Buch 
An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations / by Adam Smith
Entstehung
Seite
577
JPEG-Download
 

THE WEAET11 OE NATIONS.

577

which it occasioned. Such sacrifices, though they mightfrequently be agreeable to the interest, are always mortifyingto the pride of every nation, and, what is perhaps of stillgreater consequence, they are always contrary to the privateinterest of the governing part of it, who would thereby be de-prived of the disposal of many places of trust and profit, ofmany opportunities of acquiring wealth and distinction,which the possession of the most turbulent, and, to the greatbody of the people, the most unprofitable province seldomfails to afford. The most visionary enthusiasts would scarcebe capable of proposing such a measure, with any serioushopes at least of its ever being adopted. If it was adopted,however, Great Britain would not only be immediately freedfrom the whole annual expense of the peace establishment ofthe colonies, but might settle with them such a treaty ofcommerce as would effectually secure to her a free trade,more advantageous to the great body of the people, thoughless so to the merchants, than the monopoly which she atpresent enjoys. By thus parting good friends, the naturalaffection of the colonies to the mother country, which per-haps our late dissensions have well nigh extinguished, wouldquickly revive. It might dispose them not only to respect,for whole centuries together, that treaty of commerce whichthey had concluded with us at parting, but to favour us inwar as well as in trade, and, instead of turbulent and factioussubjects, to become our most faithful, affectionate, and ge-nerous allies; and the same sort of parental affection on theone side, and filial respect on the other, might revive betweenGreat Britain and her colonies, which used to subsist be-tween those of ancient Greece and the mother city fromwhich they descended.

In order to render any province advantageous to theempire to which it belongs, it ought to afford, in time of peace,a revenue to the public sufficient not only for defraying thewhole expense of its own peace establishment, but for con-tributing its proportion to the support of the general govern-ment of the empire. Every province necessarily contributes,more or less, to increase the expense of that general govern-ment. It any particular province, therefore, does not contri-bute its share towards defraying this expense, an unequalburden must be thrown upon some other part of the empire.The extraordinary revenue too which every province affordsto the public in time of war, ought, from parity of reason, to

I