'blast er mt eternal and uncaused. 353

imply causation. The conception of^tter is not that it is a substance figuring,

Pr 0 anc!

P^rty of its existence. The second , that matter existsjj . e *«rily in all places, is a direct contradiction ; fortX' Ce 1Tlatter ( an y particle of it, or the -whole mass) can^ but in one determined place at once, in all other^ es it exists neither necessarily j nor unnecessarily.

^ CX '^ S * ts ex ‘^ ence ®dl ni> properties.

c tbe third supposition, viz. That matter exists ne-^ ^ f in whatever place it is supposed to be in, is re-^Snajit i n fj }e ver y f ermSi ft cannot be said to be inPhce, rather than another, but by Juppafition, and atobs ^ 3rrie ^' me it is said to be necessarily there. What Ijust before is very evident here ; the determi-once supposed, or matter is once supposed in aej{( .^ determined place; and it is hence inferred that no"re determination is necessary, or that matter existsar ‘ ly ^ere. If this be not so, let the Objeffor as-3n °ther reason, why it should exist in any particularst e f tert nined place, besides his own suppofition. Lett ber e p aCe * s laid to be in, be called A; it existspotf 1 j l j )re * n the place A at the time « ; now it was equallytinj e ^t it might have existed in the place B at thethi 5 pj 1 ° r there is no other necessity for its existing mitii^ j Ce ’ but an arbitrary supposition; and another manthe pj a laVe opposed with equal reason, that it existed in; C ? or O, at the time a. But to suppose it

j l h^ ln the place A at the time *, and thence to infers T e ^ S nec essarily there at that time, is as much asV 0 * s supposing it to exist there makes it necessarily' ' 11 A a ~ cxi/p