PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN.

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man begin some definite movement undoubtedly workedupon Hood, and after the expected preparation for his ad-vance was made lie still delayed till Beauregard spurred himanew to his work by urgent despatches of a kind to which hewas not used. It is not unreasonable to suppose that hewas bitterly disappointed in finding that Sherman did nothasten back to Tennessee , and was oppressed with the fore-boding that if this part of his plan failed and Shermanturned eastward, he would be in no small measure respon-sible for the impending ruin of the Confederate cause.

Returning to the preparations Sherman was making togive Thomas forces enough to cope with Hood in Tennes­ see , we find that on October 30th Wood’s division of Stan-ley’s (Fourth) corps was moving by rail from Chattanooga ,and by November 3d the whole corps was concentrated atPulaski, eighty miles south of Nashville and forty-four northof Decatur , upon the railway connecting those places. De­ catur and Athens were held by General Granger, who com-manded the District of Northern Alabama, which also includ-ed Huntsville and Stevenson; but the bridges and trestleson the railway between Pulaski and Athens at the crossing ofElk River had been destroyed by Forrest in the latter part ofSeptember and had not been rebuilt, and Pulaski was there-fore the terminus of the direct railway line south from Nash­ ville . When it was definitely known that the Confederate armywas at Tuscumbia and Florence, Thomas had ordered Stanleyto get together his corps at Pulaski, but he did not put Gran-ger under his command, and the latter continued through thewhole campaign to receive his orders direct from Nashville .

On November 3d, Schofield started Cooper’s division ofthe Twenty-third Corps upon the railway trains for Nash­ ville , leaving Cox’s division for several days at Dalton tilltransportation could be got for it. Schofield himself went