

www.e-rara.ch

**Animadversions of warre; or a militarie magazine of the truest rules, and
ablest instructions, for the managing of warre**

Ward, Robert

London, 1639

ETH-Bibliothek Zürich

Shelf Mark: Rar 1439

Persistent Link: <https://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-122>

Section II.

www.e-rara.ch

Die Plattform e-rara.ch macht die in Schweizer Bibliotheken vorhandenen Drucke online verfügbar. Das Spektrum reicht von Büchern über Karten bis zu illustrierten Materialien – von den Anfängen des Buchdrucks bis ins 20. Jahrhundert.

e-rara.ch provides online access to rare books available in Swiss libraries. The holdings extend from books and maps to illustrated material – from the beginnings of printing to the 20th century.

e-rara.ch met en ligne des reproductions numériques d'imprimés conservés dans les bibliothèques de Suisse. L'éventail va des livres aux documents iconographiques en passant par les cartes – des débuts de l'imprimerie jusqu'au 20e siècle.

e-rara.ch mette a disposizione in rete le edizioni antiche conservate nelle biblioteche svizzere. La collezione comprende libri, carte geografiche e materiale illustrato che risalgono agli inizi della tipografia fino ad arrivare al XX secolo.

Nutzungsbedingungen Dieses Digitalisat kann kostenfrei heruntergeladen werden. Die Lizenzierungsart und die Nutzungsbedingungen sind individuell zu jedem Dokument in den Titelinformationen angegeben. Für weitere Informationen siehe auch [Link]

Terms of Use This digital copy can be downloaded free of charge. The type of licensing and the terms of use are indicated in the title information for each document individually. For further information please refer to the terms of use on [Link]

Conditions d'utilisation Ce document numérique peut être téléchargé gratuitement. Son statut juridique et ses conditions d'utilisation sont précisés dans sa notice détaillée. Pour de plus amples informations, voir [Link]

Condizioni di utilizzo Questo documento può essere scaricato gratuitamente. Il tipo di licenza e le condizioni di utilizzo sono indicate nella notizia bibliografica del singolo documento. Per ulteriori informazioni vedi anche [Link]



HOW TO PROVIDE IN PEACE FOR WARRE.

SECT. II.

CHAP. VI.

It is good in time of Peace, to provide for Warre.

*Non minus in secundis
adversa, quam in ad-
versis secunda cogitan-
da sunt. Just. l. 31.*

*Cane ne Clipeum post
vulnera sumas,*



*Pacem sub Clipeo para-
re. Salust.*

*Inopinata magis pre-
miunt male. Seneca.*

That will goe to Sea, must before-hand provide him-
selfe of Bisket; and that Kingdome that cannot avoyd
Warre, must before hand be provided of meanes to with-
stand it: for nothing can be more unseasonable, than to
be about provision, at such time as we should be in acti-
on. A wise State (like *Haniball*) will in prosperitie
provide for adversitie, as well as in adversitie, hope for
prosperitie; if they doe otherwise, peradventure they
may have their heads broken, before they betake them-
selves to their bucklers: As may appeare, by the ex-
ample of *Katherine* Queene of Navarre, and *John* of Albert her Husband; whose
want of timely preparatio, gave occasion to *Ferdinand* the Catholike King, not only to
invade their Kingdome, but also after invasion, easily to subdue it. Had this Queene
and her husband, beene in time provided, *Ferdinand* would eyther have desisted from
enterprising any thing against them, or else he would have capitulated with them
concerning a peace, in which they might have had the better condicions, being pro-
vided for warre: for the best treating for peace, is with the sword in hand. Or if he
would have beene so hardy, as to have given them battell, they being provided, sure
might have expected farre better successe than they found: but they were found un-
furnished, and that was the losse of their Kingdome. And the same, may be the losse
of any other. For how hard and difficult will it be, for any Nation, to resist an Ene-
mie invading, if they prevent not his arrivall by their provisions. People are discour-
aged, by the suddainnesse of danger, and rather studie how by flight to shift for their
particular safetie, than by making head, to preserve their Countrie from the
Enemie.

But, if any be so vertuously minded as to make resistance, how difficult will it be
for them to draw together, in such a Kingdome as ours, where we have no fortified
Townes, to hold the enemy play? The enemy shall no sooner heare of any assem-
bly, but presently he will be upon them with his horse, to sever them before they
can be able to make head against him: unlesse they will flye to the utmost limits of
the

the Kingdome, there to make up an Army in haste; suffering in the meane time, the Enemie to enrich himselfe with the spoyle of the Country; and when such an Armie is composed, what good can be expected from it, seeing it must needs consist of raw, and untrained people, hastily gathered together, and altogether unskilfull in the use of Armes? When *Caesar* came against *Pompey* the Great into Italy, *Pompey* and the Senate, being unable to make resistance for want of timely provision; they were glad to forsake, not onely the other parts of Italy, but Rome it selfe, and flye into Greece, before they could draw any competent numbers together, to give the Enemie Battell. Let *Pompeys* carelesnesse be condemned, and let wise Estates imitate *Augustus Caesar*; who at the first bruite of *Antonies* stirring, provided himselfe, and crossed over from Brundium, to give Warre the meeting; thinking it more safe so to doe, than to receive it within the limits and borders of his owne Italy: By these precedent relations, I hope any man may see; That it is good in time of Peace, to provide for Warre.

*Ad primam novorum
motinam jamam. Ca-
sar a Brundisio trajece-
rat ut venienti Bello
occurreret. Flor. l. 4. c. 11*

CHAP. VII.

Of the Things necessarily to be provided; And first of Victuals.



He things especially to be provided; are *Victuals, Weapons, Money, Ships, and Men*: all of them needfull for the maintenance of Warre, and such as if they be not provided in time of Peace, can hardly be procured, the warre being begun. And first for *Victuals*; so needfull they are, as that without them no Army can be maintained, neither by Sea nor Land, nor any Towne (how strong soever) without them can be defended. This want of victuals was the losse of Jerusalem, of Santerra, of Paris, and lately Rochel, to the French King. The like want of victuals and other necessities, hindered our Navie in 88. so that it could follow the Spaniards no further; whereby we lost a faire advantage that God had given us, of destroying that whole Fleet. If in the Field an Armie be pinched with want, it must starve or fight, bee the disadvantage never so great; whereas that Army that is well provided, can fight when it sees advantage, and can forbear till it have got it. And by this meanes alone, would *Pompey* have beaten *Caesar* out of Greece in despite of him, had not the Senate (in a manner against his will) forced him to fight in the field of Philippi. It is requisite therefore for a Prince when he is to use his forces eyther by Sea or Land, to appoint, not onely experienced, but also faithfull mento be his Stewards, to make his provisions for his Armies; such as will faithfully lay out his Treasure, according as the affaires in hand require, and not imbeazzell them in riotous courses, nor hoord them up for their owne private gaine.

*1 Macch. 8. 26.
Ne cui Romanae ditio-
nis cum Judaeis bellum
gerere liceat, neque pra-
bere hostibus eorum, tri-
ticum aut nares, aut
pecuniam. Joseph. An-
tiq. l. 12. c. 18.*

*Stowes Annals in vi-
ta Elizabeth.*

Lucius Florus l. 4. c. 2.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the preparation of Armour and Weapons.



ooke how necessarie *Victuals* be for the maintenance of a Souldiers life; so needfull is *Armour* for the defence of it: Nature hath furnished us but with a thin and weake defence, against eyther shot of *Musket*, or push of *Pike*. Herein must be a supply of Natures defect; good *Armour* and *Weapons* must be provided, else we can neither defend our selves, nor offend our foes; as may appeare by the ancient Brittaines, whose naked valour (though as great as might be) could not gainestand, much lesse offend, the Roman Armes. Wherefore; it were to bee wished that all men, especially those who have the name of Souldiers, would transferre the care of apparell, which so much troubles this age of ours, unto the studie of *Armes*, and provision of *Armour*; and that their former negligence of *Armour*, might be transferred to apparell; for so should they both provide for their owne particular safetie,

*Plurimum ad terrem ho-
stium splendor confert,
ac competens armorum
apparatus plurimum fa-
cit ad necessitatem. Po-
lybius hist. l. 11.*

*Armanon supellestitem
decorari esse. Salust. bello
Jugurth.*

*Studium illud vestimen-
tis sese ornandi mulie-
ris esse, idq. non admo-
dum pudice, armorum
vero sumptum & ser-
vum studium bonorum
virorum qui se &
patrem servare cupiant;
Polyb. l. 11.*

and for the generall safety of the Kingdome. But because some private men will be negligent this way, whatsoever be sayd to the contrary; it were requisite therefore, that those that have the over-sight of the Musters, should be carefull to see all Companies full; and be more diligent, to certifie the defects in *Armes*, to them that have power to punish; and that they would have regard, that all *Muskets* be of one bore, and not of severall, as now they are; from whence a great confusion would arise in time of need, if it be not amended: (which must bee by some strict order taken with the Gun-makers, that the Kingdome be not so abused.) Also they must have regard that when a Trayning is done in one place, Armour be not borrowed to shew in another; for such errors as these, may be very prejudiciall to a Kingdome in time of danger: There must be care had also that the enemy have no oddes or advantage of us in weapons, whether *Musket* or *Pike*, if we looke for good successe in the Warre; for oddes in this kinde, will carry a victory both against valour and number; as appeared in the Warres betweene Pope *Alexander* the sixt, and the *Orsini*, where *Vstellozzo* having provided his souldiers of *Pikes* two foot longer than ordinary, carried away the victory from the Ecclesiasticke souldiers, who had the oddes of him, both in courage and number.

Guiccardine.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Provision of Money.

Quemadmodum homines sine nervis ambulare nequeunt, ita nec bellum usquam progredi sine pecunia. Lips. pol. l. 5.



It sufficeth not to the strength of the Armes, to have flesh, bloud, and bones, unlesse they have also sinewes, to stretch out and pull in, for defence of the body; so it sufficeth not in an Army to have *Victuals*, for the maintenance of it; *Armour* and *Weapons* for the defence of it; unlesse it have *Money* also, the sinewes of Warre; which above all things beareth sway with the common souldier, and causeth him to venture upon any danger, which oftentimes for

Viget. l. 3.

want of pay he will refuse. Wherefore *Vegetius* gives this advice; *Antequam inchoetur bellum, de copiis expensisq; sollicitus debet esse tractatus*: I doe marvell not that she is called *Regina pecunia*; seeing that all men yeeld obeyfance to her, she it is that traineth the souldiers to the Warres, who otherwise would sleepe quietly at home. The Bayliffe of *Diion* sent by the French King into *Swisserland* to hire souldiers, could traine none along with him, because his Masters coffers were known to be empty: but so soone as the Kings Exchequer was well filled with the mony which he had of the *Florentines*, for the restitution of *Pisa* and other cautionary Townes, the *Swissers* came downe to his ayde, in greater numbers than he required. So when *Rezin* and *Pekah* Kings of *Syria* and *Israel*, made warre upon *Abaz* King of *Judah*; he with a present of Silver and Gold, easily drew *Tiglath-Pileser* King of *Assyria*, to his ayde and succour.

Guiccardine.

In pratio prætium nunc est, dat census honores, census amicitias. Ovid.

2 King. 16. 8.

Imperat aut servit col-
lecta pecunia cuiq; Ho-
rat. Serm.
Disciplinam non potest
servare se juxta exerci-
tus. Cassiodor.

It is likewise *Money* and pay, that keepes the Army in good order, and makes it strictly to observe discipline, the preserver of all; Pay is the poore souldiers *Aqua vite*, which makes him comfortably undergoe the hardest command; but want of it is such an *Aqua fortis*, as eates through the iron doores of Discipline, and causeth whole Armies to rush into disorders: and ever when they are commanded upon any Service, their usuall fashion, is to demand their Pay, and refuse the employment.

Salustius in bello Ju-
gurthino.

Hæc fuit de nobis ejus
prima victoria Florus.

Furthermore, *Money* is of such force, as that it will not onely prevent an Enemies invasion, but also beat him backe, and cause him speedily to retyre; when as *Armes* are no way able to doe it: As may appeare by the example of *Jugurth*; who having sorely incensed the Romans by the slaughter of *Hiempsall*, yet nevertheless prevailed so farre upon them with his money, as that he drew, even the Senate, to take his part against *Adherball* his accuser. Afterwards, this same *Jugurth* was so hardy, as to cashiere *Adherball* out of that part of *Numidia*, which the Romans had

had estated him in; then was Warre decreed in the Senate, and *Calpurnius Bestia* the Consull, sent into Numidia against him; but the craftie King, knowing that Gold could doe more against the Romans than Steele, bought his peace. Now being assured, that all things for money, were to be bought and sold at Rome; hee slew even within the walles of the Citie, *Massina* grandchild to *Massinissa* his Competitor in the Kingdomé. Now had the Romans a third cause of warre against him, which was likewise decreed; and the managing of it was committed to *Albinus*: but (oh the shame) *Jugurth* so bribed this Armie also, that it voluntarily gave away, and suffered him to take from them, both the Victory and their Campe withall. Neyther could the Romans ever have any hope to withstand the force of *Jugurths* money, untill *Motellus* came to deale with him, of whom they expected very much; especially, *Quod adversus divitias invictum animum gerebat.*

Rex peritus fortius adversus Romanos aurum esse, quam ferrum pacem emat. Florus.

Salust in bello Jugurth.

Phil. de Com. l. 4.

The like example, *Philip de Comines* reporteth of our *Edward* the fourth; who by the solicitation of the Duke of Burgundy, passed into France, with greater forces than any of his Predecessors had ever done; and yet this valourous Prince, who had beene Conquerour in nine severall Battels before, suffered the victory at this time to be taken from him, with the payment of 72000. Crownes: as *Lewis* of Brettailles, one of King *Edwards* servants, affirmed to *Philip Commines*; for which wee were derided by the French, as we well deserved. To conclude, money is of such matchlesse force, as nothing almost but a free and liberall minde (which few men have) can withstand it; there is no baite to the golden hooke, nor weapon to the silver speare, nor Fort, be it never so strong, that can hold out against the Mulet charged with Treasure; It was the opinion of *Jugurth* (as *Salust* reporteth) that Rome it selfe, even then when she was at her highest pitch, was vendible; and would quickly come to ruine, had she but had a Chapman, that would bid faire for her: Wherefore seeing that money is such a reall advantage in the Warres, we may conclude; that whosoever preparoth for Warre, must first be provided of Money, the Sinewes thereof.

Urbem venalem et mature perituram, si emptorem manerit. Salust. Bell. Jugurth.

CHAP. X.

Of the provision of Shipping.

Shipping is so necessarie in *Maritime* Countries, especially in Islands, (as this Kingdome is) who on all sides, coast it upon the Sea; as that no Warre, neyther offensive nor defensive, can be well managed without it. If we be on the offensive part, our forces cannot be transported without *Shipping*; and if we bee on the defensive part, we cannot well keepe out an enemy without the same. For though the Enemy may make his approaches in one place; and endeavour to land there, yet then will the strength of the Island be drawne thither to impeach his landing; which the Enemy perceiving, can easily put out to Sea againe, and by next day be in another part of the Country, where he may gaine landing peradventure, with lesse hazard: But suppose resistance be made there also, yet can hee by putting to Sea againe, finde out a third, fourth, or fifth place, as convenient for his landing as eyther of the former; and I am sure we cannot have an Armie in every Harbour to impeach him, much lesse can wee with one Armie so speedily follow him, as to prevent his gaining the shore; because he can sayle farther in one night, than we can march in divers dayes, and if he hath gained our shore, hee can eyther sufficiently intrench himselfe, before we can possible come to impeach him; or hee can pillage and waste the Country, and be gone againe to another part of the Island, when he perceives the approach of our Land forces; and there also doe according to his owne discretion.

An example hereof we have in our owne Chronicles; *Canutus* the Dane, entering the *Thames* with a mighty Navie, besieged the Citie of London; but being unable to prevaile there, he re-imbarkes his men, and sailes into the West of England; where at his pleasure, he landed them againe in *Dorsetshire*; there *Edmond*, surnamed

Stowes Annals in Edward.

Iron-side, after a long and tedious march met with him; which *Canutus* perceiving, shippes his men againe, and enters the *Severne*; causing *Edmund* to beate upon the hoofe, to relieve *Worcestershire*; which the Dane had much pillaged. No sooner was *Edmund* arrived there, but *Canutus* re-imbarked againe, and came for *London*; after him speeds *Edmund*: and then the Danes repaire to their shippes, and so returned for the *Westerne* parts. Thus they tyred *Edmund* and his whole Armie, with continuall marches; ever wasting the Country, before resistance could be made.

The like example, we have in *Maurice* Earle of *Nassaw*, who in the yeare 1590. shipped his forces, with forty Canons, pretending for *Gertrudenberg*; and to make the Enemy beleve so, he sailed up the River so farre as *Breda*; the Enemy presently thrust into *Gertrudenberg*, such men and provision as was fit for resistance; which the Grave understanding, changed his course and sayled up the *Rhine*, and thence into the River *Ysell*; and so fell downe the streame before *Zutphen*, which he surprized, before the Arch-duke (who was 80. miles from thence) could come with his succours; when the Arch-duke approached, the Count retyres to his ships; and changing his course, arrives before *Hulst* in *Brabant*, which he surprized; ere the Spaniards well understood where he was; when the Arch-duke approached neare *Hulst*, Prince *Maurice* returns to his Navie, and presents it before *Nimnegem*, in the Confines of *Guilders*, which he also surprized before the tired Spaniard could come with his forces.

*Atheniensibus Delphos
Oraculorum consulenti-
bus, responsum fuerat,
salutem Muris lignis
tuerentur, id est, Na-
vibus. Justin. l. 2.*

By this I hope, you may see; how difficult it is for *Islanders*, and *Maritime* Countries, without *Shipping*, to make resistance against an invading Enemy; wherefore *Marriners* and *Shipping*, must be maintained by us that are *Islanders*; else can we not long abide in safetie; and so I will conclude with *Saint Pauls* speech, *Acts* 27. 31. *Unlesse the Marriners abide in the Ship, ye cannot be safe.*

CHAP. XI.

Of the provision of Souldiers, and Land-forces.



It is needfull for *Islanders* and *Maritime* Countries, to maintaine *Shipping* and *Marriners*; So is it as needfull for them to maintaine *Souldiers* and *Land-forces*; which though they bee the last refuge, yet are they the safest and strongest defence, and must wholly be relyed on: For it is possible that the enemy may overpower us at Sea, or he may by helpe of Windes and Mistes, or other advantages that may bee gotten, gaine footing on our shore, though we have a more potent Navie than he on the Seas; and how shall we deale with them on land. if we maintaine not our *Land-forces* and Martiall discipline? for which this Island hath bene very famous in times past; Should wee suffer our souldiery and the Art of Warre to decay amongst us, ten thousand of the Enemies well trained, would foile forty thousand of ours, that are not flesht, nor know the use of their armes, were they never so valiant; For *Valour in the warres without skill, availeth but little*: As may appeare by the example of *Alexander the Great*; who with no more than 40. thousand well-trained souldiers (*Macedonians*) in the fields of *Adraftia*, overthrew fixe hundred thousand *Persians*, that were unskilfull in the use of their Armes.

I would to God that notice might be taken hereof, and that greater care might be had of our Trainings than is; that they might no longer be used as matters of disport, and things of no moment; but as needfull for the training up of souldiers, and enabling of men for the Warres, against times of danger and hostilitie; so should our Prince and his Kingdomes, receive both honour and securitie: But as Trainings are now used, we shall I am sure, never be able to make one good souldier; for our custome and use is now adayes, to cause our Companies to meet on a certaine day, and by that time the Armes be all viewed, the Muster-master hath had his pay (which is the chiefest thing many times he looks after) it drawes towards dinner time; and indeed

Officers

Officers love their bellies so well, as that they are loath to take too much paines about disciplining of their souldiers. Wherefore, after a little carelesse hurrying over of the Postures, with which the Companies are nothing bettered, they make them charge their Muskets, and so prepare to give the Captaine a brave volley of shot at his entrance into his Inne; where having solaced themselves a while after this brave service, every man repaires home; and that which is not well taught them (oh the shame) is easily forgotten before the next Training. Whereas, if we trained but twice in the yeare, and at each tittle kept the Companies together, but three or foure dayes at the most; they would be better acquainted with their Armes and the use of them: so often practising of them at one time, would make them remember what is shewed, better than seven yeeres practice as now we goe to worke.

But, peradventure some will thinke, that to keepe souldiers so long together at once, would damnifie the Country, by reason of neglect of husbandry: But as farre as I conceive, it would rather be beneficiall to the Country; for now every Moneth in the Summer, they lose a day by reason of the Training; and the greater part of the Souldiers use to fall a drinking after the Training; and happily lose the next day also; and so in the Moneths of June, Iuly, and August, which are busie times for Hay, and Harveft, they lose three dayes or more; which is more damage to them, than eight dayes in May and September, for these are the two times in the yeare, wherein husbandmen have more leisure, than in any other of the Summer-Moneths; in May, because all their seed is then in the ground, and no Hay nor Corne ready; in the latter end of September, because Harveft and Hop-time, for the most part is over, and wheat-seed not fully come; wherefore I thinke, with lesse damage, they might spare foure dayes together in May, and so many also in September, than to spare in every of the Summer moneths but one.

We have other inconveniences also which attend our Trainings, and hindreth our breeding of Souldiers; for we appoint our meetings, commonly neare some great Towne, as indeed it is meet for the reliefe of the Companies, but this inconvenience followeth thereon: when we are in the Field, many of our souldiers (so regardlesse are they of the Service) slip away, and are in the Innes and Tavernes tipling, when they should be exercising in the field. And this is another cause, why divers of them are so ignorant in the use of their Armes; hereby also they get an ill habit of drinking, which is the disgrace of our Nation and the losse of many of our souldiers, at such times as they are imployed in forraigne service: As appeared in the taking of the Groyn, where by immoderate drinking, many of the soldiers became senselesse and un-

Stowes Annals in vii
ta Elizabeth.

Priusquam Seythe e-
brietate, quam Bello
Ancuntur: Just. lib. 1.

serviceable, being altogether carelesse both of their proper healthes, present danger, and imployment. By this inordinate drinking, the Plague was bred among them; and (which is worse) the sword of the Enemie might have cut them off; had not the Generall, for redresse hereof, caused the head of all Wine-vessels, to be stricken out: according to a former president (upon the like occasion) in the conquest of *S. Dominico fago. &c.* For prevention of which abuse, the Captaines must either have more power to punish, or if they have power enough already, they must better put it in practice upon such malefactors, or we shall never be able to make them Souldiers.

Secondly, we admit into our trained Bands, without judgement or discretion, any that are offered, how unlikely, or uncapable soever they be of the *Art militarie*; yea, which is worse, we suffer them almost every Training to alter their men, and put in new ones, and how is it possible, with our best skill and paines, to make such men souldiers? *Mercuries* Image is not to be made of every wood, nor every dull heavie fellow, to be made a *Mars* or man of Warre; care must be had to correct this abuse also, if we will have able souldiers to oppose against an enemie. We must therefore herein imitate the worthy Citizens of London, who in the Reigne of

Stowes Annals in vii
ta Elizabeth.

Queene *Elizabeth*, chose out of their severall Companies, three thousand of the most

likely and active persons, whom they appointed to be Pikemen and shot: These that

we admit into our trained Bands, must be likely and active; for every one that will

be a souldier, must have these two qualities in him; *Likelineesse*, and *Ingennitie* to

conceive the use of his Armes, and then *Activitie* and *Abilitie* of body, to put it

in practice.

Matth. 15. 14.

Thirdly, some be admitted for their wealthes sake, into Captainships, which neither have courage, skill, nor delight in Armes themselves, nor discretion to command others; but I hope of these not many, yet if any, it is too many; for how can we hope to make our people souldiers, when they bee under blinde and ignorant guides; *If the Blinde leade the Blinde*, the issue (as our Saviour saith) will be; *Amba in foveam cadunt*: We will not commit the teaching of our children to a Dunse, and what reason is there we should commit the leading of our souldiers to such a one? wherefore this must be remedied also, and I suppose it may easily be done by the honourable care of the Lord Lieutenant in every County: Had wee but all these abuses well corrected, me thinkes we might make our English trained Bands, parallell the best souldiers in Europe.

Stow in regno Haroldi.

Now because in times of danger, it is requisite that the trained souldiers should be drawne to the Coasts to resist the Enemies landing; it were fit that men should provide themselves of double Armour, that we might also have an Army of the best men of the Kingdome, to guard the heart of the Land; and to keepe under disaffected persons, if any such be; which Army as occasion served, might give succour to the Trained Souldiers, in case they should be in any danger; for it is not safe to hazard all upon the fortune and successe of one Battell; as King *Harold* did (contrary to the advice of his brother *Girthe*) by meanes of which he was defeated, his people disheartened, his Enemy Duke *William* animated; and finally, thereupon followed his owne and all his subjects confusion: For upon his enemies marching forward after the Battell, every man for his owne particular safetie, reconciled himselfe to the Conquerour; whereas, if there had beene an Army in the heart of the Land, to have seconded the other, it would both have bridled the Enemy, succoured the distressed Army, and have kept the Natives from revolting.

For the better composing of such an Army, in the heart of the Land; it were well also if all our great Cities and Townes, would imitate the famous Cities of London, and Westminster: which have instituted the two *Artillery yards*, for the training up of their ablest Citizens, in the use of their Armes; from whence not onely good souldiers, but also many good Leaders and Officers might be drawne, for the conduction of our forces in the heart of the Kingdome.

Furthermore, whereas divers Noblemen and Gentlemen keepe proper men to attend them; if they would but take care to have such Servants well instructed in the use of their Armes, both on Horse-backe and Foot, what exceeding profit and honour might redound to his Majesty, and his Kingdomes, if he should have any suddaine employments? And those Servants thus souldier-like qualified, were as easily maintained and kept, and as fit for any other service, as those brave swaggering fellows; who had rather be like *Sardanapalus* among light women, than among Troopes of armed souldiers: And truly such Noblemen and Gentlemen their bee in divers places, who to doe their Prince Service, are at great charges to keepe divers good and well ridden Horses, and divers Gentlemen with good furniture, to serve both on Foot and Horse-back.

Besides if every private man, whether in the City or in the Country, which keepe Coaches for their owne ease and reputation, would but have furniture for the riding and managing of such Horses, what an increase of strength would this bee in suddaine danger?

Lastly, whereas divers Gentlemen of the lower ranke, and rich Yeomen, keepe very good Teames of Horses for their private use; if such would but have furniture for one of their principle Horses, which when they had leisure, they might ride and manage for their recreation; this would make his Majesty, if occasion served, equall if not superiour in Horse, to any Prince in Europe; neither would it bee any great charge to any man, onely the purchase of the furniture, and armes, which once gotten, would last to Generations.

Publica privata: ante ferenda bonis.

We would easily be perswaded to these things, had we but as great a care for the generall safety of the Kingdome, as we have for our owne particular security: which of us is there, that is not at great cost and charges, for provision of strong Gates, doores, and lockes, without; and of strong Closets and Chests within, for the preservation of our owne private wealth and substance; but what will this private

care

care avails us, if we be negligent of the generall safety of the Kingdome? Should we by our senselesse security suffer an Enemy to pick the lockes that are to keepe him out of the Realme; What good would all our private Gates, Doores, Lockes, Closets, and Chests doe us, for the preservation either of our Estates or Lives? Wherefore, let us be perswaded rather to respect the common good in keeping out an Enemy, by provision of Armes, and able souldiers, than in looking to our owne private honour and security, by building our houses strong and stately.

But some peradventure will thinke, this provision of land-forces, is altogether needlesse; because no Enemy can make warre upon us, we living in an Island; but upon very difficult termes: First, in regard of our dangerous Seas and Harbours. Secondly, in regard of our Navie and shipping; which upon intelligence, will bee fitted to entertaine them. Thirdly, in regard of our strong Castles, and Blockhouses; which will be able to impeach their landing. As for our Seas and Harbours, true it is they are dangerous, in regard of their high Tides; which flow (as *Plinie* sayth) 80. Cubits in height: yet for all this, our owne, and Neighbours shipping, (having good Pilots) dayly frequent them without damage or danger: and doubtlesse, what Enemy soever assaulteth us, will store himselfe with Pilots, which knowes our Seas and Harbours as well as our selves; as may appeare by the practice of the King of Spaine, in the year 1588. Wherefore, we may not be too secure, upon conceit of our dangerous Seas and Harbours.

Secondly, for our shipping; true it is, if we have sure intelligence, we should bee provided: and doubtlesse, would quell an enemy that should dare to approach them: But the Enemy to blinde our intelligence, may carry his designs in the Clouds, by making his preparation in divers parts and Ports of his Kingdome; as if they were to be sent to sundry places, and about sundry imployments; and yet all these severall Fleets, after some time beating on the Seas, may meet and joine; cutting a speedie passage through the waters to accomplish their designs. By such courses as these, our intelligence may be deceived, and so our Ships unfurnished. Yet suppose wee have sure knowledge of the enemies purpose, and have our Navie in readinesse, yet are there 32. points in the Compasse to sayle by, and our Island the Center; in one of these 32. points, must our Navie await the approaches of the Enemy; and he to eschew their opposition, and gaine our shore, may sayle by 20. other. Yea, though he sayle upon the same point whereon our Ships doe lye, yet may he without discovery escape them, by the helpe of a Mist or night. Or suppose our shippes discover and fight with them, yet we know victory in every fight is doubtfull; because no understanding Enemy will put out to Sea, but with such a Fleet, as he thinkes is proportionable to his adversaries, whom he assaileth. Therefore, you see we must not relye upon our shipping.

Neyther may we relye too much upon our Block-houses and Forts, for the sure keeping out of an Enemy; for they are not very many: I am sure we have them not upon every Harbour where the Enemy may land; and those we have, are not very strong, not answerable to those Forts beyond the Seas. But though they were, yet experience teacheth us that upon swift currents they are of little use; for in such streames, if a Navie have but a merry Winde and Tide, a hundred sayle may passe by one of them, without having much damage; as was seene in the three yeares siege of Ostend, where the Arch-duke had planted two Batteries, one on the West, and the other on the East side of the Haven: yet the shippes every day passed too and fro from the Towne, and scarce one vessell touched, when 70. shot had beene made at a Fleet; and in the whole three yeares siege, scant 50. Vessels were sunke, when thousands passed too and againe, every yeare.

Likewise, in *Queene Elizabeths* time, the King of Denmarke threatned to stop our Eastland Fleet at the *Sound*; yet they passed by his Castles, having one of the *Queenes* ships called the *Minion*, to lead them, and received no hurt; this so provoked the King, that he made the best provision he possible could, to sinke them at their returne; but the *Queenes* ship led the way backe againe, and did not onely passe in safety, but beate downe part of the Fort of *Ellenore*.

So in the siege of Antwerp the Duke of Alva so planted his Ordnance, that it was thought to be impossible for a Boate to passe them; yet the Zealanders having

faire

Historia Natural. l. 2. c. 7.

Grimston.

Sir Walter Raleigh.

faire Winde and Tide, passed by daily without damage. Wherefore, you see notwithstanding all these colourable objections, *Land-forces* must be provided, if we will be in safety.

Now *Land-forces* being (as is afore-layd) provided: Mr. *Edmunds* in his observations upon *Cæsars* Commentaries, would have them thus ordered; Those that are appointed for the guard of the Coasts, he would have divided into three divisions; viz, a Body, and two Wings; the Body to double the strength of the Wings, and to be quartered in this manner: the Body to attend the principle place supposed for the Enemies landing, the two Wings to lye upon some other Haven, where also is danger of landing, being about ten miles distant on either hand of the Body. If the Enemy shall assaile eyther of the Wings, the Body being quartered betweene them both, easily moves to eyther of their aydes. Or if he assault the Body, they from eyther side being alike distant; as easily moves to its succour; and so doing, they may hold an Enemy play, till the forces of the Country comes downe. But in regard the Land is spacious and wide, it were well that souldiers should learne to ride on Horse-backe with their compleat Armes, for so might they move further (if a suddaine Alarum should be given) in one day, than on foot they can march in two. These are of great use in Germany, where they want Vessels for the speedy conveying of their men, which they call Dragons, which both on horse-backe and on foot do very good service; and here might they be brought in use as well as there, wee being as well furnished with swift high-way Nagges, as any Nation in Europe.

And for further indangering of an Enemy, if there were good notice taken throughout all the Coasts of the Land, of those Markes which serves for the direction of Shippes to recover their wished Harbour; these in time of danger being removed (unknowne to the Enemy) might bring him in very great hazard of our dangerous Rockes and Sands; and in regard our Sea-coasts are so large, and our Harbours so many, as that in every one of them we cannot have an Army to defend it, it were well that in places of advantage (such as winding waters be, which are commonly slow, and where at every turne they cannot have the helpe of the Winde) some more Forts were built; in such places they would indanger an Enemy, if he should dare to approach them; how ever they would secure the Coasts from rising and robbing by Pyrates, as often they be in times of Hostility.



THE