233
with Grand Gulf, he could not bring men enoughinto battle to ensure him the victory. But nothingcould be more certain than that Pemberton wouldfall upon his line of communications the momenthe should move eastward against Johnston.Grant therefore came to the startling decision tocut loose from his base altogether, to feed histroops on what they could carry in their haver-sacks and what they could pick up on the way,and moving with all possible speed, unencumberedby heavy wagons, to vanquish the enemy and gaina new base of supplies on the Mississippi northof Vicksburg before famine should have time toovertake him. This was defying Fortune out-right. No general ever conceived a more daringscheme. There was no precedent for it in thehistory of modern warfare. Napoleon and otherEuropean generals who had “ lived upon thecountry ” had done so through a regularly organ-ized system of requisitions. No one had everundertaken an elaborate campaign in an enemy’scountry with no more provisions than could becarried in haversacks or got by foraging. Doubt-less all would go well if everything should turnout as Grant had planned, but cam- (j rant i a su ^_paigns are seldom carried out pre- lime auda-cisely as they are conceived, and in ° lty ‘the event of defeat the total destruction of the