' not eternal and, uncaused. 339

V. We may next observe concerning mat-* er that//' it exijled necejsarily , it either exist-ed

< ( &ven; and till it can be known, bow come we to be«j/° bold in speaking of the manner of his existence?’*^ 0 a U this I answer, first, that I do think there is a. s °ng necessity for the existence of Being in general, nay,^ eCe ssity for infinite existence ; because otherwise an^ nite and eternal nothing would be necessary. It seemsfas l be greatest absurdity to make all existence larely^ ble > or contingent; for even that supposes some Being^ Ce fiary, 0 f which it must be a possible effect. And ifsilence be allowed necessary, it must be infinite^s ce 1 for where-ever necessary existence ends, a ne~iff nothing will take place , either finite nothing, or\s te ' But nothing can have no properties, otherwisej, r 'nd be something. Infinite and eternal are necessary>, .^ r,; ies of something , and therefore of infinite and eter-j} r ein g- And this I would beg leave to call a demon -i[^° n °f infinite and eternal existence, or Being, merelyhjf ^e speculation of our own ideas, abstracting fromp r ' which if we should give up, we cannot, 1 think,Cotl fd t0 Certa ^ n a ^ out an f ^hwg. Or let it beV ^d thus, that there is' an absolute, unconditional,t: y either of existence or non-existence j and this willhot- f ° He ’•he two universal and absolute. There can-%0)u e a necessity for both; there would be then twoCijfj- e necessities opposing each other, whereby the ne-°n both sides would be suspended or destroyed:

Z L nor