Nashville

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was frequent skirmishing, but little waste of life,except at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27. Onthat occasion, mindful of his primary object, Sher-man tried the effect of an assault, but desistedwhen he saw that he was losing faster than theenemy. The Union army lost 3000 men , the Con­ federates scarcely 500.

In this sort of campaign, despite Sherman’s rareskill and resourcefulness, the element of time wasworking against him and in favour of Johnston.The victorious advance southward was daily length-ening Sherman’s line of communications and short-ening Johnston’s; and as the former was weakenedby the necessity of detaching men to guard thelong line, so the latter was more and more relievedfrom such a necessity. Apparently, then, thetime was approaching when the Confederate gen-eral might no longer think it worth while to de-cline battle. The experience of Fair Oaks, inMay, 1862, showed that Johnston could strikequickly and heavily when the occasion offered it-self. But as the armies drew near to Atlanta , thepatience of Jefferson Davis was ex- T . ,

J ohnston

liausted. His feelings toward Joseph supersededJohnston were unfriendly and unfair, byHood -and appearances now seemed to justify the blamewhich he was ready to visit upon him. On the17th of July he removed Johnston from command,