2Z6 Dean Berkeley V scheme exatni

the hint, not only to doubt of the reality ^matter and a material world, but to P rcte . pto demonstrate the existence of any such th 1 °impojfble and contradictory ( a ). The

certain

(a) Whatever way our dreams may be accounted ^ywhether by thin membranes rising from the surfa^ ^bodies, as Demcritus thought; or motions contin u£ jthe sensory after the objects cease to act, as Arist olS j tHobbes maintained; or by new impressions made up 0 * 1 ^in the time of sleep, as I have endeavoured tothe last Section: all these ways still suppose the re^ ^istertce of matter, in supposing both a sensory and ^acting upon it. Hence it seems inconsistent in Pln th .think the existence of matter might be called in q ue * rfrom this appearance of our dreams; since on any ™ ^thesis for solving it, the existence of matter mustlowed: or if it be not allowed , all indeed is but a df £ e(teven while we are awake, and the very distinctiondreaming and not dreaming is taken quite aw as' v

what reason can we have to argue that objects &xe iginary and unreal., while we are awake, because ^imaginary and unreal while we sleep; if weprevious difference? Waking itself is made butdeceitful dream, and we then determine the q u£ ;ewithout referring to dreams, and take away all dm ^between the two states, as to the reality of extern ^jects. And if we previously allow a difference,we infer from allowing a difference, that thet e ^difference ? We thus cut off the conclusion a c0J1 ^ 3 y,