34-2

Matter not eternal and unca^s^

fact

exist necessarily either of these ways,the other was equally possible, or irnpl 1 ^contradiction: that is, it existed necen arl

and having found out the truth this tvay, theystanding theorem, to argue a priori from, for eV ^ rWhy should it be otherwise here? When by ^ ^Z/raw esfedls we find out that there must be 311 ^ ^

uncaused Being , why may we not make this .jstanding theorem , and deduce all the fame cons e< l

from it, as if we had seen it directly without invests, ^

If we discover a necessarily existing Being a his

have then a sufficient reason a posteriori , for ' }W ~' r : e fbexistence; and if we have a sufficient reason a P°f jutwhy demand another sufficient reason a priori fin truth, we have a sufficient reason s priori, fo r ^ {J> eCover a necessity of his existence, which isstronger. A sufficient reason is only applicable it*ture of things, I conceive, when we are enquiry < ^effiegts ; but to require a sufficient reason of iijT

istence (or of the manner of it, which must b e ^ eI yeffected, and therefore necessary) seems toabsurd; it is the fame as to require a sufficient 1

to effect these uncaused or necessary things. ^

Being

(to

would observe that the denying a necessaryimply a contradiction, and yet that contradi l ^ :l0n j £jl yisghe brought out by a train of reasoning- ' c0 fl'

pvery true proposition as well as axioms, imp^^^ss^radiction; and yet these want to be proved. ^jcl>propositions may be axioms to the quick-jig"* e ’

%q others will require a demonstration, 0