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An EJfay on the

XLVI. This imputation on the rationalnature of the soul, from the inconsistency

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But I answer, i. It is not a contradictory suppositionand therefore, is sufficient to account for the poffibih'lity of the point objected to. 2 . It is not my suppositionbut as old as any thing whereof we have records. Pi u “torch tells us it was rm 7rotvv na.’Kcuui \6yoc y that thet®were cpavAas Jcctp-cvia x, (socckxvx, ro>t

«y«9-o“f av^aVt, &c. I might bring many instances toshew that the word Souy.a>v, as it is used by the best wrhters of antiquity, constantly infers this supposition; andthat from hence came the words ivfoupm and Kuy.oiai'fAw, to express a fortunate or unhappy man. I mightgive Heswd’s authority;

To) juev aaxjAovU eitri Aios /tteyscAii eft* 1 3sfA«Y,'JEcS'AoJ, imysy ovioi, chvAoexsr Svijt uv dvB ^ceTTooY.

But, lastly, I would beg leave to observe that this is nota bare supposition. For as the existence of such Being 5it) general, cannot be called a supposition, when it lSproved by natural phœnomena ; so the diversity of thetfnatures cannot be called a supposition, when it is {hewnby the diversity os these Pheenomena. It is from the na-ture of the esseEi, that we come to know the nature ofthe cause in any cafe. Would it not be absurd to ascribehurtful effeiis to a beneficent and good cause ? and still

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