Chap. IV. Of Carthage.

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OF all the free ſtates whoſe memory is preſerved to us in hiſtory, Carthage bears the neareſt reſemblance to Britain, both in her commerce, opulence, ſovereignty of the ſea, and her method of carrying on her land-wars by foreign mercenaries. If to theſe we add the vicinity of the Carthaginians to the Romans, the moſt formidable and moſt rapacious people at that time in Europe, and the ſpecific difference, as I may term it, of the reſpective military force of each nation, the ſituation of Carthage with reſpect to Rome, ſeems greatly analogous to that of Britain with reſpect to France, at leaſt for this laſt century. Conſequently, the dreadful fate of that Republic, once the moſt flouriſhing ſtate in the univerſe, and the moſt formidable rival Rome ever had to cope with, muſt merit our higheſt attention at this juncture: both as the greatneſs of her power aroſe from, and was ſupported by commerce, and as ſhe owed her ruin more to her own inteſtine diviſions, than to the arms of the Romans.

We know very little of this opulent and powerful people till the time of the firſt Punic war. For as not one of their own hiſtorians has reached our times, we have no accounts of them but what are tranſmitted to us by their

enemies. Such writers conſequently deſerve little credit, as well from their ignorance of the Carthaginian conſtitution, as their inveterate prejudice againſt that great people. Hence it is that we know ſo little of their laws, and have but an imperfect idea of their conſtitutional form of government.

The government of Carthage, if we may credit the judicious Ariſtotle, ſeems to have been founded on the wiſeſt maxims of policy. For he affirms, [1] the different branches of their legiſlature were ſo exactly balanced, that for the ſpace of five hundred years, from the commencement of the Republic down to his time, the repoſe of Carthage had never been diſturbed by any conſiderable ſedition, or her liberty invaded by any ſingle Tyrant: the two fatal evils to which every Republican government is daily liable, from the very nature of their conſtitution. An additional proof too may be drawn from this conſideration, that Carthage was able to ſupport herſelf upwards of ſeven hundred years in opulence and ſplendor in the midſt of ſo many powerful enemies, and during the greater part of that time, was the centre of commerce of the known world, and enjoyed the uninterrupted ſovereignty of the ſea without a rival.

The genius of the Carthaginians was warlike as well as commercial, and affords undeniable

[1] Ariſt. de Republ. lib. 2. cap. 9. lit. 4.

proof, that thoſe qualities are by no means incompatible to the ſame people. It is almoſt impoſſible indeed to diſcover the real character of this great people. The Roman hiſtorians, their implacable enemies, conſtantly paint them in the blackeſt colors, to palliate the perfidious and mercileſs behaviour of their own countrymen towards that unfortunate Republic. A fact ſo notorious, that neither Livy nor any other of their writers, with all their art, were able to conceal it. The Greek hiſtorians, whoſe countrymen had ſuffered ſo greatly by the Carthaginian arms in Sicily and all the other iſlands in the Mediterranean, betray as ſtrong a prejudice againſt them as the Roman. Even the reſpectable Polybius, the only author amongſt them who deſerves any degree of credit, is plainly partial, when he ſpeaks of the Carthaginian manners. The Romans continually charge them with the want of public faith, and have handed down the *Punica Fides* as a proverb. I ſhall take notice of this ſcandalous charge in another place, where I ſhall ſhow how much more juſtly it may be retorted upon the Romans.

As the deſire of gain is the chief ſpur to commerce, and as the greateſt men in Carthage never thought it beneath them to engage in that lucrative employment, all the hiſtorians have repreſented the whole body of the people as ſo inſatiably fond of amaſſing wealth, that they eſteemed even the loweſt and dirtieſt means

lawful, that tended to the acquiſition of their darling object. "[2] Amongſt the Carthaginians," ſays Polybius, when he compares the manners of that people with thoſe of the Romans, "nothing was infamous that was attended with gain.[3] Amongſt the Romans nothing ſo infamous as bribery, and to enrich themſelves by unwarrantable means."[4] He adds, in proof of his aſſertion, that, "at Carthage all the dignities and higheſt employments in the State were openly ſold. A practice, he affirms, which at Rome was a capital crime." Yet but a few pages before, where he inveighs bitterly againſt the ſordid love of money, and rapacious avarice of the Cretans, he remarks, that "they were the only people[5] in the world to whom no kind of gain appeared either infamous or unlawful." In[6] another place where he cenſures the Greeks for aſperſing Titus Flaminius the Roman General, as if he had not been proof againſt the gold of Macedon, he affirms, "that whilſt the Romans preſerved the virtuous manners of their fore-fathers, and had not yet carried their arms into foreign countries, not a ſingle man of them would have been guilty of a crime of that nature." But though he can boldly aſſert, as he ſays, "that

[2] Polyb. lib. 6. p. 692.

[3] Id. ibid. [4] Ibid.

[5] Polyb. lib. 6. p. 681.

[6] Excerpt. ex Polyb. de virtutibus & vitiis, p. 1426.

in his time many of the Romans, if taken man by man, were able to preſerve the truſt repoſed in them inviolable as to that point, yet he owns he durſt not venture to ſay the ſame of all." Though he ſpeaks as modeſtly as he can to avoid giving offence, yet this hint is ſufficient to convince us, that corruption was neither new nor uncommon at that time amongſt the Romans. But as I ſhall reſume this ſubject in a more proper place, I ſhall only obſerve from Polybius's own detail of the hiſtory of the Carthaginians, That, unleſs when the intrigues of faction prevailed, all their great poſts were generally filled by men of the moſt diſtinguiſhed merit.

The charge of cruelty is brought againſt them with a very ill grace by the Romans, who treated even Monarchs themſelves, if they were ſo unhappy as to become their priſoners of war, with the [7] utmoſt inhumanity, and threw them to periſh in dungeons, after they had expoſed them in triumph to the inſults of their own populace.

The ſtory, indeed, of Regulus has afforded a noble ſubject for Horace, which he has embelliſhed with ſome of the moſt beautiful ſtrokes of poetry; and that fine ode has propagated and confirmed the belief of it, more perhaps than the writings of all their hiſtorians. But as

[7] Perſeus, &c.

neither Polybius nor Diodorus Siculus make the leaſt mention of ſuch an event (though the Greeks bore an equal averſion to the Carthaginians), and as the Roman writers from whom we received it, differ greatly in their accounts of it, I cannot help joining in opinion with many learned men, that it was a Roman forgery.

The Greek writers accuſe them of barbariſm and a total ignorance of the Belles-Lettres, the ſtudy of which was the reigning taſte of Greece. Rollin contemptuouſly affirms, that their education in general amounted to no more than writing and the knowledge of merchants accounts; that a Carthaginian Philoſopher would have been a prodigy amongſt the learned; and then aſks, "What would they have thought of a Geome-"trician or Aſtronomer of that nation?" Rollin ſeems to have put this queſtion too haſtily, ſince it is unanimouſly confeſſed, that they were the beſt ſhip-builders, the ableſt navigators, and the moſt ſkilful mechanics at that time in the world: that they raiſed abundance of magnificent ſtructures, and very well underſtood the art of fortification; all which (eſpecially as the uſe of the compaſs was then unknown) muſt of neceſſity imply a more than common knowledge of Aſtronomy, Geometry, and every other branch of mathematics. Let [a] me add, too, that their knowledge in Agriculture was ſo eminent, that the works of Mago the Carthaginian upon that

[a] Varro.

ſubject were ordered to be tranſlated by a decree of the Senate, for the uſe of the Romans and their colonies.

That the education of their youth was not confined to the mercantile part only, muſt be evident from that number of great men, who make ſuch a figure in their hiſtory; particularly Hannibal, perhaps the greateſt Captain which any age has ever yet produced, and at the ſame time the moſt conſummate Stateſman, and diſintereſted Patriot. Painting, Sculpture, and Poetry, they ſeem to have left to their more idle and more luxurious neighbours the Greeks, and applied their wealth to the infinitely nobler uſes of ſupporting their marine, enlarging and protecting their commerce and colonies. What opinion even the wiſer part of the Romans had of theſe ſpecious arts, and how unworthy they judged them of the cloſe attention of a brave and free people, we may learn from the advice which [9] Virgil gives his countrymen by the mouth of his Hero's father Anchiſes. I have endeavoured here to clear the much injured character of this great people from the aſperſions and groſs miſrepreſentations of hiſtorians, by proofs drawn from the

[9] Excudent alii ſpirantia mollius æra:
Credo equidem, vivos ducent de marmore vultus.
Virg. Æneid. lib. 6.
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento;
(Hæ tibi erunt artes) paciſque imponere morem
Parcere ſubjectis, &c. Ibid.

conceſſions and ſelf-contradictions of the hiſtorians themſelves.

The State of Carthage bears ſo near a reſemblance to that of our nation, both in their conſtitution (as far as we are able to judge of it) maritime power, commerce, party-diviſions, and long as well as bloody wars which they carried on with the moſt powerful nation in the univerſe, that their hiſtory, I again repeat it, affords us in my judgment, more uſeful rules for our preſent conduct than that of any other ancient Republic. As we are engaged in a war (which was till very lately unſucceſsful) with an enemy, leſs powerful indeed, but equally rapacious as the Romans, and acting upon the ſame principles, we ought moſt carefully to beware of thoſe falſe ſteps both in war and policy, which brought on the ruin of the Carthaginians. For ſhould we be ſo unhappy as to be compelled to receive law from that haughty nation, we muſt expect to be reduced to the ſame wretched ſituation in which the Romans left Carthage at the concluſion of the ſecond Punic war. This iſland had been hitherto the inexpugnable barrier of the liberties of Europe, and is as much the object of the jealouſy and hatred of the French, as ever Carthage was of the Romans. As they are ſenſible that nothing but the deſtruction of this country can open them a way to their grand project of univerſal monarchy, we may be certain that *Delenda eſt Britannia* will be as much the popular maxim at Paris, as *Delenda eſt Carthago* was at Rome.——

But I ſhall wave theſe reflections at preſent, and point out the real cauſes of the total ruin of that powerful Republic.

Carthage took its riſe from a handful of diſtreſſed Tyrians who ſettled in that country, by permiſſion of the natives, like our colonies in America, and actually paid a kind of rent, under the name of tribute, for the very ground on which their city was founded. As they brought with them the commercial genius of their mother-country they ſoon arrived at ſuch a ſtate of opulence by their frugality and indefatigable induſtry, as occaſioned the envy of their poorer neighbours. Thus jealouſy on the one hand, and pride naturally ariſing from great wealth on the other, quickly involved them in a war. The natives juſtly feared the growing power of the Carthaginians, and the latter feeling their own ſtrength, wanted to throw off the yoke of tribute, which they looked upon as diſhonorable, and even galling to a free people. The conteſt was by no means equal. The neighbouring princes were poor, and divided by ſeparate intereſts; the Carthaginians were rich, and united in one common cauſe. Their commerce made them maſters of the ſea, and their wealth enabled them to bribe one part of their neighbours to fight againſt the other; and thus by playing one againſt the other alternately, they reduced all at laſt to be their tributaries, and extended their dominions near two thouſand miles upon that continent. It may be objected that the conduct

of the Carthaginians in this caſe was highly criminal. I grant it: but if we view all thoſe maſter-ſtrokes of policy, and all thoſe ſplendid conqueſts which ſhine ſo much in hiſtory, in their true colors, they will appear to be nothing more than fraud and robbery, gilded over with thoſe pompous appellations. Did not every nation that makes a figure in hiſtory riſe to Empire upon the ruin of their neighbours? Did not France acquire her preſent formidable power, and is ſhe not at this time endeavouring to worm us out of our American ſettlements by the very ſame means? But though the motives are not to be juſtified; yet the conduct of the Carthaginians upon theſe occaſions, will afford us ſome very uſeful and inſtructive leſſons in our preſent ſituation.

It is evident that the mighty power of theſe people was founded in and ſupported by commerce, and that they owed their vaſt acquiſitions, which extended down both ſides of the Mediterranean quite into the main ocean, to a right application of the public money, and a proper exertion of their naval force. Had they bounded their views to this ſingle point, viz. the ſupport of their commerce and colonies, they either would not have given ſuch terrible umbrage to the Romans, who, as Polybius obſerves, could brook no equal, or might ſafely have bid defiance to their utmoſt efforts. For the immenſe ſums which they ſquandered away

in ſubſidies to ſo many foreign Princes, and to ſupport ſuch numerous armies of foreign mercenaries, which they conſtantly kept in pay, to complete the reduction of Spain and Sicily, would have enabled them to cover their coaſts with ſuch a fleet as would have ſecured them from any apprehenſion of foreign invaſions. Beſides, the Roman genius was ſo little turned for maritime affairs, that at the time of their firſt breach with Carthage, they were not maſters of one ſingle ſhip of war, and were ſuch abſolute ſtrangers to the mechaniſm of a ſhip, that a Carthaginian galley driven by accident on their coaſts gave them the firſt notion of a model. But the ambition of Carthage grew as her wealth increaſed; and how difficult a taſk is it to ſet bounds to that reſtleſs paſſion! Thus by graſping at too much, ſhe loſt all. It is not probable therefore that the Romans would ever have attempted to diſturb any of the Carthaginian ſettlements, when the whole coaſt of Italy lay open to the inſults and depredations of ſo formidable a maritime power. The Romans felt this ſo ſenſibly in the beginning of the firſt Punic war, that they never reſted till they had acquired the ſuperiority at ſea. It is evident too, that the Romans always maintained that ſuperiority: For if Hannibal could poſſibly have paſſed by ſea into Italy, ſo able a general would never have haraſſed his troops by that long and ſeemingly impoſſible march over the Alps, which coſt him

above half his army; an expedition which has been, and ever will be the wonder of all ſucceeding ages. Nor could Scipio have landed without oppoſition ſo very near the city of Carthage itſelf, if the maritime force of that people had not been at the very loweſt ebb.

The Carthaginians were certainly greatly weakened by the long continuance of their firſt war with the Romans, and that ſavage and deſtructive war with their own mercenaries, which followed immediately after. They ought therefore in true policy, to have turned their whole attention, during the interval between the firſt and ſecond Punic wars, to the re-eſtabliſhment of their marine; but the conqueſt of Spain was their favorite object, and their finances were too much reduced to be ſufficient for both. Thus they expended that money in carrying on a continental war, which would have put their marine on ſo formidable a footing, as to have enabled them to regain once more the dominion of the ſea; and the fatal event of the ſecond Punic war convinced them of the falſe ſtep they had taken, when it was too late to retrieve it.

I have here pointed out one capital error of the Carthaginians as a maritime power, I mean their engaging in too frequent, and too extenſive wars on the continent of Europe, and their neglect of their marine. I ſhall now mention another, which more than once brought them to the very brink of deſtruction. This

was — their conſtantly employing ſuch a vaſt number of foreign mercenary troops, and not truſting the defence of their country, nay not even Carthage itſelf wholly, to their own native ſubjects.

The Carthaginians were ſo entirely devoted to commerce, that they ſeem to have looked upon every native employed in their armies as a member loſt to the community; and their wealth enabled them to buy whatever number of ſoldiers they pleaſed from their neighbouring States in Greece and Africa, who traded (as I may term it) in war as much as the Swiſs and Germans do now, and were equally ready to ſell the blood and lives of their ſubjects to the beſt bidder. From hence they drew ſuch inexhauſtible ſupplies of men, both to form and recruit their armies, whilſt their own natives were at leiſure to follow the more lucrative occupations of navigation, huſbandry, and mechanic trades. For the number of native Carthaginians, which we read of, in any of their armies, was ſo extremely ſmall, as to bear no proportion to that of their foreign mercenaries. This kind of policy, which prevails ſo generally in all mercantile States, does, I confeſs, at firſt ſight appear extremely plauſible. The Carthaginians, by this method, ſpared their own people, and purchaſed all their conqueſts by the venal blood of foreigners; and, in caſe of a defeat, they could with great eaſe and expedition recruit their broken armies with any number of good

troops, ready trained up to their hands in military diſcipline. But, alas! theſe advantages were greatly over-balanced by very fatal inconveniences. The foreign troops were attached to the Carthaginians by no tie but that of their pay. Upon the leaſt failure of that, or if they were not humored in all their licentious demands, they were juſt as ready to turn their arms againſt the throats of their maſters. Strangers to that heart-felt affection, that enthuſiaſtic love of their country, which warms the hearts of free citizens, and fires them with the glorious emulation of fighting to the laſt drop of blood in defence of their common mother; theſe ſordid hirelings were always ripe for mutiny and ſedition, and ever ready to revolt and change ſides upon the leaſt proſpect of greater advantages.

But a ſhort detail of the calamities which they drew upon themſelves by this miſtaken policy, will better ſhow the dangers which attend the admiſſion of foreign mercenaries into any country, where the natives are unaccuſtomed to the uſe of arms. A practice which is too apt to prevail in commercial nations.

At the concluſion of the firſt Punic war the Carthaginians were compelled, by their treaty with the Romans, to evacuate Sicily. Geſco therefore, who then commanded in that Iſland, to prevent the diſorders which might be committed by ſuch a multitude of deſperate fellows, compoſed of ſo many different nations, and ſo long inured

to blood and rapine, ſent them over gradually in ſmall bodies, that his countrymen might have time to pay off their arrears, and ſend them home to their reſpective countries. But either the lowneſs of their finances, or the ill-timed parſimony of the Carthaginians totally [1] defeated this ſalutary meaſure, though the wiſeſt that, as their affairs were at that time circumſtanced, could poſſibly have been taken. The Carthaginians deferred their payment till the arrival of the whole body, in hopes of obtaining ſome abatement in their demands, by fairly laying before them the neceſſities of the public. But the mercenaries were deaf to every repreſentation and propoſal of that nature. They felt their own ſtrength, and ſaw too plainly the weakneſs of their maſters. As faſt as one demand was agreed to, a more unreaſonable one was ſtarted; and they threatened to do themſelves juſtice by military execution, if their exorbitant demands were not immediately complied with. At laſt, when they were juſt at the point of an accommodation with their maſters, by the mediation and addreſs of Geſco, two deſperate ruffians, named [2] Speudius and Mathos, raiſed ſuch a flame amongſt this unruly multitude, as broke out inſtantly into the moſt bloody, and deſtructive war ever yet recorded in hiſtory. The account we have of it from the Greek hiſtorians muſt

[1] Polyb. lib. 1. p. 92—3. [2] Polyb. p. 98—9.

ſtrike the moſt callous breaſt with horror; and though it was at laſt happily terminatted by the ſuperior conduct of Hamilcar Barcas, the father of the great Hannibal, yet it continued near four years, and left the territories around Carthage a moſt ſhocking ſcene of blood and devaſtation. Such was, and ever will be the conſequence, when a large body of mercenary troops is admitted into the heart of a rich and fertile country, where the bulk of the people are denied the uſe of arms by the miſtaken policy of their governors. For this was actually the caſe with the Carthaginians, where the total diſuſe of arms amongſt the lower claſs of people, laid that opulent country open, an eaſy and tempting prey to every invader. This was another capital error, and conſequently another cauſe which contributed to their ruin.

How muſt any nation but our own, which with reſpect to the bulk of the people, lies in the ſame defenceleſs ſituation; how, I ſay, muſt they cenſure the mighty State of Carthage, ſpreading terror, and giving law to the moſt diſtant nations by her powerful fleets, when they ſee her at the ſame time trembling, and giving herſelf up for loſt at the landing of any invader in her own territories?

The conduct of that petty prince Agathocles, affords us a ſtriking inſtance of the defenceleſs ſtate of the territories of Carthage. The Carthaginians were at that very time maſters of all Sicily, except the ſingle city of Syracuſe, in which

which they had cooped up that tyrant both by land and ſea. [3] Agathocles, reduced to the laſt extremity, ſtruck perhaps the boldeſt ſtroke ever yet met with in hiſtory. He was perfectly well acquainted with the weak ſide of Carthage, and knew that he could meet with little oppoſition from a people who were ſtrangers to the uſe of arms, and enervated by a life of eaſe and plenty. On this defect of their policy he founded his hopes; and the event proved that he was not miſtaken in his judgment. He embarked with only 13000 men on board the few ſhips he had remaining, eluded the vigilance of the Carthaginian fleet by ſtratagem, landed ſafely in Africa, plundered and ravaged that rich country up to the very gates of Carthage, which he cloſely blocked up, and reduced nearly to the ſituation in which he had left his own Syracuſe. Nothing could equal the terror into which the city of Carthage was thrown at that time, but the panic which, in the late rebellion, ſtruck the much larger, and more populous city of London, at the approach of a poor handful of Highlanders, as much inferior even to the ſmall army of Agathocles in number, as they were in arms and diſcipline. The ſucceſs of that able leader compelled the Carthaginians to recal part of their forces out of Sicily to the immediate defence of Carthage itſelf; and this occaſioned the raiſing the ſiege of Syracuſe, and ended in the total defeat of their army, and death of their General in that

[3] Diodor. Sicul. lib. 20. p. 735—36.

country. Thus Agathocles, by this daring meaſure, ſaved his own petty State, and, after a variety of good and ill fortune, concluded a treaty with the Carthaginians, and died at Syracuſe at a time when, from a thorough experience of their defenceleſs ſtate at home, he was preparing for a freſh invaſion.

* Livy informs us, that this very meaſure of Agathocles ſet the precedent which Scipio followed with ſo much ſucceſs in the ſecond Punic war, when that able General, by a ſimilar deſcent in Africa, compelled the Carthaginians to recal Hannibal out of Italy to their immediate aſſiſtance, and reduced them to that impotent ſtate, from which they never afterwards were able to recover. How ſucceſsfully the French played the ſame game upon us, when they obliged us to recal our forces out of Flanders to cruſh the Rebellion, which they had ſpirited up with that very view, is a fact too recent to need any mention of particulars. How lately did they drive us to the expenſe, and I my ſay the ignominy, of fetching over a large body of foreign mercenaries for the immediate defence of this nation, which plumes herſelf ſo much upon her power and bravery? How greatly did they cramp all our meaſures, how much did they confine all our military operations to our own immediate ſelf-defence, and prevent us from ſending ſufficient ſuccours to our colonies by the perpetual alarm of an invaſion?

* Livy, lib. 28. p. 58—9.

Though we may in part truly aſcribe the ruin of Carthage to the two above-mentioned errors in their policy, yet the cauſe which was productive of the greateſt evils, and conſequently the more immediate object of our attention at this dangerous juncture, was party-diſunion; that bane of every free State, from which our own country has equal reaſon to apprehend the ſame direful effects, as the Republics of Greece, Rome, and Carthage experienced formerly.

By all the lights, which we receive from hiſtory, the State of Carthage was divided into two oppoſite factions; the Hannonian and the Barcan, ſo denominated from their reſpective leaders, who were heads of the two moſt powerful families in Carthage. The Hannonian family ſeems to have made the greateſt figure in the ſenate; the Barcan in the field. Both were ſtrongly actuated by ambition, but ambition of a different kind. The Barcan family ſeems to have had no other object in view but the glory of their country, and were always ready to give up their private animoſities, and even their paſſion for military glory to the public good. The Hannonian family acted from quite oppoſite principles, conſtantly aiming at one point; the ſupporting themſelves in power, and that only. Ever jealous of the glory acquired by the Barcan family, they perpetually thwarted every meaſure propoſed from that quarter, and were equally ready to ſacrifice the honor and real intereſt of their country to that ſelfiſh view. In ſhort,

the one family ſeems to have produced a race of Heroes, the other of ambitious Stateſmen.

The chiefs of theſe two jarring families, beſt known to us in hiſtory, were Hanno and Hamilcar Barcas, who was ſucceeded by his ſon Hannibal, that terror of the Romans. The oppoſition between theſe two parties was ſo flagrant, that Appian does not ſcruple to call the party of [5] Hanno, the Roman faction; and that of Barcas, the popular, or the Carthaginian, from the different intereſts which each party eſpouſed.

The firſt inſtance, which we meet with in hiſtory, of the enmity ſubſiſting between the heads of theſe factions, was in that deſtructive war with the mercenaries, from which I have made this explanatory digreſſion.

Hanno was firſt ſent with a powerful, and well provided army againſt theſe mutinous deſperadoes; but he knew little of his trade, and made perpetual blunders. [6] Polybius, who treats his character, as a ſoldier, with the utmoſt contempt, informs us, that he ſuffered himſelf to be ſurpriſed, a great part of his fine army to be cut to pieces, and his camp taken, with all the military ſtores, engines, and all the other apparatus of war.

The Carthaginians, terrified and diſtreſſed by the bad conduct of their General, were now compel-

[5] Appian. de Bell. Punic. p. 36.

[6] Polyb. lib. 1. p. 104—5.

led, by the neceſſity of their affairs, to reſtore Hamilcar to the chief command of their forces, from which he muſt have been excluded before by the influence of the Hannonian faction. That able commander with his ſmall army (for his whole force amounted to no more than ten thouſand men) quickly changed the face of the war, defeated Spendius in two pitched battles, and puſhed every advantage to the utmoſt, which the incapacity of the rebel Generals threw in his way. Senſible that he was too weak alone to cope with the united forces of the Rebels (which amounted to 70, 000 men) he [7] ordered Hanno (who had ſtill influence enough to procure himſelf to be continued in the command of a ſeparate body) to join him, that they might finiſh this execrable war by one deciſive action. After they were joined, the Carthaginians ſoon felt the fatal effects of diſunion between their Generals. No plan could now be followed, [8] no meaſure could be agreed on; and the diſagreement between theſe two leading men aroſe to ſuch a height at laſt, that they not only let ſlip every opportunity of annoying the enemy, but gave them many advantages againſt themſelves, which they could not otherwiſe have hoped for. [9] The Carthaginians, ſenſible of their error, and knowing the very different abilities of the two Generals, yet willing to avoid the imputation of

[7] Ibid. lib. 1. p. 115. [8] Polyb. lib. 1. p. 115.
[9] Id. ibid.

partiality, empowered the army to decide which of the two they judged moſt proper for their General, as they were determined to continue only one of them in the command. [1] The deciſion of the army was, that Hamilcar ſhould take the ſupreme command, and that Hanno ſhould depart the camp. A convincing proof that they threw the whole blame of that diſunion, and the ill-ſucceſs, which was the conſequence of it, entirely upon the envy and jealouſy of Hanno. One Hannibal, a man more tractable, and more agreeable to Hamilcar, was ſent in his room. Union was reſtored, and the happy effects which attended it were quickly viſible. Hamilcar now puſhed on the war with his uſual vigilance and activity, and ſoon convinced the Generals of the Rebels how greatly he was their maſter in the art of war. He harraſſed them perpetually, and, like a ſkilful [2] gameſter, (as Polybius terms him) drew them artfully every day into his ſnares, and obliged them to raiſe the ſiege of Carthage. At laſt he cooped up Spendius with his army in ſo diſadvantageous a place, that he reduced them to ſuch an extremity of famine as to devour one another, and compelled them to ſurrender at diſcretion though they were upwards of 40,000 effective men. — The army of Hamilcar, which was much inferior to that of Spendius in number, was compoſed partly of mercenaries and deſerters,

[1] Idem. ibid. 117.

[2] Polyb. Ἀγαθὸς πεττευτὴς, ibid. p. 119.

partly of the city militia, [a] both horſe and foot (troops which the enemies to the militia-bill would have called raw and undiſciplined, and treated as uſeleſs) of which the major part of his army conſiſted. The rebel army was compoſed chiefly of brave and experienced veterans, trained up by Hamilcar himſelf in Sicily during the late war with the Romans, whoſe courage was heightened by deſpair. It is worthy our obſervation therefore, that theſe very men who, under the conduct of Hamilcar, had been a terror to the Romans, and given them ſo many blows in Sicily towards the latter end of the firſt Punic war, ſhould yet be ſo little able to cope with an army ſo much inferior in number, and compoſed in a great meaſure of city-militia only, when commanded by the ſame General. [b] Polybius, who eſteems Hamilcar by far the greateſt Captain of that age, obſerves, that though the Rebels were by no means inferior to the Carthaginian troops in reſolution and bravery, yet they were frequently beaten by Hamilcar by mere dint of Generalſhip. Upon this occaſion he cannot help remarking [c] the vaſt ſuperiority which judicious ſkill and ability of Generalſhip has over long military practice, where this ſo eſſentially neceſſary ſkill and judgment is wanting. It might

[a] Id. ibid. Πολιτικὸν ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζούς. p. 120.

[b] Polyb. lib. 1. p. 119.

[c] Id. ibid.

have been thought unpardonabe in me, if I had omitted this juſt remark of Polybius, ſince it has been ſo lately verified by his Pruſſian Majeſty in thoſe maſterly ſtrokes of Generalſhip, which are the preſent admiration of Europe. Hamilcar, after the deſtruction of Spendius and his army, immediately blocked up Mathos, with the remaining corps of the Rebels, in the city of Tunes. Hannibal, with the forces under his command, took poſt on that ſide of the city which looked towards Carthage. Hamilcar prepared to make his attack on the ſide which was directly oppoſite, but the conduct of Hannibal, when left to himſelf, was the direct contraſt to that of Hamilcar, and proves undeniably, that the whole merit of their former ſucceſs was entirely owing to that abler General. Hannibal, who ſeems to have been little acquainted with the true genius of thoſe daring veterans, lay ſecure, and careleſs in his camp, neglected his out-guards, and treated the enemy with contempt, as a people already conquered. [e] But Mathos obſerving the negligence and ſecurity of Hannibal, and well knowing that he had not Hamilcar to deal with, made a ſudden and reſolute ſally, forced Hannibal's intrenchments, put great numbers of his men to the ſword, took Hannibal himſelf, with ſeveral other perſons of diſtinction, priſoners, and pillaged his camp. This daring meaſure was ſo well concerted, and executed with ſo much

[e] Polyb. ibid. p. 121.

rapidity, that Mathos, who made good uſe of his time, had done his buſineſs before Hamilcar, who lay encamped at ſome diſtance, was in the leaſt apprized of his colleague's misfortune. Mathos faſtened Hannibal, whilſt alive, on the ſame gibbet to which Hamilcar had lately nailed the body of Spendius: A terrible, but juſt reward for the ſhameful careleſſneſs in a commanding officer, who had ſacrificed the lives of ſuch a number of his fellow-citizens by his own indolence and preſumptuous folly. Mathos alſo crucified thirty of the firſt nobility of Carthage, who attended Hannibal in this expedition. A commander who is ſurpriſed in the night-time, though guilty of an egregious fault, may yet plead ſomething in excuſe; but, in point of diſcipline, for a General to be ſurpriſed by an enemy juſt under his noſe in open day-light, and caught in a ſtate of wanton ſecurity, from an overweening preſumption on his own ſtrength; is a crime of ſo capital a nature as to admit neither of alleviation nor pardon. This dreadful and unexpected blow threw Carthage in the utmoſt conſternation, and obliged Hamilcar to draw off his part of the army to a conſiderable diſtance from Tunes. Hanno had again influence enough to procure the command, which he was compelled before by the army to give up to Hamilcar. But the Carthaginians, ſenſible of the fatal conſequences of diſunion between the two Generals, eſpecially at ſuch a deſperate criſis,

ſent [7] thirty of the moſt reſpectable amongſt the Senators to procure a thorough reconciliation between Hamilcar and Hanno before they proceeded upon any operation; which they effected at laſt, though not without difficulty. Pleaſed with this happy event, the Carthaginians (as their laſt, and utmoſt effort) ſent [8] every man in Carthage, who was able to bear arms, to re-enforce Hamilcar, on whoſe ſuperior abilities they placed their whole dependence. Hamilcar now reſumed his operations, and, as he was no longer thwarted by Hanno, ſoon reduced Mathos to the neceſſity of putting the whole iſſue of the war upon one deciſive action, in which the Carthaginians were moſt completely victors, by the exquiſite diſpoſition and conduct of Hamilcar.

I hope the enemies to a militia will at leaſt allow theſe new levies, who compoſed by far the greateſt part of Hamilcar's army upon this occaſion, to be raw, undiſciplined, and ignorant of the uſe of arms; epithets which they beſtow ſo plentifully upon a militia. Yet that able commander, with an army conſiſting chiefly of this kind of men, totally deſtroyed an army of deſperate veterans, took their General, and all who eſcaped the ſlaughter, priſoners, and put an end to the moſt

[7] Polyb. lib. 1. p. 122.

[8] Τὰς ὑπολοίπας τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις καθοπλίσαντες (οἷον ἰσχάτην ἔχοντες ταύτην) ἐξαπέστελλον πρὸς τὸν Βάρκαν. Polyb. lib. 1. p. 122.

ruinous, and moſt inhuman war ever yet mentioned in hiſtory. Theſe new levies had courage (a quality never yet, I believe, diſputed to the Britiſh commonalty) and were to fight *pro aris & focis*, for whatever was dear and valuable to a people; and Hamilcar, who well knew how to make the proper uſe of theſe diſpoſitions of his countrymen, was maſter of thoſe abilities which Mathos wanted. Of ſuch advantage is it to an army to have a commander ſuperior to the enemy in the art of Generalſhip; an advantage which frequently ſupplies a deficiency even in the goodneſs of troops, as well as in numbers.

The enmity of Hanno did not expire with Hamilcar, who fell glorioufly in the ſervice of his country, in Spain ſome years after. Hannibal, the eldeſt ſon, and a ſon worthy of ſo heroic a father, immediately became the object of his jealouſy and hatred. For when Aſdrubal (ſon-in-law to Hamilcar) had been appointed to the command of the army in Spain, after the death of that General, he deſired that Hannibal, at that time but twenty-two years of age, might be ſent to Spain to be trained up under him in the art of war. Hanno oppoſed this with the utmoſt virulence in a rancorous ſpeech (made for him by Livy) fraught with the moſt infamous inſinuations againſt Aſdrudal, and a ſtrong charge of ambition againſt the Barcan family. But his malice, and the true reaſon of his oppoſition, varniſhed over with a ſpecious concern for the

public welfare, were ſo eaſily ſeen through, that he was not able to carry a point, which he ſo much wiſhed for.

[9] Aſdrubal not long after being aſſaſſinated by a Gaul, in revenge for ſome injury he had received, the army immediately appointed Hannibal to the command; and ſending advice to Carthage of what they had done, the Senate was aſſembled, who [1] unanimouſly confirmed the election then made by the ſoldiers. Hannibal in a ſhort time reduced all that part of Spain which lay between New Carthage, and the river Iberus, except the city of Saguntum, which was in alliance with the Romans. But as he inherited his father's hatred to the Romans, for their [2] infamous behaviour to his country at the concluſion of the war with the mercenaries, he made great preparations for the ſiege of Saguntum. The Romans (according to [3] Polybius) receiving intelligence of his deſign, ſent ambaſſadors to him at New Carthage, who warned him of the conſequences of either attacking the Saguntines, or croſſing the Iberus, which by the treaty with Aſdrubal, had been made the boundary of the Carthaginian and Roman dominions in that country. Hannibal acknowledged his reſolution to proceed againſt Saguntum; but the reaſons he aſſigned for his

[9] Polyb. lib. 2. p. 172.

[1] Μία γνώμη. Polyb. lib. 3. p. 234.

[2] This will be explained in another place.

[3] Lib. 3. 236.

conduct were so unsatisfactory to the ambassadors, that they crossed over to Carthage to know the resolution of their Senate upon that subject. Hannibal in the mean time, according to the same [4] author, sent advice to Carthage of this Embassy, and desired instructions how to act, complaining heavily that the Saguntines depending upon their alliance with the Romans, committed frequent depredations upon the Carthaginian subjects.

We may conclude that the ambassadors met with as disagreeable a reception from the Carthaginian Senate as they had done from Hannibal, and that he received orders from Carthage to proceed in his intended expedition. For [5] Polybius, reflecting upon writers, who pretended to relate what passed in the Roman Senate when the news arrived of the capture of Saguntum, and even inserted the debates which arose when the question was put, whether, or no, war should be declared against Carthage, treats their whole accounts as absurd and fictitious. "For how, says he, with indignation, could it possibly be, that the Romans, who had denounced war the year before at Carthage, if Hannibal should invade the Saguntine territories, should now after that city was taken by storm, assemble to deliberate whether war should be commenced against the Carthaginians or not." Now as this declaration

[4] Id. ibid. p. 237.

[5] Polyb. lib. 3. p. 243 — 44.

of war was conditional, and not to take place unleſs Hannibal ſhould attack the Saguntines, it muſt have been made before that event happened, and conſequently muſt be referred to the Embaſſy above-mentioned. And as Hannibal undertook the ſiege of Saguntum notwithſtanding the Roman menaces, he undoubtedly acted by orders from the Carthaginian Senate.

When the Romans received the news of the deſtruction of Saguntum, they diſpatched another Embaſſy to Carthage (as [e] Polybius relates) with the utmoſt expedition; their orders were to inſiſt that Hannibal and all who adviſed him to commit hoſtilities againſt the Saguntines ſhould be delivered up to the Romans, and in caſe of a refuſal, to declare immediate war. The demand was received by the Carthaginian Senate with the utmoſt indignation, and one of the Senators, who was appointed to ſpeak in the name of the reſt, begun in an artful ſpeech to recriminate upon the Romans, and offered to prove, that the Saguntines were not allied to the Romans when the peace was made between the two nations, and conſequently could not be included in the treaty. But the Romans cut the affair ſhort, and told them that they did not come there to diſpute, but only to inſiſt upon a categorical anſwer to this plain queſtion: Whether they would give up the authors of the hoſtilities, which would convince the

[e] Polyb. ibid.

world that they had no ſhare in the deſtruction of Saguntum, but that Hannibal had done it without their authority; or, whether by protecting them, they choſe to confirm the Romans in the belief, that Hannibal had acted with their approbation? As their demand of Hannibal was refuſed, war[7] was declared by the Romans, and accepted with equal alacrity and fierceneſs by the majority of the Carthaginian Senate.

Livy[8] affirms that the firſt Embaſſy was decreed by the Roman Senate, but not ſent till Hannibal had actually inveſted Saguntum, and varies from Polybius in his relation of the particulars. For according to[9] Livy, Hannibal received intelligence of the Roman Embaſſy, but he ſent them word, that he had other buſineſs upon his hands at that time than to give audience to ambaſſadors; and that he wrote at the ſame time to his friends of the Barcan faction to exert themſelves, and prevent the other party from carrying any point in favor of the Romans.

The ambaſſadors, thus denied admittance by Hannibal, repaired to Carthage, and laid their demands before the Senate. Upon this occaſion Livy[1] introduces Hanno inveighing bitterly in a formal harangue againſt the ſending Hannibal

[7] Polyb. lib. 3. p. 259. [8] Livy, lib. 21. p. 132.

[9] Ib. p. 135. [1] Liv. lib. 21. p. 135, 36.

into Spain, a meaſure which he foretels, muſt terminate in the utter deſtruction of Carthage. And after teſtifying his joy for the death of his father Hamilcar, whom he acknowledges he moſt cordially hated, as he did the whole Barcan family whom he terms the fire-brands of the State, he adviſes them to give up Hannibal, and make full ſatisfaction for the injury then done to the Saguntines. [2] When Hanno had done ſpeaking, there was no occaſion, as Livy obſerves for a reply. For almoſt all the Senate were ſo entirely in the intereſt of Hannibal, that they accuſed Hanno of declaiming againſt him with more bitterneſs and rancor than even the Roman ambaſſadors, who were diſmiſſed with this ſhort anſwer, "That not Hannibal, but the Saguntines, were the authors of the war, and that the Romans treated them with great injuſtice, if they preferred the friendſhip of the Saguntines before that of their moſt ancient allies the Carthaginians." Livy's [3] account of the ſecond Embaſſy, which followed the deſtruction of Saguntum, differs ſo very little from that of Polybius, both as to the queſtion put by the Romans, the anſwer given by the Carthaginian Senate, and the declaration of war which was the conſequence, that it is needleſs to repeat it.

If what Hanno ſaid in the ſpeech above-mentioned, had been his real ſentiments from any

[2] Id. ibid. [3] Lib. 3. p. 142—43.

conſciouſneſs

conſciouſneſs of the ſuperior power of the Romans, and the imprudence of engaging in a war of that conſequence before his country had recovered her former ſtrength, he would have acted upon principles worthy of an honeſt and prudent Patriot. For [4] Polybius, after enumerating the ſuperior excellencies of Hannibal as a General, is ſtrongly of opinion, that if he had begun with other nations, and left the Romans for his laſt enterpriſe, he would certainly have ſucceeded in whatever he had attempted againſt them, but he miſcarried by attacking thoſe firſt, whom he ought to have reſerved for his laſt enterpriſe. The ſubſequent behaviour of Hanno, during the whole time that Italy was the ſeat of war, evidently proves, that his oppoſition to this war proceeded entirely from party-motives, and his perſonal hatred to the Barcan family, conſequently is by no means to be aſcribed to any regard for the true intereſt of his country. [5] Appian informs us, that when Fabius had greatly ſtraitened Hannibal by his cautious conduct, the Carthaginian General ſent a preſſing meſſage to Carthage for a large ſupply both of men and money. But, according to that author, he was flatly refuſed, and could obtain neither, by the influence of his enemies, who were averſe to that war, and cavilled perpetually at every enterpriſe which Hannibal

[4] Polyb. lib. 11. p. 888—89.

[5] Appian. de Bell. Annib. 323. Edit. Hen. Steph.

undertook. [6] Livy, in his relation of the account which Hannibal ſent to the Carthaginian Senate of his glorious victory at Cannæ by his brother Mago, with the demand for a large re-enforcement of men as well as money, introduces Hanno (in a ſpeech of his own which he gives us on that occaſion) ſtrongly oppoſing that motion, and perſiſting ſtill in his former ſentiments in reſpect both to the war and to Hannibal. But the Carthaginians, elate with that victory, which was the greateſt blow the Romans ever received in the field ſince the foundation of their Republic, and thoroughly ſenſible (as Livy informs us) of the enmity which Hanno and his faction bore to the Barcan family, immediately decreed a ſupply of 40,000 Numidians, and 24,000 foot and horſe to be immediately levied in Spain, beſides Elephants, and a very large ſum of money. Though Hanno at that time had not weight enough in the Senate to prevent that decree, yet he had influence enough by his intrigues to retard the ſupply then voted, and not only to get it reduced to 12,000 foot and 2500 horſe, but even to procure that ſmall number to be ſent to Spain upon a different ſervice. That Hanno was the true cauſe of this cruel diſappointment, and the fatal conſequences which attended it, is equally evident from the ſame hiſtorian. For [7] Livy tells us, "that when

[6] Lib. 23. p. 265 — 66.

[7] Liv. lib. 30. p. 135.

orders were ſent to him by the Carthaginian Senate to quit Italy, and haſten to the immediate defence of his own country, Hannibal inveighed bitterly againſt the malice of his enemies, who now openly and avowedly recalled him from Italy, out of which they had long before endeavoured to drag him, when they tied up his hands by conſtantly refuſing him any ſupply either of men or money. That Hannibal affirmed he was not conquered by the Romans, whom he had ſo often defeated, but by the calumny and envy of the oppoſite faction in the Senate. That Scipio would not have ſo much reaſon to plume himſelf upon the ignominy of his return, as his enemy Hanno, who was ſo implacably bent upon the deſtruction of the Barcan family, that ſince he was not able to cruſh it by any other means, he had at laſt accompliſhed it, though by the ruin of Carthage itſelf."

Had that large ſupply been ſent to Hannibal with the ſame unanimity and diſpatch with which it was voted, it is more than probable, that ſo conſummate a General would have ſoon been maſter of Rome, and transferred the Empire of the world to Carthage. For the Romans were ſo exhauſted after the terrible defeat at Cannæ, that [s] Livy is of opinion, that Hannibal would have given the finiſhing blow to that Republic,

[s] Lib. 22. p. 240.

if he had marched directly to Rome from the field of battle, as he was adviſed to do by his General of horſe Maherbal: that many of the nobility, upon the firſt news of this fatal event, were in actual conſultation about the means of quitting Italy, and looking out for a ſettlement in ſome other part of the world, and he affirms, that the ſafety both of the city and empire of Rome muſt be attributed (as it was then firmly believed at Rome) to the delay of that ſingle day only, on which Maherbal gave that advice to Hannibal. [1] Appian confirms the diſtreſsful ſituation of the Roman affairs at that juncture, and informs us, that including the ſlaughter at Cannæ, in which the Romans had loſt moſt of their ableſt officers, Hannibal had put to the ſword 250,000 of their beſt troops in the ſpace of two years only, from the beginning of the ſecond Punic war incluſive. It is eaſy therefore to imagine how little able the Roman armies, conſiſting chiefly of new levies, would have been to face ſuch a commander as Hannibal, when ſupported by the promiſed re-enforcement of 64,000 freſh men, beſides money and elephants in proportion. For Hannibal, though deprived of all ſupplies from Carthage by the malice of the Hannonian faction, maintained his ground above fourteen years more after his victory at Cannæ, in ſpite of the utmoſt efforts

[1] Appian. de Bell. Hannib. p. 328.

of the Romans. A truth which Livy himſelf acknowledges with admiration and aſtoniſhment at his ſuperior military capacity. From that period therefore after the battle of Cannæ, when Hannibal was firſt diſappointed of the promiſed ſupplies from Carthage, we ought properly to date the fall of that Republic, which muſt be wholly imputed to the inveterate malice of the profligate Hanno and his impious faction, who were determined, as Hannibal obſerved before, to ruin the contrary party, though by means which muſt be inevitably attended with the deſtruction of their country. [1] Appian inſinuates, that Hannibal firſt engaged in this war more from the importunity of his friends, than even his own paſſion for military glory and hereditary hatred to the Romans. For Hanno and his faction (as [2] Appian tells us) no longer dreading the power of Hamilcar and Aſdrubal his ſon-in-law, and holding Hannibal extremely cheap upon account of his youth, began to perſecute and oppreſs the Barcan party with ſo much rage and hatred, that the latter were obliged by letter to implore aſſiſtance from Hannibal, and to aſſure him that his own intereſt and ſafety was inſeparable from theirs. Hannibal (as Appian adds) was conſcious of the truth of this remark, and well knew that the blows which ſeemed directed at his friends, were levelled in reality at his own head, and

[1] Iberic. p. 259.

[2] Appian, id. ibid.

judged that a war with the Romans, which would be highly agreeable to the generality of his countrymen, might prove the ſureſt means of counterworking his enemies, and preſerving himſelf and his friends from the fury of a pliant and fickle populace, already inflamed againſt his party by the intrigues of Hanno. He concluded therefore, according to Appian, that a war with ſo formidable and dangerous a power, would divert the Carthaginians from all inquiries relative to his friends, and oblige them to attend wholly to an affair, which was of the laſt importance to their country. Should Appian's account of the cauſe of this war be admitted as true, it would be a yet ſtronger proof of the calamitous effects of party-diſunion; though it would by no means excuſe Hannibal. For Hanno and his party would be equally culpable for driving a man of Hannibal's abilities to ſuch a deſperate meaſure, purely to ſcreen himſelf and his party from their malice and power. But the blame for not ſupporting Hannibal after the battle of Cannæ, when ſuch ſupport would have enabled him to cruſh that power, which by their means recovered ſtrength ſufficient to ſubvert their own country, muſt be thrown entirely upon Hanno and his party. It was a crime of the blackeſt die, and an act of the higheſt treaſon againſt their country, and another terrible proof of the fatal effects of party-diſunion. Nor was this evil peculiar to Carthage only, but was equally common in the

Roman and Grecian Republics. Nay, could we trace all our public meaſures up to their firſt ſecret ſprings of action, I don't doubt (notwithſtanding the plauſible reaſons which might have been given to the public to palliate ſuch meaſures) but we ſhould find our own country raſhly engaged in wars detrimental to her true intereſts, or obliged to ſubmit to a diſadvantageous peace, juſt as either was conducive to the private intereſt of the prevailing party. Will not our own annals furniſh us with ſome memorable inſtances of the truth of this aſſertion too recent to be denied? Was not the treatment which the great Duke of Marlborough received from Bolingbroke, the Engliſh Hanno parallel to that which the victorious Hannibal met with from the Carthaginian, after the battle of Cannæ? Did not Bolingbroke, from the worſt of party-motives, diſplace that ever-victorious General, deſert our allies, and ſacrifice the brave and faithful Catalans, and the city of Barcelona, in at leaſt as ſhameful a manner as the Romans did their unhappy friends at Saguntum? Did not the ſame miniſter by the fatal treaty of Utrecht, rob the nation of all thoſe advantages, which ſhe had reaſon to hope for from a long and ſucceſsful war? Did he not by the ſame treaty, give our mortal enemy France time to retrieve her affairs, and recover from that low ſtate to which the Duke of Marlborough had reduced her, and even to arrive at that power, at preſent ſo terrible to us and to all Europe?

To what can we attribute the late ill conducted war with Spain [a], but to the ambition of party? How was the nation ſtunned with the noiſe of Spaniſh depredations from the preſs! how loudly did the ſame outcry reſound in parliament! yet when the leaders of that powerful oppoſition had carried their point by their popular clamors; when they had puſhed the nation into that war; when they had drove an overgrown miniſter from the helm, and neſtled themſelves in power, how quickly did they turn their backs upon the honeſt men of their party, who refuſed to concur in their meaſures! How ſoon did they convince the nation, by ſcreening that very miniſter who had been ſo many years the object of their reſentment, and by carrying on their own war (as I may term it) with the ſame or greater lukewarmneſs than what they had ſo lately exclaimed againſt in the ſame miniſter; they convinced, I ſay, the whole nation that the welfare of the public, and the protection of our trade had not the leaſt ſhare in the real motives of their conduct.

But as the Carthaginian hiſtory during this period, is immediately blended with the Roman, to avoid repetition, I am obliged to defer my farther remarks upon the conduct of this people, till I ſpeak of the difference between the civil and military polity, and manners of both thoſe nations.

[a] The firſt Edition of this work appeared in 1759.