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THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF

of the duty of that power; and if nations always acted con-sistently, the particular duties levied for the purposes of suchparticular protection, should always have been left equally toits disposal. But in this respect, as well as in many others,nations have not always acted consistently; and in the greaterpart of the commercial states of Europe , particular companiesof merchants have had the address to persuade the legislatureto entrust to them the performance of this part of the duty ofthe sovereign, together with all the powers which are neces-sarily connected with it.

These companies, though they may, perhaps, have beenuseful for the first introduction of some branches of com-merce, by making, at their own expense, an experiment whichthe state might not think it prudent to make, have in the longrun proved, universally, either burdensome or useless, andhave either mismanaged or confined the trade.

When those companies do not trade upon a joint stock,but are obliged to admit any person, properly qualified, uponpaying a certain fine, and agreeing to submit to the regu-lations of the company, each member trading upon his ownstock, and at his own risk, they are called regulated compa-nies. When they trade upon a joint stock, each membersharing in the common profit or loss in proportion to his sharein this stock, they are called joint stock companies. Suchcompanies, whether regulated, or joint stock, sometimes have,and sometimes have not, exclusive privileges.

Regulated companies resemble, in every respect, the cor-porations of trades so common in the cities and towns of allthe different countries of Europe ; and are a sort of enlargedmonopolies of the same kind. As no inhabitant of a towncan exercise an incorporated trade, without first obtaininghis freedom in the corporation, so in most cases no subject ofthe state can lawfully carry on any branch of foreign trade,for which a regulated company is established, without firstbecoming a member of that company. The monopoly is moreor less strict according as the terms of admission are more orless difficult; and according as the directors of the companyhave more or less authority, or have it more or less in theirpower to manage in such a manner as to confine the greaterpart of the trade to themselves and their particular friends.In the most ancient regulated companies the privileges ofapprenticeship were the same as in other corporations; andentitled the person who had served his time to a member of