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be supposed to represent the community at large,) than any otherperson.

« My Lords, I conceive this reasoning is not true; it wouldhave been true had the law been absolutely silent as to what wasto become of the trust, when he to whom it had been given becameincapable of executing it: but the law is not silent on this point.In one case in which the King becomes incapable of executingthe trust committed to him, the law has clearly and positivelysaid, No, the trust shall not revert to the community at large;the community perfectly understand the mischief which wouldattend such a reversion; they will have nothing to do with it; itshall go according to an established order of succession, and itshall go entire to the heir. This is the express declaration of law,when the King becomes, by death, incapable of exercising thetrust committed to him; and the analogy of law speaks preciselythe same language in the present case ; it says, No, the trust shallnot revert to the community, it shall go pro tempore , and it shallgo entire, to the next in succession to the Crown; it shall goto the Prince of Wales, who is of an age to receive, and of acapacity to execute the trust for the public good.

“ I say not, My Lords, that the Prince of Wales has a legalright to the trust; but I do most firmly contend that he has sucha title to it, as cannot be set aside without violating the strongestand most irrefragable analogy of law: and in what such ana-logy differs from law itself, I submit to Your Lordships’ maturedeliberation.

“We have heard much on this occasion of the word right,but no one has condescended to define it. Now if, with Grotius ,we define Right, as applied to things, to be a moral power of pos-