PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN.

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soon as possible. They conceived the idea that a strongdiversion in his favor west of the Tennessee would be ofmost use to him, and Forrest accordingly started northwardon the 18th and was at Jackson , Tenn. , on the day Hood leftthe Guntersville road to move westward. But Hood’s state-ment that this news from Forrest was the reason for hischange of plan is more specious than sound. Forrest re-mained at Jackson till the 28th, when Beauregard and Hoodwere in conference near Decatur, and the orders which ap-parently stopped him there could have brought him backto Tuscumbia, or to any other place where the Tennessee could be more easily crossed and a junction with Hood morespeedily made. It is more probable that Hood’s realmotive was to get rid of Sherman, who would have beenclose upon his heels at Guntersville . He hoped that whenhe should cross the river at Decatur or at Tuscumbia, Sher-man would hasten to concentrate in front of Nashville tomeet him, and that his brilliant strategy would thus undoall that had been done since the battle of Stone’s Kiver.After his disappointment and defeat, it was natural that heshould seek plausible reasons for what had proven so disas-trous a movement. There certainly was no excuse for mak-ing so radical a change in plans without consulting hissuperior, and his doing so shows that he was determined totreat his subordination to Beauregard as only a nominalthing, while he sought to regain his own prestige by abrilliant stroke.'

Beauregard, amazed at the sudden change of movement,hastened after Hood and overtook him at Decatur, where hehad expected to cross the river, but where the vigorous de-fense of the post satisfied both the Confederate officers that

1 Beauregard’s Report; also, Taylor’s Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 207,208, and Jordan and Prior’s Campaigns of Forrest, pp. 580, 590.