40 2 Mutter not eternal and uncaused*

which, as- not involving contradiction, I have libertysuppose, it will be able, as such, to have two objects underthe consideration of the understanding at once, and towill two distinct things to be performed at once: andits power , corresponding to its other perfections , .wist V®able to perform both at once. And, without mentioningother intermediate degrees, we may imagine the p r0 'gression to go on. Now, if we suppose the mind to b®'come at last infinite, or all limits to be taken away f r0IItit, it must (assuch) have an infinite number of object* urlder the intuition of the intellect at once, or an infimt cnumber of things all in view at a time; and this by th®same kind of reason as a very sinite mind can have h u ^one; and be able to w/// an infinite number of thingsto be done at once; and its power being also infiniteor without limitation, it will be able to perform th ®* 11all at the fame time, without perplexity or disorder (fi 1stances of which I hope have appeared, when the vant# 5 *indefinent , universal action of an immaterial Being up 0 * 1all the parts of matter, in all places, and at all tiifl cS ’was shewn to be necessary to support the material world''This, I fay, it will be able to do qua infinite. Infinite p® rsection directly implies this; and it would be absurddeny it, because we cannot conceive the mtmnero fThe firststep being duly weighed, let us next c0 °

sider this Infinite Mind as necessarily existing , and m

tba £Jet

respect it must have had an infinite number of objects uflthe view of the intellect, not only once, but always- r"cessity of existence doth not limit infinity of perfect* 011 ’but shews that infinity necessary and eternal. It would **be having an infinite and neceflary understanding, (*• e "necejj'anly infinite understanding') to be able to comprheed an infinity of things at once, andfor a littk ° n ^2