TWENTY-THIRD CONGRESS, Sess. L Ch. 136. 1834.

709

of New Jersey , for the purpose of agreeing upon and settling the juris-diction and territorial limits of the two states, have executed certainarticles, which are contained in the words following, viz :

Agreement made and entered into by and between Benjamin F. Butler , Articles ofPeter Augustus Jay and Henry Seymour, commissioners duly appointed agreement,on the part and behalf of the state of New York , in pursuance of an actof the legislature of the said state, entitled “ An act concerning the ter-ritorial limits and jurisdiction of the state of New York and the state ofNew Jersey, passed January 18th, 1833, of the one part; and TheodoreFrelinghuysen , James Parker, and Lucius Q,. C. Elmer, commission-ers duly appointed on the part and behalf of the state of New Jersey , inpursuance of an act of the legislature of the said state, entitled “ Anact for the settlement of the territorial limits and jurisdiction between thestates of New Jersey and New York, ” passed February 6th, 1833, ofthe other part.

Article First; The boundary line between the two states of NewYork and New Jersey, from a point in the middle of Hudson river ,opposite the point on the west shore thereof, in the forty-first degree ofnorth latitude, as heretofore ascertained and marked, to the main sea,shall be the middle of the said river, of the Bay of New' York , of thewaters between Staten Island and New Jersey , and of Raritan Bay, tothe main sea; except as hereinafter otherwise particularly mentioned.

Article Second. The state of New York shall retain its present juris-diction of and over Bedlow’s and Ellis’s islands; and shall also retainexclusive jurisdiction of and over the other islands lying in the watersabove mentioned and now under the jurisdiction of that state.

Article Third. The state of New York shall have and enjoy exclu-sive jurisdiction of and over all the waters of the bay of New York ; andof and overall the waters of Hudson river lying west of Manhattan Island

pact, claimed the right to the soil, as well as the jurisdiction over the territory, andhaving granted laudsin the same. The compact of 1820 was confirmed by Congress . The defendants in the ejectmentclaimed the lands under titles emanating from the state of North Carolina , in 17S6, 1794, 1795; beforethe formation of the state of Tennessee; and grants from the state of Tennessee , in 1809, 1811, 1812,1814, in which the lands claimed by the defendants were situated, according to 'the boundary of thestate of Tennessee,declared and established at a time when the state of Tennessee became one ofthe statesof the United States. The circuit court instructed the jury that the state of Tennessee , by sanctioning thecompact, admitted, in the most solemn form, that the lands in dispute were not within her jurisdiction,nor within the jurisdiction of North Carolina , at the time they were granted ; and that, consequently,the titles are subject to the compact: Held, by the Supreme Court , that the instructions of the circuitcourt were entirely correct. Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Peters, 185.

The seventh article of the compact between Virginia and Kentucky declares C( all private rights andinterests of lands within the said district (Kentucky,) derived from the laws of Virginia , prior to suchseparation, shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the proposed state, and shall be determined

by the laws now existing in this state (Virginia).’ * * * * 5 Whatever course of legislation, by Kentucky , would

be sanctioned by the principles and practice of Virginia , should be regarded as an unaffected compli-ance with the compact. Such are all reasonable quieting statutes. Hawkins v. Barney’s Lessee,

5 Peters, 457. %

Prom as early a date as the year 1705, Virginia has never been without an act of limitation ; and noclass of laws is more universally sanctioned by the practice of nations, and the consent of mankind, thanthose laws which give peace and confidence to the actual possessor and tiller of the soil. Such lawshave frequently passed in review before the Supreme Court ; and occasions have occurred in which theyhave been particularly noticed, as laws not to be impeached on the ground of violating private rights.It is impossible to take any reasonable exception to the course of legislation pursued by Kentucky onthis subject. She has in fact literally complied with the compact in its most rigid construction. Forshe adopted the very statute ofVirginia in the first instance, and literally gave her citizens the full benefitof twenty years to prosecute their suits, before she enacted the law now under consideration. As tothe exceptions and provisoes, and savings in such statutes, they must necessarily be left, in all cases,to the wisdom or discretion of the legislative power. Ibid.

It is not to be questioned, that laws limiting the time of bringing suits constitute a part of the lex foriof every country ; the laws for administering justice, one of the most sacred and important of sovereignrights and duties, and a restriction upon which must materially affect both legislative and judicial inde-pendence. It can scarcely be supposed that Kentucky would have consented to accept a limited andcrippled sovereignty ; nor is it doing justice to Virginia to believe that she would have wished to reduceKentucky to a state of vassalage. Yet it would be difficult, if the literal and rigid construction neces-sary to exclude her from passing the limitation act were adopted, to assign her a position higher thanthat of a dependent on Virginia . Ibid.

The limitation act of the state of Kentucky , commonly known by the epithet of “the seven yearslaw,” does not violate the compact between the state of Virginia and the state of Kentucky . Ibid.