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Characteristics of men, manners, opinions, times

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Treatise IV. Viz. An inquiry concerning virtue, or merit.

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T R E A T I S E IV.

V I Z,

A N

I N Q U I R Y

C O N C E R N I N G

V I R T U E , O R M E R I T .

—— *Amoto queramus seria ludo.*

Hor. sat. 1. lib. 1.

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AN INQUIRY, &c.

BOOK I. PART I.

S E C T. I.

Occasion of this Inquiry.

RELIGION and Virtue appear in many respects so nearly related, that they are generally presumed inseparable companions. And so willing we are to believe well of their union, that we hardly allow it just to speak, or even think of them apart. It may, however, be questioned, whether the practice of the world, in this respect, be answerable to our speculation. It is certain that we sometimes meet with instances which seem to make against this general supposition. We have known people, who having the appearance of great zeal in religion, have yet wanted even the common affections of humanity, and shown themselves extremely degenerate and corrupt. Others, again, who have paid little regard to religion, and been considered as mere Atheists, have yet been observed to practise the rules of morality, and act in many cases with such good meaning and affection towards mankind, as might seem to force an acknowledgment of their being virtuous. And, in general, we find mere moral principles of such weight, that, in

our dealings with men, we are seldom satisfied by the fullest assurance given us of their zeal in religion, till we hear something further of their character. If we are told, a man is religious, we still ask, "What are his morals?" But if we hear at first that he has honest, moral principles, and is a man of natural justice and good temper, we seldom think of the other question, "Whether he be religious and devout?"

This has given occasion to inquire, "What honesty or Virtue is, considered by itself; and in what manner it is influenced by religion: How far religion necessarily implies virtue; and whether it be a true saying, That it is impossible for an Atheist to be virtuous, or share any real degree of honesty or Merit."

And here it cannot justly be wondered at, if the method of explaining things should appear somewhat unusual; since the subject-matter has been so little examined, and is of so nice and dangerous speculation. For so much is the religious part of mankind alarmed by the freedom of some late pens, and so great a jealousy is raised every where on this account, that whatever an author may suggest in favor of religion, he will gain little credit in the cause, if he allows the least advantage to any other principle. On the other side, the men of wit and raillery, whose pleasantest entertainment is in the exposing the weak sides of religion, are so desperately afraid of being drawn into any serious thoughts of it, that they look upon a man as guilty of foul play,

who assumes the air of a free writer, and at the same time preserves any regard for the principles of natural religion. They are apt to give as little quarter as they receive; and are resolved to think as ill of the morals of their antagonists, as their antagonists can possibly think of theirs. Neither of them, it seems, will allow the least advantage to the other. It is as hard to persuade one sort, that there is any virtue in religion, as the other, that there is any virtue out of the verge of their particular community. So that, between both, an author must pass his time ill, who dares plead for religion and moral virtue, without lessening the force of either; but allowing to each its proper province, and due rank, would hinder their being made enemies by detraction.

However it be, if we would pretend to give the least new light, or explain any thing effectually, within the intended compass of this inquiry, it is necessary to take things pretty deep; and endeavour, by some short scheme, to represent the original of each opinion, whether natural or unnatural, relating to the Deity. And if we can happily get clear of this thorny part of our philosophy, the rest, it is hoped, may prove more plain and easy.

S E C T. II.

State of opinions.

IN the whole of things, or in the universe, either all is according to a good order, and the most agreeable to a general interest; or there is that which is otherwise, and might possibly have been better constituted, more wisely contrived, and with more advantage to the general interest of beings, or of the whole.

If every thing which exists be according to a good order, and for the best; then of necessity there is no such thing as real Ill in the universe, nothing Ill with respect to the whole.

Whatsoever, then, is so as that it could not really have been better, or any way better ordered, is perfectly good. Whatsoever in the order of the world can be called Ill, must imply a possibility in the nature of the thing to have been better contrived or ordered: for if it could not, it is perfect, and as it should be.

Whatsoever is really Ill, therefore, must be caused or produced, either by design, that is to say, with knowledge and intelligence, or in defect of this, by hazard and mere chance.

If there be any thing Ill in the universe from design, then that which disposes all things, is no one good designing principle. For either the one

designing principle is itself corrupt, or there is some other in being which operates contrarily, and is Ill.

If there be any Ill in the universe from mere chance, then a designing principle or mind, whether good or bad, cannot be the cause of all things. And consequently, if there be supposed a designing principle, who is the cause only of good, but cannot prevent the ill which happens from chance, or from a contrary ill design; then there can be supposed in reality no such thing as a superior good design or mind, other than what is impotent and defective: for not to correct, or totally exclude that ill of chance, or of a contrary ill design, must proceed either from impotency or ill-will.

Whatsoever is superior in any degree over the world, or rules in nature with discernment and a mind, is what, by universal agreement, men call God. If there are several such superior minds, they are so many gods: but if that single, or those several superiors, are not in their nature necessarily good, they rather take the name of Dæmon.

To believe, therefore, that every thing is governed, ordered, or regulated for the best, by a designing principle or mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect Theist.

To believe nothing of a designing principle or mind, nor any cause, measure, or rule of things, but chance, so that in nature neither the interest of the whole, nor of any particulars, can be said to

be in the last designed, pursued, or aimed at: is to be a perfect Atheist.

To believe no one supreme designing principle or mind, but rather two, three, or more, though in their nature good, is to be a Polytheist.

To believe the governing mind, or minds, not absolutely and necessarily good, nor confined to what is best, but capable of acting according to mere will or fancy, is to be a Dæmonist.

There are few who think always consistently, or according to one certain hypothesis, upon any subject so abstruse and intricate as the cause of all things, and the œconomy or government of the universe. For it is evident in the case of the most devout people, even by their own confession, that there are times when their faith hardly can support them in the belief of a supreme wisdom; and that they are often tempted to judge disadvantageously of a providence, and just administration in the whole.

That alone, therefore, is to be called a man's opinion, which is of any other the most habitual to him, and occurs upon most occasions. So that it is hard to pronounce certainly of any man, that he is an Atheist; because, unless his whole thoughts are, at all seasons, and on all occasions, steadily bent against all supposition or imagination of design in things, he is no perfect Atheist. In the same manner, if a man's thoughts are not at all times steady and resolute against all imagination of chance, fortune, or ill design in things, he is no perfect Theist. But if any one believes more of

chance and confusion than of design, he is to be esteemed more an Atheist than a Theist, from that which most predominates, or has the ascendant. And in case he believes more of the prevalence of an ill-designing principle, than of a good one, he is rather a Dæmonist; and may be justly so-called, from the side to which the balance of his judgment most inclines.

All these sorts, both of Dæmonism, Polytheism, Atheism, and Theism, may be mixed¹. Religion

¹ As thus:

1. Theism with Dæmonism; 2. Dæmonism with Polytheism; 3. Theism with Atheism; 4. Dæmonism with Atheism; 5. Polytheism with Atheism; 6. Theism, as it stands in opposition to Dæmonism, and denotes goodness in the superior *Deity*, with Polytheism; 7. The same Theism or Polytheism with Dæmonism; 8. Or with Dæmonism and Atheism.

1. As when *the one* chief mind, or sovereign being, is, in the believer's sense, divided between a good and an ill nature, by being the cause of ill as well as good: or otherwise, when *two* distinct and contrary principles subsist; one, the author of all good, the other of all ill.

2. As when there is not *one*, but *several* corrupt minds who govern; which opinion may be called *Polydæmonism*.

3. As when chance is not excluded, but God and chance divide.

4. As when an evil dæmon and chance divide.

5. As when many minds and chance divide.

6. As when there are more principal minds than one, but agreeing in good, with one and the same will and reason.

7. As when the same system of Deity or corresponding Deity subsists, together with a contrary principle, or with several contrary principles or governing minds.

8. As when the last case is, together with chance.

excludes only perfect Atheism. Perfect Dæmonists undoubtedly there are in religion; because we know whole nations who worship a devil or fiend, to whom they sacrifice and offer prayers and supplications, in reality on no other account than because they fear him. And we know very well, that, in some religions, there are those who expressly give no other idea of God, than of a being arbitrary, violent, causing ill, and ordaining to misery; which in effect is the same as to substitute a Dæmon, or devil, in his room.

Now, since there are these several opinions concerning a superior power; and since there may be found perhaps some persons who have no formed opinion at all upon this subject, either through scepticism, negligence of thought, or confusion of judgment; the consideration is, how any of these opinions, on this want of any certain opinion, may possibly consist with Virtue and Merit, or be compatible with an honest or moral character.

P A R T II.

S E C T. I.

A constitution. Whole and parts. Interest or end in creatures. Interest of the species. Goodness. Private good. Private system. System of the species. Animal system. System of the earth. Planetary system. Universal system. Absolute ill. Relative ill. Good and ill man. Goodness through affection.

WHEN we reflect on any ordinary frame or constitution, either of art or nature; and consider how hard it is to give the least account of a particular part, without a competent knowledge of the whole; we need not wonder to find ourselves at a loss in many things relating to the constitution and frame of Nature herself. For to what end in nature many things, even whole species of creatures, refer, or to what purpose they serve, will be hard for any one justly to determine: but to what end the many proportions and various shapes of parts in many creatures actually serve, we are able, by the help of study and observation, to demonstrate with great exactness.

We know that every creature has a private good and interest of his own; which Nature has compelled him to seek, by all the advantages

afforded him, within the compass of his make. We know that there is in reality a right and a wrong state of every creature; and that his right one is by nature forwarded, and by himself affectionately sought. There being therefore in every creature a certain interest or good, there must be also a certain End, to which every thing in his constitution must naturally refer. To this End if any thing, either in his appetites, passions, or affections, be not conducing, but the contrary; we must of necessity own it ill to him. And in this manner he is ill with respect to himself; as he certainly is with respect to others of his kind, when any such appetites or passions make him any way injurious to them. Now, if, by the natural constitution of any rational creature, the same irregularities of appetite which make him ill to others, make him ill also to himself; and if the same regularity of affections which causes him to be good in one sense, causes him to be good also in the other; then is that goodness by which he is thus useful to others, a real good and advantage to himself. And thus virtue and interest may be found at last to agree.

Of this we shall consider particularly in the latter part of our inquiry. Our first design is, to see if we can clearly determine, what that quality is to which we give the name of goodness, or Virtue.

Should a historian or traveller describe to us a certain creature of a more solitary disposition than ever was yet heard of; one who had neither

mate nor fellow of any kind ; nothing of his own likeness , towards which he stood well affected or inclined ; nor any thing without , or beyond himself , for which he had the least passion or concern : we might be apt to say perhaps , without much hesitation , “ That this was doubtless a very “ melancholy creature ; and that , in this unfociable “ and sullen state , he was like to have a very “ disconsolate kind of life . ” But if we were assured , that , notwithstanding all appearances , the creature enjoyed himself extremely , had a great relish of life , and was in nothing wanting to his own good ; we might acknowledge perhaps , “ That the creature was no monster , nor absurdly “ constituted as to himself . ” But we should hardly , after all , be induced to say of him , “ That he “ was a good creature . ” However , should it be urged against us , “ That such as he was , the “ creature was still perfect in himself , and therefore “ to be esteemed good ; for what had he to do “ with others ? ” in this sense , indeed , we might be forced to acknowledge , “ That he was a good “ creature , if he could be understood to be absolute “ and complete in himself ; without any real relation “ to any thing in the universe besides . ” For should there be any where in nature a system , of which this living creature was to be considered as a part , then could he no wise be allowed good , whilst he plainly appeared to be such a part , as made rather to the harm than good of that system or whole in which he was included .

If therefore , in the structure of this or any

other animal, there be any thing which points beyond himself, and by which he is plainly discovered to have relation to some other being or nature besides his own, then will this animal undoubtedly be esteemed a part of some other system. For instance, if an animal has the proportions of a male, it shows he has relation to a female. And the respective proportions both of the male and female will be allowed, doubtless, to have a joint relation to another existence and order of things beyond themselves. So that the creatures are both of them to be considered as parts of another system; which is that of a particular race or species of living creatures, who have some one common nature, or are provided for, by some one order or constitution of things subsisting together, and co-operating towards their conservation and support.

In the same manner, if a whole species of animals contribute to the existence or well-being of some other; then is that whole species in general a part only of some other system.

For instance: To the existence of the spider, that of the fly is absolutely necessary. The heedless flight, weak frame, and tender body of this latter insect, fits and determines him as much a prey, as the rough make, watchfulness, and cunning of the former, fits him for rapine, and the insnaring part. The web and wing are suited to each other. And in the structure of each of these animals, there is as apparent and perfect a relation to the other, as in our own

bodies there is a relation of limbs and organs, or; as in the branches or leaves of a tree, we see a relation of each to the other, and all in common to one root and trunk.

In the same manner are flies also necessary to the existence of other creatures, both fowls and fish. And thus are other species or kinds subservient to one another; as being parts of a certain system, and included in one and the same order of beings,

So that there is a system of all animals; an animal order or œconomy, according to which the animal affairs are regulated and disposed.

Now, if the whole system of animals, together with that of vegetables, and all other things in this inferior world, be properly comprehended in one system of a globe or earth; and if, again, this globe or earth itself appears to have a real dependence on something still beyond; as, for example, either on its sun, the galaxy, or its fellow-planets; then is it in reality a Part only of some other system. And if it be allowed, that there is in like manner a System of all things, and a universal nature; there can be no particular being or system, which is not either good or ill in that general one of the universe: for if it be insignificant, and of no use, it is a fault or imperfection, and consequently ill in the general system.

Therefore, if any being be wholly and really Ill, it must be ill with respect to the universal system; and then the system of the universe is ill,

or imperfect. But if the ill of one private system be the good of others ; if it makes still to the good of the general system , (as when one creature lives by the destruction of another , one thing is generated from the corruption of another , or one planetary system or vortex may swallow up another) , then is the ill of that private system no real ill in itself ; any more than the pain of breeding teeth is ill , in a system or body which is so constituted , that , without this occasion of pain , it would suffer worse , by being defective.

So that we cannot say of any being , that it is wholly and absolutely ill , unless we can positively show and ascertain , that what we call Ill is no where Good besides , in any other system , or with respect to any other order or œconomy whatsoever.

But were there in the world any entire species of animals destructive to every other , it might be justly called an ill species , as being ill in the animal system. And if in any species of animals , as in men , for example , one man is of a nature pernicious to the rest , he is in this respect justly styled an ill man.

We do not , however , say of any one , that he is an ill man , because he has the plague-spots upon him , or because he has convulsive fits which make him strike and wound such as approach him. Nor do we say , on the other side , that he is a good man , when having his hands tied up , he is hindered from doing the mischief he designs ;

or , which is in a manner the same , when he abstains from executing his ill purpose , through a fear of some impending punishment , or through the allurements of some exterior reward.

So that in a sensible creature , that which is not done through any affection at all , makes neither good nor ill in the nature of that creature ; who then only is supposed good , when the good or ill of the system to which he has relation , is the immediate object of some passion or affection moving him.

Since it is therefore by affection merely that a creature is esteemed good or ill , natural or unnatural ; our business will be , to examine which are the good and natural , and which the ill and unnatural affections.

S E C T. II.

Private or Self-affection. Temper.

IN the first place , then , it may be observed , that if there be an affection towards any subject considered as private good , which is not really such , but imaginary ; this affection , as being superfluous , and detracting from the force of other requisite and good affections , is in itself vicious and ill , even in respect of the private interest or happiness of the creature.

If there can possibly be supposed in a creature such an affection towards self-good , as is actually ,

in its natural degree, conducing to his private interest, and at the same time inconsistent with the public good; this may indeed be called still a vicious affection: and on this supposition, a creature¹ cannot really be good and natural in respect of his society or public, without being ill and unnatural towards himself. But if the affection be then only injurious to the society, when it is immoderate, and not so when it is moderate, duly tempered, and allayed; then is the immoderate degree of the affection truly vicious, but not the moderate. And thus, if there be found in any creature a more than ordinary self-concernment, or regard to private good, which is inconsistent with the interest of the species or public; this must in every respect be esteemed an ill and vicious affection. And this is what we commonly call Selfishness, and disapprove so much, in whatever creature we happen to discover it².

On the other side, if the affection towards private or self good, however selfish it may be esteemed, is in reality not only consistent with public good, but in some measure contributing to it; if it be such, perhaps, as, for the good of the species in general, every individual ought to share; it is so far from being ill, or blameable in any sense, that it must be acknowledged absolutely necessary to constitute a creature good.

¹ *Infra*, book 2. part 1. § 1. parag. 5. book 2. part 2. § 3. parag. 1. &c.

² Vol. 1. p. 102.

For if the want of such an affection as that towards self-preservation, be injurious to the species; a creature is ill and unnatural, as well through this defect, as through the want of any other natural affection. And this no one would doubt to pronounce, if he saw a man who minded not any precipices which lay in his way, nor made any distinction of food, diet, clothing, or whatever else related to his health and being. The same would be averred of one who had a disposition which rendered him averse to any commerce with womankind, and of consequence unfitted him, through illness of temper, and not merely through a defect of constitution, for the propagation of his species or kind.

Thus the affection towards self-good, may be a good affection, or an ill one. For if this private affection be too strong, (as when the excessive love of life unfits a creature for any generous act), then is it undoubtedly vicious; and if vicious, the creature who is moved by it, is viciously moved, and can never be otherwise than vicious in some degree, when moved by that affection. Therefore, if, through such an earnest and passionate love of life, a creature be accidentally induced to do good, (as he might be upon the same terms induced to do ill), he is no more a good creature for this good he executes, than a man is the more an honest or good man, either for pleading a just cause, or fighting in a good one, for the sake merely of his fee or stipend.

Whatsoever therefore is done which happens to be advantageous to the species, through an affection merely towards self-good, does not imply any more goodness in the creature than as the affection itself is good. Let him, in any particular, act ever so well, if, at the bottom, it be that selfish affection alone which moves him, he is in himself still vicious. Nor can any creature be considered otherwise, when the passion towards self-good, though ever so moderate, is his real motive, in the doing that to which a natural affection for his kind ought by right to have inclined him.

And indeed, whatever exterior helps or succours an ill-disposed creature may find, to push him on towards the performance of any one good action; there can no goodness arise in him till his temper be so far changed, that in the issue he comes in earnest to be led by some immediate affection, directly, and not accidentally, to good, and against ill.

For instance: If one of those creatures supposed to be by nature tame, gentle, and favorable to mankind, be, contrary to his natural constitution, fierce and savage; we instantly remark the breach of temper, and own the creature to be unnatural and corrupt. If, at any time afterwards, the same creature, by good fortune, or right management, comes to lose his fierceness, and is made tame, gentle, and treatable, like other creatures of his kind, it is acknowledged, that the creature thus restored

becomes good and natural. Suppose now, that the creature has indeed a tame and gentle carriage, but that it proceeds only from the fear of his keeper; which if set aside, his predominant passion instantly breaks out; then is his gentleness not his real temper; but his true and genuine nature, or natural temper, remaining just as it was, the creature is still as ill as ever.

Nothing therefore being properly either goodness or illness in a creature, except what is from natural temper; "A good creature is such a one
" as, by the natural temper or bent of his affec-
" tions, is carried primarily and immediately, and
" not secondarily and accidentally, to good,
" and against ill:" and an ill creature is just the contrary, viz. "One who is wanting in right
" affections, of force enough to carry him directly
" towards good, and bear him out against ill; or
" who is carried by other affections directly to
" ill, and against good."

When, in general, all the affections or passions are suited to the public good, or good of the species, as above mentioned; then is the natural temper entirely good. If, on the contrary, any requisite passion be wanting, or if there be any one supernumerary, or weak, or any wise disserviceable, or contrary to that main end; then is the natural temper, and consequently the creature himself, in some measure corrupt and ill.

There is no need of mentioning either envy, malice, forwardness, or other such hateful passions; to show in what manner they are ill, and constitute

an ill creature. But it may be necessary perhaps to remark, that even as to kindness and love of the most natural sort, such as that of any creature for its offspring, if it be immoderate and beyond a certain degree, it is undoubtedly vicious. For thus over-great tenderness destroys the effect of love, and excessive pity renders us incapable of giving succour. Hence the excess of motherly love is owned to be a vicious fondness; over-great pity, effeminacy and weakness; over-great concern for self-preservation, meanness and cowardice; too little, rashness; and none at all, or that which is contrary, viz. a passion leading to self-destruction, a mad and desperate depravity.

S E C T. III.

Reflex affection. Moral beauty and deformity. Public Good an object. Goodness and virtue. Unequal affection, or iniquity. Impaired sense. Corrupt opinion. Right and wrong. Vice in opinion. Vicious worship. Vicious custom.

BUT to proceed from what is esteemed mere goodness, and lies within the reach and capacity of all sensible creatures, to that which is called Virtue or Merit, and is allowed to man only:

In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings

which offer themselves to the sense, are the objects of the affection; but the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that, by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike.

The case is the same in the mental or moral subjects, as in the ordinary bodies, or common subjects of sense. The shapes, motions, colors, and proportions of these latter being presented to our eye, there necessarily results a beauty or deformity^{*}, according to the different measure, arrangement, and disposition of their several parts. So in behaviour and actions, when presented to our understanding, there must be found, of necessity, an apparent difference, according to the regularity or irregularity of the subjects.

The Mind, which is spectator or auditor of other minds, cannot be without its eye and ear, so as to discern proportion, distinguish sound, and scan each sentiment or thought which comes before it. It can let nothing escape its censure. It feels the soft and harsh, the agreeable and disagreeable, in the affections; and finds a foul and fair, a harmonious and a dissonant, as really and truly here.

^{*} Rhapsody, part 3. § 2. parag. 42. in this volume.

as in any musical numbers, or in the outward forms or representations of sensible things. Nor can it² withhold its admiration and ecstasy, its aversion and scorn, any more in what relates to one than to the other of these subjects. So that to deny the common and natural sense of a sublime and beautiful in things, will appear in affectation merely³, to any one who considers duly of this affair.

Now, as in the sensible kind of objects, the species or images of bodies, colors, and sounds, are perpetually moving before our eyes, and acting on our senses, even when we sleep; so in the moral and intellectual kind, the forms and images of things are no less active and incumbent on the mind, at all seasons, and even when the real objects themselves are absent.

In these vagrant characters or pictures of manners, which the mind of necessity figures to itself, and carries still about with it, the heart cannot possibly remain neutral; but constantly takes part one way or other. However false or corrupt it be within itself, it finds the difference, as to beauty and comeliness, between one heart and another, one turn of affection, one behaviour, one sentiment and another, and accordingly, in all disinterested cases, must approve in some measure of what is natural and honest, and disapprove what is dishonest and corrupt.

² Rhapsody, part 3. § 2. parag. 43. &c.

³ Vol. 1. p. 76, 77. Misc. 2. ch. 1. parag. 6. &c. in vol. 3.

Thus the several motions, inclinations, passions, dispositions, and consequent carriage and behaviour of creatures in the various parts of life, being in several views or perspectives represented to the mind, which readily discerns the good and ill towards the species or public; there arises a new trial or exercise of the heart: which must either rightly and soundly affect what is just and right, and disaffect what is contrary; or corruptly affect what is ill, and disaffect what is worthy and good.

And in this case alone it is we call any creature worthy or virtuous, when it can have the notion of a public interest, and can attain the speculation or science of what is morally good or ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong. For though we may vulgarly call an ill horse vicious, yet we never say of a good one, nor of any mere beast, idiot, or changeling, though ever so good-natured, that he is worthy or virtuous.

So that if a creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate; yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself does, or sees others do, so as to take notice of what is worthy or honest, and make that notice or conception of worth and honesty to be an object of his affection, he has not the character of being virtuous: for thus, and no otherwise, he is capable of having a sense of right or wrong; a sentiment or judgment of what is done, through just, equal, and good affection, or the contrary.

Whatsoever is done through any unequal affec-

tion, is iniquitous, wicked, and wrong. If the affection be equal, sound, and good, and the subject of the affection such as may with advantage to society be ever in the same manner prosecuted or affected; this must necessarily constitute what we call equity and right in any action. For Wrong is not such action as is barely the cause of harm, since at this rate a dutiful son aiming at an enemy, but by mistake or ill chance happening to kill his father, would do a wrong: but when any thing is done through insufficient or unequal affection, as when a son shows no concern for the safety of a father; or, where there is need of succour, prefers an indifferent person to him, this is of the nature of wrong.

Neither can any weakness or imperfection in the senses be the occasion of iniquity or wrong; if the object of the mind itself be not at any time absurdly framed, nor any way improper, but suitable, just, and worthy of the opinion and affection applied to it. For if we will suppose a man, who being sound and entire both in his reason and affection, has nevertheless so depraved a constitution or frame of body, that the natural objects are, through his organs of sense, as through ill glasses, falsely conveyed and misrepresented; it will be soon observed, in such a person's case, that since his failure is not in his principal or leading part, he cannot in himself be esteemed iniquitous or unjust.

It is otherwise in what relates to opinion, belief, or speculation. For as the extravagance of

judgment or belief is such, that in some countries even monkeys, cats, crocodiles, and other vile or destructive animals, have been esteemed holy, and worshipped even as deities; should it appear to any one of the religion or belief of those countries, that to save such a creature as a cat, preferably to a parent, was right; and that other men, who had not the same religious opinion, were to be treated as enemies, till converted; this would be certainly wrong, and wicked in the believer: and every action, grounded on this belief, would be an iniquitous, wicked, and vicious action.

And thus whatsoever causes a misconception or misapprehension of the worth or value of any object, so as to diminish a due, or raise any undue, irregular, or unsocial affection, must necessarily be the occasion of wrong. Thus he who affects or loves a man for the sake of something which is reputed honorable, but which is in reality vicious, is himself vicious and ill. The beginnings of this corruption may be noted in many occurrences: as when an ambitious man, by the fame of his high attempts, a conqueror or a pirate by his boasted enterprises, raises in another person an esteem and admiration of that immoral and inhuman character, which deserves abhorrence; it is then that the hearer becomes corrupt, when he secretly approves the ill he hears. But, on the other side, the man who loves and esteems another, as believing him to have that virtue which he has not, but only counterfeits, is not on this account either vicious or corrupt.

A mistake therefore in fact being no cause or sign of ill affection, can be no cause of vice. But a mistake of right being the cause of unequal affection, must of necessity be the cause of vicious action, in every intelligent or rational being.

But as there are many occasions where the matter of right may even to the most discerning part of mankind appear difficult, and of doubtful decision, it is not a slight mistake of this kind which can destroy the character of a virtuous or worthy man. But when, either through superstition or ill custom, there come to be very gross mistakes in the assignment or application of the affection; when the mistakes are either in their nature so gross, or so complicated and frequent, that a creature cannot well live in a natural state; nor with due affections, compatible with human society and civil life; then is the character of Virtue forfeited.

And thus we find how far Worth and Virtue depend on a knowledge of right and wrong, and on a use of reason, sufficient to secure a right application of the affections; that nothing horrid or unnatural, nothing unexemplary, nothing destructive of that natural affection by which the species or society is upheld, may, on any account, or through any principle or notion of honor or religion, be at any time affected or prosecuted as a good and proper object of esteem. For such a principle as this must be wholly vicious: and whatsoever is acted upon it, can be no other than vice and immorality. And thus, if there be any thing

which teaches men either treachery, ingratitude, or cruelty, by divine warrant, or under color and pretence of any present or future good to mankind; if there be any thing which teaches men to persecute their friends ⁴ through love, or to torment captives of war in sport, or to offer human sacrifice ⁵; or to torment, macerate, or mangle themselves, in a religious zeal, before their God; or to commit any sort of barbarity, or brutality, as amiable or becoming; be it custom which gives applause, or religion which gives a sanction; this is not, nor ever can be virtue, of any kind, or in any sense; but must remain still horrid depravity, notwithstanding any fashion, law, custom, or religion, which may be ill and vicious itself; but can never alter the eternal measures, and immutable, independent nature of worth and Virtue.

S E C T. IV.

Sensible and rational objects. Trial of virtue. Degrees of virtue.

UPON the whole: As to those creatures who are only capable of being moved by sensible objects, they are accordingly good or vicious, as the sensible affections stand with them. It is

⁴ Vol. 1. p. 14, 15.; Misc. 2. chap. 3. parag. 37. in vol. 3.

⁵ Misc. 2. chap. 3. parag. 52.

otherwise in creatures capable of framing rational objects of moral good. For in one of this kind, should the sensible affections stand ever so much amiss; yet if they prevail not, because of those other rational affections spoken of, it is evident, the temper still holds good in the main; and the person is with justice esteemed virtuous by all men.

More than this, if by temper any one is passionate, angry, fearful, amorous, yet resists these passions, and, notwithstanding the force of their impression, adheres to virtue; we say commonly in this case, that the virtue is the greater: and we say well: Though if that which restrains the person, and holds him to a virtuous-like behaviour, be no affection towards goodness or virtue itself, but towards private good merely, he is not in reality the more virtuous; as has been shown before. But this still is evident, that if voluntarily, and without foreign constraint, an angry temper bears, or an amorous one refrains, so that neither any cruel or immodest action can be forced from such a person, though ever so strongly tempted by his constitution; we applaud his virtue above what we should naturally do, if he were free of this temptation, and these propensities. At the same time, there is no body will say, that a propensity to vice can be an ingredient in virtue, or any way necessary to complete a virtuous character.

There seems therefore to be some kind of difficulty in the case: but it amounts only to this.

If there be any part of the temper in which ill passions or affections are seated, whilst in another part the affections towards moral good are such as absolutely to master those attempts of their antagonists; this is the greatest proof imaginable, that a strong principle of virtue lies at the bottom, and has possessed itself of the natural temper: whereas, if there be no ill passions stirring, a person may be indeed more cheaply virtuous; that is to say, he may conform himself to the known rules of virtue, without sharing so much of a virtuous principle as another. Yet if that other person, who has the principle of virtue so strongly implanted, comes at last to lose those contrary impediments supposed in him, he certainly loses nothing in virtue; but, on the contrary, losing only what is vicious in his temper, is left more entire to virtue, and possesses it in a higher degree.

Thus is virtue shared in different degrees by rational creatures, such at least as are called rational; but who come short of that sound and well-established reason which alone can constitute a just affection, a uniform and steady will and resolution. And thus vice and virtue are found variously mixed, and alternately prevalent in the several characters of mankind. For it seems evident from our inquiry, that how ill soever the temper or passions may stand with respect either to the sensible or the moral objects; however passionate, furious, lustful, or cruel, any creature may become; however vicious the mind be, or whatever ill

rules or principles it goes by; yet if there be any flexibleness or favorable inclination towards the least moral object, the least appearance of moral good, (as if there be any such thing as kindness, gratitude, bounty, or compassion), there is still something of virtue left; and the creature is not wholly vicious and unnatural.

Thus a ruffian, who, out of a sense of fidelity and honor of any kind, refuses to discover his associates; and rather than betray them, is content to endure torments and death; has certainly some principle of virtue, however he may misapply it. It was the same case with that malefactor, who, rather than do the office of executioner to his companions, chose to keep them company in their execution.

In short, as it seems hard to pronounce of any man, "That he is absolutely an Atheist;" so it appears altogether as hard to pronounce of any man, "That he is absolutely corrupt or vicious;" there being few, even of the horridest villains, who have not something of virtue in this imperfect sense. Nothing is more just than a known saying, That it is as hard to find a man wholly ill, as wholly good; because, wherever there is any good affection left, there is certainly some goodness or virtue still in being.

And having considered thus of Virtue, What it is in itself, we may now consider how it stands with respect to the opinions concerning a Deity, as above mentioned.

P A R T I I I.

S E C T. I.

Causes of vice. Of virtue. Loss of moral sense. Moral sense. How impaired: by opposite affection, or antipathy; not by opinion merely.

THE nature of Virtue consisting, as has been explained, in a certain just disposition, or proportionable affection of a rational creature towards the moral objects of right and wrong; nothing can possibly in such a creature exclude a principle of virtue, or render it ineffectual, except what,

1. Either takes away the natural and just sense of right and wrong;
2. Or creates a wrong sense of it;
3. Or causes the right sense to be opposed by contrary affections.

On the other side, nothing can assist or advance the principle of virtue, except what either in some manner nourishes and promotes a sense of right and wrong, or preserves it genuine and uncorrupt; or causes it, when such, to be obeyed, by subduing and subjecting the other affections to it.

We are to consider, therefore, how any of the above-mentioned opinions on the subject of a Deity may influence in these cases, or produce either of these three effects.

1. As to the first case, The taking away the natural sense of right and wrong:

It will not surely be understood, that by this is meant the taking away the notion of what is good or ill in the species or society. For of the reality of such a good and ill, no rational creature can possibly be insensible. Every one discerns and owns a public interest, and is conscious of what affects his fellowship or community. When we say therefore of a creature, "That he has wholly lost the sense of right and wrong;" we suppose, that being able to discern the good and ill of his species, he has at the same time no concern for either, nor any sense of excellency or baseness in any moral action, relating to one or the other. So that, except merely with respect to a private and narrowly-confined self-good, it is supposed there is in such a creature no liking or dislike of manners; no admiration or love of any thing as morally good; nor hatred of any thing as morally ill, be it ever so unnatural or deformed.

There is in reality no rational creature whatsoever, who knows not, that when he voluntarily offends, or does harm to any one, he cannot fail to create an apprehension and fear of like harm, and consequently a resentment and animosity in every creature who observes him. So that the offender must needs be conscious of being liable to such a treatment from every one, as if he had in some degree offended all.

Thus offence and injury are always known as punishable by every one; and equal behaviour, which

which is therefore called Merit, as rewardable and well-deserving from every one. Of this even the wickedest creature living must have a sense. So that if there be any further meaning in this sense of right and wrong; if in reality there be any sense of this kind which an absolute wicked creature has not; it must consist in a real antipathy or aversion to injustice or wrong, and in a real affection or love towards equity and right, for its own sake, and on the account of its own natural beauty and worth.

It is impossible to suppose a mere sensible creature originally so ill constituted and unnatural, as that, from the moment he comes to be tried by sensible objects, he should have no one good passion towards his kind, no foundation either of pity, love, kindness, or social affection. It is full as impossible to conceive, that a rational creature coming first to be tried by rational objects, and receiving into his mind the images or representations of justice, generosity, gratitude, or other virtue, should have no liking of these, or dislike of their contraries; but be found absolutely indifferent towards whatsoever is presented to him of this sort. A soul, indeed, may as well be without sense, as without admiration in the things of which it has any knowledge. Coming therefore to a capacity of seeing and admiring in this new way, it must needs find a beauty and a deformity, as well in actions, minds, and tempers, as in figures, sounds, or colors. If there be no real amiableness or deformity in moral acts, there is at least an

imaginary one of full force. Though perhaps the thing itself should not be allowed in nature, the imagination or fancy of it must be allowed to be from nature alone. Nor can any thing besides art and strong endeavour, with long practice and meditation, overcome such a natural prevention, or prepossession¹ of the mind, in favor of this moral distinction.

Sense of right and wrong, therefore, being as natural to us as natural affection itself, and being a first principle in our constitution and make; there is no speculative opinion, persuasion or belief, which is capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroy it. That which is of original and pure nature, nothing beside contrary habit and custom, a second nature, is able to displace. And this affection being an original one of earliest rise in the soul or affectionate part, nothing beside contrary affection, by frequent check and control, can operate upon it, so as either to diminish it in part, or destroy it in the whole.

It is evident, in what relates to the frame and order of our bodies, that no particular odd mien or gesture, which is either natural to us, and consequent to our make, or accidental and by habit acquired, can possibly be overcome by our immediate disapprobation, or the contrary bent of our will, ever so strongly set against it. Such a change cannot be effected without extraordinary means, and the intervention of art and method,

¹ Rhapf. part. 3. § 2. parag. 39. 51. in this volume.

a strict attention, and repeated check. And even thus, nature, we find, is hardly mastered; but lies fullen, and ready to revolt, on the first occasion. Much more is this the mind's case in respect of that natural affection and anticipating fancy which makes the sense of right and wrong. It is impossible that this can instantly, or without much force and violence, be effaced, or struck out of the natural temper, even by means of the most extravagant belief or opinion in the world.

Neither Theism, therefore, nor Atheism, nor Dæmonism, nor any religious or irreligious belief of any kind, being able to operate immediately or directly in this case, but indirectly, by the intervention of opposite or of favorable, affections, casually excited by any such belief; we may consider of this effect in our last case, where we come to examine the agreement or disagreement of other affections, with this natural and moral one which relates to right and wrong.

S E C T. II.

*Corruption of moral sense. Causes of this corruption.
Custom. Superstition. Influence of religion.*

II. **AS** to the second case, viz. The wrong sense or false imagination of right and wrong:

This can proceed only from the force of custom and education, in opposition to nature; as may

be noted in those countries, where, according to custom or politic institution, certain actions naturally foul and odious, are repeatedly viewed with applause, and honor ascribed to them. For thus it is possible, that a man forcing himself, may eat the flesh of his enemies, not only against his stomach, but against his nature, and think it nevertheless both right and honorable; as supposing it to be of considerable service to his community, and capable of advancing the name, and spreading the terror of his nation.

But to speak of the opinions relating to a Deity, and what effect they may have in this place: As to Atheism, it does not seem that it can directly have any effect at all towards the setting up a false species of right or wrong. For, notwithstanding a man may, through custom, or by licentiousness of practice, favored by Atheism, come in time to lose much of his natural moral sense; yet it does not seem, that Atheism should, of itself, be the cause of any estimation or valuing of any thing as fair, noble, and deserving, which was the contrary. It can never, for instance, make it be thought, that the being able to eat man's flesh, or commit bestiality, is good and excellent in itself. But this is certain, that by means of corrupt religion, or Superstition, many things the most horribly unnatural and inhuman, come to be received as excellent, good, and laudable in themselves.

Nor is this a wonder. For wherever any thing, in its nature odious and abominable, is by religion

advanced, as the supposed will or pleasure of a supreme Deity; if, in the eye of the believer, it appears not indeed in any respect the less ill or odious on this account; then must the Deity of necessity bear the blame, and be considered as a being naturally ill and odious, however courted and solicited, through mistrust and fear. But this is what religion, in the main, forbids us to imagine. It every where prescribes esteem and honor in company with worship and adoration. Whenever, therefore, it teaches the love and admiration of a Deity, who has any apparent character of ill; it teaches at the same time a love and admiration of that ill, and causes that to be taken for good and amiable, which is in itself horrid and detestable.

For instance: if Jupiter be he who is adored and revered; and if his history represents him amorously inclined, and permitting his desires of this kind to wander in the loosest manner; it is certain that his worshippers, believing this history to be literally and strictly true, must of course be taught a greater love of amorous and wanton acts. If there be a religion, which teaches the adoration and love of a God, whose character it is to be capacious, and of high resentment, subject to wrath and anger, furious, revengeful; and revenging himself, when offended, on others than those who gave the offence; and if there be added to the character of this God, a fraudulent disposition, encouraging deceit and treachery amongst men; favorable to a few, though

for flight causes, and cruel to the rest: it is evident, that such a religion as this being strongly enforced, must of necessity raise even an approbation and respect towards the vices of this kind, and breed a suitable disposition, a capricious, partial, revengeful, and deceitful temper. For even irregularities and enormities of a heinous kind, must in many cases appear illustrious, to one who considers them in a being admired and contemplated with the highest honor and veneration.

This indeed must be allowed, that, if in the cult or worship of such a Deity, there be nothing beyond common form, nothing beside what proceeds from mere example, custom, constraint, or fear; if there be at the bottom, no real heartiness, no esteem or love implied, the worshipper perhaps may not be much misled as to this notion of right and wrong. If, in following the precepts of his supposed God, or doing what he esteems necessary towards the satisfying of such his Deity, he is compelled only by fear; and contrary to his inclination, performs an act which he secretly detests as barbarous and unnatural; then has he an apprehension or sense still of right and wrong, and, according to what has been already observed, is sensible of ill in the character of his God, however cautious he may be of pronouncing any thing on this subject, or so thinking of it, as to frame any formal or direct opinion in the case. But if, by insensible degrees, as he proceeds in his religious faith and devout exercise, he comes to be more and more recon-

ciled to the malignity, arbitrariness, partiality, or revengefulness of his believed Deity, his reconciliation with these qualities themselves will soon grow in proportion; and the most cruel, unjust, and barbarous acts, will, by the power of this example, be often considered by him, not only as just and lawful, but as divine, and worthy of imitation.

For whoever thinks there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that he is just and good, must suppose, that there is independently such a thing as justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true. If the mere will, decree, or law of God be said absolutely to constitute right and wrong, then are these latter words of no significancy at all. For thus, if each part of a contradiction were affirmed for truth by the supreme power, they would consequently become true. Thus, if one person were decreed to suffer for another's fault, the sentence would be just and equitable. And thus, in the same manner, if arbitrarily, and without reason, some beings were destined to endure perpetual ill, and others as constantly to enjoy good; this also would pass under the same denomination. But to say of any thing that it is just or unjust, on such a foundation as this, is to say nothing, or to speak without a meaning.

And thus it appears, that where a real devotion and hearty worship is paid to a supreme being, who in his history or character is represented

otherwise than as really and truly just and good, there must ensue a loss of rectitude, a disturbance of thought, and a corruption of temper and manners in the believer. His honesty will, of necessity, be supplanted by his zeal, whilst he is thus unnaturally influenced, and rendered thus immorally devout.

To this we need only add, that as the ill character of a God does injury to the affections of men, and disturbs and impairs the natural sense of right and wrong; so, on the other hand, nothing can more highly contribute to the fixing of right apprehensions, and a sound judgment or sense of right and wrong, than to believe a God who is ever, and on all accounts, represented such as to be actually a true model and example of the most exact justice, and highest goodness and worth. Such a view of divine providence and bounty, extended to all, and expressed in a constant good affection towards the whole, must of necessity engage us, within our compass and sphere, to act by a like principle and affection. And having once the good of our species or public in view, as our end or aim; it is impossible we should be misguided by any means to a false apprehension or sense of right or wrong.

As to this second case, therefore, Religion, according as the kind may prove, is capable of doing great good or harm; and Atheism nothing positive in either way. For however it may be indirectly an occasion of men's losing a good and sufficient sense of right and wrong; it will not, as

Atheism merely, be the occasion of setting up a false species of it; which only false religion, or phantastical opinion, derived commonly from superstition and credulity, is able to effect.

S E C T. III.

Opposition of the affections. Rise of moral sense. Deity. Hope and fear. Fear. Honor and love. Divine example. Divine presence. Fear and hope. Self-love, how advanced. Its effects in religion. False resignation. Belief of future life; how advantageous; supporting; saving; improving. Rewards and punishments, in the state; in the family; in religion. Security to virtue. Caution. Imprudent zeal. Atheism. Theism. Atheism and Theism. Effects of each. Of Atheism. Of Theism. Contemplation. Religious affection. Conclusion.

NOW, as to the last case, the opposition made by other affections to the natural sense of right and wrong:

It is evident, that a creature having this sort of Sense or good affection in any degree, must necessarily act according to it; if it happens not to be opposed, either by some settled sedate affection towards a conceived private good, or by some sudden, strong, and forcible passion, as of lust or anger; which may not only subdue the sense of right and wrong, but the very sense of private good itself; and over-rule even the most

familiar and received opinion of what is conducing to self-interest.

But it is not our business, in this place, to examine the several means or methods by which this corruption is introduced or increased. We are to consider only how the opinions concerning a Deity can influence one way or another.

That it is possible for a creature capable of using reflection, to have a liking or dislike of moral actions, and consequently a sense of right and wrong, before such time as he may have any settled notion of a God, is what will hardly be questioned; it being a thing not expected, or any way possible, that a creature such as man, arising from his childhood slowly and gradually, to several degrees of reason and reflection, should, at the very first, be taken up with those speculations, or more refined sort of reflections, about the subject of God's existence.

Let us suppose a creature, who wanting reason, and being unable to reflect, has notwithstanding many good qualities and affections; as love to his kind, courage, gratitude, or pity. It is certain, that if you give to this creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the same instant approve of gratitude, kindness, and pity; be taken with any show or representation of the social passion, and think nothing more amiable than this, or more odious than the contrary. And this is to be capable of Virtue, and to have a sense of right and wrong.

Before the time, therefore, that a creature can

have any plain or positive notion one way or other, concerning the subject of a God, he may be supposed to have an apprehension or sense of right and wrong, and be possessed of virtue and vice in different degrees; as we know by experience of those, who having lived in such places, and in such a manner as never to have entered into any serious thoughts of religion, are nevertheless very different among themselves, as to their characters of honesty and worth; some being naturally modest, kind, friendly, and consequently lovers of kind and friendly actions; others proud, harsh, cruel, and consequently inclined to admire rather the acts of violence and mere power.

Now, as to the belief of a Deity, and how men are influenced by it; we may consider, in the first place, on what account men yield obedience, and act in conformity to such a supreme being. It must be either in the way of his Power, as presupposing some disadvantage or benefit to accrue from him; or in the way of his Excellency and Worth, as thinking it the perfection of nature to imitate and resemble him.

If, as in the first case, there be a belief or conception of a Deity, who is considered only as powerful over his creature, and enforcing obedience to his absolute will, by particular rewards and punishments; and if, on this account, through hope merely of reward, or fear of punishment, the creature be incited to do the good he hates, or restrained from doing the ill to which he is not otherwise in the least degree averse; there is

in this case, as has been already shown, no virtue or goodness whatsoever. The creature, notwithstanding his good conduct, is intrinsically of as little worth, as if he acted in his natural way, when under no dread or terror of any sort. There is no more of rectitude, piety, or sanctity in a creature thus reformed, than there is meekness or gentleness in a tiger strongly chained, or innocence and sobriety in a monkey under the discipline of the whip. For however orderly and well those animals, or man himself upon like terms, may be induced to act, whilst the will is neither gained, nor the inclination wrought upon, but awe alone prevails, and forces obedience; the obedience is servile, and all which is done through it merely servile. The greater degree of such a submission or obedience, is only the greater servility, whatever may be the object. For whether such a creature has a good master, or an ill one, he is neither more or less servile in his own nature. Be the master, or superior, ever so perfect or excellent, yet the greater submission caused in this case, through this sole principle or motive, is only the lower and more abject servitude; and implies the greater wretchedness and meanness in the creature, who has those passions of self-love so predominant, and is in his temper so vicious and defective, as has been explained.

As to the second case; If there be a belief or conception of a Deity, who is considered as worthy and good, and admired and revered as

such; being understood to have, besides mere power and knowledge, the highest excellence of nature; such as renders him justly amiable to all; and if in the manner this sovereign and mighty being is represented, or as he is historically described, there appears in him a high and eminent regard to what is good and excellent, a concern for the good of all, and an affection of benevolence and love towards the whole; such an example must undoubtedly serve, as above explained, to raise and increase the affection towards virtue, and help to submit and subdue all other affections to that alone.

Nor is this good effected by example merely. For where the Theistical belief is entire and perfect, there must be a steady opinion of the superintendency of a supreme being, a witness and spectator of human life, and conscious of whatsoever is felt or acted in the universe: so that in the perfectest recess, or deepest solitude, there must be one still presumed remaining with us; whose presence singly must be of more moment than that of the most august assembly on earth. In such a presence, it is evident, that as the shame of guilty actions must be the greatest of any; so must the honor be, of well-doing, even under the unjust censure of a world. And in this case, it is very apparent how conducing a perfect Theism must be to virtue, and how great deficiency there is in Atheism.

What the fear of future punishment, and Hope of future reward, added to this belief, may fur-

ther contribute towards virtue, we come now to consider more particularly. So much in the mean while may be gathered from what has been said above, that neither this fear or hope can possibly be of the kind called good affections, such as are acknowledged the springs and sources of all actions truly good. Nor can this fear or hope, as above intimated, consist in reality with virtue, or goodness; if it either stands as essential to any moral performance, or as a considerable motive to any act, of which some better affection ought alone to have been a sufficient cause.

It may be considered withal, that, in this religious sort of discipline, the principle of self-love, which is naturally so prevailing in us, being no way moderated or restrained, but rather improved and made stronger every day, by the exercise of the passions in a subject of more extended self-interest; there may be reason to apprehend, lest the temper of this kind should extend itself in general through all the parts of life. For if the habit be such as to occasion, in every particular, a stricter attention to self-good, and private interest; it must insensibly diminish the affections towards public good, or the interest of society; and introduce a certain narrowness of spirit, which, as some pretend, is peculiarly observable in the devout persons and zealots of almost every religious persuasion.

This, too, must be confessed, that if it be true piety, to love God for his own sake, the over-solicitous regard to private good expected

from him, must of necessity prove a diminution of piety. For whilst God is beloved only as the cause of private good, he is no otherwise beloved than as any other instrument or means of pleasure by any vicious creature. Now, the more there is of this violent affection towards private good, the less room is there for the other sort towards goodness itself, or any good and deserving object worthy of love and admiration for its own sake; such as God is universally acknowledged, or at least by the generality of civilized or refined worshippers.

It is in this respect that the strong desire and love of life may also prove an obstacle to piety, as well as to virtue and public love. For the stronger this affection is in any one, the less will he be able to have true resignation, or submission to the rule and order of the Deity. And if that which he calls resignation depends only on the expectation of infinite retribution or reward, he discovers no more worth or virtue here, than in any other bargain of interest; the meaning of his resignation being only this: "That he
" resigns his present life and pleasures, condi-
" tionally for that which he himself confesses to
" be beyond an equivalent; eternal living in a
" state of highest pleasure and enjoyment."

But notwithstanding the injury which the principle of virtue may possibly suffer, by the increase of the selfish passion, in the way we have been mentioning; it is certain, on the other side, that the principle of fear of future punishment,

and hope of future reward, how mercenary or servile soever it may be accounted, is yet, in many circumstances, a great advantage, security, and support to virtue.

It has been already considered, that notwithstanding there may be implanted in the heart a real sense of right and wrong, a real good affection towards the species or society; yet, by the violence of rage, lust, or any other counter-working passion, this good affection may frequently be controuled and overcome. Where therefore there is nothing in the mind capable to render such ill passions the objects of its aversion, and cause them earnestly to be opposed; it is apparent how much a good temper in time must suffer, and a character by degrees change for the worse. But if religion interposing, creates a belief that the ill passions of this kind, no less than their consequent actions, are the objects of a Deity's animadversion; it is certain, that such a belief must prove a seasonable remedy against vice, and be in a particular manner advantageous to virtue. For a belief of this kind must be supposed to tend considerably towards the calming of the mind, and disposing or-fitting the person to a better recollection of himself, and to a stricter observance of that good and virtuous principle, which needs only his attention, to engage him wholly in its party and interest.

And as this belief of a future reward and punishment is capable of supporting those who, through ill practice, are like to apostatize from
virtue;

virtue; so when, by ill opinion and wrong thought, the mind itself is bent against the honest course, and debauched even to an esteem, and deliberate preference of a vicious one, the belief of the kind mentioned may prove on this occasion the only relief and safety.

A person, for instance, who has much of goodness and natural rectitude in his temper, but withal, so much softness, or effeminacy, as unfits him to bear poverty, crosses, or adversity; if by ill fortune he meets with many trials of this kind, it must certainly give a sourness and distaste to his temper, and make him exceedingly averse to that which he may falsely presume the occasion of such calamity or ill. Now, if his own thoughts, or the corrupt insinuations of other men, present it often to his mind, "That his Honesty is the occasion of this calamity, and that if he were delivered from this restraint of Virtue and Honesty, he might be much happier;" it is very obvious that his esteem of these good qualities must in proportion diminish every day, as the temper grows uneasy and quarrels with itself. But if he opposes to this thought the consideration, "That honesty carries with it, if not a present, at least a future advantage, such as to compensate that loss of private good which he regrets;" then may this injury to his temper and honest principle be prevented, and his love or affection towards honesty and virtue remain as it was before.

In the same manner, where instead of regard

or love, there is rather an aversion to what is good and virtuous, as, for instance, where lenity and forgiveness are despised, and revenge highly thought of, and beloved, if there be this consideration added, "That lenity is, by its rewards, made the cause of a greater self-good and enjoyment than what is found in revenge;" that very affection of lenity and mildness may come to be industriously nourished, and the contrary passion depressed. And thus temperance, modesty, candor, benignity, and other good affections, however despised at first, may come at last to be valued for their own sakes, the contrary species rejected, and the good and proper object beloved and prosecuted, when the reward or punishment is not so much as thought of.

Thus in a civil State or Public, we see that a virtuous administration, and an equal and just distribution of rewards and punishments, is of the highest service; not only by restraining the vicious, and forcing them to act usefully to society, but by making virtue to be apparently the interest of every one, so as to remove all prejudices against it, create a fair reception for it, and lead men into that path which afterwards they cannot easily quit. For thus a people raised from barbarity or despotic rule, civilized by laws, and made virtuous by the long course of a lawful and just administration; if they chance to fall suddenly under any misgovernment of unjust and arbitrary power, they will on this account be the rather animated to exert a stronger virtue, in opposition to such violence

and corruption. And even where, by long and continued arts of a prevailing tyranny, such a people are at last totally oppressed, the scattered seeds of virtue will for a long time remain alive, even to a second generation; ere the utmost force of misapplied rewards and punishments can bring them to the object and compliant state of long-accustomed slaves.

But though a right distribution of justice in a government be so essential a cause of virtue, we must observe in this case, that it is example which chiefly influences mankind and forms the character and disposition of a people. For a virtuous administration is in a manner necessarily accompanied with virtue in the magistrate: otherwise it could be of little effect, and of no long duration. But where it is sincere and well established, there virtue and the laws must necessarily be respected and beloved. So that as to punishments and rewards, their efficacy is not so much from the fear or expectation which they raise, as from a natural esteem of virtue, and detestation of villany, which is awakened and excited by these public expressions of the approbation and hatred of mankind in each case. For in the public executions of the greatest villains, we see generally that the infamy and odiousness of their crime, and the shame of it before mankind, contribute more to their misery than all besides; and that it is not the immediate pain, or death itself, which raises so much horror either in the sufferers or spectators, as the igno-

minious kind of death which is inflicted for public crimes, and violations of justice and humanity.

And as the case of reward and punishment stands thus in the public; so, in the same manner, as to private families. For slaves and mercenary servants, restrained and made orderly by punishment, and the severity of their master, are not on this account made good or honest. Yet the same master of the family using proper rewards and gentle punishments towards his children, teaches them goodness, and by this help instructs them in a virtue, which afterwards they practise upon other grounds, and without thinking of a penalty or bribe. And this is what we call a liberal education and a liberal service: the contrary service and obedience, whether towards God or man, being illiberal, and unworthy of any honor and commendation.

In the case of religion, however, it must be considered, that if by the hope of reward be understood the love and desire of virtuous enjoyment, or of the very practice and exercise of virtue in another life; the expectation or hope of this kind is so far from being derogatory to virtue, that it is an evidence of our loving it the more sincerely, and for its own sake. Nor can this principle be justly called selfish: for if the love of virtue be not mere self-interest, the love and desire of life for virtue's sake cannot be esteemed so. But if the desire of life be only through the violence of that natural aversion to death; if it be

through the love of something else than virtuous affection, or through the unwillingness of parting with something else than what is purely of this kind; then is it no longer any sign or token of real virtue.

Thus a person loving life for life's sake, and virtue not at all, may by the promise or hope of life, and fear of death, or other evil, be induced to practise virtue, and even endeavour to be truly virtuous, by a love of what he practises. Yet neither is this very endeavour to be esteemed a virtue. For though he may intend to be virtuous; he is not become so, for having only intended, or aimed at it, through love of the reward. But as soon as he is come to have any affection towards what is morally good, and can like or affect such good for its own sake, as good and amiable in itself; then is he in some degree good and virtuous, and not till then.

Such are the advantages or disadvantages which accrue to virtue from reflection upon private good or interest. For though the habit of selfishness, and the multiplicity of interested views are of little improvement to real merit or virtue; yet there is a necessity for the preservation of virtue, that it should be thought to have no quarrel with true interest and self-enjoyment.

Whoever, therefore, by any strong persuasion or settled judgment, thinks in the main, that virtue causes happiness, and vice misery, carries with him that security and assistance to virtue which is required. Or though he has no such thought, nor

can believe virtue his real interest, either with respect to his own nature and constitution, or the circumstances of human life; yet if he believes any supreme powers concerned in the present affairs of mankind, and immediately interposing in behalf of the honest and virtuous, against the impious and unjust; this will serve to preserve in him, however, that just esteem of virtue, which might otherwise considerably diminish. Or should he still believe little of the immediate interposition of Providence in the affairs of this present life; yet if he believes a God dispensing rewards and punishments to vice and virtue in a future, he carries with him still the same advantage and security; whilst his belief is steady, and no wise wavering or doubtful. For it must be observed, that an expectation and dependency, so miraculous and great as this, must naturally take off from other inferior dependencies and encouragements. Where infinite rewards are thus enforced, and the imagination strongly turned towards them, the other common and natural motives to goodness are apt to be neglected, and lose much by disuse. Other interests are hardly so much as computed, whilst the mind is thus transported in the pursuit of a high advantage and self-interest, so narrowly confined within ourselves. On this account, all other affections towards friends, relations, or mankind, are often slightly regarded, as being worldly, and of little moment, in respect of the interest of our soul. And so little thought is there of any immediate satisfaction arising from such

good offices of life, that it is customary with many devout people zealously to decry all temporal advantages of goodness; all natural benefits of virtue; and magnifying the contrary happiness of a vicious state, to declare, "That, except only
" for the sake of future reward, and fear of future
" punishment, they would divest themselves of
" all goodness at once, and freely allow themselves to be most immoral and profligate." From whence it appears, that in some respects there can be nothing more fatal¹ to virtue than the weak and uncertain belief of a future reward and punishment. For the stress being laid wholly here, if this foundation come to fail, there is no further prop or security to men's morals. And thus virtue is supplanted and betrayed.

Now as to Atheism: Though it be plainly deficient, and without remedy, in the case of ill judgment on the happiness of virtue: yet it is not, indeed, of necessity the cause of any such ill judgment. For without an absolute assent to any hypothesis of Theism, the advantages of virtue may possibly be seen and owned, and a high opinion of it established in the mind. However, it must be confessed, that the natural tendency of Atheism is very different.

It is in a manner impossible to have any great opinion of the happiness of virtue, without conceiving high thoughts of the satisfaction resulting from the generous admiration and love of it: and

¹ Vol. I. p. 80. &c.

nothing beside the experience of such a love is likely to make this satisfaction credited. The chief ground and support, therefore, of this opinion of happiness in virtue, must arise from the powerful feeling of this generous moral affection, and the knowledge of its power and strength. But this is certain, that it can be no great strengthening to the moral affection, no great support to the pure love of goodness and virtue, to suppose there is neither goodness nor beauty in the whole itself, nor any example or precedent of good affection in any superior being. Such a belief must tend rather to the weaning the affections from any thing amiable or self-worthy, and to the suppressing the very habit and familiar custom of admiring natural beauties, or whatever in the order of things is according to just design, harmony, and proportion. For how little disposed must a person be, to love or admire any thing as orderly in the universe, who thinks the universe itself a pattern of disorder? How unapt to reverence or respect any particular subordinate beauty of a part, when even the whole itself is thought to want perfection, and to be only a vast and infinite deformity?

Nothing indeed can be more melancholy, than the thought of living in a distracted universe, from whence many ills may be suspected, and where there is nothing good or lovely which presents itself, nothing which can satisfy in contemplation, or raise any passion besides that of contempt, hatred, or dislike. Such an opinion as this may by degrees imbitter the temper, and not only

make the love of virtue to be less felt, but help to impair and ruin the very principle of virtue, viz. natural and kind affection.

Upon the whole: Whoever has a firm belief of a God, whom he does not merely call good, but of whom in reality he believes nothing beside real good, nothing beside what is truly suitable to the exactest character of benignity and goodness; such a person believing rewards or retributions in another life, must believe them annexed to real goodness and merit, real villany and baseness, and not to any accidental qualities or circumstances; in which respect they cannot properly be styled rewards or punishments, but capricious distributions of happiness or unhappiness to creatures. These are the only terms on which the belief of a world to come can happily influence the believer. And on these terms, and by virtue of this belief, man perhaps may retain his virtue and integrity, even under the hardest thoughts of human nature; when, either by any ill circumstance or untoward doctrine, he is brought to that unfortunate opinion of virtue's being naturally an enemy to happiness in life.

This, however, is an opinion which cannot be supposed consistent with sound Theism. For whatever be decided as to a future life, or the rewards and punishments of hereafter; he who, as a sound Theist, believes a reigning mind, sovereign in nature, and ruling all things with the highest perfection of goodness, as well as of wisdom and power, must necessarily believe virtue to be natur-

ally good and advantageous. For what could more strongly imply an unjust ordinance, a blot and imperfection in the general constitution of things, than to suppose virtue the natural ill, and vice the natural good of any creature?

And now, last of all, there remains for us to consider a yet further advantage to virtue, in the Theistical belief above the Atheistical. The proposition may at first sight appear over-refined, and of a sort which is esteemed too nicely philosophical. But, after what has been already examined, the subject perhaps may be more easily explained.

There is no creature, according to what has been already proved, who must not of necessity be ill in some degree, by having any affection or aversion in a stronger degree than is suitable to his own private good, or that of the system to which he is joined. For in either case the affection is ill and vicious. Now, if a rational creature has that degree of aversion which is requisite to arm him against any particular misfortune, and alarm him against the approach of any calamity; this is regular and well. But if, after the misfortune has happened, his aversion continues still, and his passion rather grows upon him, whilst he rages at the accident, and exclaims against his private fortune or lot; this will be acknowledged both vicious in present, and for the future; as it affects the temper, and disturbs that easy course of the affections on which virtue and goodness so much depend. On the other side, the patient enduring of the calamity, and the bearing up of the mind

under it, must be acknowledged immediately virtuous, and preservative of virtue. Now, according to the hypothesis of those who exclude a general mind, it must be confessed, there can nothing happen in the course of things to deserve either our admiration and love, or our anger and abhorrence. However, as there can be no satisfaction at the best in thinking upon what atoms and chance produce; so, upon disastrous occasions, and under the circumstances of a calamitous and hard fortune, it is scarce possible to prevent a natural kind of abhorrence and spleen, which will be entertained and kept alive by the imagination of so perverse an order of things.

But in another hypothesis, that of perfect Theism, it is understood, That whatever the order of the world produces, is in the main both just and good. Therefore, in the course of things in this world, whatever hardship of events may seem to force from any rational creature a hard censure of his private condition or lot, he may by reflection nevertheless come to have patience, and to acquiesce in it. Nor is this all. He may go further still in this reconciliation, and from the same principle may make the lot itself an object of his good affection; whilst he strives to maintain this generous fealty, and stands so well disposed towards the laws and government of his higher country.

Such an affection must needs create the highest constancy in any state of sufferance, and make us

in the best manner support whatever hardships are to be endured for virtue's sake. And as this affection must of necessity cause a greater acquiescence and complacency with respect to ill accidents, ill men, and injuries; so of course it cannot fail of producing still a greater equality, gentleness, and benignity, in the temper. Consequently the affection must be a truly good one, and a creature the more truly good and virtuous, by possessing it. For whatsoever is the occasion or means of more affectionately uniting a rational creature to his Part in society, and causes him to prosecute the public good or interest of his species with more zeal and affection than ordinary, is undoubtedly the cause of more than ordinary virtue in such a person.

This too is certain, that the admiration and love of order, harmony, and proportion, in whatever kind, is naturally improving to the temper, advantageous to social affection, and highly assistant to virtue; which is itself no other than the love of order and beauty in society. In the meanest subjects of the world, the appearance of order gains upon the mind, and draws the affection towards it. But if the order of the world itself appears just and beautiful, the admiration and esteem of order must run higher, and the elegant passion or love of beauty, which is so advantageous to virtue, must be the more improved by its exercise in so ample and magnificent a subject. For it is impossible that such a divine order should be contemplated with-

out ecstasy and rapture²; since in the common subjects of science, and the liberal arts, whatever is according to just harmony and proportion, is so transporting to those who have any knowledge or practice in the kind.

Now, if the subject and ground of this divine passion be not really just or adequate, the hypothesis of Theism being supposed false, the passion still in itself is so far natural and good, as it proves an advantage to virtue and goodness, according to what has been above demonstrated. But if, on the other side, the subject of this passion be really adequate and just, the hypothesis of Theism being real, and not imaginary, then is the passion also just, and becomes absolutely due and requisite in every rational creature.

Hence we may determine justly the relation which Virtue has to Piety, the first being not complete but in the latter; since where the latter is wanting, there can neither be the same benignity, firmness, or constancy; the same good composure of the affections, or uniformity of mind.

And thus the perfection and height of Virtue must be owing to the belief of a God.

² Rhapf. part 3. § 2. parag. 7. 20. in this vol.; Misc. 2. chap. 1. parag. 3. in vol. 3.

BOOK II. PART I.

S E C T. I.

Obligation to virtue. Difficulty stated. Union with a kind or species. Opposition from self-interest. Reconciliation.

WE have considered what Virtue is, and to whom the character belongs. It remains to inquire, What obligation there is to Virtue, or what reason to embrace it?

We have found, that to deserve the name of good or virtuous, a creature must have all his inclinations and affections, his dispositions of mind and temper, suitable, and agreeing with the good of his kind, or of that system in which he is included, and of which he constitutes a part. To stand thus well affected, and to have one's affections right and entire, not only in respect of one's self, but of society and the public; this is rectitude, integrity, or Virtue. And to be wanting in any of these, or to have their contraries, is depravity, corruption, and Vice.

It has been already shown, that in the passions and affections of particular creatures, there is a constant relation to the interest of a species, or common nature. This has been demonstrated in the case of natural affection, parental kindness,

zeal for posterity, concern for the propagation and nurture of the young, love of fellowship and company, compassion, mutual succour, and the rest of this kind. Nor will any one deny, that this affection of a creature towards the good of the species or common nature, is as proper and natural to him, as it is to any organ, part, or member of an animal body, or mere vegetable, to work in its known course, and regular way of growth. It is not more natural for the stomach to digest, the lungs to breathe, the glands to separate juices, or other entrails to perform their several offices, however they may by particular impediments be sometimes disordered or obstructed in their operations.

There being allowed therefore in a creature such affections as these towards the common nature, or system of the kind, together with those other which regard the private nature, or self-system; it will appear, that in following the first of these affections, the creature must on many occasions contradict and go against the latter. How else should the species be preserved? Or what would signify that implanted natural affection, by which a creature through so many difficulties and hazards preserves its offspring, and supports its kind?

It may therefore be imagined, perhaps, that there is a plain and absolute opposition between these two habits or affections. It may be presumed, that the pursuing the common interest or public good through the affections of one kind, must be a hindrance to the attainment of private good

through the affections of another. For it being taken for granted, that hazards and hardships, of whatever sort, are naturally the ill of the private state; and it being certainly the nature of those public affections to lead often to the greatest hardships and hazards of every kind; it is presently inferred, "That it is the creature's interest to be without
"any public affection whatsoever."

This we know for certain, that all social love, friendship, gratitude, or whatever else is of this generous kind, does by its nature take place of the self-interesting passions, draws us out of ourselves, and makes us disregarding of our own convenience and safety. So that, according to a known way of reasoning on self-interest¹, that which is of a social kind in us, should of right be abolished. Thus kindness of every sort, indulgence, tenderness, compassion, and, in short, all natural affection, should be industriously suppressed, and, as mere folly, and weakness of nature, be resisted and overcome; that by this means there might be nothing remaining in us which was contrary to a direct self-end; nothing which might stand in opposition to a steady and deliberate pursuit of the most narrowly confined self-interest.

According to this extraordinary hypothesis, it must be taken for granted, "That, in the
"system of a kind, or species, the interest of
"the private nature is directly opposite to that

¹ Vol. 1. p. 76. 93. &c.

“ of the common one; the interest of particulars
 “ directly opposite to that of the public in gene-
 “ ral.” — A strange constitution! in which it
 must be confessed there is much disorder and
 untowardness; unlike to what we observe else-
 where in nature: as if, in any vegetable or ani-
 mal body, the part or member could be suppo-
 sed in a good and prosperous state as to itself,
 when under a contrary disposition, and in an un-
 natural growth or habit as to its whole.

Now, that this is in reality quite otherwise,
 we shall endeavour to demonstrate, so as to make
 appear, “ That what men represent as an ill
 “ order and constitution in the universe, by ma-
 “ king moral rectitude appear the ill, and depra-
 “ vity the good or advantage of a creature, is
 “ in nature just the contrary: That to be
 “ well affected towards the public interest and
 “ one’s own, is not only consistent, but insepa-
 “ rable: and that moral rectitude, or virtue, must
 “ accordingly be the advantage; and vice the in-
 “ jury and disadvantage of every creature. ”

S E C T. II.

*Contradictory notions. Dissolute or immoral state. In
 whole. In part. Inward proportion. Continuity.
 Fabric or system of the affections.*

Here are few, perhaps, who, when they
 consider a creature void of natural affection, and

wholly destitute of a communicative or social principle, will suppose him, at the same time, either tolerably happy in himself, or as he stands abroad, with respect to his fellow-creatures or kind. It is generally thought, that such a creature as this feels slender joy in life, and finds little satisfaction in the mere sensual pleasures which remain with him, after the loss of social enjoyment, and whatever can be called humanity or good-nature. We know, that to such a creature as this, it is not only incident, to be morose, rancorous, and malignant; but that, of necessity, a mind or temper thus destitute of mildness and benignity, must turn to that which is contrary, and be wrought by passions of a different kind. Such a heart as this must be a continual seat of perverse inclinations and bitter aversions, raised from a constant ill-humor, sourness, and disquiet. The consciousness of such a nature, so obnoxious to mankind, and to all beings which approach it, must overcloud the mind with dark suspicion and jealousy, alarm it with fears and horror, and raise in it a continual disturbance, even in the most seeming fair and secure state of fortune, and in the highest degree of outward prosperity.

This, as to the complete immoral state, is what, of their own accord, men readily remark. Where there is this absolute degeneracy, this total apostasy from all candor, equity, trust, sociableness, or friendship, there are few who do not see and acknowledge the misery which is consequent. Seldom is the case misconstrued, when

at worst. The misfortune is, we look not on this depravity, nor consider how it stands, in less degrees. The calamity, we think does not o necessity hold proportion with the injustice or iniquity: as if to be absolutely immoral and inhuman, were indeed the greatest misfortune and misery; but that to be so, in a little degree, should be no misery nor harm at all! Which to allow, is just as reasonable as to own, that it is the greatest ill of a body to be in the utmost manner distorted and maimed; but that to lose the use only of one limb, or to be impaired in some one single organ or member, is no inconvenience or ill worthy the least notice.

The parts and proportions of the mind, their mutual relation and dependency, the connexion and frame of those passions which constitute the soul or temper, may easily be understood by any one who thinks it worth his while to study this inward anatomy. It is certain, that the order or symmetry of this inward part is, in itself, no less real and exact than that of the body. However, it is apparent, that few of us endeavour to become anatomists of this sort. Nor is any one ashamed of the deepest ignorance in such a subject. For though the greatest misery and ill is generally owned to be from disposition and temper; though it is allowed, that temper may often change, and that it actually varies on many occasions, much to our disadvantage; yet how this matter is brought about, we inquire not. We never trouble ourselves to consider

thoroughly by what means or methods our inward constitution comes at any time to be impaired or injured. The *solutio continui*, which bodily surgeons talk of, is never applied in this case by surgeons of another sort. The notion of a whole and parts is not apprehended in this science. We know not what the effect is of straining any affection, indulging any wrong passion, or relaxing any proper and natural habit, or good inclination. Nor can we conceive how a particular action should have such a sudden influence on the whole mind, as to make the person an immediate sufferer. We suppose rather, that a man may violate his faith, commit any wickedness unfamiliar to him before, engage in any vice or villany, without the least prejudice to himself, or any misery naturally following from the ill action.

It is thus we hear it often said, "Such a person has done ill indeed: but what is he the worse for it?" Yet speaking of any nature thoroughly savage, cursed, and inveterate, we say truly, "Such a one is a plague and torment to himself:" and we allow, "That through certain humors or passions, and from temper merely, a man may be completely miserable, let his outward circumstances be ever so fortunate." These different judgments sufficiently demonstrate, that we are not accustomed to think with much coherency on these moral subjects; and that our notions, in this respect, are not a little confused and contradictory.

Now, if the fabric of the mind or temper appeared such to us as it really is; if we saw it impossible to remove hence any one good or orderly affection, or introduce any ill or disorderly one, without drawing on, in some degree, that dissolute state, which at its height is confessed to be so miserable; it would then undoubtedly be owned, that since no ill, immoral, or unjust action, could be committed, without either a new inroad and breach on the temper and passions, or a further advancing of that execution already begun; whoever did ill, or acted in prejudice of his integrity, good-nature, or worth, would of necessity act with greater cruelty towards himself, than he who scrupled not to swallow what was poisonous, or who with his own hands should voluntarily mangle or wound his outward form or constitution, natural limbs or body.

S E C T. III.

System explained. Spring of actions. Affections, three kinds. Degrees of affection. Oeconomy of the passions. Measure. Tone. Balance. Temper. Best or worst in man. State of the argument.

IT has been shown before, that no animal can be said properly to act, otherwise than through affections or passions, such as are proper to an animal. For in convulsive fits, where a creature

strikes either himself or others, it is a simple mechanism, an engine, or piece of clock-work, which acts, and not the animal.

Whatsoever, therefore, is done or acted by any animal as such, is done only through some affection or passion, as of fear, love, or hatred, moving him.

And as it is impossible that a weaker affection should overcome a stronger, so it is impossible but that where the affections or passions are strongest in the main, and form in general the most considerable party, either by their force or number; thither the animal must incline: and according to this balance, he must be governed, and led to action.

The affections or passions which must influence and govern the animal, are either:

1. The natural affections, which lead to the good of the Public.
2. Or the self-affections, which lead only to the good of the Private.
3. Or such as are neither of these, nor tending either to any good of the Public or Private, but contrariwise; and which may therefore be justly styled unnatural affections.

So that according as these affections stand, a creature must be virtuous or vicious, good or ill.

The latter sort of these affections, it is evident, are wholly vicious. The two former may be vicious or virtuous, according to their degree.

It may seem strange, perhaps, to speak of natural affections as too strong, or of self-affections

as too weak. But to clear this difficulty, we must call to mind what has been already explained. "That natural affection may, in particular cases, be excessive, and in an unnatural degree:" as when pity is so overcoming as to destroy its own end, and prevent the succour and relief required; or, as when love to the offspring proves such a fondness as destroys the parent, and consequently the offspring itself. And notwithstanding it may seem harsh to call that unnatural and vicious, which is only an extreme of some natural and kind affection; yet it is most certain, that wherever any single good affection of this sort is over-great, it must be injurious to the rest, and detract in some measure from their force and natural operation. For a creature possessed with such an immoderate degree of passion, must of necessity allow too much to that one, and too little to others of the same character, and equally natural and useful as to their end. And this must necessarily be the occasion of partiality and injustice, whilst only one duty or natural part is earnestly followed, and other parts or duties neglected, which should accompany it, and perhaps take place and be preferred.

This may well be allowed true in all other respects; since even Religion itself, considered as a passion, not of the selfish but nobler kind, may in some characters be strained beyond its natural proportion, and be said also to be in too high a degree. For as the end of religion is to render us more perfect, and accomplished in all moral duties and performances, if, by the height of

devout ecstacy and contemplation, we are rather disabled in this respect, and rendered more unapt to the real duties and offices of civil life; it may be said that Religion indeed is then too strong in us. For how possibly can we call this Superstition, whilst the object of the devotion is acknowledged just, and the faith orthodox? It is only the excess of zeal, which in this case is so transporting, as to render the devout person more remiss in secular affairs, and less concerned for the inferior and temporal interests of mankind.

Now, as in particular cases, public affection, on the one hand, may be too high, so private affection may, on the other hand, be too weak. For if a creature be self-neglectful, and insensible of danger; or if he want such a degree of passion in any kind, as is useful to preserve, sustain, or defend himself; this must certainly be esteemed vicious, in regard of the design and end of nature. She herself discovers this in her known method and stated rule of operation. It is certain, that her provisional care and concern for the whole animal, must at least be equal to her concern for a single part or member. Now, to the several parts she has given, we see, proper affections, suitable to their interest and security; so that, even without our consciousness, they act in their own defence, and for their own benefit and preservation. Thus an eye, in its natural state, fails not to shut together, of its own accord, unknowingly to us, by a peculiar caution and timidity; which if it

wanted, however we might intend the preservation of our eye, we should not in effect be able to preserve it, by any observation or forecast of our own. To be wanting therefore in those principal affections, which respect the good of the whole constitution, must be a vice and imperfection, as great surely in the principal part, the soul or temper, as it is in any of those inferior and subordinate parts to want the self-preserving affections which are proper to them.

And thus the affections towards private good become necessary and essential to goodness. For though no creature can be called good or virtuous, merely for possessing these affections; yet since it is impossible, that the public good, or good of the system, can be preserved without them, it follows, that a creature really wanting in them, is in reality wanting in some degree to goodness and natural rectitude, and may thus be esteemed vicious and defective.

It is thus we say of a creature, in a kind way of reproof, that he is too good; when his affection towards others is so warm and zealous, as to carry him even beyond his part; or when he really acts beyond it, not through too warm a passion of that sort, but through an over-cool one of another, or through want of some self-passion to restrain him within due bounds.

It may be objected here, That the having the natural affections too strong, where the self-affections are overmuch so, or the having the self-affections defective or weak, where the natural

affections are also weak, may prove upon occasion the only cause of a creature's acting honestly, and in moral proportion. For thus, one who is to a fault regardless of his life, may, with the smallest degree of natural affection, do all which can be expected from the highest pitch of social love, or zealous friendship. And thus, on the other hand, a creature excessively timorous, may, by as exceeding a degree of natural affection, perform whatever the perfectest courage is able to inspire,

To this it is answered, That whenever we arraign any passion as too strong, or complain of any as too weak, we must speak with respect to a certain constitution or œconomy of a particular creature or species. For if a passion, leading to any right end, be only so much the more serviceable and effectual, for being strong, if we may be assured, that the strength of it will not be the occasion of any disturbance within, nor of any disproportion between itself and other affections; then consequently the passion, however strong, cannot be condemned as vicious. But if to have all the passions in equal proportion with it, be what the constitution of the creature cannot bear, so that only some passions are raised to this height, whilst others are not, nor can possibly be wrought up to the same proportion; then may those strong passions, though of the better kind, be called excessive. For, being in unequal proportion to the others, and causing an ill balance in the affection at large, they must of course be the occasion of

inequality in the conduct, and incline the party to a wrong moral practice.

But to show more particularly what is meant by the œconomy of the passions, from instances in the species or kinds below us¹: As for the creatures who have no manner of power or means given them by nature, for their defence against violence, nor any thing by which they can make themselves formidable to such as injure or offend them; it is necessary they should have an extraordinary degree of fear, but little or no animosity, such as might cause them to make resistance, or incline them to delay their flight. For in this their safety lies; and to this the passion of fear is serviceable, by keeping the senses on the watch, and holding the spirits in readiness to give the start.

And thus timorousness, and a habitual strong passion of fear, may be according to the œconomy of a particular creature, both with respect to himself, and to the rest of his species. On the other hand, courage may be contrary to his œconomy, and therefore vicious. Even in one and the same species, this is by nature differently ordered, with respect to different sexes, ages, and growths. The tamer creatures of the grazing kind, who live in herds, are different from the wilder, who herd not, but live in pairs only, apart from company, as is natural and suitable to their rapacious life.

¹ *Infra*, book 2. part 1. § 3. parag. 13, 14. *Rhapf.* part 2. § 4. parag. 37, 38, &c. in this volume; *Misc.* 4. chap. 2. parag. 6. &c. in vol. 3.

Yet is there found, even among the former inoffensive kind, a courage proportionable to their make and strength. At a time of danger, when the whole herd flies, the bull alone makes head against the lion, or whatever other invading beast of prey, and shows himself conscious of his make. Even the female of this kind is armed, we see, by nature, in some degree to resist violence, so as not to fly a common danger. As for a hind, or doe, or any other inoffensive and mere defenceless creature, it is no way unnatural or vicious in them, when the enemy approaches, to desert their offspring, and fly for safety. But for creatures who are able to make resistance, and are by nature armed offensively, be they of the poorest insect-kind, such as bees or wasps; it is natural to them to be roused with fury, and, at the hazard of their lives, oppose any enemy or invader of their species. For by this known passion in the creature, the species itself is secured; when, by experience, it is found, that the creature, though unable to repel the injury, yet voluntarily exposes his life for the punishment of the invader, and suffers not his kind to be injured with impunity. And, of all other creatures, man is in this sense the most formidable; since, if he thinks it just and exemplary, he may possibly, in his own or in his country's cause, revenge an injury on any one living; and, by throwing away his own life, if he be resolute to that degree, is almost certain master of another's, however strongly guarded. Examples of this nature have often

served to restrain those in power, from using it to the utmost extent, and urging their inferiors to extremity.

Upon the whole : It may be said properly to be the same with the affections or passions in an animal constitution, as with the cords or strings of a musical instrument. If these, though in ever so just proportion one to another, are strained beyond a certain degree, it is more than the instrument will bear. The lute or lyre is abused, and its effect lost. On the other hand, if, while some of the strings are duly strained, others are not wound up to their due proportion, then is the instrument still in disorder, and its part ill performed. The several species of creatures are like different sorts of instruments; and even in the same species of creatures, as in the same sort of instrument, one is not entirely like the other, nor will the same strings fit each. The same degree of strength which winds up one, and fits the several strings to a just harmony and consort, may in another burst both the strings and instrument itself. Thus men who have the liveliest sense, and are the easiest affected with pain or pleasure, have need of the strongest influence or force of other affections, such as tenderness, love sociableness, compassion, in order to preserve a right Balance within, and to maintain them in their duty, and in the just performance of their part; whilst others, who are of a cooler blood, or lower key, need not the same allay or counter-part; nor are made by nature to feel

those tender and endearing affections in so exquisite a degree.

It might be agreeable, one would think, to inquire thus into the different tunings of the passions, the various mixtures and allays by which men become so different from one another. For as the highest improvements of temper are made in human kind; so the greatest corruptions and degeneracies are discoverable in this race. In the other species of creatures around us, there is found generally an exact proportionableness, constancy and regularity in all their passions and affections; no failure in the care of the offspring, or of the society, to which they are united; no prostitution of themselves; no intemperance or excess in any kind. The smaller creatures, who live as it were in cities, as bees and ants, continue the same train and harmony of life: nor are they ever false to those affections which move them to operate towards their public good. Even those creatures of prey, who live the farthest out of society, maintain, we see, such a conduct towards one another, as is exactly suitable to the good of their own species. Whilst man, notwithstanding the assistance of religion, and the direction of laws, is often found to live in less conformity with nature; and, by means of religion itself, is often rendered the more barbarous and inhuman. Marks are set on men, distinctions formed, opinions decreed, under the severest penalties, antipathies instilled, and aversions raised in men against the generality of their own species.

So that it is hard to find in any region a human society which has human laws. No wonder, if in such societies it is so hard to find a man who lives Naturally, and as a man.

But having shown what is meant by a passion's being in too high or in too low a degree; and that, "To have any natural affection too high, " or any self-affection too low," though it be often approved as virtue, is yet, strictly speaking, a vice and imperfection: we come now to the plainer and more essential part of Vice, and which alone deserves to be considered as such; that is to say,

1. "When either the public affections are weak " or deficient."

2 "Or the private and self-affections too strong."

3. "Or that such affections arise as are neither " of these, nor in any degree tending to the support either of the public or private system."

Otherwise than thus, it is impossible any creature can be such as we call ill or vicious. So that if once we prove, that it is really not the creature's interest to be thus viciously affected, but contrariwise; we shall then have proved, "That it is his interest to be wholly good and " virtuous:" since, in a wholesome and sound state of his affections, such as we have described, he cannot possibly be other than sound, good, and virtuous, in his action and behaviour.

Our business therefore will be, to prove,

I. "That to have the natural, kindly, or

“ generous affections strong and powerful towards
“ the good of the public, is to have the chief
“ means and power of self-enjoyment;” and,
“ That to want them, is certain misery and ill.”

II. “ That to have the private or self-affections
“ too strong, or beyond their degree of subordi-
“ nacy to the kindly and natural, is also miser-
“ able.”

III. And, “ That to have the unnatural affec-
“ tions, viz. such as are neither founded on the
“ interest of the kind, or public, nor of the pri-
“ vate person or creature himself, is to be miser-
“ able in the highest degree.”

P A R T I I.

S E C T. I.

First proof, from the natural affections. Pleasures of the body and mind. The latter preferable. Inference. Mental enjoyments, whence. Energy of natural affections. Effects of natural affection. Partial affection examined. Partial affection. Entire affection. Mind and temper. Temper. Mind. Reflection. Conscience. Moral conscience. False conscience; causes reproach from true. Conscience from interest. Conclusion drawn from the mental pleasures. Pleasures of the sense, dependent also on natural affection. Vulgar epicurism. Imagination, fancy. A debauch. Women. Pleasures of the sense, convertible into disgust; variable; insupportable. Balance of the affections. Instance in the Animal kinds, Mankind. Oeconomy. Fabric. Monsters.

TO begin therefore with this proof, "That to have the natural affections, such as are founded in love, complacency, good-will, and in a sympathy with the kind or species, is to have the chief means and power of self-enjoyment; and that to want them is certain misery and ill:"

We may inquire, first, what those are which we call pleasures or satisfactions; from whence happiness is generally computed. They are,

according to the common distinction, satisfactions and pleasures either of the body, or of the mind.

That the latter of these satisfactions are the greatest, is allowed by most people, and may be proved by this. That whenever the mind, having conceived a high opinion of the worth of any action or behaviour, has received the strongest impression of this sort, and is wrought up to the highest pitch or degree of passion towards the subject; at such time it sets itself above all bodily pain as well as pleasure, and can be no way diverted from its purpose by flattery or terror of any kind. Thus we see Indians, barbarians, malefactors, and even the most execrable villains, for the sake of a particular gang or society, or through some cherished notion or principle of honor or gallantry, revenge or gratitude, embrace any manner of hardship, and defy torments and death. Whereas, on the other hand, a person being placed in all the happy circumstances of outward enjoyment, surrounded with every thing which can allure or charm the sense, and being then actually in the very moment of such a pleasing indulgence; yet no sooner is there any thing amiss within, no sooner has he conceived any internal ail or disorder, any thing inwardly vexatious or distempered, than instantly his enjoyment ceases, the pleasure of sense is at an end; and every means of that sort becomes ineffectual, and is rejected as uneasy, and subject to give distaste.

The pleasures of the mind being allowed,

therefore, superior to those of the body, it follows, "That whatever can create in any intelligent being a constant flowing series or train of mental enjoyments, or pleasures of the mind, is more considerable to his happiness, than that which can create to him a like constant course or train of sensual enjoyments, or pleasures of the body."

Now, the mental enjoyments are either actually the very natural affections themselves in their immediate operation; or they wholly, in a manner, proceed from them, and are no other than their effects.

If so, it follows, that the natural affections duly established in a rational creature, being the only means which can procure him a constant series or succession of the mental enjoyments, they are the only means which can procure him a certain and solid happiness.

Now, in the first place, to explain, "How much the natural affections are in themselves the highest pleasures and enjoyments;" there should, methinks, be little need of proving this to any one of human kind, who has ever known the condition of the mind under a lively affection of love, gratitude, bounty, generosity, pity, succour, or whatever else is of a social or friendly sort. He who has ever so little knowledge of human nature, is sensible what pleasure the mind perceives when it is touched in this generous way. The difference we find between solitude and company, between a common company and

that of friends; the reference of almost all our pleasures to mutual converse, and the dependence they have on society, either present or imagined; all these are sufficient proofs in our behalf.

How much the social pleasures are superior to any other, may be known by visible tokens and effects. The very outward features, the marks and signs which attend this sort of joy, are expressive of a more intense, clear, and undisturbed pleasure, than those which attend the satisfaction of thirst, hunger, and other ardent appetites. But more particularly still may this superiority be known, from the actual prevalence and ascendancy of this sort of affection over all besides. Wherever it presents itself with any advantage, it silences and appeases every other motion of pleasure. No joy, merely of sense, can be a match for it. Whoever is judge of both the pleasures, will ever give the preference to the former. But to be able to judge of both, it is necessary to have a sense of each. The honest man indeed can judge of sensual pleasure, and knows its utmost force. For neither is his taste or sense the duller; but, on the contrary, the more intense and clear, on the account of his temperance, and a moderate use of appetite. But the immoral and profligate man can by no means be allowed a good judge of social pleasure, to which he is so mere a stranger by his nature.

Nor is it any objection here, that in many natures the good affection, though really present, is found to be of insufficient force. For where

it is not in its natural degree, it is the same indeed as if it were not, or had never been. The less there is of this good affection in any unward creature, the greater the wonder is, that it should at any time prevail; as in the very worst of creatures it sometimes will. And if it prevails but for once, in any single instance, it shows evidently, that if the affection were thoroughly experienced or known, it would prevail in all.

Thus the charm of kind affection is superior to all other pleasure; since it has the power of drawing from every other appetite or inclination. And thus in the case of love to the offspring, and a thousand other instances, the charm is found to operate so strongly on the temper, as, in the midst of other temptations, to render it susceptible of this passion alone, which remains as the master-pleasure and conqueror of the rest.

There is no one who, by the least progress in science or learning, has come to know barely the principles of mathematics, but has found, that, in the exercise of his mind on the discoveries he there makes, though merely of speculative truths, he receives a pleasure and delight superior to that of sense. When we have thoroughly searched into the nature of this contemplative delight, we shall find it of a kind which relates not in the least to any private interest of the creature, nor has for its object any self-good or advantage of the private system. The admiration, joy, or love, turns wholly upon what is

exterior, and foreign to ourselves. And though the reflected joy or pleasure which arises from the notice of this pleasure once perceived, may be interpreted a self-passion, or interested regard; yet the original satisfaction can be no other than what results from the love of truth, proportion, order, and symmetry, in the things without. If this be the case, the passion ought in reality to be ranked with natural affection. For having no object within the compass of the private system, it must either be esteemed superfluous and unnatural, as having no tendency towards the advantage or good of any thing in nature, or it must be judged to be, what it truly is, "A natural joy" in the contemplation of those "numbers, that harmony, proportion, and concord, which supports the universal nature, and is essential in the constitution and form of every particular species, or order of beings."

But this speculative pleasure, however considerable and valuable it may be, or however superior to any motion of mere sense, must yet be far surpassed by virtuous motion, and the exercise of benignity and goodness; where, together with the most delightful affection of the soul, there is joined a pleasing assent and approbation of the mind to what is acted in this good disposition and honest bent. For where is there on earth a fairer matter of speculation, a goodlier, view or contemplation, than that of a beautiful,

¹ Misc. 2. chap. 1. parag. 3 in vol. 3.

proportioned, and becoming action? Or what is there relating to us, of which the consciousness and memory is more solidly and lastingly entertaining?

We may observe, that in the passion of love between the sexes, where, together with the affection of a vulgar sort, there is a mixture of the kind and friendly, the sense or feeling of this latter is in reality superior to the former; since often through this affection, and for the sake of the person beloved, the greatest hardships in the world have been submitted to, and even death itself voluntarily embraced, without any expected compensation. For where should the ground of such an expectation lie? Not here, in this world surely; for death puts an end to all. Nor yet hereafter, in any other: for who has ever thought of providing a heaven or future recompence for the suffering virtue of lovers?

We may observe, withal, in favor of the natural affections, that it is not only when joy and sprightliness are mixed with them, that they carry a real enjoyment above that of the sensual kind. The very disturbances which belong to natural affection, though they may be thought wholly contrary to pleasure, yield still a contentment and satisfaction greater than the pleasures of indulged sense. And where a series or continued succession of the tender and kind affections can be carried on, even through fears, horrors, sorrows, griefs; the emotion of the soul is still agreeable. We continue pleased even with

this melancholy aspect or sense of virtue. Her beauty supports itself under a cloud, and in the midst of surrounding calamities. For thus, when by mere illusion, as in a tragedy, the passions of this kind are skilfully excited in us, we prefer the entertainment to any other of equal duration. We find by ourselves, that the moving our passions in this mournful way, the engaging them in behalf of merit and worth, and the exerting whatever we have of social affection, and human sympathy, is of the highest delight; and affords a greater enjoyment in the way of thought and sentiment, than any thing besides can do in a way of sense and common appetite. And after this manner it appears, "How much the mental enjoyments are actually the very natural affections themselves."

Now, in the next place, to explain, "How they proceed from them, as their natural effects;" we may consider, first, that the effects of love or kind affection, in a way of mental pleasure, are, "An enjoyment of good by communication; a receiving it, as it were, by reflection, or by way of participation in the good of others;" and, "A pleasing consciousness of the actual love, merited esteem, or approbation of others."

How considerable a part of happiness arises from the former of these effects, will be easily apprehended by one who is not exceedingly ill-natured. It will be considered how many the pleasures are, of sharing contentment and delight with

others; of receiving it in fellowship and company; and gathering it, in a manner, from the pleased and happy states of those around us, from accounts and relations of such happinesses, from the very countenances, gestures, voices, and sounds, even of creatures foreign to our kind, whose signs of joy and contentment we can any way discern. So insinuating are these pleasures of sympathy, and so widely diffused through our whole lives, that there is hardly such a thing as satisfaction or contentment, of which they make not an essential part.

As for that other effect of social love, viz. the consciousness of merited kindness or esteem, it is not difficult to perceive how much this avails in mental pleasure, and constitutes the chief enjoyment and happiness of those who are, in the narrowest sense, voluptuous. How natural is it for the most selfish among us, to be continually drawing some sort of satisfaction from a character, and pleasing ourselves in the fancy of deserved admiration and esteem? For though it be mere fancy, we endeavour still to believe it truth, and flatter ourselves all we can with the thought of merit of some kind, and the persuasion of our deserving well from some few at least, with whom we happen to have a more intimate and familiar commerce.

What tyrant is there, what robber, or open violator of the laws of society, who has not a companion, or some particular set, either of his own kindred, or such as he calls friends, with

whom he gladly shares his good, in whose welfare he delights, and whose joy and satisfaction he makes his own? What person in the world is there, who receives not some impressions from the flattery or kindness of such as are familiar with him? It is to this soothing hope and expectation of friendship, that almost all our actions have some reference. It is this which goes through our whole lives, and mixes itself even with most of our vices. Of this, vanity, ambition, and luxury, have a share; and many other disorders of our life partake. Even the unchaste love borrows largely from this source. So that, were pleasure to be computed in the same way as other things commonly are, it might properly be said, that out of these two branches, viz community or participation in the pleasures of others, and belief of meriting well from others, would arise more than nine tenths of whatever is enjoyed in life. And thus, in the main sum of happiness, there is scarce a single article but what derives itself from social love, and depends immediately on the natural and kind affections.

Now, such as Causes are, such must be their Effects. And therefore as natural affection or social love is perfect or imperfect, so must be the content and happiness depending on it.

But lest any should imagine with themselves, that an inferior degree of natural affection or an imperfect partial regard of this sort, can supply the place of an entire, sincere, and truly moral one; lest a small tincture of social inclination

should be thought sufficient to answer the end of pleasure in society, and give us that enjoyment of participation and community which is so essential to our happiness; we may consider, first, that partial Affection, or social love in part, without regard to a complete society or whole, is in itself an inconsistency, and implies an absolute contradiction. Whatever affection we have towards any thing besides ourselves, if it be not of the natural sort towards the system, or kind, it must be of all other affections the most dissociable, and destructive of the enjoyments of society: if it be really of the natural sort, and applied only to some one part of society, or of a species, but not to the species or society itself; there can be no more account given of it, than of the most odd, capricious, or humorsome passion which may arise. The person, therefore, who is conscious of this affection, can be conscious of no merit or worth on the account of it. Nor can the persons on whom this capricious affection has chanced to fall, be in any manner secure of its continuance or force. As it has no foundation or establishment in reason, so it must be easily removable, and subject to alteration, without reason. Now, the variableness of such sort of passion, which depends solely on capriciousness and humor, and undergoes the frequent successions of alternate hatred and love, aversion and inclination must of necessity create continual disturbance and disgust, give an alloy to what is immediately enjoyed in the way of friendship and

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society, and in the end extinguish, in a manner, the very inclination towards friendship and human commerce. Whereas, on the other hand, entire Affection, from whence integrity has its name, as it is answerable to itself, proportionable, and rational; so it is irrefragable, solid and durable. And as in the case of partiality, or vicious friendship, which has no rule or order, every reflection of the mind necessarily makes to its disadvantage, and lessens the enjoyment; so in the case of integrity, the consciousness of just behaviour towards mankind in general, casts a good reflection on each friendly affection in particular, and raises the enjoyment of friendship still the higher, in the way of community or participation above mentioned.

And, in the next place, as partial Affection is fitted only to a short and slender enjoyment of those pleasures of sympathy or participation with others; so neither is it able to derive any considerable enjoyment from that other principal branch of human happiness, viz. consciousness of the actual or merited esteem of others. From whence should this esteem arise? The merit, surely, must in itself be mean, whilst the affection is so precarious and uncertain. What trust can there be to a mere casual inclination or capricious liking? Who can depend on such a friendship as is founded on no moral rule, but fantasically assigned to some single person or small part of mankind, exclusive of society, and the whole?

It may be considered, withal, as a thing impos-

fible, that they who esteem or love by any other rule than that of virtue, should place their affection on such subjects as they can long esteem or love. It will be hard for them, in the number of their so beloved friends, to find any in whom they can heartily rejoice, or whose reciprocal love or esteem they can sincerely prize and enjoy. Nor can those pleasures be found or lasting, which are gathered from a self-flattery, and false persuasion of the esteem and love of others, who are incapable of any sound esteem or love. It appears therefore how much the men of narrow or partial affection must be losers in this sense, and of necessity fall short in this second principal part of mental enjoyment.

Mean while entire affection has all the opposite advantages. It is equal, constant, accountable to itself, ever satisfactory, and pleasing. It gains applause and love from the best; and in all disinterested cases, from the very worst of men. We may say of it, with justice, that it carries with it a consciousness of merited love and approbation from all society, from all intelligent creatures, and from whatever is original to all other intelligence. And if there be in nature any such original, we may add, that the satisfaction which attends entire affection, is full and noble, in proportion to its final object, which contains all perfection; according to the sense of Theism above noted. For this, as has been shown, is the result of virtue. And to have this entire Affection or Integrity of mind, is to live according

to nature, and the dictates and rules of supreme wisdom. This is morality, justice, piety, and natural religion.

But lest this argument should appear perhaps too scholastically stated, and in terms and phrases which are not of familiar use, we may try whether possibly we can set it yet in a plainer light.

Let any one, then, consider well those pleasures which he receives either in private retirement, contemplation, study, and converse with himself; or in mirth, jollity, and entertainment, with others; and he will find, that they are wholly founded in an easy temper, free of harshness, bitterness, or distaste; and in a mind or reason well composed, quiet, easy within itself, and such as can freely bear its own inspection and review. Now, such a mind, and such a Temper, which fit and qualify for the enjoyment of the pleasures mentioned, must of necessity be owing to the natural and good affections.

As to what relates to Temper, it may be considered thus. There is no state of outward prosperity, or flowing fortune, where inclination and desire are always satisfied, fancy and humor pleased. There are almost hourly some impediments or crosses to the appetite; some accidents or other from without, or something from within, to check the licentious course of the indulged affections. They are not always to be satisfied by mere indulgence. And when a life is guided by fancy only, there is sufficient ground of contrariety and disturbance. The very ordinary las-

situdes, uneasinesses, and defects of disposition in the soundest body; the interrupted course of the humors, or spirits in the healthiest people; and the accidental disorders, common to every constitution, are sufficient, we know, on many occasions, to breed uneasiness and distaste. And this, in time, must grow into a habit, where there is nothing to oppose its progress, and hinder its prevailing on the temper. Now, the only sound opposite to ill Humor, is natural and kind affection. For we may observe, that when the mind, upon reflection, resolves at any time to suppress this disturbance already risen in the temper, and sets about this reforming work with heartiness, and in good earnest, it can no otherwise accomplish the undertaking, than by introducing into the affectionate part some gentle feeling of the social and friendly kind; some enlivening motion of kindness, fellowship, complacency, or love, to allay and convert that contrary motion of impatience and discontent.

If it be said, perhaps, that, in the case before us, religious affection or devotion is a sufficient and proper remedy; we answer, that it is according as the kind may happily prove. For if it be of the pleasant and chearful sort, it is of the very kind of natural affection itself: if it be of the dismal or fearful sort²; if it brings along with it any affection opposite to manhood, generosity,

² Vol. 1. p. 26. &c; Misc. 2. chap. 3. parag. 38, 39. 51. &c. in vol. 3.

courage, or free thought; there will be nothing gained by this application; and the remedy will, in the issue, be undoubtedly found worse than the disease. The severest reflections on our duty, and the consideration merely of what is by authority and under penalties enjoined, will not by any means serve to calm us on this occasion. The more dismal our thoughts are on such a subject, the worse our temper will be, and the readier to discover itself in harshness and austerity. If, perhaps, by compulsion, or through any necessity or fear incumbent, a different carriage be at any time affected, or different maxims owned, the practice at the bottom will be still the same. If the countenance be composed, the heart, however, will not be changed. The ill passion may for the time be withheld from breaking into action, but will not be subdued, or in the least debilitated against the next occasion. So that in such a breast as this, whatever devotion there may be, it is likely there will in time be little of an easy spirit, or good temper remaining; and consequently few and slender enjoyments of a mental kind.

If it be objected, on the other hand. That though in melancholy circumstances ill humor may prevail, yet in a course of outward prosperity, and in the height of fortune, there can nothing probably occur which should thus sour the temper, and give it such disrelish as is suggested; we may consider, that the most humored and indulged state is apt to receive the most disturbance from every disappointment or smallest ail.

And

And if provocations are easiest raised, and the passions of anger, offence, and enmity, are found the highest in the most indulged state of will and humor; there is still the greater need of a supply from social affection, to preserve the temper from running into savageness and inhumanity. And this, the case of tyrants, and most unlimited potentates, may sufficiently verify and demonstrate.

Now, as to the other part of our consideration, which relates to a Mind or reason well composed and easy within itself; upon what account this happiness may be thought owing to natural affection, we may possibly resolve ourselves after this manner. It will be acknowledged, that a creature, such as man, who from several degrees of reflection has risen to that capacity which we call reason and understanding, must, in the very use of this his reasoning faculty, be forced to receive reflections back into his mind of what passes in itself, as well as in the affections, or will; in short, of whatsoever relates to his character, conduct, or behaviour amidst his fellow-creatures, and in society. Or should he be of himself unapt, there are others ready to remind him, and refresh his memory, in this way of criticism. We have all of us remembrancers enow to help us in this work. Nor are the greatest favorites of fortune exempted from this task of self-inspection. Even flattery itself, by making the view agreeable, renders us more attentive this way, and insnares us in the habit. The vainer any person is, the more he has his eye inwardly fixed upon himself, and is,

after a certain manner, employed in this home-survey. And when a true regard to ourselves cannot oblige us to this inspection, a false regard to others, and a fondness for reputation, raises a watchful jealousy, and furnishes us sufficiently with acts of reflection on our own character and conduct.

In whatever manner we consider of this, we shall find still, that every reasoning or reflecting creature is, by his nature, forced to endure the review of his own mind and actions; and to have representations of himself, and his inward affairs, constantly passing before him, obvious to him, and revolving in his mind. Now, as nothing can be more grievous than this is, to one who has thrown off natural affection; so nothing can be more delightful to one who has preserved it with sincerity.

There are two things which to a rational creature must be horridly offensive and grievous, viz. "To have the reflection in his mind of any
" unjust action or behaviour, which he knows
" to be naturally odious and ill-deserving; or of
" any foolish action or behaviour, which he knows
" to be prejudicial to his own interest or happiness.

The former of these is alone properly called Conscience, whether in a moral or religious sense. For to have awe and terror of the Deity, does not, of itself, imply conscience. No one is esteemed the more conscientious for the fear of evil spirits, conjurations, enchantments, or whatever may proceed from any unjust, capricious, or

devilish nature. Now, to fear God any otherwise than as in consequence of some justly blamable and imputable act, is to fear a devilish nature, not a divine one. Nor does the fear of hell, or a thousand terrors of the Deity, imply conscience, unless where there is an apprehension of what is wrong, odious, morally deformed, and ill deserving. And where this is the case, there conscience must have effect, and punishment of necessity be apprehended, even though it be not expressly threatened.

And thus religious conscience supposes moral or natural conscience. And though the former be understood to carry with it the fear of divine punishment; it has its force, however, from the apprehended moral deformity and odiousness of any act, with respect purely to the divine presence, and the natural veneration due to such a supposed being. For in such a presence, the shame of villany or vice must have its force, independently on that further apprehension of the magisterial capacity of such a being, and his dispensation of particular rewards or punishments in a future state.

It has been already said that no creature can maliciously and intentionally do ill, without being sensible at the same time, that he deserves ill. And in this respect, every sensible creature may be said to have conscience. For with all mankind, and all intelligent creatures, this must ever hold, "That what they know they deserve from
" every one, that they necessarily must fear and

“ expect from all.” And thus suspicions and ill apprehensions must arise, with terror both of men and of the Deity. But besides this, there must in every rational creature be yet farther conscience; viz. from sense of deformity in what is thus ill-deserving and unnatural; and from a consequent shame or regret of incurring what is odious, and moves aversion.

There scarcely is, or can be any creature, whom consciousness of villany, as such merely, does not at all offend; nor any thing opprobrious or heinously imputable move or affect. If there be such a one, it is evident he must be absolutely indifferent towards moral good or ill. If this indeed be his case, it will be allowed he can be no way capable of natural affection: if not of that, then neither of any social pleasure, or mental enjoyment, as shown above; but, on the contrary, he must be subject to all manner of horrid, unnatural, and ill affection. So that to want Conscience, or natural sense of the odiousness of crime and injustice, is to be most of all miserable in life: but where conscience, or sense of this sort, remains; there, consequently, whatever is committed against it, must of necessity, by means of reflection, as we have shown, be continually shameful, grievous, and offensive.

A man who in a passion happens to kill his companion, relents immediately on the sight of what he has done. His revenge is changed into pity, and his hatred turned against himself; and this merely by the power of the object. On this

account he suffers agonies; the subject of this continually occurs to him; and of this he has a constant ill remembrance, and displeasing consciousness. If, on the other side, we suppose him not to relent, or suffer any real concern or shame, then either he has no sense of the deformity of the crime and injustice, no natural affection, and consequently no happiness or peace within; or if he has any sense of moral worth or goodness, it must be of a perplexed and contradictory kind. He must pursue an inconsistent notion, idolize some false species or virtue, and affect as noble, gallant, or worthy, that which is irrational and absurd. And how tormenting this must be to him, is easy to conceive. For never can such a phantom as this be reduced to any certain form. Never can this Proteus of honor be held steady to one shape. The pursuit of it can only be vexatious and distracting. There is nothing besides real virtue, as has been shown, which can possibly hold any proportion to esteem, approbation, or good conscience. And he, who being led by false religion, or prevailing custom, has learned to esteem or admire any thing as virtue which is not really such, must, either through the inconsistency of such an esteem, and the perpetual immoralities occasioned by it, come at last to lose all conscience, and so be miserable in the worst way; or, if he retains any conscience at all, it must be of a kind never satisfactory, or able to bestow content. For it is impossible that a cruel enthusiast, or bigot, a persecutor, a murderer,

a bravo, a pirate, or any villain of less degree, who is false to the society of mankind in general, and contradicts natural affection, should have any fixed principle at all, any real standard or measure by which he can regulate his esteem, or any solid reason by which to form his approbation of any one moral act. And thus, the more he sets up honor, or advances zeal, the worse he renders his nature, and the more detestable his character. The more he engages in the love or admiration of any action or practice, as great and glorious, which is in itself morally ill and vicious, the more contradiction and self-disapprobation he must incur. For there being nothing more certain than this, "That no natural affection can be contradicted, nor any unnatural one advanced, without a prejudice, in some degree, to all natural affection in general;" it must follow, "That inward deformity growing greater, by the encouragement of unnatural affection, there must be so much the more subject for dissatisfactory reflection, the more any false principle of honor, any false religion or superstition, prevails."

So that whatever notions of this kind are cherished, or whatever character affected, which is contrary to moral equity, and leads to inhumanity, through a false conscience, or wrong sense of honor, serves only to bring a man the more under the lash of real and just conscience, shame, and self-reproach. Nor can any one, who, by any pretended authority, commits one single im-

morality, be able to satisfy himself with any reason, why he should not at another time be carried further, into all manner of villany, such perhaps as he even abhors to think of. And this is a reproach which a mind must of necessity make to itself, upon the least violation of natural conscience; in doing what is morally deformed, and ill-deserving, though warranted by any example or precedent amongst men, or by any supposed injunction or command of higher powers.

Now, as for that other part of conscience, viz. the remembrance of what was at any time unreasonably and foolishly done, in prejudice of one's real interest or happiness: This dissatisfactory reflection must follow still and have effect, wheresoever there is a sense of moral deformity, contracted by crime and injustice. For even where there is no sense of moral deformity, as such merely; there must be still a sense of the ill merit of it with respect to God and man. Or, though there were a possibility of excluding for ever all thoughts or suspicions of any superior powers, yet considering that this insensibility towards moral good or ill, implies a total defect in natural affection, and that this defect can by no dissimulation be concealed; it is evident, that a man of this unhappy character must suffer a very sensible loss in the friendship, trust, and confidence of other men; and consequently must suffer in his interest and outward happiness. Nor can the sense of this disadvantage fail to occur to him, when he sees

with regret and envy, the better and more grateful terms of friendship and esteem, on which better people live with the rest of mankind. Even, therefore, where natural affection is wanting, it is certain still, that by immorality, necessarily happening through want of such affection, there must be disturbance from conscience of this sort, viz. from sense of what is committed imprudently, and contrary to real interest and advantage.

From all this we may easily conclude, how much our happiness depends on natural and good affection. For if the chief happiness be from the Mental pleasures; and the chief mental pleasures are such as we have described, and are founded in natural affection: it follows, "That to have the
" natural affections, is to have the chief means and
" power of self-enjoyment, the highest possession
" and happiness of life."

Now, as to the pleasures of the Body, and the satisfactions belonging to mere Sense, it is evident they cannot possibly have their effect, or afford any valuable enjoyment, otherwise than by the means of social and natural affection.

To live well, has no other meaning with some people, than to eat and drink well. And methinks it is an unwary concession we make in favor of these pretended good livers, when we join with them, in honoring their way of life with the title of living fast; as if they lived the fastest who took the greatest pains to enjoy least of life: for if our account of happiness be right, the greatest enjoyments in life are such as these

men pass over in their haste, and have scarce ever allowed themselves the liberty of tasting.

But as considerable a part of voluptuousness as is founded in the palate; and as notable as the science is, which depends on it; one may justly presume that the ostentation of elegance, and a certain emulation and study how to excel in this sumptuous art of living, goes very far in the raising such a high idea of it, as is observed among the men of pleasure. For were the circumstances of a table and company, equipages, services and the rest of the management withdrawn, there would be hardly left any pleasure worth acceptance, even in the opinion of the most debauched themselves.

The very notion of a debauch, which is a fallacy into whatever can be imagined of pleasure and voluptuousness, carries with it a plain reference to society or fellowship. It may be called a surfeit, or excess of eating and drinking, but hardly a debauch of that kind, when the excess is committed separately, out of all society or fellowship. And one who abuses himself in this way, is often called a sot, but never a debauchee. The courtesans, and even the commonest of women, who live by prostitution, know very well how necessary it is, that every one whom they entertain with their beauty, should believe there are satisfactions reciprocal, and that pleasures are no less given than received. And were this imagination to be wholly taken away, there would be hardly any of the grosser sort of mankind, who would not per-

ceive their remaining pleasure to be of slender estimation.

Who is there can well or long enjoy any thing, when alone, and abstracted perfectly, even in his very mind and thought, from every thing belonging to society? Who would not, on such terms as these, be presently cloyed by any sensual indulgence? Who would not soon grow uneasy with his pleasure, however exquisite, till he had found means to impart it, and make it truly pleasant to him, by communicating, and sharing it at least with some one single person? Let men imagine what they please, let them suppose themselves ever so selfish, or desire ever so much to follow the dictates of that narrow principle, by which they would bring nature under restraint, nature will break out; and in agonies, disquiets, and a distempered state, demonstrate evidently the ill consequence of such violence, the absurdity of such a device, and the punishment which belongs to such a monstrous and horrid endeavour.

Thus, therefore, not only the pleasures of the mind, but even those of the body, depend on natural affection; insomuch, that where this is wanting, they not only lose their force, but are in a manner converted into uneasiness and disgust. The sensations which should naturally afford contentment and delight, produce rather discontent and sourness, and breed a wearisomeness and restlessness in the disposition. This we may perceive by the perpetual inconstancy, and love of change,

so remarkable in those who have nothing communicative or friendly in their pleasures. Good fellowship, in its abused sense, seems indeed to have something more constant and determining. The company supports the humor. It is the same in love. A certain tenderness and generosity of affections supports the passion, which otherwise would instantly be changed. Perfectest beauty cannot of itself retain or fix it. And that love which has no other foundation, but relies on this exterior kind, is soon turned into aversion. Satiety, perpetual disgust, and feverishness of desire, attend those who passionately study pleasure. They best enjoy it, who study to regulate their passions. And by this they will come to know how absolute an incapacity there is in any thing sensual to please, or give contentment, where it depends not on something friendly or social, something conjoined, and in affinity with kind or natural affection.

But ere we conclude this article of social or natural affection, we may take a general view of it, and bring it, once for all, into the scale, to prove what kind of Balance³ it helps to make within; and what the consequence may be of its deficiency or light weight.

There is no one, of ever so little understanding in what belongs to a human constitution, who knows not, that without action, motion, and employment, the body languishes, and is oppressed; its nourishment turns to disease; the

³ *Supra*, p. 74. 75.

spirits, unemployed abroad, help to consume the parts within; and nature, as it were, preys upon herself. In the same manner, the sensible and living part, the soul or mind, wanting its proper and natural exercise, is burdened and diseased. Its thoughts and passions being unnaturally withheld from their due objects, turn against itself, and create the highest impatience and ill humor.

In brutes*, and other creatures, who have not the use of reason or reflection, at least not after the manner of mankind, it is so ordered in nature, that, by their daily search after food, and their application either towards the business of their livelihood, or the affairs of their species or kind, almost their whole time is taken up, and they fail not to find full employment for their passion, according to that degree of agitation to which they are fitted, and which their constitution requires. If any one of these creatures be taken out of his natural laborious state, and placed amidst such a plenty as can profusely administer to all his appetites and wants; it may be observed, that as his circumstances grow thus luxuriant, his temper and passions have the same growth. When he comes, at any time, to have the accommodations of life at a cheaper and easier rate than was at first intended him by nature, he is made to pay dear for them in another way; by losing his natural good disposition, and the orderliness of his kind or species.

* Supra, p. 74, 75.; Rhaps. part 2. § 4. parag. 42, &c. in this volume; Misc. 4. chap. 2. parag. 9, &c. in vol. 3.

This needs not to be demonstrated by particular instances. Whoever has the least knowledge of natural history, or has been an observer of the several breeds of creatures, and their ways of life and propagation, will easily understand this difference of orderliness between the wild and the tame of the same species. The latter acquire new habits, and deviate from their original nature. They lose even the common instinct and ordinary ingenuity of their kind; nor can they ever regain it, whilst they continue in this pampered state; but being turned to shift abroad, they resume the natural affection and sagacity of their species. They learn to unite in stricter fellowship, and grow more concerned for their offspring. They provide against the seasons, and make the most of every advantage given by nature for the support and maintenance of their particular species, against such as are foreign and hostile. And thus, as they grow busy and employed, they grow regular and good. Their petulancy and vice forsakes them with their idleness and ease.

It happens with mankind, that whilst some are by necessity confined to labor, others are provided with abundance of all things, by the pains and labor of inferiors. Now, if among the superior and easy sort, there be not something of fit and proper employment raised in the room of what is wanting in common labor and toil; if, instead of an application to any sort of work, such as has a good and honest end in society, as letters, sciences, arts, husbandry, public

affairs, æconomy, or the like, there be a thorough neglect of all duty or employment; a settled idleness, supineness, and inactivity; this of necessity must occasion a most relaxed and dissolute state: it must produce a total disorder of the passions, and break out in the strangest irregularities imaginable.

We see the enormous growth of luxury in capital cities, such as have been long the seat of empire. We see what improvements are made in vice of every kind, where numbers of men are maintained in lazy opulence and wanton plenty. It is otherwise with those who are taken up in honest and due employment, and have been well inured to it from their youth. This we may observe in the hardy remote provincials, the inhabitants of smaller towns, and the industrious sort of common people; where it is rare to meet with any instances of those irregularities which are known in courts and palaces, and in the rich foundations of easy and pampered priests.

Now, if what we have advanced concerning an inward constitution be real and just; if it be true, that Nature works by a just order and regulation, as well in the passions and affections, as in the limbs and organs which she forms; if it appears withal, that she has so constituted this inward part, that nothing is so essential to it as exercise; and no exercise so essential as that of social or natural affection: it follows, that where this is removed or weakened, the inward part

must necessarily suffer and be impaired. Let indolence, indifference, or insensibility, be studied as an art, or cultivated with the utmost care; the passions thus restrained will force their prison, and in one way or another procure their liberty, and find full employment. They will be sure to create to themselves unusual and unnatural exercise, where they are cut off from such as is natural and good. And thus in the room of orderly and natural affection, new and unnatural must be raised, and all inward order and œconomy destroyed.

One must have a very imperfect idea of the order of nature in the formation and structure of animals, to imagine that so great a principle, so fundamental a part as that of natural affection, should possibly be lost or impaired, without any inward ruin or subversion of the temper and frame of mind.

Whoever is the least versed in this moral kind of architecture, will find the inward fabric so adjusted, and the whole so nicely built, that the barely extending of a single passion a little too far, or the continuance of it too long, is able to bring irrecoverable ruin and misery. He will find this experienced in the ordinary case of phrenzy and distraction; when the mind, dwelling too long upon one subject, whether prosperous or calamitous, sinks under the weight of it, and proves what the necessity is of a due balance, and counterpoise in the affections. He will find, that in every different creature, and distinct sex, there is a

different and distinct order, set, or suit of passions, proportionable to the different order of life, the different functions and capacities assigned to each. As the operations and effects are different, so are the springs and causes in each system. The inward-work is fitted to the outward action and performance. So that where habits or affections are dislodged, misplaced, or changed; where those belonging to one species are intermixed with those belonging to another, there must of necessity be confusion and disturbance within.

All this we may observe easily, by comparing the more perfect with the imperfect natures, such as are imperfect from their birth, by having suffered violence within, in their earliest form, and inmost matrix. We know how it is with monsters, such as are compounded of different kinds, or different sexes. Nor are they less monsters, who are misshapen or distorted in an inward part. The ordinary animals appear unnatural and monstrous, when they lose their proper instincts, forsake their kind, neglect their offspring, and pervert those functions or capacities bestowed by nature. How wretched must it be, therefore, for Man, of all other creatures, to lose that sense and feeling which is proper to him as a Man, and suitable to his character and genius? How unfortunate must it be for a creature, whose dependence on society is greater than any others, to lose that natural affection by which he is prompted to the good and interest of his species and community? Such indeed is man's natural share of this affection,
that

that he, of all other creatures, is plainly the least able to bear solitude. Nor is any thing more apparent, than that there is naturally in every man such a degree of social affection, as inclines him to seek the familiarity and friendship of his fellows. It is here that he lets loose a passion, and gives reins to a desire which can hardly by any struggle or inward violence be with-held; or if it be, is sure to create a sadness, dejection, and melancholy in the mind. For whoever is unsociable, and voluntarily shuns society or commerce with the world, must of necessity be morose and ill-natured. He, on the other side, who is with-held by force or accident, finds in his temper the ill effects of this restraint. The inclination, when suppressed, breeds discontent; and on the contrary affords a healing and enlivening joy, when acting at its liberty, and with full scope; as we may see particularly, when, after a time of solitude and long absence, the heart is opened, the mind disburdened, and the secrets of the breast unfolded to a bosom-friend.

This we see yet more remarkably instanced in persons of the most elevated stations; even in princes, monarchs, and those who seem by their condition to be above ordinary human commerce, and who affect a sort of distant strangeness from the rest of mankind. But their carriage is not the same towards all men. The wiser and better sort, it is true, are often held at a distance, as unfit for their intimacy, or secret trust. But to compensate this, there are others substituted in

their room, who, though they have the least merit, and are perhaps the most vile and contemptible of men, are sufficient, however, to serve the purpose of an imaginary friendship, and can become favorites in form. These are the subjects of humanity in the great. For these we see them often in concern and pain: in these they easily confide: to these they can with pleasure communicate their power and greatness, be open, free, generous, confiding, bountiful, as rejoicing in the action itself; having no intention or aim beyond it; and their interest, in respect of policy, often standing a quite contrary way. But where neither the love of mankind, nor the passion for favorites, prevails, the tyrannical temper fails not to show itself in its proper colors, and to the life, with all the bitterness, cruelty, and mistrust, which belong to that solitary and gloomy state of uncommunicative and unfriendly greatness. Nor needs there any particular proof from history, or present time, to second this remark.

Thus it may appear, how much natural affection is predominant; how it is inwardly joined to us, and implanted in our natures; how interwoven with our other passions; and how essential to that regular motion and course of our affections, on which our happiness and self-enjoyment so immediately depend.

And thus we have demonstrated, that as, on one side, to have the natural and good affections, is to have the chief means and power of self-enjoy-

ment; so, on the other side, to want them, is certain misery, and ill.

S E C T. II.

Second proof; from the self-passions. Love of life. Resentment. Pleasure. Luxury. Amours. Interest. Emulation. Indolence. Self-passions in general.

WE are now to prove, That by having the self-passions too intense or strong, a creature becomes miserable.

In order to this, we must, according to method, enumerate those home-affections which relate to the private interest or separate œconomy of the creature; such as, love of life; — resentment of injury; — pleasure, or appetite towards nourishment and the means of generation; — interest, or desire of those conveniencies, by which we are well provided for, and maintained; — emulation, or love of praise and honor; — indolence, or love of ease and rest. — These are the affections which relate to the private system, and constitute whatever we call interestedness or self-love.

Now, these affections, if they are moderate, and within certain bounds, are neither injurious to social life, nor a hindrance to virtue: but being in an extreme degree, they become cowardice, — revengefulness, — luxury, — avarice, — vanity

and ambition, — sloth; — and, as such, are owned vicious and ill with respect to human society. How they are ill also with respect to the private person, and are to his own disadvantage, as well as that of the public, we may consider, as we severally examine them.

If there were any of these self-passions, which, for the good and happiness of the creature, might be opposed to natural affection, and allowed to overbalance it; The desire and love of life would have the best pretence. But it will be found perhaps, that there is no passion which, by having much allowed to it, is the occasion of more disorder and misery.

There is nothing more certain, or more universally agreed, than this, “That life may sometimes be even a misfortune and misery.” To enforce the continuance of it in creatures reduced to such extremity, is esteemed the greatest cruelty. And though religion forbids that any one should be his own reliver; yet if, by some fortunate accident, death offers of itself, it is embraced as highly welcome. And on this account the nearest friends and relations often rejoice at the release of one entirely beloved; even though he himself may have been so weak as earnestly to decline death, and endeavour the utmost prolongment of his own uneligible state.

Since life, therefore, may frequently prove a misfortune and misery; and since it naturally becomes so, by being only prolonged to the infirmities of old age; since there is nothing, withal, more

common than to see life over-valued, and purchased at such a cost as it can never justly be thought worth : it follows evidently , that the passion itself, viz. the love of life, and abhorrence or dread of death, if beyond a certain degree, and overbalancing in the temper of any creature, must lead him directly against his own interest; make him, upon occasion, become the greatest enemy to himself, and necessitate him to act as such.

But though it were allowed the interest and good of a creature, by all courses and means whatsoever, in any circumstances, or at any rate, to preserve life; yet would it be against his interest still to have this passion in a high degree. For it would by this means prove ineffectual, and no way conducing to its end. Various instances need not be given. For what is there better known, than that at all times an excessive fear betrays to danger, instead of saving from it? It is impossible for any one to act sensibly, and with presence of mind, even in his own preservation and defence, when he is strongly pressed by such a passion. On all extraordinary emergencies, it is courage and resolution saves; whilst cowardice robs us of the means of safety, and not only deprives us of our defensive faculties, but even runs us to the brink of ruin, and makes us meet that evil which of itself would never have invaded us.

But were the consequences of this passion less injurious than we have represented, it must be allowed still, that in itself it can be no other than

miserable; if it be misery to feel cowardice, and be haunted by those spectres and horrors which are proper to the character of one who has a thorough dread of death. For it is not only when dangers happen, and hazards are incurred, that this sort of fear oppresses and distracts. If it in the least prevails, it gives no quarter, so much as at the safest, stillest hour of retreat and quiet. Every object suggests thought enough to employ it. It operates when it is least observed by others; and enters at all times into the pleasanter parts of life, so as to corrupt and poison all enjoyment and content. One may safely aver, that, by reason of this passion alone, many a life, if inwardly and closely viewed, would be found to be thoroughly miserable, though attended with all other circumstances which in appearance render it happy. But when we add to this the meannesses, and base condescensions, occasioned by such a passionate concern for living; when we consider how, by means of it, we are driven to actions we can never view without dislike, and forced by degrees from our natural conduct into still greater crookednesses and perplexity; there is no one, surely, so disingenuous, as not to allow, that life, in this case, becomes a sorry purchase, and is passed with little freedom or satisfaction. For how can this be otherwise, whilst every thing which is generous and worthy, even the chief relish, happiness, and good of life, is for life's sake abandoned and renounced?

And thus it seems evident, "That to have this

“ affection of desire and love of life too intense,
 “ or beyond a moderate degree, is against the
 “ interest of a creature, and contrary to his happiness and good.”

There is another passion very different from that of fear, and which in a certain degree is equally preservative to us, and conducing to our safety. As that is serviceable, in prompting us to shun danger; so is this, in fortifying us against it, and enabling us to repel injury, and resist violence, when offered. It is true, that according to strict virtue, and a just regulation of the affections in a wise and virtuous man, such efforts towards action amount not to what is justly styled passion or commotion. A man of courage may be cautious without real fear; and a man of temper may resist or punish without anger. But in ordinary characters, there must necessarily be some mixture of the real passions themselves; which, however, in the main, are able to allay and temper one another. And thus Anger in a manner becomes necessary. It is by this passion that one creature offering violence to another, is deterred from the execution; whilst he observes how the attempt affects his fellow; and knows, by the very signs which accompany this rising motion, that if the injury be carried further, it will not pass easily, or with impunity. It is this passion withal, which, after violence and hostility executed, rouses a creature in opposition, and assists him in returning like hostility and harm on the invader. For thus, as rage and despair increase, a creature grows still

more terrible; and being urged to the greatest extremity, finds a degree of strength and boldness unexperienced till then, and which had never risen except through the height of provocation. As to this affection therefore, notwithstanding its immediate aim be indeed the ill or punishment of another, yet it is plainly of the sort of those which tend to the advantage and interest of the self-system, the animal himself; and is withal, in other respects, contributing to the good and interest of the species. But there is hardly need we should explain how mischievous and self-destructive Anger is, if it be what we commonly understand by that word; if it be such a passion as is rash and violent in the instant of provocation, or such as imprints itself deeply, and causes a settled revenge, and an eager vindictive pursuit. No wonder indeed, that so much is done in mere revenge, and under the weight of a deep resentment, when the relief and satisfaction found in that indulgence is no other than the assuaging of the most torturous pain, and the alleviating the most weighty and pressing sensation of misery. The pain of this sort being for a while removed or alleviated by the accomplishment of the desire, in the ill of another, leaves indeed behind it the perception of a delicious ease, and an overflowing of soft and pleasing sensation. Yet is this, in truth, no better than the rack itself. For whoever has experienced racking pains, can tell in what manner a sudden cessation or respite is used to affect him. From hence are those untoward delights of perverseness, frowardness, and an inve-

nomed, malignant disposition, acting at its liberty. For this is only a perpetual assuaging of Anger perpetually renewed. In other characters, the passion arises not so suddenly, or on slight causes; but being once moved, is not so easily quieted. The dormant fury, Revenge, being raised once, and wrought up to her highest pitch, rests not till she attains her end; and, that attained, is easy and reposes; making our succeeding relief and ease so much the more enjoyed, as our preceding anguish and incumbent pain was of long duration, and bitter sense. Certainly, if among lovers, and in the language of gallantry, the success of ardent love is called the assuaging of a pain, this other success may be far more justly termed so. However soft or flattering the former pain may be esteemed, this latter surely can be no pleasing one: nor can it be possibly esteemed other than sound and thorough wretchedness, a grating and disgustful feeling, without the least mixture of any thing soft, gentle, or agreeable.

It is not very necessary to mention the ill effects of this passion, in respect of our minds, or bodies, our private condition, or circumstances of life. By these particulars we may grow too tedious. These are of the moral sort of subjects, joined commonly with religion, and treated so rhetorically, and with such enforced repetition in public, as to be apt to raise the satiety of mankind. What has been said, may be enough perhaps to make this evident, "That to be subject to such a passion as we
" have been mentioning, is, in reality, to be

“very unhappy;” and, “That the habit itself is
“a disease of the worst sort, from which misery
“is inseparable.”

Now, as to luxury, and what the world calls Pleasure: Were it true, as has been proved the contrary, that the most considerable enjoyments were those merely of the sense; and were it true, withal, that those enjoyments of the sense lay in certain outward things capable of yielding always a due and certain portion of pleasure, according to their degree and quality; it would then follow, that the certain way to obtain happiness, would be to procure largely of these subjects, to which happiness and pleasure were thus infallibly annexed. But however fashionably we may apply the notion of good living, it will hardly be found that our inward faculties are able to keep pace with these outward supplies of a luxuriant fortune. And if the natural disposition and aptness from within be not concurring, it will be in vain that these subjects are thus multiplied from abroad, and acquired with ever so great facility.

It may be observed in those who by excess have gained a constant nauseating and distaste, that they have nevertheless as constant a craving or eagerness of stomach. But the appetite of this kind is false and unnatural; as is that of thirst arising from a fever, or contracted by habitual debauch. Now, the satisfactions of the natural appetite in a plain way, are infinitely beyond those indulgences of the most refined and elegant luxury. This is often perceived by the luxurious them-

felves. It has been experienced, in people bred after the sumptuous way, and used never to wait, but to prevent appetite, that when, by any new turn of life, they came to fall into a more natural course, or for a while, as on a journey, or a day of sport, came accidentally to experience the sweet of a plain diet, recommended by due abstinence and exercise, they have with freedom owned, that it was then they received the highest satisfaction and delight which a table could possibly afford.

On the other side, it has been as often remarked in persons accustomed to an active life, and healthful exercise, that having once thoroughly experienced this plainer and more natural diet, they have, upon a following change of life, regretted their loss, and undervalued the pleasures received from all the delicacies of luxury, in comparison with those remembered satisfactions of a preceding state. It is plain, that by urging nature, forcing the appetite, and inciting sense, the keenness of the natural sensations is lost. And though, through vice or ill habit, the same subjects of appetite may every day be sought with greater ardor, they are enjoyed with less satisfaction. Though the impatience of abstaining be greater, the pleasure of indulgence is really less. The palls or nauseatings which continually intervene, are of the worst and most hateful kind of sensation. Hardly is there any thing tasted which is wholly free from this ill relish of a surfeited sense and ruined appetite. So that, instead of a

constant and flowing delight afforded in such a state of life, the very state itself is in reality a sickness and infirmity, a corruption of pleasure, and destructive of every natural and agreeable sensation. So far is it from being true, "That in
" this licentious course we enjoy Life best, or are
" likely to make the most of it."

As to the consequences of such an indulgence, how fatal to the body, by diseases of many kinds, and to the mind, by sottishness and stupidity, this needs not any explanation.

The consequences as to interest are plain enough. Such a state of impotent and unrestrained desire, as it increases our wants, so it must subject us to a greater dependence on others. Our private circumstances, however plentiful or easy they may be, can less easily content us. Ways and means must be invented to procure what may administer to such an imperious luxury, as forces us to sacrifice honor to fortune, and runs us out into all irregularity and extravagance of conduct. The injuries we do ourselves by excess and forbearance, are then surely apparent, when, through an impotence of this sort, and an impossibility of restraint, we do what we ourselves declare to be destructive to us. But these are matters obvious of themselves. And from less than what has been said, it is easy to conclude, "That luxury,
" riot, and debauch, are contrary to real interest,
" and to the true enjoyment of life."

There is another luxury superior to the kind we have been mentioning, and which, in strict-

ness, can scarce be called a self-passion, since the sole end of it is the advantage and promotion of the species. But whereas all other social affections are joined only with a mental pleasure, and founded in mere kindness and love; this has more added to it, and is joined with a pleasure of sense. Such concern and care has nature shown for the support and maintenance of the several species, that, by a certain indigence and kind of necessity of their natures, they are made to regard the propagation of their kind. Now, whether it be the interest or good of the animal to feel this indigence beyond a natural and ordinary degree, is what we may consider.

Having already said so much concerning natural and unnatural appetite, there needs less to be said on this occasion. If it be allowed, that to all other pleasures there is a measure of appetite belonging, which cannot possibly be exceeded without prejudice to the creature, even in his very capacity of enjoying pleasure; it will hardly be thought that there is no certain limit or just boundary of this other appetite of the amorous kind. There are other sorts of ardent sensations accidentally experienced, which we find pleasant and acceptable, whilst they are held within a certain degree; but which, as they increase, grow oppressive and intolerable. Laughter provoked by titillation, grows an excessive pain; though it retains still the same features of delight and pleasure. And though in the case of that particular kind of itch which belongs to a distemper named from that

effect, there are some, who, far from disliking the sensation, find it highly acceptable and delightful; yet it will hardly be reputed such among the more refined sort, even of those who make pleasure their chief study and highest good.

Now, if there be in every sensation of mere pleasure, a certain pitch or degree of ardor, which, by being further advanced, comes the nearer to mere rage and fury; if there be indeed a necessity of stopping somewhere, and determining on some boundary for the passion; where can we fix our standard, or how regulate ourselves but with regard to nature, beyond which there is no measure or rule of things? Now, nature may be known from what we see of the natural state of creatures, and of man himself, when unprejudiced by vicious education.

Where happily any one is bred to a natural life, inured to honest industry and sobriety, and unaccustomed to any thing immoderate or intemperate; he is found to have his appetites and inclinations of this sort at command. Nor are they on this account less able to afford him the pleasure or enjoyment of each kind. On the contrary, as they are more sound, healthy, and uninjured by excess and abuse, they must afford him proportionate satisfaction. So that were both these sensations to be experimentally compared; that of a virtuous course, which belonged to one who lived a natural and regular life, and that of a vicious course, which belonged to one who was relaxed and dissolute; there is no ques-

tion but judgment would be given in favor of the former, without regard to consequences, and only with respect to the very pleasure of sense itself.

As to the consequences of this vice with respect to the health and vigor of the body, there is no need to mention any thing. The injury it does the mind, though less noticed, is yet greater. The hindrance of all improvement, the wretched waste of time, the effeminacy, sloth, supineness, the disorder and looseness of a thousand passions, through such a relaxation and enervating of the mind, are all of them effects sufficiently apparent, when reflected on.

What the disadvantages are of this intemperance in respect of interest, society, and the world; and what the advantages are of a contrary sobriety, and self-command, would be to little purpose to mention. It is well known there can be no slavery greater than what is consequent to the dominion and rule of such a passion. Of all other, it is the least manageable by favor or concession, and assumes the most from privilege and indulgence. What it costs us in the modesty and ingenuity of our natures, and in the faith and honesty of our characters, is as easily apprehended by any one who will reflect. And it will from hence appear, "That there is no passion which in its extravagance and excess more necessarily occasions disorder and unhappiness."

Now, as to that passion which is esteemed peculiarly interesting, as having for its aim the pos-

feſſion of wealth, and what we call a ſettlement or fortune in the world: If the regard towards this kind be moderate, and in a reaſonable degree; if it occasions no paſſionate purſuit, nor raiſes any ardent deſire or appetite, there is nothing in this caſe which is not compatible with virtue, and even ſuitable and beneficial to ſociety. The public as well as private ſyſtem is advanced by the induſtry which this affection excites. But if it grows at length into a real paſſion, the injury and miſchief it does the public, is not greater than that which it creates to the perſon himſelf. Such a one is in reality a ſelf oppreſſor, and lies heavier on himſelf than he can ever do on mankind.

How far a coveting or avaricious Temper is miſerable, needs not, ſurely, be explained. Who knows not how ſmall a portion of worldly matters is ſufficient for a man's ſingle uſe and convenience, and how much his occasions and wants might be contracted and reduced, if a juſt frugality were ſtudied, and temperance and a natural life came once to be purſued with half that application, induſtry, and art, which is beſtowed on ſumptuousneſs and luxury? Now, if temperance be in reality ſo advantageous, and the practice as well as the conſequences of it ſo pleaſing and happy, as has been before expreſſed; there is little need, on the other ſide, to mention any thing of the miſeries attending thoſe covetous and eager deſires after things which have no bounds or rule, as being out of nature, beyond which there can be no
limits

limits to desire. For where shall we once stop, when we are beyond this boundary? How shall we fix or ascertain a thing wholly unnatural and unreasonable? or what method, what regulation shall we set to mere imagination, or the exorbitancy of fancy, in adding expense to expense, or possession to possession?

Hence that known restlessness of covetous and eager minds, in whatever state or degree of fortune they are placed, there being no thorough or real satisfaction, but a kind of insatiableness belonging to this condition. For it is impossible there should be any real enjoyment, except in consequence of natural and just appetite. Nor do we readily call that an enjoyment of wealth or of honor, when, through covetousness or ambition, the desire is still forward, and can never rest satisfied with its gains. But against this vice of Covetousness there is enough said continually in the world, and in our common way of speaking, "A covetous and a miserable temper has, in reality, one and the same signification."

Nor is there less said, abroad, as to the ills of that other aspiring temper, which exceeds an honest emulation, or love of praise, and passes the bounds even of vanity and conceit. Such is that passion which breaks into an enormous Pride and Ambition. Now, if we consider once the ease, happiness, and security which attend a modest disposition and quiet mind, such as is of easy self-command, fitted to every station in society, and able to suit itself with any reasonable circum-

stances whatever; it will, on the first view, present us with the most agreeable and winning character. Nor will it be found necessary after this to call to mind the excellence and good of moderation, or the mischief and self-injury of immoderate desires, and conceited, fond imaginations of personal advantage, in such things as titles, honors, precedencies, fame, glory, or vulgar astonishment, admiration, and applause.

This too is obvious, that as the desires of this kind are raised, and become impetuous, and out of our command; so the aversions and fears of the contrary part grow proportionably strong and violent, and the temper accordingly suspicious, jealous, captious, subject to apprehensions from all events, and incapable of bearing the least repulse or ordinary disappointment. And hence it may be concluded, "That all rest and security as to
" what is future, and all peace, contentedness,
" and ease as to what is present, is forfeited by
" the aspiring passions of this emulous kind, and
" by having the appetites towards glory and outward appearance thus transporting and beyond
" command."

There is a certain temper placed often in opposition to those eager and aspiring aims of which we have been speaking. Not that it really excludes either the passion of covetousness or ambition; but because it hinders their effects, and keeps them from breaking into open action. It is this passion, which by soothing the mind, and softening it into an excessive Love of Rest and

Indolence, renders high attempts impracticable, and represents as insuperable the difficulties of a painful and laborious course towards wealth and honors. Now, though an inclination to ease, and a love of moderate recess and rest from action, be as natural and useful to us as the inclination we have towards sleep; yet an excessive love of rest, and a contracted aversion to action and employment, must be a disease in the mind equal to that of a lethargy in the body.

How necessary action and exercise are to the body, may be judged by the difference we find between those constitutions which are accustomed, and those which are wholly strangers to it; and by the different health and complexion which labor and due exercise create, in comparison with that habit of body we see consequent to an indulged state of indolence and rest. Nor is the lazy habit ruinous to the body only. The languishing disease corrupts all the enjoyments of a vigorous and healthy sense, and carries its infection into the mind, where it spreads a worse contagion. For however the body may for a while hold out, it is impossible that the mind, in which the distemper is seated, can escape without an immediate affliction and disorder. The habit begets a tediousness and anxiety, which influences the whole temper, and converts the unnatural rest into an unhappy sort of activity, ill-humor, and spleen; of which there has been enough said above, where we considered the want of a due balance in the affections.

It is certain, that, as in the body, when no

labor or natural exercise is used, the spirits which want their due employment, turn against the constitution, and find work for themselves in a destructive way; so in a soul, or mind, unexercised, and which languishes for want of proper action and employment, the thoughts and affections being obstructed in their due course, and deprived of their natural energy, raise disquiet, and foment a rancorous eagerness and tormenting irritation. The temper from hence becomes more impotent in passion, more incapable of real moderation, and, like prepared fuel, readily takes fire by the least spark.

As to interest, how far it is here concerned; how wretched that state is, in which by this habit a man is placed, towards all the circumstances and affairs of life, when at any time he is called to action; how subjected he must be to all inconveniencies, wanting to himself, and deprived of the assistance of others; whilst being unfit for all offices and duties of society, he yet of any other person most needs the help of it, as being least able to assist or support himself; all this is obvious. And thus it is evident, "That
"to have this over-biasing inclination towards
"rest, this slothful, soft, or effeminate temper,
"averse to labor and employment, is to have an
"unavoidable mischief, and attendant plague."

Thus have we considered the self-passions; and what the consequence is of their rising beyond a moderate degree. These affections, as self-interesting as they are, can often, we see, become

contrary to our real interests They betray us into most misfortunes, and into the greatest of unhappineſſes, that of a profligate and abject character. As they grow imperious and high, they are the occaſion that a creature in proportion becomes mean and low. They are original to that which we call ſelfiſhneſs, and give riſe to that ſordid diſpoſition of which we have already ſpoken. It appears there can be nothing ſo miſerable in itſelf, or ſo wretched in its conſequence, as to be thus impotent in temper, thus maſtered by paſſion, and, by means of it, brought under the moſt ſervile ſubjection to the world.

It is evident withal, that as this ſelfiſhneſs increaſes in us, ſo muſt a certain ſubtilty, and feignedneſs of carriage, which naturally accompanies it. And thus the candor and ingenuity of our natures, the eaſe and freedom of our minds, muſt be forfeited; all truſt and confidence in a manner loſt; and ſuſpicions, jealousies, and envies multiplied. A ſeparate end and intereſt muſt be every day more ſtrongly formed in us; generous views and motives laid aſide; and the more we are thus ſenſibly diſjoined every day from ſociety and our fellows, the worſe opinion we ſhall have of thoſe uniting paſſions which bind us in ſtrict alliance and amity with others. Upon theſe terms we muſt of courſe endeavour to ſilence, and ſuppreſs our natural and good affections; ſince they are ſuch as would carry us to the good of ſociety, againſt what we fondly conceive to be our private good and intereſt; as has been ſhown.

Now, if these selfish passions, besides what other ill they are the occasion of, are withal the certain means of losing us our natural affections; then, by what has been proved before, it is evident, “ That they must be the certain means of losing “ us the chief enjoyment of life, and raising in us “ those horrid and unnatural passions, and that “ savageness of temper, which makes the greatest “ of miseries, and the most wretched state of life;” as remains for us to explain.

S E C T. III.

Third proof; from the unnatural affections. Inhumanity. Petulancy. Malignity. Envy. Moroseness. Misanthropy. Inhospitallity. Barbarity. Superstition. Unnatural lusts. Tyranny. Treachery. Ingratitude. Unnatural pleasure in general. Unnatural state.

THE passions, therefore, which, in the last place, we are to examine, are those which lead neither to a public nor a private good; and are neither of any advantage to the species in general, or the creature in particular. These, in opposition to the social and natural, we call the unnatural affections.

Of this kind is that unnatural and inhuman delight in beholding torments, and in viewing

distress, calamity, blood, massacre, and destruction, with a peculiar joy and pleasure. This has been the reigning passion of many tyrants and barbarous nations; and belongs, in some degree, to such tempers as have thrown off that courteousness of behaviour which retains in us a just reverence of mankind, and prevents the growth of harshness and brutality. This passion enters not where civility or affable manners have the least place. Such is the nature of what we call good-breeding, that, in the midst of many other corruptions, it admits not of inhumanity, or savage pleasure. To see the sufferance of an enemy with cruel delight, may proceed from the height of anger, revenge, fear, and other extended self-passions: but to delight in the torture and pain of other creatures indifferently, natives or foreigners, of our own or of another species, kindred, or no kindred, known or unknown; to feed, as it were, on death, and be entertained with dying agonies; this has nothing in it accountable in the way of self-interest or private good above-mentioned, but is wholly and absolutely unnatural, as it is horrid and miserable.

There is another affection nearly related to this, which is a gay and frolicsome delight in what is injurious to others; a sort of wanton mischievousness, and pleasure in what is destruction; a passion which, instead of being restrained, is usually encouraged in children: so that it is indeed no wonder if the effects of it are very unfortunately felt in the world. For it will be hard,

perhaps, for any one to give a reason why that temper which was used to delight in disorder and ravage, when in a nursery, should not afterwards find delight in other disturbances, and be the occasion of equal mischief in families, amongst friends, and in the public itself. But of this passion there is not any foundation in nature; as has been explained.

Malice, malignity, or ill-will, such as is grounded on no self-consideration, and where there is no subject of anger or jealousy, nor any thing to provoke or cause such a desire of doing ill to another; this also is of that kind of passion.

Envy too, when it is such as arises from the prosperity or happiness of another creature no wise interfering with ours, is of the same kind of passion.

There is also among these a sort of hatred of mankind and society; a passion which has been known perfectly reigning in some men, and has had a peculiar name given to it. A large share of this belongs to those who have long indulged themselves in a habitual moroseness, or who, by force of ill-nature and ill-breeding, have contracted such a reverse of affability and civil manners, that to see or meet a stranger is offensive. The very aspect of mankind is a disturbance to them, and they are sure always to hate at first sight. The distemper of this kind is sometimes found to be in a manner national; but peculiar to the more savage nations, and a plain characteristic of uncivilized manners and barbarity. This

is the immediate opposite to that noble affection, which, in ancient language, was termed hospitality¹, viz. extensive love of mankind, and relief of strangers.

We may add likewise to the number of the unnatural passions, all those which are raised from superstition, as before mentioned, and from the customs of barbarous countries: all which are too horrid and odious in themselves, to need any proof of their being miserable.

There might be other passions named, such as unnatural lusts, in foreign kinds or species, with other perversions of the amorous desire within our own. But as to these depravities of appetite, we need add nothing here, after what has been already said on the subject of the more natural passion.

Such as these are the only affections or passions we can strictly call unnatural, ill, and of no tendency so much as to any separate or private good. Others indeed there are which have this tendency; but are so exorbitant and out of measure, so beyond the common bent of any ordinary self-passion, and so utterly contrary and abhorrent to all social and natural affection, that they are generally called, and may be justly esteemed unnatural and monstrous.

Among these may be reckoned such an enormous pride or ambition, such an arrogance and tyranny, as would willingly leave nothing emi-

¹ Misc. 3. chap. 1. parag. 23. in the notes, in vol. 3.

ment, nothing free, nothing prosperous in the world: such an anger as would sacrifice every thing to itself: such a revenge as is never to be extinguished, nor ever satisfied without the greatest cruelties: such an inveteracy and rancor as seeks, as it were, occasion to exert itself; and lays hold of the least subject, so as often to make the weight of its malevolence fall even upon such as are mere objects of pity and compassion.

Treachery and ingratitude are in strictness mere negative vices, and, in themselves, no real passions; having neither aversion or inclination belonging to them; but are derived from the defect, unsoundness, or corruption of the affections in general. But when these vices become remarkable in a character, and arise in a manner from inclination and choice; when they are so forward and active, as to appear of their own accord, without any pressing occasion; it is apparent they borrow something of the mere unnatural passions, and are derived from malice, envy, and inveteracy; as explained above.

It may be objected here, That these passions, unnatural as they are, carry still a sort of pleasure with them; and that however barbarous a pleasure it be, yet still it is a pleasure and satisfaction which is found in pride, or tyranny, revenge, malice, or cruelty exerted. Now, if it be possible in nature, that any one can feel a barbarous or malicious joy, otherwise than in consequence of mere anguish and torment, then may we perhaps allow this kind of satisfaction

to be called pleasure or delight. But the case is evidently contrary. To love, and to be kind; to have social or natural affection, complacency, and good-will, is to feel immediate satisfaction and genuine content. It is in itself original joy, depending on no preceding pain or uneasiness, and producing nothing beside satisfaction merely. On the other side, animosity, hatred, and bitterness, is original misery and torment, producing no other pleasure or satisfaction, than as the unnatural desire is for the instant satisfied by something which appeases it. How strong soever this pleasure, therefore, may appear, it only the more implies the misery of that state which produces it. For as the cruellest bodily pains do by intervals of assuagement produce, as has been shown, the highest bodily pleasure; so the fiercest and most raging torments of the mind do, by certain moments of relief, afford the greatest of mental enjoyments to those who know little of the truer kind.

The men of gentlest dispositions, and best of tempers, have at some time or other been sufficiently acquainted with those disturbances, which, at ill hours, even small occasions are apt to raise. From these slender experiences of harshness and ill-humor, they fully know and will confess the ill moments which are past, when the temper is ever so little galled or fretted. How must it fare, therefore, with those who hardly know any better hours in life, and who, for the greatest part of it, are agitated by a thorough active spleen,

a close and settled malignity and rancor? How lively must be the sense of every thwarting and controuling accident? How great must be the shocks of disappointment, the stings of affront, and the agonies of a working antipathy, against the multiplied objects of offence? Nor can it be wondered at, if to persons thus agitated and oppressed, it seems a high delight to appease and allay for the while those furious and rough motions, by an indulgence of their passion in mischief and revenge.

Now, as to the consequences of this unnatural state, in respect of interest, and the common circumstances of life; upon what terms a person who has in this manner lost all which we call nature, can be supposed to stand, in respect of the society of mankind; how he feels himself in it; what sense he has of his own disposition towards others, and of the mutual disposition of others towards himself; this is easily conceived.

What enjoyment or rest is there for one who is not conscious of the merited affection or love, but, on the contrary, of the ill-will and hatred of every human soul? What ground must this afford for horror and despair? What foundation of fear, and continual apprehension from mankind, and from superior powers? How thorough and deep must be that melancholy, which being once moved, has nothing soft or pleasing from the side of friendship, to allay or divert it? Wherever such a creature turns himself; whichever way he casts his eye, every thing around

must appear ghastly and horrid; every thing hostile, and, as it were, bent against a private and single being, who is thus divided from every thing, and at defiance and war with the rest of nature.

It is thus, at last, that a Mind becomes a wilderness; where all is laid waste, every thing fair and goodly removed, and nothing extant beside what is savage and deformed. Now, if banishment from one's country; removal to a foreign place, or any thing which looks like solitude or desertion, be so heavy to endure; what must it be to feel this inward banishment, this real estrangement from human commerce; and to be after this manner in a desert, and in the horridest of solitudes, even when in the midst of society? What must it be to live in this disagreement with every thing, this irreconcilableness and opposition to the order and government of the universe?

Hence it appears, that the greatest of miseries accompanies that state which is consequent to the loss of natural affection; and that to have those horrid, monstrous, and unnatural affections, is to be miserable in the highest degree.

C O N C L U S I O N.

THUS have we endeavoured to prove what was proposed in the beginning. And since, in the

common and known sense of vice and illness, no one can be vicious or ill, except either,

1. By the deficiency or weakness of natural affections;

Or, 2. By the violence of the selfish;

Or, 3. By such as are plainly unnatural:

It must follow, that if each of these are pernicious and destructive to the creature, insomuch that his completest state of misery is made from hence; To be wicked or vicious, is to be miserable and unhappy.

And since every vicious action must in proportion, more or less, help towards this mischief, and self-ill; it must follow, that every vicious action must be self-injurious and ill.

On the other side, the happiness and good of Virtue has been proved from the contrary effect of other affections, such as are according to nature, and the œconomy of the species or kind. We have cast up all those particulars, from whence, as by way of addition and subtraction, the main sum or general account of happiness is either augmented or diminished. And if there be no article exceptionable in this scheme of moral arithmetic, the subject treated may be said to have an evidence as great as that which is found in numbers or mathematics. For let us carry scepticism ever so far; let us doubt, if we can, of every thing about us; we cannot doubt of what passes within ourselves. Our passions and affections are known to us. They are certain, whatever the objects may be on which they are em-

ployed. Nor is it of any concern to our argument, how these exterior objects stand; whether they are realities or mere illusions; whether we wake or dream. For ill dreams will be equally disturbing; and a good dream, if life be nothing else, will be easily and happily passed. In this dream of life, therefore, our demonstrations have the same force; our balance and œconomy hold good, and our obligation to Virtue is in every respect the same.

Upon the whole: There is not, I presume, the least degree of certainty wanting, in what has been said concerning the preferableness of the mental pleasures to the sensual; and even of the sensual, accompanied with good affection, and under a temperate and right use, to those which are no wise restrained, nor supported by any thing social or affectionate.

Nor is there less evidence in what has been said of the united structure and fabric of the mind, and of those passions which constitute the temper or soul, and on which its happiness or misery so immediately depend. It has been shown, that in this constitution, the impairing of any one part must instantly tend to the disorder and ruin of other parts, and of the whole itself; through the necessary connexion and balance of the affections: that those very passions through which men are vicious, are of themselves a torment and disease; and that whatsoever is done which is knowingly ill, must be of ill consciousness; and in proportion as the act is ill, must im-

pair and corrupt social enjoyment, and destroy both the capacity of kind affection, and the consciousness of meriting any such. So that neither can we participate thus in joy or happiness with others, or receive satisfaction from the mutual kindness or imagined love of others: on which, however, the greatest of all our pleasures are founded.

If this be the case of moral delinquency, and if the state which is consequent to this defection from nature, be of all other the most horrid, oppressive, and miserable; it will appear, "That to yield or
" consent to any thing ill or immoral, is a breach
" of interest, and leads to the greatest ills:" and,
" That, on the other side, every thing which is an
" improvement of virtue, or an establishment of
" right affection and integrity, is an advancement
" of interest, and leads to the greatest and most
" solid happiness and enjoyment."

Thus the wisdom of what rules, and is first and chief in nature, has made it to be according to the private interest and good of every one, to work towards the general good; which if a creature ceases to promote, he is actually so far wanting to himself, and ceases to promote his own happiness and welfare. He is, on this account, directly his own enemy: nor can he any otherwise be good or useful to himself, than as he continues good to society, and to that whole of which he is himself a part. So that Virtue, which of all excellencies and beauties is the chief and most amiable; that which is the prop and ornament of human affairs;
which

which upholds communities, maintains union, friendship, and correspondence amongst men; that by which countries as well as private families, flourish and are happy; and for want of which every thing comely, conspicuous, great, and worthy, must perish, and go to ruin; that single quality, thus beneficial to all society, and to mankind in general, is found equally a happiness and good to each creature in particular; and is that by which alone man can be happy, and without which he must be miserable.

And thus Virtue is the good, and Vice the ill of every one.

