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History of natural philosophy : from the earliest periods to the present time / by Baden Powell
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PHYSICAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES. <)1

of gross matter ought to conform themselves. By thedisputants of the schools, the object and aim of naturalphilosophy was mistaken ; they looked to the main-tenance of certain metaphysical principles, of far tooabstruse a nature for any physical conclusions, howevergeneralised, ever to reach. They attempted to sup-port theories far too remote from all relation to theregions of sense and the order of nature, constituted asit actually is, for any deductions from those sources everto establish : their speculations, therefore, remain a me.nument, on the one hand, of chimerical but lofty con-ceptions, never realised ; and of unfinished attempts, onthe other, which, if carried on, might have formed partof a substantial edifice of a far more humble, but yetmore useful description.

The systems of the ancient schools were wholly con-jectural, though they were in some cases right ; hencescience did not advance with the lapse of time. Thestate of opinion was often not only stationary, but retro-grade. The earlier views were often the best: thereveries of Democritus and Anaxagoras were more just,and more like waking sense, than those of Aristotle andPtolemy ; but they were all dreams alike: there was,therefore, no sequence in them, and the later age could notprofit by the experience of the earlier. The venerationwhich is felt for antiquity cannot apply in reference tothese subjects; and even where we do perceive the at-tempt to found knowledge on experience, still, in thatrespect, the observation of Bacon holds good : — “ An-tiquitas sfficuli juventus mundior, “ We are moreancient than those w r ho went before us.” The later agehas had, at least, more opportunity of profiting by theaccumulated results of the experience and observationsof their predecessors. This applies, be it remembered,only to those branches of knowledge which rest uponobservation. Those, on the other hand, which, likepure mathematics, are properly matters of original in-vention and abstract speculation, have no such necessary