324 Matter not eternal and uncauf^’

This carries the point beyond the reachobjection; for to fay, There might have be eI1some incomplete JiibjeB , or substratum, e *- er .nal and self-existent which the power or tCause (by being exerted in it) constituted io^a solid, resisting substance, would be tonot only unintelligibly but absurdly. ^ ?could this incomplete, self-existent thingIt could not be matter, or solid,and refih 111 ^substance; but some unsubstantialof matter. And I demand a reason fromPatrons of eternal and uncaused matter, ^ san incomplete unsubstantial phantomAr should be eternal and uncaused; since tsubstance in its complete nature could °.be a dependent effect (b)1 Can a half-fi^j

(b) All this would be the counter-part to .

figment of substantialforms. The phantom of fubm 1 ^(which is the fame as unsubstantial substance)ftantial forms, seem to tally in making up s orne .^glike real substance between them, if we couldeither of them to subsist without the other; ^ utmust either be both substances, or both fisadotu^in the terms to which the controversy is here r e ^the Deity contributed the one part in finishingstance, [the solid and resisting nature of matter) ^seems the only substantial part: and the other