2

THE MARCH TO THE SEA.

showing a bold front there, moved still further west to Tus-cumbia, nearly at the Mississippi line, it was clear as day tothe National Commander that the only way to preserve themoral superiority and the initiative, was to put in operationhis previous plan. He thought it probable that Hoodwould be forced to follow him, especially since the latterhad been made, by a recent order of the Confederate Gov-ernment, subordinate to General Beauregard, who had beeninvested with the military command of all the territory be-tween Middle Georgia and the Mississippi River . He wasnot mistaken in his forecast of Beauregard’s judgment inthis respect, as will soon be seen; but Beauregard did notfeel authorized to take actual control of Hood’s movementsunder the somewhat peculiar orders given by PresidentDavis. To try whether an indication of his counter-move-ment would call Hood back from the west, Sherman marchedagain into Georgia in the first days of November, and con-centrated his army at Rome and Kingston. There, uponthe second of the month, he got from Grant the final assentto his plan, and put all the capacity of the railroad, now re-paired, to the utmost strain to remove surplus stores andmaterial of war from Atlanta and other posts in Georgia toNashville .

No military operation of the war has been so commonlymisunderstood as the campaign on which Sherman was nowentering. The brilliancy of its design and the immense re-sults which followed, have captivated the popular imagina-tion and deeply impressed students of military history every-where; but there has been a singular tendency to treat theconception of a march from Atlanta to the gulf or to theocean as if that were an invention or a discovery. Peoplehave disputed the priority of idea, as if it were a patentright; and, besides the military claimants of the honor of