256 Dean Berkeley V scheme exatttitt^ 1
strate to us, that we have tiothing whereby adother could know that we exifi ; since he &¬ do this, but by supposing the truth 0what he pretends to demonstrate sals, ®is at a loss what notion to form of s uC \^procedure. He may be justified, I think?saying, " The strangeness of the atternp 1 " ^<c not to be parallel’d.” And how oaf
<e litatlons of Philosophers-, but a man can scarcely P {
" pose it to himself seriously. If he doth, the a°
“ will attend it." But, with submission, I ^can have no place even disputandi gratia, with° ut ^,contradiction in the method. For the supposing ^thing which we think to be but a dream (though ^certain that we ourselves, who thus dream exist ) ,S ^posing all other things unreal, or only phantasti ca ^ e ,sions: and then we must suppose ourselves lestsurrounded only with our own visions andand how a man can velitate with others in this >° wcondition is hard to imagine, unless he make a c ° n j,gssupposition, definitive of the first, viz. Th a( jBeings are not unreal. And if men cannot sind a yto scepticize from, without making contradict 01 ^ ^ t jj0sitions, they fliould be satisfied of the absurdly ^attempt. We cannot conceive how truth andCould have been more guarded than it is. Mest 11111 j, it.
vioufly suppose a contradiction, before they canAnd if this be considered, we may justly ' vkronthe reputation of Scepticism should be so great*