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and for an appearance of bravado which could hardly bejustified on military grounds. Doubtless, too, Hood be-lieved that while his veterans might be forced to retreat,they could not be routed; and he underestimated the dis-couragement that began to pervade them when they weretaught, by the terrible lesson of Franklin, how hopeless wasthat dream of conquest with which their leaders had triedto inspire them when they crossed the Tennessee . Hoodalso says he learned that Schofield retreated in alarm ; butnever was a greater mistake. Schofield’s officers on theline had reported their perfect confidence in their ability tohold it, and the withdrawal from the Harpeth had beenbased solely on the probability of the position being turnedbefore reinforcements could be sure to arrive.
In truth, Hood’s situation was a very difficult one, and togo forward or to go hack was almost equally unpromising.He followed his natural bent, therefore, which alwaysfavored the appearance, at least, of aggression, and hemarched after Schofield to Nashville . On approaching thetown, he put Lee’s corps in the centre, across the Franklinturnpike, for it had suffered least in the campaign, and wasnow his strongest corps. Cheatham took the right, andStewart the left of the line, while Forrest, with the cavalry,occupied the country between Stewart and the river belowNashville . Attempts were made to repair the railway fromCorinth to Decatur, and thence by Pulaski to Hood’s rear.Hood tells us that he gained possession of two locomotivesand several cars (perhaps at Spring Hill), and that thesewere used to help transport supplies.
Thomas put his troops in position upon the heights sur-rounding Nashville , General Smith’s divisions on the right,the Fourth Corps (General Wood temporarily commanding)in the centre, and Schofield’s Twenty-third Corps on the