The Vicksburg Problem 201

tain seasons, was intersected by a labyrinth ofbayous and stagnant lakes in such wise that therewere only five paths along which an army couldadvance toward the bluffs, and these paths were socompletely commanded by the Confederate gunsas to be impassable. The outlook was not promis-ing, but it was the only point north of Vicksburg where a landing could be made at all, and accord-ingly it must be tried. Sherman’s theory of thecampaign was based on the expectation of surpris-ing the enemy and securing a foothold upon thebluffs, where he might maintain himself untilGrant could join him. There were no topogra-phical maps upon which he could rely, and he didnot know how completely the Confederates hadcrowned the bluffs with batteries. The enemy,moreover, having watchful scouts all up and downthe banks of the river, had observed him everymoment since his departure from Memphis ; andthe bluffs were guarded by 12,000 men, who inthat position were more than a match for 100,000assailants on the swampy ground below. Theground, indeed, was so bad that Sherman’s 32,000men were twice as many as he could use to goodeffect. Under these circumstances he ordered anassault, and was right in doing so, inasmuch asthe facts here stated were not fully known to him,and could not be ascertained save by trial. On