Leí. 8.

and State of E u st o p e.

aS5

liis impérial majeíty’s concurrence, in the springof one tliousand sevcn hundred andthirteen; as itntight hâve been made, much more advantageousiyfor them ail, in that of one thousand seven hundredand tvvelve. Léss obstinacy on the part of theStates, and perhaps more décisive résolutions onthe part of the Queen, would hâve wound upail thefe divided threads in one, and hâve finiíhedthis gréât work much fooner and better. I fay,perhaps more décisive résolutions on the part ofthe Queen ; becaufe, although I tliink that I siiouldhâve conveyed her orders for signing a treaty ofpeace vvith France , before the armies took thesield, much more vvillingly, thán I executed themafterwards in signing that of the cessation of arms ;yet 1 do not présumé to décidé, but sir ail désiréyour lordsliip to do fo, on a r.eview of ail cir-cumstances, fome of which I sliall just mention,The league made for protracting the war havingoppofed the Queen to the utmost of their povver,and by means of every fort, from the first appear-ances of a négociation ; the général effect of thisviolent opposition, on her and her ministers was,to make them proceed by ílovverand more cautionssteps: the particular esiect of it was, to obligethem to open the eyes of the nation and to inflamethe people with a désiré of peace, by íhowing, inthe most public and folemn manner, how tinequallywe vvere burdened, and how unfairìy we weretreated by our allies. The first gave an air ofdissidence and timidity to their conduct, whichencouraged the league, and gave yigor to the