WRITINGS O F D II. SMITH.

XIX

have availed themfelves of every light furniffiedby nature to human reafon ; and indeed thofe wri-ters who, in later times, have treated the fubjeClwith the greateft fuccefs, are they who have fol-lowed mod clofely the footfteps of the Greek andthe Roman philofophers. The theoretical queftion,too, concerning the effence of virtue, or the pro-per obje£l of moral approbation, was a favoritetopic of difcuffion in the ancient fchools. Thequeftion concerning the principle of moral appro-bation , though not entirely of modern origin , hasbeen chiefly agitated fince the writings of Dr.Cudworth, in oppofition to thofe of Mr. Hobbes ;and it is this queftion accordingly, (recommended,at once, by its novelty and difficulty to the cu-riofity of fpeculative men, ) that has producedmoft of the theories which characterize and dif-tinguiffi from each other the later fyftems of moralphilofophy.

It was the opinion of Dr. Cudworth, and alfoof Dr. Clarke , that moral diltinClions are per-ceived by that power of the mind which diftin-guiflies truth from falfliood. This fyftem it wasone great objeCt of Dr. Hutcheson’s philofophyto refute, and in oppofition to it, to ffiow that thewords Right and Wrong exprefs certain agreeableand difagreeable qualities in actions, which it isnot the province of reafon but of feeling to per-ceive; and to that power of perception which