INDE X.

sometimes but always, i. 261, 7, d, ibid. Its perceptivitynot excited by any thing external, which, by the bye,takes off the objection that spirits separate could not per-ceive without the help of the five senses, ibid’e. Cannotbe the object to itself, ibid, g.

The necessity of our being always active and percipient,more fully and clearly Ihewn, i, 267, 8, h, ibid. A moremechanical way of proving this assertion, i, 269, 9. Le?i, k, ibid. What is here said of the soul in a state of se-paration, is equally true concerning it in a state of re-union, i. 273, 10.

Soul, 6. But it is objected, that if our author’s account ofmatter be true, it must be a subject quite improper for thesoul to be re-united to : and it must be a punishment toit, once separated, to be re-united to any system of matter,however disposed, i. 278, 11. The first part of the ob-jection answered at large, by considering the several dis-advantages of the constitution of our bodies at present,and the possible advantages they may have in a state os're-union, ibid, to 16. notes ibid. As to the latter part ofthe objection, it is ihewn, that our being united to, orseparated from matter, is a thing indifferent, either as tothe degree or kind of our happiness, i. 304, 16.

—— 7. Against the indefinent action of the foul it isobjected, that though the incessant perceptivity of itshould be admitted, yet the incessant activity of it shouldseem rather a torture and fatigue to it, from the expe-rience we have in this life, i. 306, 17. The same consi-dered and answered, ibid, and, 311, 18, 19. The mutualaction os soul and body on each other illustrated by aparallel instance of a clock or watch, and that by whichthey move, i. 315, 20. The law of union of soul andbody is such, that only a final ineptitude of the latterto be actuated, can separate them, i. 317, 21. Why thesoul doth not act by itself when the body is not fit to beactuated by it, ibid.

-- 8. Does not owe its perfection of rational thinking to

matter, ibid. and i, 385, to, &seqq. notes ibid.

Arguments shewing that the soul always thinks, whereMr. Lock' s arguments against thinking being inseparablefrom the foul are confuted, i. 322, 22, if seqq, Particu-larly, i, 341, 25, 26. See a, ibid. Ah objection againstthe above reasoning, with regard to the souls of brutes,considered, i. Z47, 27. b, ibid.

3 Soul,