JOURNAL OF THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL.
43 /
able, by a new effort, to complete the success by possessing ourselves of another point which may be necessaryto preserve the former.
Lastly, in this system of attack, which has been settled since the commencement of the siege, all thebatteries will be used in the manner proposed when constructing them.
There is a last consideration, to which it is necessary to call the immediate attention of the generals in chief,and which may influence their opinions :—
If before the arrival of winter the place is not taken, it will be of course necessary to raise the siege. Toguard the trenches during the winter cannot be thought of; they are too near the enemy, and con-sequently too much exposed to both his fire and sorties. The soldier will not be sustained with the hope ofa speedy solution, as he was last winter ; and in the opinion of the undersigned the defence of a line ofcontravallation ought to be considered as having been already a sufficiently severe trial for him.
It is necessary, then, under all considerations, to hasten the conclusion of the siege, which, whateverit may bring out, will at all events leave time for many things before the coming of winter.
Before Sebastopol, 1st August 1855.
(Signed) Harry D. Jones,
Major-General,
Comdg. Royal Engineers.
The General of Division, Aide-de-Camp of the Emperor , commanding theEngineers of the French army,
(Signed) Niel.
Mem orandum.
Head-Quarters before Sebastopol, 3d August 1855.
The result of the attack of the enemy last night upon the post stationed in the Woronzoff Road Ravinecalls for serious attention.
The destruction of the iron chevaux-de-frise could not have taken place had a sufficient body of men beenstationed close to it, and in the trenches of the Right and Left attacks commanding that point, and whichwere constructed expressly with a view to the defence of the ravine, and to prevent an enemy pushing up,and thereby placing himself in a position to turn the flank of either attack.
The general officers on duty in the Right and Left attack should be instructed to pay particular attention tothe posting of sufficient men for the security of their flanks, which, resting upon the ravines, are open toattacks more easily than by any direct movement an enemy may endeavour to make in their front.
The reserve in the Right attack should be stationed in the 3d parallel, and in the Left attack in the 2dparallel.
The enemy ought not to be able to move a man up the Woronzoff Road, if advanced sentries, under vigilantand attentive officers, are properly posted. In all cases the trenches have been laid out with a view to defence,and ought to be manned according to their position, and importance of the object their fire is directed against.If attention is paid to these particulars, the trenches may be considered perfectly secure.
Everything depends upon the arrangements made by the general officers on duty, of the disposition of theguard of the trenches, and the vigilance of the officers in command of the advanced sentries.
(Signed) Harry D. Jones,
Major-General, Commg. R.E.