Matter not eternal a?td uncaused. 4.07

thought: and yet the certainty of the conclusion willmake one contemplate it with pleasure.

It was from these considerations that Boetius definesthe eternity of God to be vita interminabilis tota Jimul1$ perfecta possesfio (De confol. phil. lib. 5 . prof. 6 .) forin a necessarily infinite intellect all things must be alwaysand necessarily present; from necessary infinity of know-ledge all the purposes of wisdom and reason must bewilled by one indesment act : no new object can offer tothe understanding, no mutability can happen thereforeto the will , nor therefore can there be any rising or fall-ing of pleasure and happiness. And this is indeed inter*tninalilis vita tota Jimul & perfecta possejfio ; which co-incides with this, That the manner of necessary existenceis itself necessary, and necessarily the best. Shiod ( fays thisPhilosopher) ex collatione temporalium clarius liquet ; namquicquidvivit in tempore , id prasens d praterito in futu-rum prccedit; nihilque ejl in tempore confiitutum, quodtotum vita fua spatium pariter posfit amplecti. This isUndeniably a mark of imperfection to live by change , t»Jose what is past, to want what is yet to come , and to place■Jstfinite happiness in a succession of things, though allpleasant. If any state were good, why should it pass ? If'any thing will.be pleasant, why should it not be present ?-'Why should it be first in expectation, a minute in en-joyment* and then in reflexion only? This, I fay, is-plainly a mark of imperfection; it is our own state; andtherefore to he denied concerning a Mind infinitely per-fect, If the Roman Consul bad gone into the scepticalMays- of thinking now fashionable, he would not haveleft us such a noble , such a philosophical , such an exaltedidea of the Divine Mind. See here Dg. Clarkh’-t De-Vtenjirat. Part. I. Prop. 5.

D d 4 lastly,