332 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War

before. These retrograde movements caused someanxiety at the North, for it looked as if Sherman’sgrip on Georgia might be loosening. But he neverlet go Atlanta , nor did he relinquish his schemefor marching to the coast and dealing a blow atVirginia. After much discussion he had prevailedupon Grant to sanction such a movement, pro-vided that Hood’s army could first be disposed of.There was always a reasonable hope of entrappingthe fiery Hood into a combat. Indeed, on October16 he came very near offering himself as a preyto Sherman, but all his officers agreed that it wasnot safe to risk a battle. Against this unanimousopposition Hood did not feel like contending, andthus the existence of his army was prolonged fortwo months more.

Still, Hood could accomplish nothing by en-trenching himself and waiting upon events. Actionwas as necessary for him as for his adversary. Sohe conceived the plan of striking northward intoTennessee , in the hope of drawing Sherman afterhim. In this case the Union general would have tolet go Atlanta , and virtually surrenderup his mind all the advantages he had gained byto invade lug summer’s work. But if Shermanshould not follow him, then Hood feltable to demolish any force that might oppose himin Tennessee . He believed that he could capture