and shewn inconclusive. * 11

^° r do I think he can answer the other §>u,

v5

____ J/ueries con-

tning the beauty and order of the Universe. Can a

/Vi i i . i • r\ i

impossible and contradictory have any beauty, or^ r ’ or, in general, any property? I have shewn in N°th oven Infinite Power could not prompt us with

tJl a n

X Y

^ Ver ted. And if these objects be impossible to exist, itS ^ r ther evident, that the Infinite Mind itself could have

^eas of this beauty, order, or properties, any farther^ they relate to these very objects, which are con-

•dt

■ £ as of them ; for an impossible thing there can bec °nception. We must necessarily therefore, in ex-

notio

lr Ung the pheemmena of nature , suppose the existenceobjects of our ideas; since these phanotnena areth* 6 ° n ^ tbe ob j ects 0ur *^ eas ’ ■■ot of our ideask erri stlves. What I mean is, though we conceive the. ea fty, order and proportion in the Universe by ourwe do not conceive these to be beauty, order, or^portion exhibited in our ideas, but in the things we^Ppose the objedls of them. I have strewn in a place ortvv ° above, what ridiculous philosophy it would make,substitute our ideas instead of the objetts of them.^■ er efore, I think, D. B. could' have no reason to say,. ^ t ^ >e or ^ er an ^ ^ aws lv ^ c ^ n ^ e ^ le colmex Bns of ours s > and appearances in our minds , are in every refpcil

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Of

s a *ne to us as the real existence of the snateriallltuverfc.

l b I conceive, is a great mistake; and the generality, me n allow too hastily, that it is consistent enough^ * lb Philosophy to suppose nothing but ideas, instead of■ e objects of ideas; and that demonstrations may be^ 1Ven , and tire phernomena explained, as we!! upon the0tle siippofitiQn as the other. This is that which hathX 4 made