Let. 7.

and State of Europe .

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beginning of it: and England vvas noxv privatelyfavorable to her interests, as Svvtden had been in

the beginning of it. The whole ten provinceswould hâve been subdued in the course of a fewcampaigns more: and it was better fur Spain andthe Dutch too, that part íliould be saved byaccepting a sort of composition, than the wholebe riíked by refusing it. This might be alledgedto excuse the conduit of the States General, inimposing hard terms on Spain ; in making nonefor their other allies, and in signing alone: bywhich steps they gave France an opportunity thatsue improved with gréât dexterity of management,the opportunity of treating with the confédéralesone by one, and of beating them by détail in thecabinet, if I may fa y so, as ílie had often donein the field. . I sliall not compare these reasons,which were but too well foundea in fact, andmust appear plausible at least, with other considér-ations that might be, and were at the time,insisted upon. I confine myself to a few observa-tions, which every knowing and impartial manmust admit. Your lordíhip will observe, first,that the fatal principle of compounding with Lewisthe fourteenth, from the time that his prétentions,his power, and the use he made of it began tothreaten Europe , prevailed still more at Nimeghenthan it had prevailed at Aix: fo that although hedid not obtain to the full ail he attempted, yet thedominions of France were bycommon consent, onevery treaty, more and more extended ; lier bar-riers on ail sides were more and more strensthened j

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