PRELIMINARY ORSERVATIONS.

5

It may be proper to state, that when the plan of attack had been approvedand ordered, the operation was divided into three distinct parts, but at thesame time a mutual support was to be given by each to the other; theEnglish were in the centre, and necessarily obliged to regulate their move-ments by the progress made in the attacks on their flanks. So long asthe enemy maintained himself upon the Mamelon, so long were the English obliged to remain nearly passive. The cause of the delay in pushing onrapidly at this important period must be attributed to some “ secrets defamille,” probably known only to the two Commanders-in-Chief, but whichhad a great influence upon the operations. Nothing of an enterprisingcharacter took place until the beginning of April, when the English attackedthe rifle-pits in advance of the left of their Right attack, subsequently called“ Egerton’s Rifle-pits ” in compliment to the gallant officer who lost his lifeon the occasion of their capture. This was done in a very spirited manner,and brought them considerably in advance towards the Quarries , which theenemy were daily strengthening, until the 7tli June, when the Mamelon andQuarries were so successfully attacked. Egerton’s Rifle-pits were the mostsalient works from which the English could advance independent of theFrench ; wedged in as they were between their two attacks, and exposed to across-fire from the enemy’s works, any further advance was necessarilysubordinate to the progress made on their right flank.

The enemy were constantly gaining ground quietly, and pushing theiroutposts well to their front. These at first were only a line of rifle-pits orscreens, but by degrees they were connected by a trench, which in the endformed a complete parallel or counter-approach -well in advance of theirmain line of works, making the Allies pay dear for every inch of ground theygained. It will be observed that there w r as a great want of activity displayedby the garrison after a certain period. With the exception of the attackupon the left of the French trenches near the Quarantine Harbour, nosortie in force was made; which is surprising, considering the great strengthof the garrison, arid the power of reinforcing it which the Governor alwayshad at his command.

The knowledge that the enemy at all times was sufficiently strong toassault either of the attacks with a large body of men was always a cause forgreat anxiety in regard to the safety of the trenches. It became necessaryto take the greatest precautions, and to be prepared with strong reserves torepel any attempt that might be made upon them. To do so was verydifficult, there not being any cover for them in the immediate rear of thetrenches ; and the distance to the nearest camp was too great to afford a hopethat any body of men could arrive in time to afford that immediate supportwhich would be required by the guard of the trenches.