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THE RUSSIAN FLEET

XXIV. THE TSAR'S BALTIC INTERESTS.

About ten years since , 1 the Tsar would havewillingly condescended to deliver up all his con-quests, upon condition of reserving to himself St.Petersburg ; and rather than part with this he deter-mined to abide the last extremities. The landabout this city is generally morass and wilderness,producing little or nothing for the support of man ;and though the subsistence of such populous placesrequires the cultivation of the adjacent ground, yetthe Tsar will not give leave to clear or melioratethe soil, but on the contrary has issued a strictprohibition against the cutting up of the least treeor shrub within twenty, and in some parts withinthirty, miles thereof. For St. Petersburg, beingbuilt on several islands and standing on a vastextent of ground, will not possibly admit of fortifi-cation . 2 Besides, the buildings, being mostly of wood,are liable to be burned on any sudden incursion ;and, therefore, its main security lies in renderingthe avenues impassable, and this also suits admirablywell with the temper of the Russian soldiery, everreputed better at ambuscade, or defence of a placewhere they lie covered, than in the bravery of anopen assault. A year or two after this, he insistedupon Viborg also as a convenient barrier ; and stillhis ambition being progressive as his power, so hisdemands increased.

A little before the consummation of the late war,

1 I.e. in 1714.

2 c The building of St. Petersburg seems almost like a freak. . . .It was nothing but a costly and useless toy. The fortress onwhich so much money and so much life were spent then, as now,protected nothing. Its guns could never reach the enemy unlessthe town had been previously taken ' (Schuyler, ii. p. 12).