quisitions are not allowed me, so I proceed with a sketch ofMurat’s achievements in the grand and last Russian campaign.
Napoleon was, at this time, sadly embarrassed by the warin Spain ; and the policy which prevented him from makingsome timely concessions to Alexander of Russia, who wasstimulated by England, and so defer the war, appears tome as somewhat questionable. Although the EmperorNapoleon did not, as I wish he had, aimed at the universaldominion over the Continent of Europe , still, it must beallowed, that he had become more or less misled by excessof power. True it is, that he had the most unequivocalproofs of the insincerity of the alliance of Alexander;and he felt it impossible to force the British oligarchicalministry to make peace with France , unless he could, fora sufficient period of time, exclude the English from anyparticipation in Continental trade; and so enlist, on theside of peace and mutual concessions, the interests andfeelings of the people of Great Britain . This people, asa mass, had, for many years past, been so worked up,deluded, and excited, by the studied misrepresentations oftheir rulers, as to shut their eyes to the most palpable truthsof the social science, and most devoutly to believe, that toinjure and impoverish their neighbours was a sure way toenrich themselves. It was taught that a state of war andviolence, would be, and really was, the best possible con-dition of this community. The fundamental truths of inter-national prosperity were contemned and inverted. Commerceno longer appeared in its real light, as a fair and free inter-change of produce, agricultural or manufactured, but as amonopoly to be upheld by force of arms. Malthusians, orrather the disciples of the Italian Abbe Ortez, preached thesocial advantages of checking and thinning population;of the demand for food encroaching on the power of pro-