XXXVI account of the life and

creature could grow up to manhood without anycommunication with his own fpecies, he could nomore think of his own character, or of the proprie-ty or demerit of his own fentiments and conduct,than of the beauty or deformity of his own faceThere is indeed a tribunal within the breaft, whichisthefupreme arbiter of all our actions, and whichoften mortifies us amidft the applaufe, and flip-ports us under the cenfure of the world; yet Hill,he contends, that if we inquire into the origin ofits inftitution, ive fliall find , that its jurifdiflion is,in a great meafure, derived from the authority ofthat very tribunal whole decifions it fo often andfo juftly reverfes.

When we firft come into the world, we, forfeme time, fondly purfue the impoffible projeelof gaining the good-will and approbation of everybody. We foon however find, that this univerfalapprobation is unattainable; that the moft equi-table conduct muft frequently thwart the intereftsor the inclinations of particular perfons, who willfeldom have candor enough to enter into the pro-priety of our motives, or to fee that this conducthow difagreeable foever to them, is perfectly fuit-able to our fituation. In order to defend ourfelvesfrom fuch partial judgments, we foon learn tofet up in our own minds, a judge between our-felves and thofe we live with. We conceive our-felves as aiding in the prefence ofa perfon, who has