240 Dean Berkeley’ j -scheme exatni^

jects of our ideas, as being drawn fromperties which can belong to no subject* aslwhich therefore must be impossible. Ththere must either be no truth in what I h asaid, or in what this Author advances; 1two such opposite accounts of nature eal^both be true: and if the conclusions in thtwo Sections be solid, this itself wiU ^weighty argument against his scheme. ^ever, I shall here endeavour to shew th econclusiveness of it from reasons particu^applied; and try at least to remove so we$ ^ty an objection, if I cannot add more Wto what hath already been said.

th®

II. In considering this new scheme, ^following particulars are to be rem as fThe nature or ejjence of things is al togdifferent from their existence ; the form es ^ing the ideas of the Divine Intellect, etesl1 ^consistent so as to be made to sub si#ther in the fame subject, by his power, ^ .

ever it should so seem good to his wih* _ rthe latter, viz, their existence, then c ^mences, when his power is exerted kneffect; or when this co~subststence of P^ 0 -ties is first actually effected, with relpe^^.