24
JOURNAL OF THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL.
a great effect upon his own confidence in a power of resistance, if it may not actinjuriously on the morale of the allies.
I should therefore hold it to be expedient to drive him from that post by whatever maybe conceived the best means, before attempting any assault or lodgment on his lines orthe Redan ; that is, I still think that we should adhere to the project of the French note of 2d February 1855, which would entail the necessity of dislodging him from thatadvanced position.
I do not percei /e any insuperable difficulty in carrying on approaches much furthertowards that point, even now.
If to be approached by degrees, two other measures would tend towards its isolation,and very much weaken the position of the force for its protection, and lessen its confi-dence ; one to drive away the shipping and steamers from all the upper part of theharbour above, and off the mouth of the Careening Bay; and the other by advancingalong the left side of the Careening Bay valley to the Mamelon.
The first will require some guns (probably even two may be sufficient) on the brow tothe right of the present most advanced French parallel, to act in conjunction with thosein the battery that is already established and armed opposite the lower Inkerman light-house. With regard to the approaches towards the Mamelon, it is probable that a sitemight be found somewhere on their right for a battery that, with little exposure to theenemy’s batteries, would greatly command the -whole of the valley down to CareeningBay. On the accomplishment of those measures I apprehend that the reduction of thenew lodgment of the enemy would not be difficult, and the advances towards the Redanmight be carried on at the same time, that is, as soon as the enemy’s riflemen shall becompelled to retire by the advance towards the Mamelon.
There will still be a difficulty to be provided for. The advances to close on theRedan will require an addition of at least 1,000 men in the trenches of the Right attack,for guard and working parties. The strength of the British army will not admit of then-taking this increased duty; but it is hoped that it may be obtained from the French as a joint corps, the British taking the front and the works, as it is their operation, and theFrench acting as a support in case of serious sorties.
Memorandum by Lieut.-General Sir John Burgoyne .
Memo. Camp before Sebastopol, 1st March 1855.
As an explanation on some details for works referred to in my Memo, of this dateon the further attacks of Sebastopol, and to meet objections that have been made by theFrench officers to certain proceedings, I would suggest that with regard to any difficultythat may be apprehended in the establishment or service of the proposed battery againstthe shipping in the upper harbour, which I have recommended to be somewhere on theright of the present most advanced French parallel on Inkerman ridge, it may be over-come by separating the guns to some little distance asunder, as an additional securityao-ainst the fire from the shipping themselves, and some additional embrasures opened togive an appearance of a heavier battery, against the enemy’s guns near the light-house,and on the north side generally. Each gun might be covered by a strong epaulment on