TWENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS. Sess. II. Ch. 189. 1842.

519

Chap. CLXXXIX. —An Act making an appropriation to supply a deficiency inthe navy pension fund, (a)

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the UnitedStates of America in Congress assembled, That the sum of eighty-four

Statute II.Aug. 23,1842.[Obsolete.]

Where the plaintiff has stated an account on a principle unfavorable to himself, as to the charge ofinterest, he ought to be bound by it. Ibid.

There is no difference as to the application of the general rule relative to calculating interest on debtslegally carrying interest, and on those debts where interest is given in the name of damages. Ibid.

The rate of interest fixed by the law of Georgia, the contract having been made there, will be allowedin the courts on such contracts, although it may exceed the interest allowed by the law of the State inwhich the court sits. Jaffray v. Dennis, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 253.

The defendant settled his account at the treasury department in 1808, on which a balance was statedagainst him. In 1812 he claimed further credits, which were allowed to him, and which reduced thebalance claimed in 1808. The court instructed the jury to allow interest on the actual balance from 1808.United States v. Ormsby, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 195.

Where there have been running accounts between parties, and one party has been in the habit of trans-mitting his accounts regularly to the other, striking a balance, and charging or giving credit for interest,as the balance might be, and no objections have been made to it, and where this mode of stating ac-counts is shown to be the custom of trade, such manner of charging interest is legal. Barclay v. Ken-nedy et al. 3 Wash. C. C. R. 350.

A usage to add interest to the annual account at the end of the year, and interest on the balance, doesnot apply in a case in which the commercial intercourse between the countries in which the partiesrespectively reside, had ceased when the account was transmitted; nor will it authorize the creditor tomake other rests in the account. Denniston et al. v. Imbrie, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 396.

Where an alien enemy has an agent in the United States , and this is known to the debtor, interestought not to abate during a war. Ibid.

A promise was made by the defendant, the drawer of a protested bill of exchange, that if the plaintiffwould give time, he would pay the bill when he should be able. In an action on the new promise, theplaintiff is entitled only to the sum stated in the bill, and to interest from the time when defendant wasable; and not to any damages. If the jury give more, the court will set aside the verdict, unless theplaintiff enter a remittitur for the overplus. Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 148.

If there has not been a previous demand of the penalty of a bond, or an acknowledgment that thewhole is due, interest is recoverable only from the commencement of the suit, on a bond with suretiesgiven to the Bank of the United States for the faithful discharge of the duties of cashier of the branchbank at Middletown, Connecticut . United States Bank v. Magill et al., Paine’s C. C. R. 661.

Interest is not allowed on unliquidated damages. Gilpins v. Consequa, Peters’ C. C. R. 86.

It is generally in the discretion of the jury to give interest in the name of damages. Willings et al. v.Consequa, Peters’ C. C. R. 172.

Damages for breach of contract do not bear interest. Youqua v. Nixon, Peters’ C. C. R. 224.

When an attachment is laid on money in the hands of a third person, interest ceases from the time ofthe attachment until it is dissolved; but where a debtor who is also a creditor lays an attachment in hisown hands, interest is chargeable during the continuance of the attachment. Ibid. 303.

It is the usage at Canton to add interest to the other charges on the amount of the articles sold, and forwhich compensation is demanded. This will be allowed in the United States , on a Canton contract.Ibid.

Interest on debts due by the citizens of the United States to the subjects of the king of Great Britain ,ceased during the revolutionary war, and during the war of 1812; but the mere circumstance of warexisting between two countries is not a sufficient reason for abating interest on the debts due by the sub-jects ot one belligerent to the subjects of another. Conn et al. v. renn et al. Peters’ C. C. R.497.

A prohibition of all intercourse with an enemy during a war, furnishes a just reason for the abatementof interest on debts due to the subjects of the belligerent, until the return of peace. Ibid.

The rule as to the abatement of interest during the war. does not apply where the creditor, although asubject of the enemy, remains in the country of the aeb or, or has a known agent residing there, andwho is authorized to receive the debt. Ibid.

An account current, received and not objected to in a reasonable time, becomes a settled account bear-ing interest from the time it is stated, and the balance is payable on demand. Bainbridge &, Co. v.Wil-cocks, Baldwin’s C. C. R. 538.

An account made up of principal and interest becomes one principal debt; the aggregate balance,where the account is thus settled, bearing interest. Ibid. 540.

Compound interest is not illegal, and may be recovered on an express promise, or one implied by law,as a part of the contract. Ibid. 541.

If an account contains a charge of interest during a war, it is recoverable if there is a promise to paythe amount after peace, or the account is in fact or law a settled account, from which a promise resultsby operation of law. Ibid. 542.

Whether the jury, in a case in which a man covenants to convey lands without fraud, and it afterwardsappeared that, in truth, he had no title to the land, when he covenanted to convey, should allow intereston the value of the lands at the date of the contract, must depend on the circumstances of the case, ofwhich they are the proper judges ; and it is competent to the defendant to give in evidence any circum-stances tending to show interest should not be allowed. Letcher & Arnold v. Woodson, 1 Brockenb.C.C.R. 212.

The interest allowed on the personal estate, for the sums advanced by it to discharge the specialtydebts, should, in accordance both with the general course of the court, and with justice in particularcases, be limited to twenty years. Byrd v. Executors of Byrd, 2 Brockenb. C. C. R. 171.

Where a mortgagee is in possession, and the annual rents and profits of the mortgaged estate, exceetl

(a) Act relating to the navy pension fund, July 10, 1832, chap. 194.