Nashville

335

We have now to see how Thomas fared duringthe critical weeks after Sherman’s departure, andthe question at once arises, Was he left with suffi-cient strength for the task assigned him ? It wasa task of supreme importance. If Hood shoulddefeat Thomas, or elude him and capture Nash­ ville , the whole country would con- Ought notdemn Sherman’s movement as fool- Sherman

i i t • • * -«• to have

hardy, involving an immense immedi- i e f tmoreate risk for an ultimate gain that was men withproblematical until the immediate risk Thomas ?should be eliminated. Sherman’s success was reallywrapped up in that of Thomas. Considering thisfact, would it not have been more prudent in Sher-man to have taken only three corps, say 50,000 men,along with him, and thus have spared an additional13,000 for Thomas ? In the light of the ensuingevents, it certainly seems that it would have beenwiser. 1

The force which Sherman left behind for Thomasconsisted of the Fourth corps, underStanley, 12,000 men, the Twenty-third faeces!"pre-corps of 10,000 men, commanded by sent andSchofield, and about 5000 cavalry, now prospectlve-to be commanded by General James Harrison Wil­ son , whom Grant sent from Virginia with the mes-

1 See Ropes’s masterly paper on General Sherman, in Papersof the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts , x. 144.