I o

LETTER II.

somewhere or other, in Dionysius Halicarn.

I thirik, that history is philofophy teaching byexamples. We need but to cast our eyes ou theworld, and we íïiall see the daily force of example :we need but to turn them inward, and we íhallfoon discover why example has this force. “ PauciK prudentia, ” fays Tacitus , “ honesta abc ‘ deterioribus, utilia ab noxiis difcernunt: plures‘‘ aliorum eventis docentur.” Such is the imper-fection of human understanding, such the frais tem-per of our minds, that abstract or général proposi-tions, though ever fo true,-appear obscure or doubt-fui to us very often, till they are explained byexamples: and that the wifest fessons in favor ofvirtue go but a little way to con vin ce the judg-mentj and déterminé the will, unlefs they areenforced by the famemeans; and we are obligedto apply to ourfelves what we fee happento othermen. Instructions by precept Iiave the furtherdifadvantage of coming on the authority of othersand frequently require a long déduction of reafon-ing. “ Homines amplius oculis , quam auribus,“ credunt : longum-iter est per pracepta , breveu et efficax per exempla. " The reafon of thisjudgment, which I quote from one of Seneca’sepistles in confirmation of my own opinion,rests , I think, on this ; that w h en examples arepointed out to us, íhere is a kind of appeal, withwhich we are flattered, made to our fenfes, aswell as our understandings. The instruction cornesthen upon our own authority : we frame theprecept aster our own expérience, and yield tofact when we resist spéculation. But this is not