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fcrent quarters of his camp, and directedsome of his troops to shout and makeloud noises, as if they were perfectlystationaiy. During this apparent stateof inactivity, he broke up his camp,marched along the river aside,and crossedit at a place where it was least expectedhe would make the attempt.

Among other good qualities, whichare indispensably necessary in an ablegeneral, that of knowing how to con-ceal a projected march, and to anticipatethe motions of an enemy, is not the leastimportant.

The army under the command of theDuke of Saxe Weimar , having laidsiege to Brissack in 1(338, the Impe­ rialists went to the relief of that place.The Duke, on receiving intelligence oftheir approach, instantly marched againstthem, with a body of forces composedof Swedes and French allies. The Im­ perialists , who had advanced by rapidmarches, had gained possession of aneminence, by means of which they wouldhave enjoyed all the advantages of localsuperiority, had not the Count de Gue-briant, who was then a lieutenant-generalin the Swedish service, suggested a stra-tagem to dislodge the enemy. The fol-lowing plan was consequently adopted,and it succeeded to the full extent of hisdesign.

The drums and trumpets of the dif-ferent corps were collected together, andstationed in a neighbouring wood, so asto draw the enemy’s force and attentionfrom the quarter proposed to be carried.The Imperialists being naturally led tobelieve, from the noise and concurrenceof so many military instruments, thatthey were going to he attacked from thatquarter, beat to arms, and left theirposition in complete order of battle.They had scarcely quitted the eminence,before the Duke of Saxe Weimar ap-peared in their rear, took possession ofthe ground which they had so impru-dently abandoned, and became masterof all the advantages which his enemywould otherwise have enjoyed.—An in-teresting account of this ingenious ma-noeuvre may be found in the History ofLe Marcchal de Guebriant.

Stratagems of this description havebeen frequently used by the French during the late war, particularly in Italy .Stratagems, in fact, constitute one ofthe principal branches in the art of war.They have been practised in all ages by

the most able generals, and have con-tributed, in a great degree, to theirmilitary reputation. Virgil, in his iEneid,Book II. says:—

Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirat.

The history of France abounds withinstances, in which stratagems of everykind have been successfully practised.It seems the peculiar talent of the in-habitants of that country to derive ad-vantages from well concerted feints, &c.in war, and to secure their victoriesmore by science than by downright har-dihood. Nevertheless, far be it from us todetract from the latter. Modern French-men, as soldiers, seem to have acquired,or to have had wakened in them, onshore, the courage and perseverancewhich are so remarkably conspicuousamongst us at sea. Perhaps it is out ofthe natural course of things, that theyshould ever reach the naval excellenceby which this country is so singularlydistinguished; and perhaps it is equallyordained, that we should never be thefirst in military knowledge. France andEngland unquestionably hold betweenthem the destinies of Europe , and ofthe three other quarters of the globe :France by the natural advantages of hercontinental position, added to a predi-lection for arms, which is manifestthroughout her population; and Englandby its insular situation, rendered, as itwere, impregnable, by an innate courage,and unrivalled aptitude at sea. Timealone, and the experience of facts, musthereafter determine how far either nationwill be benefited by a deviation from theprimary advantages which nature fur-nishes to each. For it must be acknow-,ledged, that the true element, in whicha Frenchman seems calculated to act, ison shore, or within the guardian rangeof his artillery and fire-arms; and thatan Englishman, though far from beingwholly out of his element on land ser-vice, is thoroughly himself at sea. Fromthe increase of our foreign possessions,but most especially from the extent ofour territories in India , and the armedstate of Europe , it has been found ex-pedient to enlarge the scale of our mili-tary establishments, in proportion to theexigencies of a very desultory serviceabroad, and a possible necessity at homefor military operations. Without, there-fore, entering into the policy of eithercountry, we shall content ourselves withobserving, that as we have an army, it