TO

LETTER II.

fomewliere or other, in Dionysius Halicarn.I think, that hiftory is philofophy teaching byexamples. We need but to caft our eyes on theworld, and we flrall fee the daily force of example :we need but to turn them inward, and we fhallfoon difcover why example has this force. “ Pauci“ prudentia, ” fays Tacitus, “ honefla ab“ deterioribus, utilia ab noxiis difcernunt: plurescc aliorum eventis docentur. ” Such is the imper-fetftion of human underftanding, fuch the frail tem-per of our minds, that abftracft or general propor-tions, though everfo true, appear obfcure or doubt-ful to us very often, till they are explained byexamples: and that the wifeft lelfons in favor ofvirtue go but a little way to convince the judge-ment, and determine the will, unlefs they areenforced by the fame means; and we are obligedto apply to ourfelves what we fee happen to othermen. Inftrudtions by precept have the furtherdifadvantage of coming on the authority of othersand frequently require a long deduction of reafon-ing. “Homines amplius oculis, quam auribus,“ credunt: longum iter eft per praecepta, breve“ et efficax per exempla. ” The reafon of thisjudgment, which I quote from one of Seneca’sepiftles in confirmation of my own opinion,reds, I think, on this; that when examples arepointed out to us, there is a kind of appeal, withwhich we are flattered , made to our fenfes, aswell as our underftandings. The inftruction comesthen upon our own authority : we frame theprecept after our own experience, and yield tofadl when we refill fpeculation. But this is not