S E C T. IX.

The third and last Reason of the Nullibists, viz.

That the Mind is conscious to herself, that she is nowhere, unless she be disturbed or joggled by the Body.

THE third and last Reason, which is the most ingenious of them all, occurs in *Lambertus Velthusius*, viz. That it is a truth which God has infused into the Mind itself, That she is nowhere, because we know by experience that we cannot tell from our spiritual Operations where the Mind is. And for that we know her to be in our Body, that we only perceive from the Operations of *Sense* and *Imagination* which without the Body or the motion of the Body the Mind cannot perform. The sense whereof, if I guess right, is this; That the Mind by a certain internal sense is conscious to herself that she is *nowhere*, unless she be now and then disturbed by the motions or joggings of the Body; which is, as I said, an ingenious presage, but not true: For it is one thing to perceive herself to be nowhere, another not to perceive herself to be somewhere. For she  
may

may not perceive herself to be somewhere, though she be somewhere, as she may not take notice of her own *Individuality* or *numerical Distinction*, from all other minds, although she be one *Numerical* or *Individual* mind distinct from the rest: For, as I intimated above, such is the nature of the mind of man, that like the eye, it is better fitted for the contemplating all other things, than for contemplating itself. And that indeed which is made for the clearly and sincerely seeing other things, ought to have nothing of itself actually perceptible in it, which it might mingle with the perception of those other things. From whence the Mind of Man is not to have any stable and fixt sense of its own Essence; and such as it cannot easily lay aside upon occasion: And therefore it is no wonder, whenas the Mind of Man can put off the sense and consciousness to it self of its own *Essence* and *Individuality*, that it can put off also therewith the sense of its being *somewhere*, or not perceive it; whenas it does not perceive its own *Essence* and *Individuality*, (of which *Hic & Nunc* are the known Characters:) And the chief Objects of the Mind are Universals.

But as the Mind, although it perceives not its *Individuality*, yet can by reason prove to herself that she is some one *Numerical* or *Individual* Mind, so she can by the same means, although she by inward sense perceives not where she is, evince notwithstanding that she is somewhere, from the general account of things, which have that of their own nature, that they are *extended, singular, and somewhere*. And besides, *Velt husius* himself

self does plainly grant, that from the Operations of Sense and Imagination, we know our Mind to be in our Body. How then can we be ignorant that she is *somewhere*, unless the Body itself be *nowhere*?

## S E C T. X.

*An Appeal to the internal sense of the Mind, if she be not environed with a certain infinite Extension; together with an excitation of the Nullibist out of his Dream, by the sound of Trumpeters surrounding him.*


THE Reasons of the *Nullibists* whereby they endeavour to maintain their Opinion, are sufficiently enervated and subverted. Nor have we need of any Arguments to establish the contrary Doctrine. I will only desire by the by, that he that thinks his *Mind* is *nowhere*, would make trial of his faculty of Thinking; and when he has abstracted himself from all thought or sense of his *Body*, and fixed his *Mind* only on an Idea of an indefinite or *infinite Extension*, and also perceives himself to be some *particular cogitant Being*, let him make trial, I say, whether he can any way avoid it, but he must at the same time perceive that he is *somewhere*, namely, within this *immense Extension*, and that he is environ'd round about with it. Verily, I must ingenuously confess, that I cannot conceive otherwise, and that I cannot but conceive an Idea of a certain *Extension infinite and immoveable*, and of necessary

*cessary and actual Existence*: Which I most clearly apprehend, not to have been drawn in by the outward sense, but to be innate and essentially inherent in the Mind itself; and so to be the genuine *object* not of *Imagination*, but of *Intellect*, and that it is but perversly and without all judgment determined by the *Nullibists*, or *Cartesians*, that whatever is extended, is also  $\varphi\alpha\upsilon\lambda\alpha\sigma\acute{o}\nu\ \eta$  or the *Object of Imagination*; When notwithstanding there is nothing *imaginable*, or the *Object of Imagination*, which is not *sensible*: For all *Phantasms* are drawn from the Senses. But this *infinite Extension* has no more to do with things that are *sensible* and fall under *Imagination*, than that which is most *Incorporeal*. But of this haply it will be more opportune to speak elsewhere.

In the mean time I will subjoin only one Argument, whereby I may manifestly evince that the Mind of Man is somewhere, and then I will betake my self to the discussing of the Opinion of the *Holenmerians*. Briefly therefore let us suppose some one environed with a Ring of Trumpeters, and that they all at the same time sound their Trumpets. Let us now see if the circumsonant clangor of those surrounding Trumpeters sounding from all sides will awake these *Nullibists* out of their Lethargick Dream. And let us suppose, which they will willingly concede, that the *Conarion* or *Glandula Pinealis*, A, is the seat of the common sense, to which at length all the motions from external Objects arrive. Nor is it any matter whether it be this *Conarion*, or some other part of the Brain, or of what is

con-

contained in the Brain: But let the *Conarion*, at least for this bout, supply the place of that matter which is the common *Sensorium* of the Soul.



And whenas it is supposed to be surrounded with Eight Trumpeters, let there be Eight Lines drawn from them, namely, from B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I; I say that the clangour or sound of every Trumpet is carried from the Ring of the Trumpeters to the extream part of every one of those Lines, and all those sounds are heard as coming from the Ring B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and perceived in the *Conarion* A; and that the perception is in that part to which all the Lines of motion, as to a common Centre, do concur; and therefore the extream parts of them, and the perceptions of the

the Clangours or Sounds, are in the middle of the Ring of Trumpeters, *viz.* where the *Conarion* is: Wherefore the *Precipient* itself, namely the Soul, is in the midst of this Ring as well as the *Conarion*, and therefore is *somewhere*. Assuredly he that denies that he conceives the force of this Demonstration, and acknowledges that the *Perception* indeed is at the extrem parts of the said Lines, and in the middle of the Ring of Trumpeters, but contends in the mean time that the *Mind* herself is not there, forasmuch as she is *nowhere*; this man certainly is either delirant and crazed, or else plays tricks, and slimly and obliquely insinuates that the *perception* which is made in the *Conarion* is to be attributed to the *Conarion* itself; and that the *Mind*, so far as it is conceived to be an *Incorporeal Substance*, is to be exterminated out of the Universe, as an useless Figment and Chimæra.


## S E C T. XI.

*The Explication of the Opinion of the Hohenmerians, together with their Two Reasons thereof proposed.*

AND thus much of the Opinion of the *Nulibists*. Let us now examine the Opinion of the *Hohenmerians*, whose Explication is thus: Let there be what Body you please, suppose C, D, E,

C, D, E, which the Soul or a Spirit may possess and penetrate. The *Holennmerians* affirm, that the whole Soul or Spirit does occupy and possess the whole Body C, D, E, by its Essence; and that it is also wholly or all of it

Fig: 2.



in every part or point of the said Body C, D, E, as in A, for example, and in B, and the rest of the least parts or points of it. This is a brief and clear Explication of their Opinion.

But the Reasons that induce them to embrace it, and so stiffly to maintain it, are these two only, or at last chiefly, as much as respects the *Holennmerism* of *Spirits*. The first is, That whereas they grant that the whole Soul does pervade and possess the whole Body, they thought it would thence follow that the Soul would be *divisible*, unless they should correct again this Assertion of theirs, by saying, that it was yet so in the *whole* Body, that it was *totally* in the mean time in *every part* thereof: For thus they thought themselves sure, that the Soul could not thence be argued in any sort *divisible*, or *corporeal*, but still remain purely *spiritual*.

Their other reason is, That from hence it might be easily understood, how the Soul being in the whole Body C, D, E, whatever happens to it in C, or B, it presently perceives it in A; Because the whole Soul being perfectly and entirely as well in C, or B, as in A, it is necessary that after what

fashion soever C or B is affected, A should be affected after the same manner; forasmuch as it is entirely and perfectly one and the same thing, viz. the whole Soul, as well in C or B, as in A. And from hence is that vulgar saying in the Schools, *That if the Eye were in the Foot, the Soul would see in the Foot.*

## S E C T. XII.

*The Examination of the Opinion of the Holenmerians.*

**B**UT now, according to our custom, let us weigh and examine all these things in a free and just Balance. In this therefore that they assert, that the whole Soul is in the whole Body, and is all of it penetrated of the Soul by her *Essence*, and therefore seem willingly to acknowledge a certain *essential amplitude* of the Soul; in this, I say, they come near to us, who contend there is a certain *Metaphysical* and *Essential Extension* in all *Spirits*, but such as is *diversis rebus a se* devoid of *bulk* or *parts*, as *Aristotle* defines of his *separate substances*: For there is no magnitude or *bulk* which may not be *physically* divided, nor any *parts* properly where there is no such division. Whence the *Metaphysical Extension* of *Spirits*, is rightly understood not to be capable of either *bulk* or *parts*. And in that sense it has *no parts*, it cannot justly be said to be a *Whole*. In that therefore we plainly agree with the *Holenmerians*, that

that a Soul or Spirit may be said by its Essence to penetrate and possess the *whole Body C, D, E*; but in this again we differ from them, that we dare not affirm that the *whole Spirit* or *whole Soul* does penetrate and possess the said Body, because that which has not *parts* cannot properly be called a *Whole*; though I will not over-stiffly contend, but that we may use that word for a more easie explication of our mind, according to that old trite Proverb, *Ἀμαθίστερον πως εἰπέ καὶ σαφέστερον λέγει*; *Speak a little more unlearnedly that thou mayest speak more intelligibly or plainly*. But then we are to remember that we do not speak *properly*, though more *accommodately* to the vulgar apprehension, but *improperly*.

But now when the *Hobenmerians* add further, That the whole Soul is in every part or Physical point of the Body *D, C, E*, in the point *A* and *B*, and all the rest of the points See Figure 2. Sect. III. of which the Body *D, C, E*, does consist, that seems an harsh expression to me, and such as may justly be deemed next door to an open Repugnancy and Contradiction: For when they say the whole Soul is in the whole Body *D, C, E*, if they understand the Essence of the Soul to be commensurate, and as it were equal to the Body *D, C, E*, and yet at the same time, the whole Soul to be contained within the point *A* or *B*, it is manifest that they make one and the same thing many thousand times greater or less than it self at the same time; which is impossible. But if they will affirm, that the *essential Amplitude* of the Soul is no bigger than what is contained within

the Physical point A, or B; but that the *Essential Presence* of the Soul is diffused through the whole Body D, C, E, the thing will succeed not a jot the better. For while they plainly profess that the whole Soul is in the point A, it is manifest that there remains nothing of the Soul which may be in the point B, which is distant from A: For it is as if one should say, that there is nothing of the Soul which is not included within A; and yet in the same moment of time, that not only something of the Soul, (which perhaps might be a more gentle Repugnancy) but that the whole Soul is in B, as if the *whole* Soul were *totally* and *entirely* out of it self; which surely is impossible in any *singular* or *individual* thing. And as for *Universals*, they are not *Things*, but *Notions* we use in contemplating them.

Again, if the *Essential Amplitude* of the Soul is no greater than what may be contained within the limits of a Physical point, it cannot extend or exhibit its *Essential Presence* through the whole Body, unless we imagine in it a stupendious velocity, such as it may be carried with in one moment into all the parts of the Body, and so be present to them: Which when it is so hard to conceive in this scant *compages* of an humane Body, and in the Soul occupying in one moment every part thereof, What an outrageous thing is it, and utterly impossible to apprehend touching that Spirit which perpetually exhibits his *Essential Presence* to the whole world, and whatever is beyond the world?

To which lastly, you may add that this Hypothesis of the *Holenmerians*, does necessarily make all *Spirits* the most *minute* things that can be conceived: For if the whole Spirit be in every Physical point, it is plain that the *Essential Amplitude* it self of the Spirit (which the two former Objections supposed) is not bigger than that Physical point in which it is, (which you may call, if you will, a *Physical Monad*) than which nothing is or can be smaller in universal Nature: which if you refer to any *created Spirit*, it cannot but seem very ridiculous; but if to the *Majesty* and *Amplitude* of the *divine Numen*, intolerable, that I may not say plainly reproachful and blasphemous.

## S E C T. XIII.

A Confutation of the first Reason of the *Holenmerians*.

**B**UT now for the Reasons for which the *Holenmerians* adhere to so absurd an Opinion; verily they are such as can no way compensate those huge difficulties and repugnancies the Opinion it self labours under. For, for the first, which so solicitously provides for the *Indivisibility* of *Spirits*, it seems to me to undertake a charge either *Superfluous* or *Ineffectual*. *Superfluous*, if *Extension* can be without *Divisibility*, as it is clearly demonstrated it can, in that infinite immovable *Extension* distinct from the movable

Matter, *Enchirid.*, *Metaphys.*, cap. 6, 7, 8. But *In-effectual*, if all *Extension* be *divisible*, and the *Essential Presence* of a *Spirit* which pervades and is extended through the whole Body C, D, E, may for that very reason be *divided*; for so the *whole Essence* which occupies the whole Body C, D, E, will be divided into *parts*. No by no means, will you say, forasmuch as it is wholly in every part of the Body.

Therefore it will be divided, if I may so speak, into so many *Totalities*. But what Logical ear can bear a saying so absurd and abhorrent from all reason, that a *Whole* should not be divided into *parts* but into *Wholes*? But you will say at least we shall have this granted us, that an *Essential Presence* may be distributed or divided according to so many distinctly *sited Totalities* which occupy at once the whole Body C, D, E, Yes verily, this shall be granted you, after you have demonstrated that a *Spirit* not bigger than a *Physical Monad* can occupy in the same instant all the parts of the Body C, D, E; but upon this condition, that you acknowledge not sundry *Totalities*, but one only *total Essence*, though the least that can be imagined, can occupy that whole space, and when there is need, occupy, in an instant, an infinite one: Which the *Holenmerians* must of necessity hold touching the Divine Essence, because according to their Opinion taken in the second sense, (which pinches the whole Essence of a Spirit into the smallest point) the Divine Essence it self is not bigger than any *Physical Monad*. From whence it is apparent the three *Objections* which

which we brought in the beginning do again recur here, and utterly overwhelm the first reason of the *Holenmerians*: So that the remedy is far more intolerable than the disease.

S E C T. XIV.

*A Confutation of the second Reason of the Holenmerians.*

**A**ND truly the other reason which from this *Holenmerism* of Spirits pretends a more easie way of conceiving how it comes to pass that the Soul, suppose in A, can perceive what happens to it in C, or B, and altogether in the same circumstances as if it self were perfectly and entirely in C, or B, when

Fig. 2.



yet it is in A; although at first shew this seems very plausible, yet if we look throughly in it, we shall find it far enough from performing what it so fairly promises. For besides that nothing is more difficult or rather impossible to conceive, than that an Essence not bigger than a Physical point should occupy and possess the whole Body of a man at the same instant, this Hypothesis is moreover plainly contrary and repugnant to the very Laws of the Souls perceptions: For Physicians and Anatomists with one consent profess,

that they have found by very solid experiments, that the Soul perceives only within the Head, and that without the Head there is no perception: Which could by no means be, if the Soul herself were wholly in the point A, and the very self-same Soul again wholly in the point B, and C, nor any where as to *Essential Amplitude* bigger than a *Physical Monad*: For hence it would follow, that one and the same thing would both perceive and not perceive at once; That it would perceive this or that Object, and yet perceive nothing at all; which is a perfect contradiction.

And from hence the falsity of that common saying is detected, That *if the Eye was in the Foot, the Soul would see in the Foot*; whenas it does not so much as see in those Eyes which it already hath, but somewhere within the Brain. Nor would the Soul by an Eye in the Foot see, unless by fitting Nerves, not unlike the Optick ones, continued from the Foot to the Head and Brain, where the Soul so far as *perceptive*, inhabiteth. In the other parts of the Body the Functions thereof are only *vital*.

Again, such is the nature of some perceptions of the Soul, that they are fitted for the moving of the Body; so that it is manifest that the very self-same thing which perceives, has the power of moving and guiding of it; Which seems impossible to be done by this Soul, which, according to the Opinion of the *Holenmerians*, exceeds not the amplitude of a small Physical point, as it may appear at first sight to any one whose reason is not blinded with prejudice.

And

And lastly, If it be lawful for the Mind of man to give her conjectures touching the Immortal *Genii*, (whether they be in Vehicles, or destitute of Vehicles) and touching their *Perceptions* and *Essential Presences* whether invisible or those in which they are said sometimes to appear to mortal men, there is none surely that can admit that any of these things are competible to such a Spirit as the *Holenmerians* describe. For how can a *Metaphysical Monad*, that is to say, a Spiritual substance not exceeding a Physical Monad in Amplitude, fill out an *Essential Presence* bigger than a Physical Monad, unless it be by a very swift vibration of itself towards all parts; as Boys by a very swift moving of a Fire-stick, make a fiery Circle in the air by that quick motion. But that Spirits, destitute of Vehicles, should have no greater *Essential Presence* than what is occupied of a naked and unmoved *Metaphysical Monad*, or exhibited thereby, seems so absonous and ridiculous a spectacle to the Mind of man, that unless he be deprived of all sagacity and sensibility of spirit, he cannot but abhor so idle an Opinion.

And as for those *Essential Presences*, according to which they sometimes appear to men, at least equalizing humane stature, how can a solitary *Metaphysical Monad* form so great a part of Air or Ether into humane shape, or govern it being so formed? Or how can it perceive any external Object in this swift motion of itself, and quick vibration, whereby this *Metaphysical Monad* is understood of the *Holenmerians*, to be present in all the parts of its Vehicle at once? For there  
can

can be no perception of the external Object, unless the Object that is to be perceived act with some stay upon that which perceiveth. Nor if it could be perceived by this *Metaphysical Monad* thus swiftly moved and vibrated towards all parts at once, would it be seen in one place, but in many places at once, and those, as it may happen, very distant.

---

S E C T. XV.

*The egregious falsity of the Opinions of the Hohenmerians and Nullibists, as also their useflessness for any Philosophical ends.*

**B**UT verily, I am ashamed to wast so much time in refuting such meer trifles and dotages which indeed are such, (that I mean of the *Nullibists*, as well as this other of the *Hohenmerians*) that we may very well wonder how such distorted and strained conceits could ever enter into the minds of men, or by what artifice they have so spread themselves in the World; but that the prejudices and enchantments of Superstition and stupid admiration of mens Persons are so strong, that they may utterly blind the minds of men, and charm them into dotage. But if any one, all prejudice and parts-taking being laid aside, will attentively consider the thing as it is, he shall clearly perceive and acknowledge, unless all belief is to be denied to the humane faculties, that the Opinions of the *Nullibists* and *Hohenmerians*,

*lenmerians*, touching *Incorporeal Beings*, are miserably false; and not that only, but as to any Philosophical purpose altogether *useless*. Forasmuch as out of neither Hypothesis there does appear any greater facility of conceiving how the *Mind* of man, or any other *Spirit*, performs those Functions of *Perception* and of *Moving* of *Bodies*, from their being supposed *nowhere*, than from their being supposed *somewhere*; or from supposing them *wholly in every part* of a *Body*, than from supposing them only, to occupie the whole *Body* by an *Essential* or *Metaphysical Extension*; but on the contrary, that both the Hypotheses do intangle and involve the Doctrine of *Incorporeal Beings* with greater Difficulties and Repugnancies.

Wherefore, there being neither *Truth* nor *Usefulness* in the Opinions of the *Holenmerians* and *Nullibists*, I hope it will offend no man if we send them quite packing from our Philosophations touching an *Incorporeal Being* or *Spirit*, in our delivering the true Idea or Notion thereof,

## S E C T. XVI.

*That those that contend that the Notion of a Spirit is so difficult and imperscrutable, do not this because they are of a more sharp and piercing Judgement than others, but of a Genius more rude and plebeian.*

**N**OW I have so successfully removed and dissipated those two vast Mounds of Night and Mistiness, that lay upon the nature of *Incorporeal Beings*, and obscured it with such gross darkness; it remains that we open and illustrate the true and genuine nature of them in general, and propose such a definition of a *Spirit*, as will exhibit no difficulty to a mind rightly prepared and freed from prejudice: For the *nature* of a *Spirit* is very easily understood, provided one rightly and skilfully shew the way to the Learner, and form to him true Notions of the thing. In-  
 somuch that I have often wondred at the super-  
 stitious consternation of mind in those men, (or  
 the profaneness of their tempers and innate aver-  
 sation from the contemplation of Divine things) who if by chance they hear any one professing that he can with sufficient clearness and distinctness conceive the nature of a *Spirit*, and communicate the Notion to others, they are presently astartled and amazed at the saying, and straightway accuse the man of intolerable levity or arrogancy, as thinking him to assume so much to himself,  
 and

and to promise to others as no humane Wit, furnished with never so much knowledge, can ever perform. And this I understand even of such men who yet readily acknowledge the *Existence* of *Spirits*.

But as for those that deny their *Existence*, whoever professes this skill to them, verily he cannot but appear a man above all measure vain and doting. But I hope that I shall so bring it about, that no man shall appear more stupid and doting, no man more unskillful and ignorant, than he that esteems the clear Notion of a Spirit so hopeless and desperate an attempt; and that I shall plainly detect, that this big and boastful profession of their ignorance in these things does not proceed from hence, that they have any thing more a sharp or discerning Judgment than other mortals, but that they have more gross and weak parts, and a shallower Wit, and such as comes nearest to the superstition and stupidity of the rude vulgar, who easilier fall into admiration and astonishment, than pierce into the reasons and notices of any difficult matter.

## S E C T. XVII.

*The Definition of Body in general, with so clear an Explication thereof, that even they that complain of the obscurity of a Spirit, cannot but confess they perfectly understand the nature of Body.*

**B**UT now for those that do thus despair of any true knowledge of the nature of a Spirit, I would entreat them to try the abilities of their wit in recognizing and thoroughly considering the nature of Body in general. And let them ingeniously tell me whether they cannot but acknowledge this to be a clear and perspicuous definition thereof, *viz.* That Body is Substance Material, if itself altogether destitute of all Perception, Life, and Motion. Or thus: Body is a Substance Material coalescent or accruing together into one, by vertue of some other thing, from whence that one by coalition, has or may have Life also, Perception and Motion.

I doubt not but they will readily answer, that they understand all this (as to the terms) clearly and perfectly; nor would they doubt of the truth thereof, but that we deprive Body of all Motion from itself, as also of Union, Life, and Perception. But that it is Substance, that is, a Being subsistent by it self, not a mode of some Being, they cannot but very willingly admit, and that also it is a material Substance compounded of physical Monads, or at least of most minute particles.

particles of Matter, into which it is divisible; and because of their *Impenetrability*, impenetrable by any other Body. So that the Essential and Positive difference of a *Body* is, that it be *impenetrable*, and *Physically divisible* into parts: But that it is *extended*, that immediately belongs to it as it is a *Being*. Nor is there any reason why they should doubt of the other part of the *Differentia*, whenas it is solidly and fully proved in Philosophy, That *Matter* of its own nature, or in itself, is endued with no *Perception*, *Life*, nor *Motion*. And besides, we are to remember that we here do not treat of the *Existence* of things, but of their intelligible *Notion* and *Essence*.

---

S E C T. XVIII.

The perfect Definition of a Spirit, with a full Explication of its Nature through all Degrees.

AND if the *Notion* or *Essence* is so easily understood in nature *Corporeal* or *Body*, I do not see but in the *Species* immediately opposite to *Body*, viz. *Spirit*, there may be found the same facility of being understood. Let us try therefore, and from the Law of *Opposites* let us define a *Spirit*, an *Immaterial Substance intrinsically endued with Life and the faculty of Motion*. This slender and brief Definition that thus easily flows without any noise, does comprehend in general the whole nature of a *Spirit*; Which left by reason

son of its exility and brevity it may prove less perceptible to the Understanding, as a Spirit is to the sight, I will subjoyn a more full Explication, that it may appear to all, that this Definition of a *Spirit* is nothing inferiour to the Definition of a *Body* as to clearness and perspicuity. And that by this method which we now fall upon, a full and perfect knowledge and understanding of the nature of a *Spirit* may be attained to.

Go to therefore, let us take notice through all the degrees of the *Definitum*, or *Thing defined*, what precise and immediate properties each of them contain, from whence at length a most distinct and perfect knowledge of the whole *Definitum* will discover itself. Let us begin then from the top of all, and first let us take notice that a Spirit is *Ens*, or a *Being*, and from this very same that it is a *Being*; that it is also *One*, that it is *True*, and that it is *Good*; which are the three acknowledged Properties of *Ens* in *Metaphysicks*, that it exists *sometime*, and *somewhere*, and is in some sort *extended*, as is shewn *Enchirid. Metaphys. cap. 2. sect. 10.* which three latter terms are plain of themselves. And as for the three former, that *One* signifies undistinguished or undivided in and from itself, but divided or distinguished from all other, and that *True* denotes the answerableness of the *thing* to its own proper *Idea*, and implies right *Matter* and *Form* duely conjoyned, and that lastly *Good* respects the fitness for the end in a large sence, so that it will take in that saying of Theologers, That  
God

God is his own End, are things vulgarly known to *Logicians* and *Metaphysicians*. That these Six are the immediate affections of Being as Being, is made apparent in the above-cited *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*; nor is it requisite to repeat the same things here. Now every *Being* is either *Substance* or the *Mode* of *Substance*, which some call *Accident*: But that a *Spirit* is not an *Accident* or *Mode* of *Substance*, all in a manner profess; and it is demonstrable from manifold Arguments, that there are *Spirits* which are no such *Accidents* or *Modes*; Which is made good in the said *Enchiridion* and other Treatises of Doctor H. M.

Wherefore the second Essential degree of a Spirit is, that it is *Substance*. From whence it is understood to subsist by itself, nor to want any other thing as a *Subject* (in which it may inhere, or of which it may be the *Mode* or *Accident*) for its subsisting or existing.

The third and last Essential degree is, that it is *Immaterial*, according to which it immediately belongs to it, that it be a *Being* not only *One*, but *one by itself*, or of its own intimate nature, and not by another; that is, That, though as it is a *Being* it is in some sort *extended*, yet it is utterly *Indivisible* and *Indiscernible* into real *Physical* parts. And moreover, That it can *penetrate* the *Matter*, and (which the *Matter* cannot do) penetrate things of its own kind; that is, pass through *Spiritual* Substances. In which two Essential Attributes (as it ought to be in every perfect and legitimate Distribution of any Genus)

it is fully and accurately contrary to its opposite *Species*, namely, to *Body*. As also in those immediate Properties whereby it is understood to have *Life* intrinsically in *itself*, and the faculty of *moving*; which in some sense is true in all Spirits whatsoever, forasmuch as *Life* is either *Vegetative*, *Sensitive*, or *Intellectual*. One whereof at least every Spiritual Substance hath: as also the faculty of *moving*; insomuch that every Spirit either moves itself by itself, or the Matter, or both, or at least the Matter either mediately or immediately; or lastly, both ways. For so all things moved are moved by God, he being the Fountain of all Life and Motion.

---

S E C T. XIX.

*That from hence that the Definition of a Body is perspicuous, the Definition of a Spirit is also necessarily perspicuous.*

WHerefore I dare here appeal to the Judgment and Conscience of any one that is not altogether illiterate and of a dull and obtuse Wit, whether this *Notion* or Definition of a *Spirit* in general, is not as intelligible and perspicuous, is not as clear and every way distinct as the *Idea* or *Notion* of a *Body*, or of any thing else whatsoever which the mind of man can contemplate in the whole compass of Nature. And whether he cannot as easily or rather with the same pains apprehend the nature of a *Spirit* as of *Body*, forasmuch

asmuch as they both agree in the immediate Genus to them, to wit *Substance*. And the *Differentia* do illustrate one another by their mutual opposition; insomuch that it is impossible that one should understand what is *Material Substance*, but he must therewith presently understand what *Immaterial Substance* is, or what it is *not* to have *Life* and *Motion* of it self, but he must straitway perceive what it is *to have both in itself*, or to be able to communicate them to others.

S E C T. XX.

*Four Objections which from the perspicuity of the terms of the Definition of a SPIRIT infer the Repugnancy of them one to another.*

NOR can I divine what may be here opposed, unless haply they may alledge such things as these, That although they cannot deny but that all the *terms* of the *Definition* and *Explication* of them, are sufficiently intelligible, if they be considered single, yet if they be compared one with another they will mutually destroy one another. For this *Extension* which is mingled with, or inserted into the nature of a *Spirit*, seems to take away the *Penetrability* and *Indivisibility* thereof, as also its *faculty* of *thinking*, as its *Penetrability* likewise takes away its *power* of *moving any Bodies*.

I. First, *Extension* takes away *Penetrability*; because if one *Extension* penetrate another, of

necessity either one of them is destroyed, or two equal Amplitudes entirely penetrating one another, are no bigger than either one of them taken single, because they are closed within the same limits.

II. Secondly, It takes away *Indivisibility*; because whatsoever is *extended* has *partes extra partes*, one part out of another, and therefore is *Divisible*: For neither would it have parts, unless it could be divided into them. To which you may further add, that forasmuch as the parts are *substantial*, nor depend one of another, it is clearly manifest that at least by the Divine Power they may be separate, and subsist separate one from another.

III. Thirdly, *Extension* deprives a *Spirit* of the faculty of *thinking*, as depressing it down into the same order that Bodies are. And that there is no reason why an *extended Spirit* should be more capable of *Perception* than *Matter* that is *extended*.

IV. Lastly, *Penetrability* renders a *Spirit* unable to *move Matter*; because, whenas by reason of this *Penetrability* it so easily slides through the *Matter*, it cannot conveniently be united with the *Matter* whereby it may move the same: For without some union or inherency (a *Spirit* being destitute of all *Impenetrability*) 'tis impossible it should protrude the *Matter* towards any place.

The sum of which Four difficulties tends to this, that we may understand, that though this Idea or *Notion* of a *Spirit* which we have exhibited be sufficiently

sufficiently plain and explicate, and may be easily understood; yet from the very perspicuity of the thing itself, it abundantly appears, that it is not the Idea of any *possible* thing, and much less of a thing *really existing*, whenas the parts thereof are so manifestly repugnant one to another.

## S E C T. XXI.

*An Answer to the first of the Four Objections.*

**I** BUT against as well the *Nullibists* as the *Hobbians*, who both of them contend that *Extension* and *Matter* is one and the same thing, we will prove that the Notion or Idea of a *Spirit* which we have produced, is a Notion of a thing *possible*. And as for the *Nullibists*, who think we so much indulge to corporeal Imagination in this our Opinion of the *Extension* of Spirits, I hope on the contrary, that I shall shew that it is only from hence, that the *Hobbians* and *Nullibists* have taken all *Amplitude* from *Spirits*, because their Imagination is not sufficiently defecated and depurated from the filth and unclean tinctures of *Corporeity*, or rather that they have their Mind over-much addicted and enslaved to *Material* things, and so disordered, that she knows not how to expedite herself from gross Corporeal Phantasms.

From which Fountain have sprung all those difficulties whereby they endeavour to overwhelm this our *Notion* of a *Spirit*; as we shall manifestly demonstrate by going through them all,

and carefully perpending each of them. For it is to be imputed to their gross Imagination, That from hence that two equal Amplitudes penetrate one another throughout, they conclude that either one of them must therewith perish, or that they being both conjoynd together, are no bigger than either one of them taken single. For this comes from hence, that their mind is so illaqueated or lime-twigg'd, as it were, with the Idea's and Properties of corporeal things, that they cannot but infect those things also which have nothing corporeal in them with this material Tincture and Contagion, and so altogether confound this *Metaphysical* Extension with that Extension which is *physical*. I say, from this *disease* it is that the sight of their mind is become so dull and obtuse, that they are not able to divide that common Attribute of a being, I mean *Extension Metaphysical* from *special* Extension and *Material*, and assign to *Spirits* their proper Extension, and leave to *Matter* hers. Nor according to that known method, whether Logical or Metaphysical, by intellectual Abstraction prescind the *Generical* nature of *Extension* from the abovesaid *Species* or kinds thereof. Nor lastly, (which is another sign of their obtuseness and dulness) is their mind able to *penetrate* with that *Spiritual* Extension into the Extension *Material*; but like a stupid Beast stands lowing without, as if the mind itself were become wholly corporeal; and if any thing enter they believe it perishes rather and is annihilated, than that two things can at the same time coexist together in the same *Ubi*. Which are Symptoms of a mind

mind desperately sick of this Corporeal Malady of *Imagination*, and not sufficiently accustomed or exercised in the free Operations of the Intellectual Powers.

And that also proceeds from the same source, That supposing two Extensions penetrating one another, and adequately occupying the same *Ubi*, they thus conjoynd are conceived not to be greater than either one of them taken by itself. For the reason of this mistake is, that the *Mind* inactivated and swayed down by the *Imagination*, cannot together with the *Spiritual* Extension penetrate into the *Material*, and follow it throughout, but only places itself hard by, and stands without like a gross stupid thing, and altogether Corporeal. For if she could but, with the *Spiritual* Extension, insinuate herself into the *Material*, and so conceive them both together as two really distinct Extensions, it is impossible but that she should therewith conceive them so conjoynd into one *Ubi*, to be notwithstanding not a jot less than when they are separated and occupy an *Ubi* as big again: For the *Extension* in neither of them is diminished, but their *Situation* only changed. As it also sometimes comes to pass in one and the same Extension of some particular Spirits which can dilate and contract their Amplitude into a greater or lesser *Ubi* without any Augmentation or Diminution of their Extension, but onely by the expansion and <sup>con</sup>traction of it into another site.

## S E C T. XXII.

That besides those *THREE* Dimensions which belong to all extended things, a *FOURTH* also is to be admitted, which belongs properly to *SPIRITS*.

**A**ND that I may not dissemble or conceal any thing, Although all *Material* things, considered in themselves, have *three* Dimensions only; yet there must be admitted in Nature a *Fourth*, which fitly enough, I think, may be called *Essential Spissitude*; Which, though it most properly appertains to those *Spirits* which can contract their Extension into a less *Ubi*; yet by an easie Analogie it may be referred also to *Spirits* penetrating as well the *Matter* as mutually *one another*: So that wherever there are more *Essences* than one, or more of the same *Essence* in the same *Ubi* than is adequate to the *Amplitude* thereof, there this *Fourth* Dimension is to be acknowledged, which we call *Essential Spissitude*.

Which assuredly involves no greater repugnancy than what may seem at first view, to him that considers the thing less attentively, to be in the other *three* Dimensions. Namely, unless one would conceive that a piece of Wax stretched out, suppose, to the length of an Eln, and afterwards

wards rolled together into the form of a Globe, loses something of its former Extension, by this its conglobation, he must confess that a Spirit, neither by the contraction of itself into a less space has lost any thing of its Extension or Essence, but as in the abovesaid Wax the diminution of its Longitude is compensated with the augmentation of its Latitude and Profundity; so in a Spirit contracting it self, that in like manner its Longitude, Latitude, and Profundity being lessened, are compensated by *Essential Spissitude*, which the Spirit acquires by this contraction of itself.

And in both cases we are to remember that the *Site* is only changed, but that the *essence* and *extension* are not at all impaired.

Verily these things by me are so perfectly every way perceived, so certain and tried, that I dare appeal to the mind of any one which is free from the morbid prejudices of *Imagination*, and challenge him to try the strength of his Intellectuals, whether he does not clearly perceive the thing to be so as I have defined, and that *two* equal Extensions, adequately occupying the very same *Obi*, be not *twice* as great as either of them alone, and that they are not closed with the same terms as the *Imagination* falsely suggests, but only with equal.

Nor is there any need to heap up more words for the solving this first difficulty; whenas what has been briefly said already abundantly sufficeth for the penetrating their understanding who are prepossessed with no prejudice: But for the piercing

S E C T. XXIII.

An Answer to the second Objection, where the fundamental Error of the Nullibists, viz. That whatsoever is extended is the Object of Imagination, is taken notice of.

II. **L** Et us now try if we can dispatch the second difficulty with like success, and see if it be not wholly to be ascribed to *Imagination*, that an *Indiscernible extension* seems to involve in it any contradiction. As if there could be no *Extension* which has not parts real and properly so called into which it may be actually divided, viz. for this reason, that that only is extended which has *partes extra partes*, which being *substantial*, may be separated one from another, and thus separate subsist. This is the summary account of this difficulty, which nothing but corrupt *imagination* supporteth.

Now the first source or fountain of this error of the *Nullibists*, is this; That they make every thing that is extended the Object of the *Imagination*, and every Object of the *Imagination Corporeal*. The latter whereof undoubtedly is true, if it be taken in a right sence; namely, if they understand such a perception as is either simply and adequately drawn from external Objects; or by increasing, diminishing, transposing, or transforming

forming of parts (as in *Chimera's* and *Hippocentaurs*) is composed of the same. I acknowledge all these Idea's, as they were sometime some way Objects of *Sensation*, so to be the genuine Objects of *Imagination*, and the perception of these to be rightly termed the operation of *Fancy*, and that all these things that are thus represented, necessarily are to be look'd upon as *corporeal*, and consequently as *actually divisible*.

But that all perception of *Extension* is such *Imagination*, that I confidently deny. Forasmuch as there is an Idea of *infinite extension* drawn or taken in from no external sense, but is natural and essential to the very faculty of perceiving; Which the mind can by no means pluck out of herself, nor cast it away from her; but if she will rouse herself up, and by earnest and attentive thinking, fix her animadversion thereon, she will be constrained, whether she will or no, to acknowledge, that although the whole matter of the World were exterminated out of the Universe, there would notwithstanding remain a certain subtile and *immaterial extension* which has no agreement with that other *Material* one, in any thing, saving that it is extended, as being such that it neither falls under sense, nor is impenetrable, nor can be moved, nor discerped into parts; and that this Idea is not only *possible*, but *necessary*, and such as we do not at our pleasure feign and invent, but do find it to be so innate and ingrafted in our mind, that we cannot by any force or artifice remove it thence. Which is a most certain demonstration that all *Perception of Extension*

*Extension* is not *Imagination* properly so called.

Which in my Opinion ought to be esteemed one of the chiefest and most fundamental Errours of the *Nullibists*, and to which especially this difficulty is to be referred touching an *Indiscerpible Extension*. For we see they confess their own guilt, namely, that their *Mind* is so corrupted by their *Imagination*, and so immersed into it, that they can use no other faculty in the contemplation of any extended thing. And therefore when they make use of their *Imagination* instead of their *Intellect* in contemplating of it, they necessarily look upon it as an Object of *Imagination*; that is, as a corporeal thing, and *discerpible* into parts. For as I noted above, the sight of their mind by reason of this *Morbus ulceris*, this *materious Disease*, if I may so speak, is made so heavy and dull, that it cannot distinguish any *Extension* from that of *Matter*, as allowing it to appertain to another kind, nor by *Logical* or *Metaphysical* Abstraction prescind it from either.

SECT,

## S E C T. XXIV.

That *Extension* as such includes in it neither *Divisibility* nor *Impenetrability*, neither *Indivisibility* nor *Penetrability*, but is indifferent to either two of those properties.

And from hence it is that because a thing is extended, they presently imagine that it has *partes extra partes*, and is not *Ens unum per se & non per aliud*, a Being one by it self, and not by vertue of another, but so framed from the juxtaposition of parts. Whenas the Idea of *Extension* precisely considered, in itself includes no such thing, but only a *trinal* Distance or *solid* Amplitude, that is to say, not *linear* only and *superficiary*, (if we may here use those terms which properly belong to magnitude Mathematical) but every way running out and reaching towards every part. This Amplitude surely, and nothing beside, does this bare and simple *Extension* include, not *Penetrability* nor *Impenetrability*, nor *Divisibility* nor yet *Indivisibility* but to either affections or properties, or if you will Essential Differences, namely, to *Divisibility* and *Impenetrability*, or to *Penetrability* and *Indivisibility*, if considered in itself, is it altogether indifferent, and may be determined to either two of them.

Wherefore, whereas we acknowledge that there is a certain *Extension* namely *Material*, which

which is endued with so stout and invincible an *Avversaria* or *Impenetrability*, that it necessarily and by an insuperable Renitency expels and excludes all other Matter that occurs and attempts to penetrate it, nor suffers it at all to enter, although in the simple Idea of Extension, this marvellous virtue of it is not contained, but plainly omitted, as not at all belonging thereto immediately and of itself; why may we not as easily conceive that another Extension, namely, an *Immaterial* one, though Extension in it self include no such thing, is of such a nature, that it cannot by any other thing whether Material or Immaterial be discerned into parts; but by an indissoluble necessary and essential Tie be so united and held together with itself, that although it can penetrate all things and be penetrated by all things, yet nothing can so insinuate itself into it as to disjoyn any thing of it Essence any where, or perforate it or make any hole or Pore in it? that is, that I may speak briefly, What hinders but there may be a *Being* that is immediately *One* of its own nature, and not held together into one by vertue of some other, either *Quality* or *Substance*? although every Being as a Being is *extended*, because Extension in its precise Notion does not include any *Physical Division*, but the Mind infected with *corporeal Imagination*, does falsely and unskillfully feign it to be necessarily there.

## S E C T. XXV.

*That every thing that is extended has not parts Physically discernible, though Logically or Intellectually divisible.*

FOR it is nothing which the *Nullbists* here allege, while they say, That all Extension inferreth parts, and all parts Division. For besides that the first is false, forasmuch as *Ens unum per se*, a Being one of itself or of its own immediate nature, although *extended* yet includes no parts in its Idea, but is conceived according to its proper Essence as a thing as simple as may be, and therefore compounded of no parts: We answer moreover, that it is not at all prejudicial to our cause though we should grant that this *Metaphysical* Extension of Spirits is also divisible, but *Logically* only, not *Physically*, that is to say, is not discernible. But that one should adjoyn a *Physical* divisibility to such an Extension, surely that must necessarily proceed from the impotency of his *Imagination*, which his Mind cannot curb, nor separate herself from the dregs and corporeal foulnesses thereof; and hence it is that she tinctures and infects this pure and Spiritual Extension with Corporeal Properties. But that an extended thing may be divided *Logically* or *Intellectually*, when in the mean time it can by no means be discerned, it sufficiently appears from hence, That a *Physical* *Monad* which has some Amplitude,

plitude, though the least that possible can be, is conceived thus to be divided in a *Line* consisting of any uneven number of *Monads*, which notwithstanding the *Intellect* divides into two equal parts. And verily in a *Metaphysical Monad*, such as the *Holenmerians* conceit the *Mind* of man to be, and to possess in the mean time and occupy the whole *Body*, there may be here again made a *Logical Distribution*, suppose, *è Subjectis*, as they call it, so far forth as this *Metaphysical Monad*, or *Soul* of the *Holenmerians* is conceived to possess the *Head*, or *Trunk*, or *Limbs* of the *Body*. And yet no man is so delirant as to think that it follows from thence, that such a *Soul* may be *discerped* into so many parts, and that the parts so *discerped* may subsist by themselves.

---

 S E C T. XXVI.

*An Answer to the latter part of the second Objection, which inferreth the separability of the parts of a Substantial Extensum, from the said parts being Substantial and independent one of another.*

FROM which a sufficiently fit and accommodate Answer may be fetched to the latter part of this difficulty, namely, to that, which because the parts of Substance are *Substantial* and *independent* one of another, and *subsisting by themselves* (as being *Substances*) would infer that they can be *discerped*, at least by the *Divine Power*,

Power, and disjoyned, and being so disjoyned, subsist by themselves. Which I confess to be the chief edge or sting of the whole difficulty, and yet such as I hope I shall with ease file off or blunt. For first, I deny that in a thing that is *absolutely One* and *Simple* as a Spirit is, there are any *Physical* parts, or parts properly so called, but that they are only falsely feigned and fancied in it, by the impure Imagination. But that the Mind it self being sufficiently defecated and purged from the impure dreggs of fancy, although from some extrinsecal respect she may consider a Spirit as having parts, yet at the very same time does she in herself, with close attention, observe and note, that *such an Extension* of itself has none. And therefore whenas it has no parts it is plain it has no *substantial* parts, nor *independent* one of another, nor subsistent of themselves.

And then as much as concerns those parts which the stupid and impotent *Imagination* fancieth in a Spirit, it does not follow from thence, because they are *Substantial*, that they may *subsist separate* by themselves. For a thing to *subsist by itself*, only signifies so to subsist, that it wants not the Prop of some other *Subject* in which it may inhere as *Accidents* do. So that the parts of a *Spirit* may be said to subsist by themselves though they cannot subsist separate, and so be substance still.

## S E C T. XXVII.

*That the mutual Independency of the parts of an extended Substance may be understood in a two-fold sense ; with an Answer thereto, taken in the first sense thereof.*

**B**UT what they mean by that *mutual Independency* of parts I do not fully understand: But I sufficiently conceive that one of these two things must be hinted thereby, *viz.* Either that they are not *mutual* and effectual *causes* to one another of their *Existing*, or that their *Existence* is understood to be connected by *no necessary condition at all.*

And as for the former sense, I willingly confess those parts which they fancy in a Spirit are not mutual causes of one anothers *Existence*; but so, that in the mean time I do most firmly deny, that it will thence follow that they may be discerped, and thus discerpt, be separately conserved, no more than the *Intelligible* parts of a *Physical Monad* which is divided into two by our Reason or Intellect; which surely are no mutual causes of one anothers *Existence*: or the *Members* of the *Distribution* of a *Metaphysical Monad* according to the *Doctrine* of the *Holenmerians* (*viz.* The Soul totally being in every part of the Body) which no man in his wits can ever hope that they may be discerped, although the said *Members* of the division are not the *mutual*

tual causes of one anothers Existence: For they are but one and the same Soul which is not the cause of itself, but was wholly and entirely caused by God.

But you will say that there is here manifestly a reason extant and apparent why these Members of the Distribution cannot be discerned, and discerned separately conserved, because one and the same indivisible Monad occurs in every Member of the Distribution, which therefore since it is a single one, it is impossible it should be discerned from itself. To which I on the other side answer, That it is as manifestly extant and apparent how frivolously therefore and ineptly Arguments are drawn from *Logical* or *Intellectual Divisions*, for the concluding a real separability of parts. And I add further, That as that fictitious *Metaphysical Monad* cannot be discerned or pluckt in pieces from itself, no more can any real Spirit, because it is a thing *most simple* and *most absolutely One*, and which a *pure Mind* darkened and possessed with no prejudices of *Imagination* does acknowledge no *real parts* at all to be in. For so it would *ipso facto* be a *compound Thing*.

## S E C T. XXVIII.

*An Answer to the Independency of parts taken in the second sence.*

FROM whence an easie entrance is made to the answering this difficulty understood in the second sence of the *mutual Independency* of the parts of a Spirit, whereby their coexistence and union are understood to be connected by *no necessary Law or Condition*. For that this is false, I do most constantly affirm without all demur: For the coexistences of the parts, as they call them, of a Spirit, are connected by a Law or Condition *absolutely necessary* and plainly *essential*; Forasmuch as a Spirit is a *most simple Being*, or a Being *unum per se & non per aliud*; that is, *one of itself or of its own nature immediately so*, and not by another either *Substance* or *Quality*. For none of those parts, as the *Nullibists* call them, can exist but upon this condition, that all jointly and unitedly exist together; which Condition or Law is contained in the very Idea or nature of every *Spirit*. Whence it cannot be created or any way produced unless upon this condition, that all its parts be inseparably and indiscerpibly one; as neither a *Rectangle Triangle*, unless upon this condition, that the powers of the *Cathetus* and *Basis*, be equal to the power of the *Hypotenuisa*. Whence the *Indiscerpibility* of a *Spirit* cannot be removed from it, no not *virtute Divina*,

*Divina*, as the Schoolmen speak, no more than the above-said Property be disjoyned from a Rectangle Triangle. Out of all which I hope it is at length abundantly clear, that the *Extension* of a Spirit does not at all hinder the *Indiscerpibility* thereof.

SECTION XXIX.

An Answer to the third Objection touching the Imperceptivity of an extended Substance, viz. That whatever is, is extended, and that the NULLIBISTS and HOLENMERIANS themselves cannot give a Reason of the perceptive Faculty in Spirits, from their Hypotheses.

III. **N**OR is it any lett (which is the third thing) to the faculty of *Perceiving* and *Thinking* in *Spirits*: For we do not thrust down a *Spirit* by attributing *Extension* to it, into the rank of *Corporeal Beings*, forasmuch as there is nothing in all Nature which is not in some sense *extended*. For whatever of *Essence* there is in any thing, it either is or may be actually present to some part of the matter, and therefore it must either be *extended* or be contracted to the narrowness of a *point*, and be a meer *nothing*. For, as for the *Nullibists* and *Holenmerians*, the Opinions of them both are above utterly routed by me, and quite subverted and overturned from the very root, that no man may seek subterfuges and lurking holes there. Wherefore there is a necessity

necessity that something that is *extended* have *Cogitation* and *Perception* in it, or else there will be nothing left that has.

But for that which this Objection further urges, that there occurs no reason why an *extended Spirit* should be more capable of *Perception* than *extended Matter*, it is verily, in my judgment, a very unlearned and unskilful argutation. For we do not take all this pains in demonstrating the *Extension* of a *Spirit*, that thence we might fetch out a reason or account of its faculty of perceiving; but that it may be conceived to be some real Being and true Substance, and not a vain Figure, such as is every thing that has no Amplitude and is in no sort *extended*.

But those that so stickle and sweat for the proving their Opinion, that a Spirit is *nowhere*, or is *totally* in every part of that *Ubi* it occupies, they are plainly engaged of all right, clearly and distinctly to render a reason out of their *Hypothesis* of the *Perceptive faculty* that is acknowledged in *Spirits*, Namely that they plainly and precisely deduce from hence, because a thing is *nowhere* or *totally* in every part of the *Ubi* it occupies, that it is necessarily endued with a faculty of *perceiving* and *thinking*; so that the reason of the conjunction of *properties* with the *Subject*, may be clearly thence understood.

Which notwithstanding I am very confident, they can never perform; And that *Perception* and *Cogitation* are the *immediate* Attributes of some Substance; and that therefore, as that Rule of Prudence, *Enchirid. Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 4. sect. 3.* declares,

declares, no Physical reason thereof ought to be required, nor can be given, why they are in the Subject wherein they are found.

---

S E C T. XXX.

*That from the Generical nature of any Species, no reason is to be fetcht of the conjunction of the Essential Difference with it, it being immediate.*

**B**UT so we are to conclude, that as *Substance* is immediately divided into *Material* and *Immaterial*, or into *Body* and *Spirit*, where no reason can be rendred from the Substance in *Spirit*, as it is Substance, why it should be *Spirit* rather than *Body*; nor from Substance in a *Body*, as it is Substance, why it should be *Body* rather than *Spirit*; But these *Essential Differences* are immediately in the Subject in which they are found: So the case stands in the subdivision of *Spirit* into meerly *Plastical* and *Perceptive*, supposing there are Spirits that are meerly *Plastical*; and then of a *Perceptive Spirit* into meerly *Sensitive* and *Intellectual*. For there can be no reason rendred touching a *Spirit* as a Spirit in a Spirit meerly *Plastical*, why it is a Spirit meerly *Plastical* rather than *Perceptive*: Nor in a *Perceptive Spirit*, why it is a *Perceptive Spirit* rather than meerly *Plastical*. And lastly, in a *Perceptive Spirit Intellectual*, why it is *Intellectual* rather than meerly *Sensitive*; and in the meerly *Sensitive*

*tive Spirit, why it is such rather than Intellectual. But these Essential Differences are immediately in the Subjects in which they are found, and any Physical and intrinsecal reason ought not to be asked, nor can be given why they are in those Subjects, as I noted a little above out of the said Enchiridion Ethicum.*

---

S E C T. XXXI.

*That although the Hohenmerias and Nullibists can give no reason, why that which perceives should be TOTALLY in every part, or should be NOWHERE rather than be in any sort extended or somewhere, yet there are reasons obvious enough, why an extended Spirit, rather should perceivethan extended Matter.*

**B**UT however, though we cannot render a reason why this or that Substance as Substance, be a Spirit rather than Body; or why this or that Spirit be Perceptive rather than merely Plastical; yet as the reason is sufficiently plain, why Matter or Body is a Substance rather than Accident, so it is manifest enough why that which Perceives, or is Plastical, should be a Spirit rather than Matter or Body; which surely is much more than either the Hohenmerians or Nullibists can vaunt of. For they can offer no reason why that which perceives should rather be nowhere than somewhere; or totally in each part of the *Ubi* it does occupy, than otherwise, as may be under-

understood from what we have said above.

But now since the *Matter* or *Body* which is *discerpible* and *Impenetrable* is destitute of itself of all Life and Motion, certainly it is consonant to reason, that the *Species* opposite to *Body*, and which is conceived to be *Penetrable* and *Indiscerpible*, should be intrinsically endued with Life in general and Motion. And whenas *Matter* is nothing else than a certain stupid and loose congeries of *Physical Monads*, that the first and most immediate opposite degree in this *indiscerpible* and *penetrable* Substance, which is called *Spirit*, should be the faculty of Union, Motion, and Life, in which all the *Sympathies* and *Synenerges* which are found in the world may be conceived to consist. From whence, it ought not at all to seem strange, that that which is *Plastical* should be a *Spirit*.

And now as for *Perception* itself, undoubtedly all Mortals have either a certain confused preface, or more precise and determinate Notion, that as that, whatever it is in which the above-said *Sympathies* and *Synenergies* immediately are, so more especially that to which belongs the faculty of *Perceiving* and *Thinking* is a thing of all things the most *subtile* and most *One* that may be.

Wherefore I appeal here to the Mind and judgment of any one, whether he can truly conceive any thing more *Subtile* or more *One* than the *Essence* or Notion of a *Spirit* as it is immediately distinguished from *Matter*, and opposed thereto. For can there be any thing more *One* than what has no parts, into which it may be discerped? or  
more

more *Subtile* than what does not only penetrate *Matter*, but *itself*, or at least other *Substances* of its own kind? For a *Spirit* can penetrate a *Spirit*, though *Matter* cannot penetrate *Matter*.

There is therefore in the very *Essence* of a *Spirit*, although it be *Metaphysically* extended, no obscure reason why all the *Sympathies* and *Synnergies*, why all *Perceptions* and all manner of *Cogitations* should be referred rather to it, by reason of the *Unity* and *Subtilty* of its nature, than to *Matter*, which is so crass, that it is *impenetrable*; and is so far from *unity* of *Essence*, that it consists of *juxtaposited* parts. But I hope by this I have abundantly satisfied this third difficulty.

## S E C T. XXXII.

*An Answer to the fourth Objection as much as respects the HOLENMERIANS and NULLIBISTS, and all those that acknowledge that the Matter is created of God.*

IV. **L**ET us go on therefore to the Fourth and last, which from the *Penetrability* of a *Spirit* concludes its unfitness for moving of *Matter*. For it cannot move *Matter*, but by impelling it; nor can it impel it, because it does so easily, without all resistance, *penetrate* it. Here therefore again, *Imagination* plays her tricks, and measures the nature of a *Spirit* by the *Laws* of *Matter*, fancying a *Spirit* like some *Body* passing through an over-large or wide hole, where it cannot

cannot stick by reason of the laxness of the passage.

But in the mean time, it is to be noted, that neither the *Holenmerians* nor *Nullibists* can of right object this difficulty to us, whenas it is much more incredible that either a *Metaphysical Monad*, or any *Essence* that is *nowhere*, should be more fit for the moving Matter, than that which has some Amplitude, and is present also to the Matter that is to be moved. Wherefore we have now only to do with such Philosophers as contend that the whole Universe consists of Bodies only: For as for those that acknowledge there is a God, and that Matter was created by him, it is not hard for them to conceive, that there may be a certain faculty in the Soul, which in some manner, though very shadowishly, answers to that Power in God of creating Matter; Namely, that as God, though the most pure of all Spirits, yet creates Matter the most gross of all things; so created Spirits themselves may emit a certain *Material Vertue*, either spontaneously or naturally, by which they may intimately inhere in the Subject Matter, and be sufficiently close united therewith. Which faculty of Spirits in the *Appendix to the Antidote against Atheism*, is called *ὀλοπάθεια*, the *Hylopathy of Spirits*, or a Power of affecting or being affected by the Matter. But I confess that Answer is less fitly used when we have to do with those who deny the Creation of Matter, and much more when with those that deny there is a God.

## S E C T. XXXIII.

*An Answer to those that think there is nothing in the Universe but Matter or Body.*

Wherefore, whenas we have to do with such infense Adversaries, and so much estranged from all knowledge and acknowledgment of *Incorporeal Things*, verily we ought to behave ourselves very cautiously and circumspectly, and something more precisely to consider the Title of the Question, which is not, Whether we can accurately discern and declare the mode or way that a Spirit moves Matter, but whether its *Penetrability* is repugnant with this faculty of *moving Matter*. But now it is manifest, if a Spirit could be united and as it were cohere with the Matter, that it might easily move Matter; forasmuch as if there be at all any such thing as a Spirit, it is according to the common Opinion of all men to be acknowledged the true Principle and Fountain of all Life and Motion. Wherefore the hinge of the whole controversy turns upon this one pin, Whether it be repugnant that any *Spirit* should be *united* and as it were *cohere* with *Matter*, or by whatever firmness or fastening (whether permanent or momentaneous) be joynd therewith.


Now that it is not repugnant, I hope I shall clearly demonstrate from hence, that the *union* of *Spirit* with *Matter*, is as intelligible as the *union*

tion of one part of Matter with another. For that ought in reason to be held an Axiome firm and sure, That that is possible to be, in which there is found no greater (not to say less) difficulty of so being, than in that which we really find to be. But we see one part of Matter really and actually united with another, and that in some Bodies with a firmness almost invincible, as in some Stones and Metals, which are held to be the hardest of all Bodies. But we will for the more fully understanding the business, suppose a Body absolutely and perfectly hard, constituted of no particles, but the very *Physical Monads* themselves, and without all pores.

I ask therefore here, By what vertue, or by what manner of way do the parts of so perfect a *Solid* cohere? Undoubtedly they can alledge nothing here besides immediate *contact* and *rest*: For if they fly to any other affections which are allied to Life and Sense, they are more rightly and more easily understood to be in a *Spirit* than in *Matter*; and we will presently pronounce that a *Spirit* may adhere to Matter by the same vertues.

But that the parts of Matter cohere by bare though immediate contact, seems as difficult, if not more difficult, than that a *Spirit* penetrating *Matter* should cleave together into one with it: For the contact of the parts of Matter is every where only superficial, but one and the same *indiscernible Spirit* penetrates and possesses the whole Matter at once.

Nor need we fear at all, that it will not in-  
here because it can so easily slide in, and there-  
fore as it may seem, slide through, and pass away.



For in a Body perfectly solid, suppose A, in  
which we will conceive some particular Super-  
ficies, suppose E, A, C; this Superficies E, A, C,  
is assuredly so glib and smooth, that there can be  
nothing imagined more smooth and glib: Where-  
fore why does not the upper part of this solid  
Cube C, D, E, by any the slightest impulse slide  
upon the inferiour part of the Cube E, F, C, e-  
specially if the inferiour part E, F, C, be held  
fast, while the superior is impell'd or thrust for-  
ward? Surely this easiness of the sliding of Bo-  
dies perfectly smooth and glib, which touch im-  
mediately one another, their easiness, I say, of  
sliding one upon another, does seem at least as  
necessary to our *Imagination*, as the proclivity of  
the passing of a Spirit through the Bodies it pe-  
netrates. Wherefore if two parts of Matter,  
suppose E, D, C, and E, F, C, which our *Imagi-  
nation* doth most urgently suggest to us that they  
will

will always with the least impulse slide one upon another, do yet notwithstanding adhere to one another with a most firm and almost invincible union, why may not then a Spirit, which our *Imagination* suspects will so easily pass through any Body, be united to a Body with equal firmness? whenas this is not more difficult than the other, yea rather much more easie if one would consider the thing as it is, laying aside all prejudice. But now since the *Penetrability* of a Spirit is not repugnant with its union with *Matter*, it is manifest that its faculty of moving *Body* is at all repugnant with its *Penetrability*. Which is the thing that was to be demonstrated.

But it half repents me that I have with so great preparation and pomp attacked so small a difficulty, and have striven so long with meer Elusions and prestigious Juggles of the *Imagination*, (which casts such a Mist of fictitious Repugnancies on the true Idea of a Spirit) as with so many Phantomes and Spectres of an unquiet Night. But in the mean time I have made it abundantly manifest that there are no other Contradictions or Repugnancies in this our Notion of a Spirit, than what the minds of our Adversaries, polluted with the impure dregs of *Imagination*, and unable to abstract *Metaphysical Extension* from *Corporeal* affections, do foully and slovenly clart upon it, and that this Idea lookt upon in itself does clearly appear to be a Notion at least of a thing *Possible*; which is all that we drive at in this place.

## S E C T. XXXIV.

*How far the Notion of a Spirit here defended is countenanced and confirmed by the common suffrage of all Adversaries.*

**A**ND that it may appear more plausible, we will not omit in the last place to take notice, how far it is countenanced and confirmed by the common suffrage of our Adversaries: For the *Hobbiens*, and whatever other Philosophers else of the same stamp, do plainly assent to us in this, That whatsoever really is, is of necessity *extended*. But that they hence infer that there is nothing in Nature but what is *Corporeal*, that truly they do very unskilfully and inconsequently collect, they by some weakness or morbidness of mind tumbling into so foul an error. For it is impossible that the mind of man, unless it were laden and polluted with the dregs and dross of *Corporeal Imagination*, should suffer itself to sink into such a gross and dirty Opinion.

But that every thing that is, is *extended*, the *Nullibists* also themselves seem to me to be near the very point of acknowledging it for true and certain. For they do not dissemble it, but that if a *Spirit* be *somewhere*, it necessarily follows that it is also *extended*. And they moreover grant, that by its *Operation* it is present to or in the Matter, and that the *Essence* of a *Spirit* is not *separated* from its *Operations*.

But

But that a thing should *be*, and yet not be *any where* in the whole Universe, is so wild and mad a vote, and so absonous and abhorrent from all reason, that it cannot be said by any man in his wits, unless by way of sport or some slim jest, as I have intimated above; Whence their case is the more to be pitied, who captivated and blinded with admiration of the chief Author of so absurd an Opinion, do so solemnly and seriously embrace, and diligently endeavour to polish the same.

And lastly, as for the *Holenmerians*, those of them who are more cautious and considerate, do so explain their Opinion, that it scarce seems to differ an hairs breadth from ours. For though they affirm that the Soul is in every part, yet they say they understand it not of the *Quantity* or *Extension* of the Soul, whereby it occupies the whole Body, but of the *perfection* of its *Essence* and *Vertue*: Which however true it may be of the *Soul*, it is most undoubtedly true of the *Divine Numen*, whose Life and Essence is most perfect and most full every where, as being such as every where contains *infinite Goodness, Wisdom, and Power*.

Thus we see that this Idea or Notion of a Spirit which is here exhibited to the world, is not only possible in itself, but very *plausible* and *unexceptionable*, and such as all parties, if they be rightly understood, will be found whether they will or no to contribute to the discovery of the truth and solidity thereof. And therefore is such as will not unusefully nor unseasonably conclude  
this

this First Part of *Saducismus Triumphatus*, which treats of the Possibility of Apparitions and Witchcraft, but make the way more easie to the acknowledgment of the force of the Arguments of the Second Part, viz. The many Relations that are produced to prove the Actual Existence of Spirits and Apparitions.

---

A N