WRITINGS OF DR. SMITH. XXXIX

I before hinted, that Mr. Smith does not rejectentirely from his fyftem that principle of utility ,of which the perception in any action or characterconftitutes, according to Mr. Hume, the fenti-ment of moral approbation. That no qualities ofthe mind are approved of as virtues, but fuch asare ufeful or agreeable, either to the perfon him-ielf or to others, he admits to* be a.proportionthat holds univerfally; and he alfo admits, thatthe fentiment of approbation with which we re-gaid virtue, is enlivened by the perception of thisutility, or, as he explains thefaft, it is enlivenedby our fympathy with the happinefs of thofe towhom the utility extends : But ftill he infills, thatit is' r.ot the view of this utility which is eitherthe firft or principal fource of moral approba-tion.

To fum up the whole of his doclrine in a fewwords. “ When we approve of any character“ or a 61 ion , the fentiments which we feet are de-“ rived from four different fources. Firft, we fym-<£ pathize with the motives of the agent; fecondly,“ we enter into the gratitude of thofe who receive“ the benefit of his a£tions; thirdly, we obferve“ that his con duel has been agreeable to the ge-“ neral rules by which thofe two fympathies ge-“ nerally a£f; and, laffly, when we conlider fuch“ aflions as making apart of a fyftem of behaviouru which tends to promote the happinefs either of