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soul’s being, as I had till then without the least hesitation con-ceived it to be, not a mere quality of the body, but a substancedifferent in kind from it. I thought one might in some measureaccount for the restitution of motion and life, to a body consideredas a machine, whose motions had been stopped without its fabricbeing destroyed; but I could not apprehend the possibility ofrecalling a soul which had left the body, with its last expiration,for the space of six weeks. I mention not this with a view ofsupporting the materiality of the soul, or the contrary, but merelyto show upon what trifling circumstances our opinions are fre-quently formed;—a consideration this, which should teach us allto speak with candour of those who happen to differ from us, andto abate in ourselves that dogmatising spirit, which often impelslearned men to impose on others their own inveterate prejudicesas incontrovertible truths.

I argued with myself at that time, when I was fond of suchspeculations, in the following manner: — A table is matter, anda tree is matter ; but the matter of the table is different from thatof the tree which furnished the wood from which the table wasmade. A tree is living matter, and a table is dead matter; lifethen, in whatever it may be supposed to consist, is that whichconstitutes an essential difference between a table and a tree.Again, a tree is matter, and an oyster is matter, and both of themare living matter; yet the matter of the tree is different from thatof the oyster: the matter of the tree being only (as is generallysupposed) living matter, whilst that of the oyster is not only liv-ing but percipient matter ; percepticity then, however it may beproduced, is that which constitutes an essential difference between