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withdrawn after tlie battle of Franklin, though without re-tracting the charge. But a commander who is personallywith the head of column in such a movement and upon thefield, has the means of enforcing his orders by direct com-mands to the divisions. Had his own confidence not wav-ered, and had he not begun to yield to the belief that muchmore than one division was before him, his own energywould have carried his subordinates with him, and wouldhave made the assault as desperate, if need be, as it wasnext day. But he seems to have lacked the grasp of mindwhich enables a general to judge and to act with vigor inthe presence of circumstances which throw doubt upon hisplan, and he proved inferior to his opponent in a strategiccontest, which has been generally regarded as one of themost critical and instructive conjunctures of the war. Thecircumstances, as narrated by the leading Confederate of-ficers who were present, show that Hood had air access ofhesitation at the very moment when the success of his move-ment demanded that all doubts should be thrown to thewinds and everything risked upon a desperate stroke . 1
1 A paper road in December, 1881, before a society of Southern officers at Louis ville , Ky. , by General Cheatham, contains a very full array of the evidence whichsustains the above view.