INTROD UC TION

xv

The general recognition of fact and possibilitycharacterised his policy. Here we have to dealwith only that department of it which was con-cerned with naval and maritime affairs, to givesome account of which was the aim of the authorof the MS. now published. Peter discerned,before the other sovereigns and statesmen ofEurope, the secret of the Swedish Empire. It wasnot the youth and inexperience of Charles XII. thatconstituted the weakness of Sweden ; it was thatshe had expanded her empire beyond all intrinsiccapacity for maintaining it. It was not the years,but the character of Charles which rendered it inthe highest degree unlikely that he would adopt theonly policy which—even for a limited period—couldensure respect for the integrity of the Swedishdominions. In spite of the possession of some loftyqualities, he proved himself altogether incapable ofseeing that conditions in Central and EasternEurope had changed since the days of GustavusAdolphus, and even since those of Charles X.Gustavus. The consolidation and development ofBrandenburg-Prussia under the Hohenzollerns, andof ‘ Muscovy ' under the Romanofs, had failed toimpress him with their true importance. ToCharles XII. Peter was no more than, half acentury later to the young gallants who left Ver-sailles for Soubise’s headquarters, was ‘ Le petitMarquis de Brandenbourg,’ known in history asFrederick the Great. On the other hand, Peterhad not only discerned the weakness of Sweden,and rightly estimated the capacity of her king;with the insight of rare genius he also saw what

a